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OVERVIEW
The new Mayor of Boston must earn the confidence of
the taxpaying public in his financial leadership by employ-
ing credibility and candor in the management of city affairs.
To begin the process of re-enfranchising Bostonians
who have come to mistrust financial decisions seemingly
determined by political calculations, the new Mayor must
make an accurate disclosure of the City's financial picture,
rely on the commitment of the state to properly support its
capital city and restore integrity and strong management
controls to government operations. Recommendations for bud-
get cuts, hiring freezes and adjustments in tax rates, when
they are necessary, should only be made when accurate infor-
mation and open debate so dictate.
The Financial Analysis Research Group for the
mayoral transition was assembled to provide an assessment of
the City's financial posture as of January, 1984; to evalu-
ate the financial management aspects of agency operations;
to determine the effectiveness of existing budgetary plan-
ning systems; and to provide the new Mayor with a pragmatic
financial management plan to support his policies and philo-
sophy.
A New Philosophy of Financial Management: Unveiling Reserve
Accounts
The greatest danger which Boston faces, like the
boy who cried wolf once too often, is that the City's tax-
payers, the state government, and the business and banking
communities all share a skepticism about the handling of the
City's finances and therefore may not rush to answer when
called
.
To establish credibility, the new Administration
must begin with a comprehensive disclosure of the location
of all "mystery money," the City's many reserve accounts,
bringing to an end the practice of swelling those reserves
while depleting accounts vital for the delivery of basic
City services.
Municipal government finance is not a static, pre-
cise field. -l 4- simply cannot always avoid the imprecision
which is revenue estimating, the "guesstimates" which are
property tax abatement reserves, the annual tea leaf reading
which is local aid a^oort ionment forecasting or the uncer-
tainty represented by federal funds subject to audit and
recall. To confront these elements of guesswork, an effi-
cient and sensible government creates pockets of available
cash which may be applied to pressing needs if they arise.
When these reserves are not used, however, it appears as
though a sudden financial windfall has enriched government
spenders who just earlier complained of being strapped for
cash. While many of Boston's constituencies have been
grateful for the restoration of some of the budget cutbacks
of the past few years, they have grown tired of the crisis
management atmosphere that has enshrouded the policy process
and retarded the City's ability to plan properly or even to
maintain its capital facilities.
The new Mayor cannot continue a financial policy of
"hide and go seek" regarding the City's budget reserves.
Those who would benefit from the political br inksmanship of
questioning every financial decision of the new Administra-
tion, in view of the apparent availability of cash in "re-
serve," must be invited to join in the financial planning
process. While necessary cash reserves must be maintained,
these reserves should also be subject to the general appro-
priations process, not distributed at year's end as a form
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of mayoral largesse. Unspent reserve accounts must be used
to support that segment of Boston's population most depen-
dent on the City as a source of last resort for provision of
basic human needs. Neighborhoods too must benefit from any
unspent reserves. The state government must have confidence
that a new local aid package for Boston will not be request-
ed while reserves for abatements and other unpredictable
expenditures will produce year end financial windfalls.
The cornerstone of the new Administration's finan-
cial management plan should be the unveiling and spending
down of all non-essential reserve accounts as a first step
toward securing the additional revenues required to provide
those services which Boston's government is obliged to guar-
antee its citizens.
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CITY OF BOSTON
STATEMENT OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
FISCAL YEARS 1984 AND 1985
(in 000' s)
Projections
FY 1984 FY 1985
Revenues
Departmental Revenues - City <fc "7 a / $ / O . Z
Hospital 108. 1 118.9
county •7/ . u "7 n
Schools 0. 9 0.9
TOTAL Departmental Revenues 192. 7 205.0
1 a A I\c VcIlUcB it i. upci \-y "3 "3 "3 "5
Chapter 121A 18. 18.0
Motor venicxe excise U o ny . u
Racing 0. 6 0.6
TOTAL Tax Revenues 360. 9 378.1
Other Revenues - State Aid 294. 7 319.7
Federal Revenue Sharing 18. 8 18.5
Sale of Garages 18. 5 —
Transfers 53. 6 20.6
TOTAL Other Revenues 385. 6 358.8
TOTAL REVENUES $939. 2 $941.9
Expenditures
Operating Expenditures $670. 8 $704.1
State Charges 47. 8 48.9
Debt Service 73. 4 76.3
Pensions 102. 5 112.7
Tax Titles 2. 2 2.2
Overlay Deficit 5. 6
Current Overlay 20. 8 17.5
Prior Year Deficit 15. 9 20.6
Prior Year Revenue Shortfall 20. 8
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $959.8 $982.3
PROJECTED DEFICIT $( 20. 6) ( 40.4
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Revenues and Expenditures; A Recap of Projections for
Fiscal Year 1984 and Fiscal Year 19bb
As the accompanying statements of revenues and ex-
penditures for fiscal year 1984 and fiscal year 1985 detail,
the Financial Analysis Research Group anticipates that even
with the implementation of strict cost controls, the City
will end fiscal year 1984 with a deficit of $20.6 million
and conclude fiscal year 1985 with a deficit of $40.4 mil-
lion.
Certain assumptions explain why these calculations
may differ from the plethora of estimates of budget deficits
published recently. The fiscal year 1984 estimate reflects:
o The sale of garages totalling $18.5 mil-
lion; and
o Operating expenditures which incorporate
agency deficiencies of $8.0 million.
The fiscal year 1985 statement assumes:
o Receipt by the City of $25 million of
new local aid in excess of fiscal year
1984 allocations;
o Settlement of all collective bargaining
contracts with an annual salary adjust-
ment of 5%;
o An increase in pension payments of 10%;
o No additional sales of capital assets of
the City;
o A 5% growth factor for all agency opera-
tions; and
o Application of 100% of the available
unliquidated cash reserves to reduce the
year end deficit.
NOTE: THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER RESERVES AVAIL-
ABLE AT THE START OF FISCAL YEAR 1986 TO
OFFSET THE EXPECTED $40.4 MILLION DEFI-
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CIT. THEREFORE, A PACKAGE OF MANAGEMENT
EXPENDITURE CONTROLS, ADDITIONAL STATE
AID AND NEW SOURCES OF REVENUE WILL BE
REQUIRED TO AVERT A SIGNIFICANT FISCAL
DILEMMA AT THE START OF FISCAL YEAR 1986.
The risk involved with the disclosure and subse-
quent elimination of existing non-essential reserves is sub-
stantial if a consensus cannot be reached regarding the com-
ponents of new state aid and new City revenues well in
advance of the onset of fiscal year 1986.
The following combination of new resources could be
used to offset the anticipated deficit of $40.4 million for
fiscal year 1985. It must be stressed, however, that a
revenue package in excess of that described will need to be
assembled if the City is to operate throughout the following
fiscal year 1986 without substantial reductions in force and
dramatic service cutbacks.
At a minimum, the new Administration should consi-
der a revenue package which considers:
$15 million Adjustment of the MBTA Formula
10 million Parking Excise Tax
6 million Augmented Fire Service Fee
5 million Street Opening Fees
4 million Restructuring of Parking Fine Rates
1 million Repayment by Boston Water and Sewer
Commission for Administrative Ser-
vices Rendered by the City
$41 million TOTAL
Expenditure Controls
Neither the General Court nor the City Council can
be expected to assist the new Administration in its quest
for new local aid and new revenues if the City Administra-
tion does not first implement a strong program of fiscal
discipline to restrict agency spending.
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As of December 1983, the half-way point in the fis-
cal year, 48 of 75 (or 64%) of the program-related agency
accounts had expended more than 50% of their fiscal year
1984 appropriations. The more dramatic expenditure rates in
excess of appropriations were achieved by:
o Printing Section — 60% (over appropria-
tions )
o Labor Relations -- 61%
o Intergovernmental Relations — 77%
o Community Services Administration -- 74%
o Parking Clerk — 78%
o Department of Public Works -- 62%
o Public Facilities Department — 64%
o Community Schools -- 70%
o Parks and Recreation Department — 59%
The preceding Administration deserves credit for
instituting management accounting systems, job performance
criteria and budgetary management techniques. However, the
pattern of excessive spending by agencies during the first
half of fiscal year 1984 clearly indicates that the new
Administration must promptly implement expenditure controls
designed to dramatically slow spending during the latter
half of fiscal year 1984 and to establish reasonable pat-
terns for agency expenditures for fiscal year 1985 lest the
projected deficits balloon to unmanageable proportions.
Boston's t::isting workforce of 21,000 employees
requires wages and fringe benefits equalling almost 75% of
the City's operating budget. In general, when government
leaders do not address the issue of expenditure controls
effectively, layoffs are not far behind.
Furthermore, if limiting the looming fiscal year
1985 deficit was not reason enough to institute meaningful
expenditure controls, the need to prepare for the dramat-
ically increasing burdens of the City's $1.3 billion un-
funded pension liability should cause great concern. With
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the City responsible for 90% of the annual cost of the fund-
ing required for the pension system, long-term financial
planning must begin now to successfully manage what likely
will be, by the end of the next decade, Boston's most dra-
matic and awesome fiscal concern.
An effective plan to restrict agency expenditures
has to be complemented by the introduction of a meaningful
budgetary system. The new Administration should consider
the implementation of two-tier budgeting, a fiscal planning
innovation discussed later in this report, which can more
clearly show decision makers the choices between essential
services and discretionary spending.
A successful modern municipal government cannot be
run by using Neanderthal budgeting practices like hiring
freezes and across-the-board cuts. Arbitrary budgeting
guidelines, implemented without regard for the specific mis-
sions and clients of individual City agencies, are guaran-
teed to be ineffectual whether as tools of financial manage-
ment or of political leadership.
At a bare minimum, the new Administration should
promptly review the 375 recommendations contained in the
City's 1979 audit and subsequent audits. Many of the recom-
mendations thus far ignored would help both to contain oper-
ating costs and to improve the City's financial management
image
.
Cash Flow; A Pending Problem
The budget deficits projected in this report are
manageable if spending controls are implemented, new revenue
sources are developed and, most importantly, if there is
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sufficient cash available to meet the City's weekly payroll
and other expenditure requirements. As the cash flow dis-
cussion later in this report documents, however, the City's
current cash position is tenuous at best.
Major managerial and political consequences result
from the City's cash flow position. The new Administration
should attempt to anticipate potential difficulties and make
suitable arrangements, as soon as possible, to ensure the
continuation of efficient, uninterrupted services to the
City's residents.
While the details provided indicate that the City's
cash flow projections for the third quarter of fiscal year
1984 have improved somewhat since the November 1983 esti-
mates, the projections for March 1984 show that the City
will remain perilously close to being unable to meet its
average weekly expenditure obligations of $23 million if
appropriate remedial steps are not taken quickly by the new
Administration.
A major consequence of a poor cash position is the
concomitant wane in investor interest resulting from an
image of poor cash management. If Boston is to successfully
enter the capital markets this spring to borrow money for
capital projects, including $10-$15 million for neighborhood
initiatives proposed by the new Administration, investor
confidence in the stable cash position and strong financial
management of the City of Boston must be ensured.
Management Improvements: Capital Planning and Budgeting
As detailed in the chapter of this report on capi-
tal budgeting, Boston lacks a formal, multi-year capital
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plan. Presently, capital planning and budgeting is diffuse,
reactive and often based on poor data.
The new Administration must be quick to correct the
trend of disinvestment in the City's capital assets that has
continued far too long. Yet, the rating agencies which cau-
tiously guard a city's entry into the capital markets will
be evaluating Boston very closely this spring to see if the
selection of projects to be financed is prudent. They will
also want to determine if the City's project monitoring
capacity has improved enough to create confidence in the
City's ability to complete projects in a timely, cost-effec-
tive fashion.
Boston has assets which include 408 municipal
buildings, 282 of which are not schools. The new Admini-
stration must create a capital planning and monitoring proc-
ess that ensures that the limited resources available are
allocated in the most effective manner and that projects of
greatest social and financial significance receive funding
on a priority basis.
Management Improvements; Contracts and Purchasing
A critical aspect of resource allocation is the
contracting and purchasing process which currently obligates
the City to commitments in excess of $500 million. Because
Boston has no central record keeping regarding contractor
selection and no coordinated City policy on contracting ser-
vices, this report includes a number of recommendations to
enhance the new Administration's control of the vendor se-
lection process.
i - 10
It is disturbing that 39% of the 1,446 City con-
tracts analyzed by the Financial Analysis Research Group,
representing 53% of the total dollar value of all contracts
analyzed, were unadver t i sed
.
Further, lack of coordination, at the very least,
has permitted more than 70% of all change orders granted on
current construction contracts to be given to two businesses
whose owners are related. Most of these change orders were
granted shortly after the contracts had been executed -- a
practice that should be monitored closely for all present
and future vendors.
Review of contracts and purchasing also highlights
the difficulties facing small business owners and minority
owned businesses seeking to compete for municipal opportuni-
ties. First, the job of learning enough about the City's
contracting process to become a plausible competitor is so
daunting that it becomes a substantial barrier to some who
wish to join the bidding. Second, the City is so lax in
paying its vendors that firms must be large enough to ad-
vance their own cash for months at a time.
A commitment by the new Administration to stream-
line the payment process and to open the bidding to more
vendors would likely produce significant savings to the City.
Management Improvements; Management Information Systems
Poor contracting procedures carry over into the
$15 million area of management information systems. Budget
overruns in excess of 500% have been found for some MIS pro-
jects. In one case, the City's main computer, purchased in
1982, was running at only 50% of capacity when, in 1983, it
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was abandoned for a newer model four times more powerful. A
user group of sufficient size has yet to appear.
The new Administration must focus on the MIS area
immediately if it is to gain effective control of current
management systems, however limited, and restrict unneces-
sary agency spending during the remainder of fiscal year
1984.
If a consistent theme appears throughout the chap-
ters which follow, it is that City Hall does not have reli-
able, comprehensive data collection for many of its most
important line agencies. If effective expenditure controls
are to be put in place, an improved MIS structure will be a
prerequi si te
.
Management Improvements; Department of Health and Hospitals
The chapter on the Department of Health and Hospi-
tals depicts the cost to one major City agency of ineffec-
tive capital planning, poor contracting and purchasing pro-
cedures, and inappropriate management information systems.
Occupancy at Boston City Hospital has fallen from
80% in fiscal year 1980 to 69% during the first half of fis-
cal year 1984. As a health care system of last resort, the
Department of Health and Hospitals, in particular, needs to
improve productivity and performance standards so that more
of the City's disadvantaged citizens can receive proper care
at a cost which is neither prohibitive nor the cause of con-
stant calls for budgetary cutbacks. The cost of providing
care for those in greatest need cannot become totally prohi-
bitive
.
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This summary of observations from four of the man-
agement improvement chapters in this report fails to convey
the frustration with miles of bureaucratic red tape that was
experienced by the 60-person Financial Analysis Research
Group and which even more often frustrates taxpayers doing
business with the City. It does not speak well for the City
that it takes a 27-step process to hire one employee, that
the City has no inventory control over the parking tickets
that it issues, that our research group was unable to deter-
mine the actual place of work for many of the City's 21,000
employees, that the City's human service agencies lack a
data collection system that can determine which Boston resi-
dents are the recipients of basic social services, or that
the City Assessor's Office, which faces a major citywide
revaluation during fiscal year 1985, presently lacks the
technical capacity to conduct the effort.
The encouraging news is that the problems can be
solved. Although in many cases, the mere substitution of
leadership for past policies of benign neglect may be suffi-
cient to make important inroads, to produce significant cost
savings and to maximize all available resources, the new
Administration must initiate certain systemic reforms.
Implementation
This report includes some 150 recommendations for
improving the quality of City services and reducing the cost
of municipal government.
In particular, however, the new Administration
should consider the following overall proposals.
1. Establish Two-Tier Budgeting to protect
essential City services from exposure
to a politicized process that invari-
ably pits public safety services
against discretionary "wish lists".
2 . Provide Accurate Revenue Estimates to
the City Council prior to the annual
budget debate so that there can be
agreement between the Mayor and the
Council as to resources available for
appropriation, thereby reducing the
pattern of constant charges and coun-
tercharges and constant budget deficits.
3 . Create an Internal Audit Division in
the Mayor's Office to reduce the in-
equities, waste and abuse in the City's
$500 million of contracts and purchases.
4. Implement Job Performance Criteria al-
ready established by the preceding
Administration to improve the effici-
ency of the government at its present
size, eliminate unnecessary positions,
and prevent unchecked spending by those
City agencies so inclined.
5. Realign the Personnel System so that
salaries more reasonably reflect job
responsibi li t ies
.
6 . Create an Office of Capital Planning
and Project Monitoring to begin the
task of coordinating the multi-agency
capital budgeting process; and to
reduce the duplication of personnel,
red tape and inefficiency which charac-
terize the present-day capital planning
cycle and which will hamper implementa-
tion of a $10-$15 million neigborhood
capital improvement program this spring.
7. Disclose All Reserve Accounts and util-
ize discretionary reserve funds for
essential City services.
8. Secure Additional Revenues to ensure
that the delivery of essential munici-
pal services to the residents of Boston
not be jeopardized by the uncertainties
of the financial management process.
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GLOSSARY
The following has been developed as both a general
reference in the area of municipal finance and as a specific
resource for this Report. It was compiled by substantially
merging glossaries prepared for: 1) the Massachusetts Muni-
cipal Data Base, Bank of Boston, 1982 Debt Survey of Massa-
chusetts Cities and Towns; 2) Public Securities Association,
Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds (1981); 3) Massachusetts
Senate Ways and Means Committee Budget Document, 1983; 4)
Coopers and Lybrand Report (Boston): Audited Financial
Statements for the Years Ended June 30, 1981, and June 30,
1982; 5) Massachusetts Municipal Association, Manual for
Municipal Budget Analysis; 6) Local Government Finance:
Capital Facilities Planning and Debt Administration, A.W.
Steiss, Lexington Books (1975); and 7) Governmental Account-
ing, Auditing, and Financial Reporting (1980), Municipal
Finance Officers Association of the United States and Canada.
Abatement. A complete or partial cancellation of a levy
imposed by a government. Abatements usually apply
to tax levies, special assessments, and service
charges. Senior citizens, veterans, and low-income
persons may also be eligible for abatements of
their property tax.
Accounting System. The total structure of records and pro-
cedures which discover, record, classify, summar-
ize, and report information on the financial posi-
tion and results of operations of a government or
any of its funds, fund types, balanced account
groups, or organizational components.
Basis. The basis of accounting under which trans-
actions are recognized when they occur, regardless
of the timing of related cash flows.
Expenses. Expenses incurred but not due until a
later date.
Interest. Interest earned on a security since the
later of the last interest payment date or the
dated date.
Activity. A specific and distinguishable line of work per-
formed by one or more organizational components of
a government for the purpose of accomplishing a
function for which the government is responsible.
For example, "food inspection" is an activity per-
formed in the discharge of the "health" function.
Accrual
Accrued
Accrued
Glossary - 1
Activity Account Code. An eight-digit number by which a
line-item is designated. The first one or two
digits of the code identify the line-item's loca-
tion in the budget. The second or third through
eighth digits indicate the nature of the line item.
Actuarial Basis. A basis used in computing the amount of
contributions to be made periodically to a fund or
account so that the total contributions plus the
compounded earnings thereon will equal the required
payments to be made out of the fund. The factors
taken into account in arriving at the amount of
these contributions include the length of time over
which each contribution is to be held and the rate
of return compounded on such contribution over its
life. A Pension Trust Fund for a public employee
retirement system is an example of a fund concerned
with actuarial basis data.
Ad Valorem Tax. A tax based on the assessed value of real
(land and improvements) and personal property.
Allotment. A part of an appropriation which may be encum-
bered or expended during an allotment period.
Spending is controlled by the Governor even after
the Legislature makes appropriations. Each fiscal
year is divided into periods, and before the begin-
ning of each period, each agency head is told how
much of his appropriation he may spend during that
period. The amount in any one period is the allot-
ment .
Allotment Period. The period during which an allotment may
be encumbered or expended.
Amortization (of bonds). A straight-line reduction of debt
by means of periodic payments sufficient to meet
current interest and to liquidate the debt (pay
down the principal) at maturity.
Appropriation. A legal authorization granted by a legisla-
tive body to make expenditures and to incur obliga-
tions for specific purposes. An appropriation is
usually limited in amount and as to the time when
it may be expended.
Appropriation Account. A budgetary account set up to record
specific authorizations to spend. The account is
credited with original and any supplemental appro-
priations and is charged with expenditures and en-
cumbrances
.
Glossary - 2
Assessed Valuation. A valuation set upon real estate or
other property by the town or city as a basis for
levying taxes; the assessed valuation is not the
same as the market value of a property.
Assessment Ratio. The ratio of the assessed value of prop-
erty to the full or true property value; full value
may be defined as fair market value at the bid side
of the market less a reasonable allowance for sales
and other expenses.
Audit. A methodical examination of utilization of resources.
It concludes in a written report of its findings.
An audit is a test of management's accounting sys-
tem to determine the extent to which internal ac-
counting controls are both available and being used.
Audit Report. The report prepared by an auditor covering
the audit or investigation made by him. As a rule,
the report should include: a) a statement of the
scope of the audit; b) explanatory comments (if
any) concerning exceptions by the auditor as to
application of generally accepted auditing stan-
dards; c) opinions; d) explanatory comments (if
any) concerning verification procedures; e) finan-
cial statements and schedules; f) sometimes statis-
tical tables, supplementary comments, and recommen-
dations. The auditor's signature follows item (c)
or (d).
Auditor's Opinion. A statement signed by an auditor in
which he states that he has examined the financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards (with exceptions, if any) and in
which he expresses an opinion on the financial pos-
ition and results of operations of some or all of
the constituent funds and balanced account groups
of the government as appropriate.
Augmented Fire Services Availability Fee. Fee authorized by
the 1982 Funding Loan Act and imposed on certain
structures by virtue of the increased burden they
place on the Fire Department.
Authority. A quasi-public corporation created by one or
more governmental bodies to carry out certain func-
tions, either within a community or among several
communities. These are often a "proprietary,"
revenue-producing nature, such as providing a water
supply, sewage treatment facilities, or building
and maintaining roads, bridges, or ports and air
terminals, for which tolls, rents or other user
charges may be imposed.
Glossary - 3
Authorization. The legal permission granted by the Council
to the Treasurer to sell notes or bonds that are
guaranteed by the City's ability to levy taxes.
Authorized Position. An activity's legislatively authorized
positions, or jobs, represent the activity's maxi-
mum allowable work force.
Balance Sheet. The basis financial statement which dis-
closed the assets, liabilities, and equities of an
equity at a specified date in conformity with GAAP.
Base Budget. A budget which describes the funding required
to maintain existing levels of service or activity.
In an inflationary period, a base budget neces-
sarily will exceed the previous fiscal year's bud-
get, while a so-called level-funded budget will
entail an actual reduction in funding.
Basis Book. A book of mathematical tables used to convert
yield percentages to equivalent dollar prices.
Basis Point. Yields on municipal securities are usually
quoted in increments of basis points. One basis
point is equal to 1/100 of 1 percent.
Basis Price. The price expressed in yield or net return on
the investment.
Batch Processing. A computer system method of handling
data, with an accumulation of transactions proc-
essed all in one "batch."
Bearer Security. A security that has no identification as
to owner. It is presumed to be owned, therefore by
the bearer or the person who holds it. Bearer
securities are freely and easily negotiable since
ownership can be quickly transferred from seller to
buyer
.
Beginning Balance. The preceding fiscal year's end of year
surplus or deficit carried over to the current fis-
cal year.
Betterments. An addition made to, or change made in, a
fixed asset which is expected to prolong its life
or to increase its efficiency. The term is also
applied to sidewalks, sewers and highways;
"improvements" could be another designation.
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Block Grant. A federal grant to a governmental unit to be
used at the recipient's discretion for a variety of
activities within a broadly defined program area.
Bond. An interest-bearing certificate issued promising to
pay the holder a specified amount on a specific
date
.
Bond Anticipation Note (BAN). Short-term notes sold in
anticipation of a bond issue and retired by pro-
ceeds from the sale of the bonds. BANs are issued
by states and municipalities to obtain interim
financing for projects that will eventually be
funded long term through the sale of a bond issue.
Bond Bank. Institutions established in a few states to buy
entire issues of bonds of municipalities, financed
by the issuance of bonds by the bond bank.
Bond Funds. Registered investment companies whose assets
are invested in diversified portfolios of bonds.
Bond Issue. Generally a certain number of bonds marketed at
one time by a municipality, school district, or
other public organization.
Bonds - General Obligation. See General Obligation Bonds.
Bonds - Revenue. Bonds payable from revenues derived from
the use of a facility, such as bridge tools, water
rents, and the like; the credit and taxing capabil-
ity of local government is not necessarily pledged
in support of such bonds.
Budget. A plan of financial operation embodying an estimate
of proposed expenditures for a given period and the
proposed means of financing them. Used without any
modifier, the term usually indicates a financial
plan for a single fiscal year. The term "budget",
is used in two senses in practice. Sometimes it
designates the financial plan presented to the
appropriating body for adoption and sometimes the
plan finally approved by that body. It is usually
necessary to specify whether the budget under con-
sideration is preliminary and tentative or whether
it has been approved by the appropriating body.
Budget Amendment. This must be filed for all changes in the
numbers, titles, salaries, etc., of positions orig-
inally budgeted.
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Budget Document. The instrument used by the budget-making
authority to present a comprehensive financial pro-
gram to the appropriating body. The budget docu-
ment usually consists of three parts. The first
part contains a message from the budget-making
authority, together with a summary of the proposed
expenditures and the means of financing them. The
second consists of schedules supporting the sum-
mary. These schedules show in detail the informa-
tion as to past years' actual revenues, expendi-
tures, and other data used in making the esti-
mates. The third part is composed of drafts of the
appropriation, revenue, and borrowing measures
necessary to put the budget into effect.
Callable. Feature of a bond whereby it may be redeemed by
the issuer prior to maturity under terms designated
prior to issuance.
Budget. Plan of proposed outlays for acquiring
long-term assets and the means for financing those
acquisitions; see also Operating Budget.
Expenditures or Outlays. Nonrecurring payments for
capital improvements including construction, acqui-
sition, site development and overhead costs. The
fees for architects, engineers, lawyers, and other
professional services plus the costs of financing,
advance planning may be included.
Plant. Buildings and other facilities needed for
the operation of public services provided by local
government including schools, roads, water and
sewer systems, street lights, parks and play-
grounds, harbor improvements, police and fire
department headquarters, administration buildings,
libraries, and health centers.
Projects Fund. Transactions related to resources
obtained and used for the acquisition, construction
or improvement of capital facilities are accounted
for in the Capital Projects Fund. Such resources
are derived principally from proceeds of general
obligation bond issues and from federal and state
grants
.
Reserve Deposits or Capital Improvements Fund Depo-
sits. Deposits by a municipality, county or school
district or current revenues in a special fund
called a "building fund," "capital reserve fund,"
or "capital improvement fund," which may be used
for payments for capital improvements or debt ser-
vice .
Capital
Capital
Capital
Capital
Capital
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Capitalization. The translation of an annual revenue or
expenditure into terms of capital value or capital
cost, on the basis of a fixed ratio.
Carry Forwards. These are appropriations whose year end
balances are deducted from the original year's
appropriation balance, and added to the appropria-
tion of the following year.
Cash Flow. The amount and timing of the City's payments to
employees and vendors.
Cash Match. Many federal funds are granted on the condition
that the state pay some of the costs of the funded
activity or program.
Categorical Grant. A federal grant, the use of which is
limited by the federal government to a single pur-
pose .
Centralized Account. A single line-item which funds other-
wise decentralized activities.
Chargebacks. The chargeback system is a method of assessing
departments for costs incurred by them which are
billed centrally. Telephone bills, workmen's and
unemployment compensation are examples of items
handled by the chargeback method.
Cherry Sheet. This is a cherry-colored form showing all
State and County charges and reimbursements to the
town or city as certified by the Director of the
Bureau of Accounts.
Classified Employee. An employee who is paid and promoted
according to an explicit civil service job classi-
fication, as prescribed by MGLA Chapter 31, the
state's civil service law.
Competitive Underwriting. A sale of municipal securities by
an issuer in which underwriters or syndicates of
underwriters submit sealed bids to purchase the
securities. This is contrasted with a negotiated
underwriting
.
Concession. The allowance (or profit) that an underwriter
allows a nonmember of the account; sometimes
referred to as dealer's allowance.
Consolidated Account. An account structure whereby several
individual line-items within one agency are consol-
idated into one line-item.
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Consolidated Revenue Statement. An accounting of all the
revenues from all funds for a given fiscal year,
their source, and their level.
Contingent Debt. Bonds which have not been sold by the Com-
monwealth, but which it nevertheless might have to
repay in the event of default by the bond seller.
Contingent debt differs from guaranteed debt in
that contingent debt involves a formal agreement
between the Commonwealth and the bond issuer, which
is generally an authority such as the MBTA.
Contingent Liabilities. Items which may become liabilities
as a result of conditions undetermined at a given
date, such as guarantees, pending law suits, judg-
ments under appeal, unsettled disputed claims, un-
filled purchase orders, and uncompleted contracts.
All contingent liabilities should be disclosed
within the basic financial statements, including
the notes thereto.
Coupon or Interest Rate. The annual rate of interest paya-
ble on a bond, note, or any other fixed income
obligation, usually expressed as a percentage of
the principal amount, which the borrower promises
to pay to the bondholder.
Coverage. This is a term usually connected with revenue
bonds. It indicates the margin of safety for pay-
ment of debt service, reflecting the number of
times by which earnings for a period of time exceed
debt service payable in such period.
Current Yield. The ratio of interest to the actual market
price of the bond stated as a percentage. For
example, a $1,000 bond that pays $80 per year in
interest would have a current yield of 8%.
Debt Financing. The financing of the cost of capital im-
provements by the creation of debt (usually done by
the issuing of bonds).
Debt Limit. The statutory or constitutional maximum debt
that an issuer can legally incur, usually expressed
as a percentage of the net debt to the "equalized
valuation basis".
Debt Outstanding. The Commonwealth's debt outstanding is
the general obligation bonds which have been sold
to cover the costs of the state's capital outlay
expenditures from the state's bond funds.
Glossary - 8
Debt Schedule. A schedule showing annual payments for in-
terest, principal, sinking funds, and other depo-
sits to be used toward the payment of principal
maturities
.
Debt Service. The annual cost of having debt (bonds) out-
standing. This cost includes both the interest
payments on bonds as well as the cost of retiring
the bonds.
Debt Service Fund. A fund established to account for the
accumulation of resources for, and the payment of,
general long-term debt principal and interest.
Deed Excise Receipts. Excise tax imposed by state law upon
the recording of deeds, instruments, and writings
filed with the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds
after August 1, 1982.
Default. Failure to pay principal or interest promptly when
due if caused by a minor omission that if remedied
promptly is known as a technical default.
Department Revenues. A variety of non-tax revenues collect-
ed by agencies. Departmental revenues include
reimbursements for services, fees, fines, penal-
ties, interest, permits, licenses, sales, and rent-
als .
Departmental Receipts. This category consists primarily of
receipts from fees charged by various departments.
Also included are revenues from interests on the
City's investments. Monthly collection rates re-
flect historical collection experience.
Differentiated Fee. The opposite of a flat fee. A differ-
entiated fee varies according to the service re-
ceived by an individual or to the individual's
ability to pay.
Discount. The amount by which the purchase price of a
security is less than the principal amount or par
value. A security selling below original offering
price shortly after sale also is considered to be
at a discount.
Discount Bonds. Fixed income securities which are issued
when interest rates are low and sell at a discount
below par when the coupon rate they bear falls
below prevailing market rates, resulting in signi-
ficant capital gains advantage to individual inves-
tors.
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Dollar Bond. A bond that is quoted and traded in dollar
prices rather than in terms of yield.
Double Exemption. Securities that are exempt from state as
well as federal income taxes.
Down Payment. Payment for a capital improvement from cur-
rent revenues or reserves, as opposed to borrowed
funds
.
Earmarked Funds. Revenues designated by statute or consti-
tution for specific purposes.
Employee Benefits. Amounts paid on behalf of employees but
are not included in the gross salary. Examples
are: 1) group health or life insurance payments;
2) contributions to employee retirement; 3) OASDI
(Social Security) taxes; 4) workmen's compensation
payments; 5) unemployment insurance payments; and
6) payments made to personnel on sabbatical leave.
Encumbrance. An encumbrance represents a charge made
against a department; or, the funds taken from
appropriation and set aside to pay a specific lia-
bility. The process by which the Auditor records
orders and contracts against appropriations is
called encumbering. As long as an item remains
unpaid, it is an unliquidated encumbrance. Once a
check is drawn, the encumbrance is fully or par-
tially liquidated. The portion represented by the
check is an expenditure. Not all charges to
departments are encumbrances. Payrolls and some
utility bills, for example, are not encumbered.
Enterprise Debt. Bonded debt issued to finance the con-
struction of facilities that are generally self-
supporting from user charges. Facilities financed
with enterprise debt include water and sewer sys-
tems, airports and utility systems. Enterprise
debt is a general obligation of the issuing muni-
cipality.
Entitlement. The amount of payment to which a state or
local government is entitled as determined by the
federal government.
Equalized Valuation. See Valuation.
Estimated Net Debt Retirement Schedule. The Net Debt
Retirement Schedule is an estimate of the outstand-
ing debt principal projected to be paid off in one
year, five years, ten years, etc.
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Excess and Deficiency Account. This is the account where
all the surpluses and deficits wind up. When the
City's accumulated revenue surplus exceeds the
amount of uncollected taxes, "free cash" results.
Expenditure Account Code. A ten-digit number made up of an
eight-digit activity account code followed by a
two-digit subsidiary account number which is used
to identify precisely the purpose for which an
activity's funds are spent.
Expenditure Budget. The budget which provides for expendi-
tures to cover agency costs and non-agency costs
for the fiscal year, as opposed to the capital out-
lay budget.
Expenditures. Expenditures include current operating
expenses which require the current or future use of
net current assets, debt service, and capital out-
lays .
Face Amount. The par value (i.e., principal or maturity
value) of a security appearing on the face of the
instrument
.
Face Value. The par value of a bond that appears on the
face; this is the amount that the issuer promises
to pay at maturity, and also the amount on which
interest is computed.
Federal Grants-In-Aid . A system of federal assistance to
state and local governments comprising three gene-
ral kinds of grants: categorical grants, block
grants, and general revenue sharing.
Fiscal Year (FY). The twelve-month financial period used by
local government which begins July 1 and ends June
30 of the following calendar year. The year is
represented by the date on which it ends. Exam-
ple: July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1977 would be FY
1977.
Fixed Assets. Assets of a long-term character which are
intended to continue to be held or used, such as
land, buildings, improvements other than buildings,
machinery and equipment.
Flat Fee. The opposite of a differentiated fee, a flat fee
does not vary according to the service received by
an individual or to the individual's ability to pay.
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Flat Scale. Little or no difference between short- and
long-term yields over the maturity range of an
issue.
Floating Debt. Temporary or shifting short-term debt that
has not been funded on a permanent basis into long-
er maturities.
Formula Grant. A federal grant for which funds are allo-
cated according to legislatively or administra-
tively specified factors.
Funded Pensions. Retirement system which sets aside con-
tributions from the participant and employer at a
level equal to the future cost when the participant
becomes eligible for benefits. At that time the
system returns the contributions and any interest
their investment may have generated.
General Debt. Bonded debt issued by municipalities for var-
ious capital purposes, but excluding enterprise
debt as defined below. It is a general obligation
of the issuing municipality, payable from property
taxes and other available revenues.
General Fund. The fund into which the general (non-
earmarked) revenues of the municipality are depo-
sited and from which money is appropriated to pay
the general expenses of the municipality.
General Obligation Bond. A bond secured by the pledge of
the issuer's full faith, credit and, usually, tax-
ing power.
General Revenue Sharing. Program in which a sum of federal
government funds raised through federal income
taxes is returned to local cities and towns for use
as the local government chooses. The amount is
based on a formula taking into account such vari-
ables as population, tax base, and income.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Uniform
minimum standards of and guidelines to financial
accounting and reporting. They govern the form and
content of the basic financial statements of an
entity. GAAP encompass the conventions, rules, and
procedures necessary to define accepted accounting
practice at a particular time. They include not
only broad guidelines of general application, but
also detailed practices and procedures. GAAP pro-
vide a standard by which to measure financial pre-
sentations. The primary authoritative statement on
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the application of GAAP to state and local govern-
ments is NCGA Statement 1. Every government should
prepare and publish financial statements in confor-
mity with GAAP. The objectives of governmental
GAAP financial reports are different from, and much
broader than, the objectives of business enterprise
GAAP financial reports.
Grants-in-Aid . Outright donations or contributions, usually
by a higher governmental unit, without the prior
establishment of conditions with which the recip-
ient must comply.
Grievance Arbitration. The process of resolving disputes
over the terms, application or alleged violation of
an existing collective bargaining agreement by the
decision of a neutral third party.
Gross Yield. The percentage return on a security that is
determined by dividing the dollar price into the
annual interest payment and calculating the return
to maturity.
Guaranteed Debt. Bonds which are issued by an authority,
typically a local housing authority or a higher
education building authority, but which ultimately
are guaranteed by the state.
Health and Hospitals' Enterprise Fund. Transactions related
to the operation of Boston City, Mattapan and Long
Island Hospitals and the Community Health Services
Division are accounted for in the Health and Hospi-
tals' Enterprise Fund. Boston City Hospital, a
teaching hospital affiliated with Boston University
Medical School, provides a full range of inpatient
and outpatient services. The other hospitals prin-
cipally provide services to persons with chronic
diseases. The Community Health Services Division
conducts or provides financial support for neigh-
borhood outpatient health clinics, public health
nursing, drug programs, health services for chil-
dren, and a variety of other community and public
health service programs.
Impasse. A breakdown in the progress of negotiations be-
tween employer and employee representatives over
the terms of a prospective bargaining agreement.
In Lieu of Taxes. Income to replace the loss of tax revenue
resulting from property exempted from taxation.
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Industrial Revenue Bond. A security issued by a state, cer-
tain agencies or authorities, a local government or
development corporation to finance the construction
or purchase of industrial plants and/or equipment
to be used by a private corporation; and backed by
the credit of the private corporation rather than
the credit of the issuer.
Interest Arbitration. The process of resolving a collective
bargaining impasse by the decision of a neutral
third party.
Interest Rate. The interest payable each year, expressed as
a percentage of the principal.
Intergovernmental Revenue. Revenue received from other
governments, such as fiscal aids, shared taxes, and
reimbursements for services.
Interim Financial Statement. A financial statement prepared
before the end of the current fiscal year and
covering only financial transactions during the
current year to date.
Internal Audit. An independent appraisal activity within an
organization for the review of the operations as a
service to management. It is a managerial control
which functions by measuring and evaluating the
effectiveness of other controls.
Internal Control. A plan of organization under which
employees' duties are so arranged and records and
procedures so designed as to make it possible to
exercise effective accounting control over assets,
liabilities, revenues and expenditures. Under such
a system, the work of employees is subdivided so
that no single employee performs a complete cycle
of operations. Thus, for example, an employee
handling cash would not post the accounts receiv-
able records. Moreover, under such a system, the
procedures to be followed are definitely laid down
and require proper authorizations by designated
officials for all actions to be taken.
Inside Debt Limit. General debt limit imposed on the City
up to which City may authorize debt without state
approval
.
Inverted Scale. When the yield is higher on the shorter
maturities than on the longer ones.
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Issuer. A municipal unit that borrows money through the
sale of bonds.
Judgment. An amount to be paid or collected by a government
as the result of a court decision.
Level Funding. Providing a line-item with a current dollar
appropriation identical to the prior fiscal year's
appropr iatt ion.
Limited Tax Bond. A bond secured by the pledge of a special
tax, a group of taxes, or specified portion of the
real estate tax that is limited as to a rate or
amount
.
Line-Item. A separately identified unit of appropriation.
Line-Item Budget. A budget which focuses on inputs or cat-
egories of spending such as supplies, equipment,
maintenance, or salaries. Contrast with program
budget
Liquidate. To use a portion of the encumbered appropriation
to make a payment to a contractor.
Liquidity. The ability to convert a security into cash
promptly with minimum risk of principal.
Marketability. A measure of the ease with which a security
can be sold in the secondary market.
Maturity. The date when the principal amount of a security
becomes due and payable.
Moral Obligation Bond. A type of municipal security that is
not backed by the full faith and credit of a state,
but state law provides that the state will replen-
ish the issue's debt service reserve fund if
necessary.
Negotiated Underwriting. In a negotiated underwriting the
issuer of municipal securities chooses one under-
writer or a group of underwriters to sell its bonds
to investors. There is no competitive bid for the
issue.
Net Debt. Gross debt less sinking fund accumulations and
all self-supporting debt.
Net Interest Cost. The traditional method of calculating
bids for new issues of municipal securities. The
other method is known as the True Interest Cost.
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Non-Callable Bond. A bond that cannot be called either for
redemption by or at the option of the issuer before
its specified maturity date.
Non-Revenue Disbursements. This account is used to record
expenditures made by the General Fund for capital
construction projects.
Revenues. These include departmental revenues and
federal reimbursements.
Short-term promises to pay specified amounts of
money, secured by specific sources of future reve-
nues, such as taxes, federal and state aid pay-
ments, and bond proceeds.
System. A data processing system which allows may
users direct, immediate access to information
stored by a computer and to its data processing
capabilities
.
Operating Budget. Plan of proposed expenditures for per-
sonnel, supplies, and other expenses for the coming
fiscal year.
Over-the-Counter Market (OTC). A securities market that is
conducted among dealers throughout the country
through negotiation rather than through the use of
an auction system as represented by a stock ex-
change.
Overlapping Debt. The debt of other governmental entities
which is chargeable to cities and towns and payable
from city and town property taxes and other reve-
nues. It includes the debt of counties, the Massa-
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and
other regional transportation authorities, the
Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), and other
special districts organized for purposes such as
pollution abatement, solid waste disposal, fire
protection, etc.
Overlay. The amount raised by the assessors in excess of
appropriations and other charges for the purpose of
creating a fund to cover abatements and to avoid
fractions
.
Overlay Reserve. The accumulated amount of overlay for pre-
vious years which has not been used and which is
not required to be held in a specific overlay
account for a given year. It may be used for
extraordinary or unforeseen purposes or made part
of the reserve fund.
Non-Tax
Notes
.
On-Line
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PL 874 Funds. Funds received by school districts from the
federal government because of the "impact" on the
district of federally-connected school children
whose parents either live on or work on federal
property, or both.
Par Value. The stated or face value of a bond; the amount
of money due at maturity.
Pay-As-You Go Financing of Pensions. Operating a pension
system in which benefits are paid from current
appropriations rather than reserves created during
an employee's active service.
Paying Agent. Place where principal and interest are pay-
able. Usually a designated bank or the office of
the treasurer of the issuer.
Post-Audit. An audit done on an after-the-fact basis, gen-
erally encompassing both revenues and expenditures.
Pre-Audit. An audit done on a before-the-fact basis, gener-
ally encompassing only proposed expenditures.
Premium. The amount by which price exceeds par amount or
maturity value of a bond; also the amount payable
to the holder of a callable bond by the issuer, if
and when the bond is called.
Primary Market (new issue market). Market for new issues of
municipal bonds and notes.
Prime Rate. Interest Rate charged by banks for loans to
their prime or most creditworthy customers.
Principal. The face or par value amount of a bond, exclu-
sive of accrued interest and payable at maturity.
Privilege Excise. A tax primarily on certain kinds of busi-
nesses for the privilege of doing business in
Massachusetts
.
Program Budget. A budget which relates financial costs to
the program it funds; the emphasis of a program
budget is on output.
Proposition 2 1/2. A state wide tax limitation initiative
petition limiting the property tax levy in cities
and towns in the Commonwealth to 2 1/2% of the full
and fair cash valuation of the taxable real estate
and personal property in that city or town.
Glossary - 17
Qualified Bonds. Bonds which are issued subject to condi-
tions and limitations as they may be specified by
the state Emergency Finance Board. The state pays
debt service on the bonds, which is then deducted
from state aid or other state payments to the City.
Ratings. Designations used by investors' services to give
relative indications of quality.
Real Estate Excise Receipts. Excise tax imposed by state
law upon the construction, conversion of condomin-
ium units or subdivision or consolidation of lots.
Reciprocal Immunity Doctrine. The doctrine that many legal
experts believe provides the constitutional basis
for the exemption from federal taxation of the
interest earned on municipal securities. The doc-
trine holds that the states are immune from federal
interference in their affairs, just as the federal
government is immune from state interference.
Refunding. A system by which a bond issue is redeemed by a
new bond issue under conditions generally more
favorable to the issuer.
Registered Bond. A bond whose owner is registered with the
issuer or its agents, either as to both principal
and interest or as to principal only. Transfer of
ownership can be accomplished only when the securi-
ties are properly endorsed by the registered owner.
Reimbursement Grant. A federal or state grant that is paid
to the City once the project is complete and
inspected as to conformance to the grant contract.
The City must provide the full funding for the
project until the reimbursement is received.
Reimbursements for Non-Revenue Expenditures. This account
is used to report reimbursements to the General
Fund for expenditures made on account of capital
projects
.
Reserve Fund. A fund which transfers may be made for extra-
ordinary or unforeseen expenditures. It may be
composed of an appropriation of not more than 5% of
the tax levy for the preceding year, or money
transferred from the overlay reserve, or both.
Reserve for Encumbrances (Unliquidated Reserve). These are
funds set aside at the end of a fiscal year to
cover encumbrances and items such as utility bills
which have not yet been paid by June 30. Items put
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into this reserve are charged to the department,
whether they are paid or not.
Revenue Anticipation Notes. Notes issued in anticipation
of future tax revenues and federal or state aid.
Revenue Bond. A bond payable from revenues secured from a
project that pays its way by charging rentals to
the users, such as toll bridges or toll highways,
or from revenues from another source that are used
for a public purpose.
Revenue Deficit. Shortfall of the prior year's non-property
tax revenues in comparison to anticipated amounts
on which the prior levy was based.
Revolving Account. Budgetary account which allows an agency
to retain a portion of revenues produced from its
operations to defray costs for material, equipment,
or salaries.
Right of Redemption. The right of an owner to redeem title
to property taken by the City for taxes within a
certain period of time after foreclosure.
Scale. Reoffering terms to the public of a serial issue
showing price or yields offered to each maturity.
Secondary Market. Market for issues previously offered or
sold
.
Self-Supporting Debt. Debt incurred for a project or
enterprise requiring no tax support other than the
specific tax or revenue earmarked for that purpose.
Serial Bonds. Bonds maturing in periodic, generally annual,
installments as opposed to "term bonds".
Short-Term Debt. Short-term debt includes Revenue Anticipa-
tion Notes, Bond Anticipation Notes, and Grants and
Highway Aid Anticipation Notes.
Sinking Fund. A fund accumulated by an issuer over a period
of time to be used for retirement of debt, either
periodically or at one time.
Sliding Fee. A differentiated fee which varies according to
the service recipient's ability to pay.
Special Revenue Funds. Transactions related to revenues and
expenditures under certain federal and state grants
and from other sources, upon which restrictions are
imposed, are accounted for in Special Revenue Funds.
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Spread. (1) Difference between bid
security. (2) Difference
prices of two securities
differing maturities. (3)
ference between price real
price paid by the investor.
and asked prices on a
between yields on or
of differing sorts or
In underwriting, dif-
.zed by the issuer and
Staging. The planning or programming of the construction of
capital improvements over time when needed and when
the community has the ability to pay.
State-Boston Retirement Fund. This fund is a fiduciary fund
type in which the transactions reflect assets, lia-
bilities and fund equities of the City-administered
pension system.
State/Boston Retirement System and Boston Retirement System.
Transactions related to assets, liabilities, and
fund equity of the City-administered retirement
systems are reflected in the Retirement Systems —
Fiduciary Fund.
State Distributions. State aid is determined by the State
Department of Revenue. The average timing of
receipts for significant portions of the total is
as follows: The total amount allocated to School
Aid, Ch. 70, is received on a quarterly basis in
the months of September, December, March and June.
Reimbursements for a lump sum in September of each
year. 121A, s.10, payments are received 20% in
December and 80% in June. The remaining revenues
are distributed over the intervening months and,
for projection purposes, are based on average his-
torical percentages of the total throughout the
year
.
State Mandated Program. Usually refers to a program or
expenditure which is implemented by the cities and
towns as required by the Legislature or Executive.
Statement of Changes in Fund Equity. The basic financial
statement which reconciles the equity balances of
an entity at the beginning and end of an accounting
period in conformity with GAAP. It explains the
relationship between the operating statement and
the balance sheet. Under NCGA Statement 1, state-
ments of changes in fund equity are combined with
operating statements into "all-inclusive" operating
statement formats.
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Statement of Revenues and Expenditures. The basic financial
statement which is the governmental fund and Expen-
dable Trust Fund GAAP operating statement. It pre-
sents increases (revenue and other financing sour-
ces) and decreases (expenditures and other finan-
cing uses) in an entity's net current assets.
Statutory Accounting System. Established by the Bureau of
Accounts of the Massachusetts Department of Reve-
nue. Although the City's audits are conducted in
accordance with GAAP by statute the property tax
levy, as well as school department accounts, are
required to be conducted in accordance with the
statutory accounting system.
Subsidiary Account. One of 20 categories into which line-
item appropriations are divided. Line-item
accounts may need funds in nearly any combination
of the following subsidiary accounts: (01) sala-
ries of permanent personnel; (02) salaries of temp-
orary personnel and overtime; (03) payments for
contracted, non-employee services; (04) food; (05)
clothing; (06) housekeeping supplies and expenses;
(07) laboratory and medical supplies and expenses;
(08) heat and fuel; (09) farm and grounds; (10)
travel and automotive; (11) advertising and print-
ing; (12) equipment maintenance and repairs; (13)
special supplies and expenses; (14) office and
administrative expenses; (15) equipment purchase;
(16) equipment or space rental; (17) state aid;
(18) capital outlays; (19) debt service; and (20)
pensions and other retirement payments.
Supplementary Budget. An appropriation submitted to the
Council after the main budget has been approved.
Syndicate. A group of investment bankers who buy (under-
write) "wholesale" a new bond issue from the issu-
ing authority and offer it for resale to the gene-
ral public.
Take-Down. The discount from the list price allowed to a
member of an underwriting account on any bonds sold
(sometimes referred to as a take-down concession).
Tax Anticipation Notes. TANs are issued by states or muni-
cipalities to finance current operations in antici-
pation of future tax receipts. The total estimated
tax anticipation notes are determined by the Col-
lector-Treasurer and approved by the City Council.
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Term Bond. A bond of an issue that has a single maturity.
Total Debt. The sum of net direct debt and overlapping debt.
Trading Market. The secondary market for issued bonds.
Trustee. A bank designated as the custodian of funds and
official representative of bondholders.
Underwriter. A bank, dealer or other financial institution
that purchases new issues of securities for resale.
Unencumbered Balance. The amount remaining, against which
encumbrances still can be made. It is the current
appropriation (net of transfers) less actual total
expenditures, and unpaid encumbrances.
Unfunded Pension Liability. Unfunded actuarial liability is
equal to the actuarial liability of active and
retired members less assets.
Unissued Debt. Bonds which have been authorized for sale by
the City of Boston but which in fact have not been
sold
.
Unlimited Tax Bond. A bond secured by pledge of taxes that
may be levied in unlimited rate or amount.
Unliquidated Balance. That portion of the contract that has
not actually been paid to the contractor.
Yield. The rate of annual income return on an investment,
expressed as a percentage.
Zero-Based Budget ( ZBB ) . A form of program budget which
requires each program or governmental subdivision
to justify not only the increase in its budget but
each aspect of its budget every year.
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INTRODUCTION
Summary - Fiscal 1984
It will not be easy for Boston to achieve FY 1984
revenue estimates of $944.5 million. The City is in its
fourth and last year of mandatory reductions in the amount
it may raise from its principal revenue source, the property
tax, and there are no alternative taxes that can be adjusted
to make up the the difference. Non-tax revenues had been
increased through across-the-board adjustments only two
years earlier. Gaps between revenues and expenditures had
to be filled by whatever was available: the sale of valua-
ble properties, which in themselves are revenue producers.
Now, at the half-way point through fiscal 1984, it
appears that the City's revenue estimates for the year are
reasonable. Undoubtedly, there will be shortfalls in some
areas, but it is also likely that there will be offsetting
increases in others. All of the City's major revenue sour-
ces are essentially fixed in the amounts they will contri-
bute: estimated property taxes — to a statutorily allow-
able level; state aid — to the cherry sheet estimates; and
federal revenue sharing — to an amount allocated by formula.
Revenue risks lie in the possibility for shortfalls
among the several hundred (relatively small) accunts classi-
fied as departmental revenues; from the City's hospital rev-
enues; and from taxpayers who do not pay the taxes they owe.
Offsetting these contingencies is the expectation
that total property sales are now expected to raise more
revenue than was originally estimated — besides garages,
there are sales of schools, properties taken for unpaid
taxes, and abandoned housing projects.
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Summary - Fiscal 1985 and Fiscal 1986
Revenue projections are more routine in this post-
Proposition 2-1/2 era since the increase in property taxes
is confined by two statutory provisions:
o The City's levy may increase each year
by 2.5%, if the ratio of the adjusted
levy to total assessed valuations is no
g; ?.ater than 2.5%, and
o There may be an additional increase in
the levy for properties which have eith-
er increased in value by 50% or more
over thf1 previous fiscal year or were
tax exempt; if the ration of the adjust-
ed levy to total assessed valuations is
no greater than 2.5%
In future fiscal years the city would again receive
revenues from the state, from the federal government, and
from its own nontax sources. For fiscal 1985 and fiscal
1986 it is reasonable to apply basically the same assump-
tions to these estimated increases as were used for the cur-
rent fiscal year: that the city will receive an increase of
approximately $25 million in state aid above the previous
fiscal year (based on the potential for economic growth in
the state's major taxes and on the retention of Boston's
share of the total); that federal revenue sharing will be
level funded and, that the requirement that departmental
revenue estimates may not exceed the previous fiscal year's
receipts (unless otherwise documented) will apply except for
hospitals, interest, and in-lieu of tax payments.
The key element for projecting future fiscal year
revenues is the estimation of the amount of new construction
to be completed during the calendar year preceding the com-
mencement of a fiscal year. The estimated full value of new
construction expected to be completed in 1984 and 1985 and a
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description of how the new values would be applied in the
levy calculation for fiscal 1985 and 1986 is provided in
detail in this chapter.
For fiscal 1985, the 2.5% allowable increase in the
levy would produce an additonal $8.3 million in new reve-
nues, and the estimated new valuations from new construction
could add an additional $8.9 million.
For fiscal 1986, the 2.5% allowable increase in the
levy would produce an additional $8.8 in the levy, and the
additional valuations from new construction is estimated to
allow an additional $38.3 million.
Total fiscal 1985 revenues, from all of the sources
identified above, are estimated to be $920 million and total
fiscal 1986 revenues, from the same sources, are estimated
to be $1.0 billion. These amounts do not include property
sales, transfers and non-recurring revenues.
The following sections discuss the outlook for all
of the City's categories of recurring revenues.
THE BOSTON ECONOMY
It is generally assumed that the economy of the
state is considerably more important to the state's revenues
than the economy of the city is to the city's. This is
because the state's principal revenue sources (income,
sales, and corporate taxes) are widely described as economy
driven. The effect of inflation on wages and salaries for
the past five years has caused the following annual in-
creases in tax revenues: income (8% to 14%), sales (6% to
13%), and corporate excise (1% to 20%). These are tax
revenue increases which the state can virtually count on
without any active change in rates or tax laws.
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In contrast, Boston's (and other cities' and
towns') principal revenue sources, the property tax, has
been viewed as economically sluggish and unresponsive to the
growth potential of an inflationary economy. Increases in
tax rates or the tax base — active events — are required
to produce increases in property tax revenues. In Massachu-
setts, it is not customary to describe the property tax as
economy-related, particularly since local assessors have
been reluctant to make even periodic changes in property
valuations. Only in the most recent three years, since the
passage of Proposition 2-1/2, has this situation changed.
Revaluations have been implemented in all but a handful of
the state's cities and towns and there is progress, if not
yet successful, in the use of computer-assisted systems for
updating valuations. When regularly updated property valua-
tions are a routine event, the property tax will be found to
be as responsive to economic changes as the state's sources
of tax revenues.
For Boston, the prospect is favorable for an
economy-driven tax base, one capable of producing annual
increases in property tax revenues. The outlook is good for
both residential and commercial properties. In part, this
reflects the City's implementation, in 1983, of a long post-
poned revaluation. The 1983 revaluation resulted in resi-
dential and commercial property tax rates which compare fav-
orably with those of the suburban cities and towns of metro-
politan Boston.
The economic impact of relatively moderate property
taxes, the capitalization effect, can be expected to have a
highly beneficial impact on the value of the city's residen-
tial properties. In the current fiscal year, the effective
tax rate for residential properties is 1.7%, comfortably
below the 2.5% limit. The city's housing prices are also
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rising due to a shortage in supply and to the impact of
inflation on new house construction costs. The city's stock
of existing housing is a financial resource with a strong
potential for economic growth. By capturing the market's
effect on property values, through frequent tax valuation
adjustments, the City is able to benefit (subject to limita-
tions) from this growth in its economic base.
Property tax revenues can also be economy-driven
through the impact on commercial properties of the demand
for office space. Fortunately for Boston, this demand is a
growing one and the City is in a strong postition to direct-
ly benefit.
During the period 1979-1983, the City's tax base
expanded dramatically from the construction of office build-
ings and hotels in the downtown district and the construc-
tion of health, education and cultural facilities in many
sections of Boston. The City's new construction has been
extraordinarily visible evidence of the city's economic
vigor and reflects an estimated $1.5 billion in construction
costs
.
The structure of Boston's economy is markedly dif-
ferent from the state's. Although both the City and the
state as a whole have the largest percentage of total em-
ployees in the services sector — Boston 35.3%, the state —
26%; Boston's service sector is one-third of its total em-
ployment while the state's service sector is one quarter.
The state's second largest employment sector is manufactur-
ing — 24.2%, whereas for Boston, manufacturing employment
represents less than 10% of the total. Another distinctive
difference between the City and the state is employment in
the finance, insurance, and real estate sector. In Boston,
14% of total employment is in this business category; for
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the state as a whole, less than half as much — only 6.4% is
employed in the finance sector.
TABLE 1
STRUCTURE OF BOSTON'S EMPLOYMENT
COMPARED WITH THE STATE, 1982
SOURCE
Sector
Services
Government
Trade
Finance
Manufacturing
Other
TOTAL
Boston — BRA;
ment Security.
Boston
35.3%
16.3
14.7
14.0
9.1
10.6
100.0%
State — Mass
State
26.0%
14.0
21.7
6.4
24.2
7.7
100.0%
Division of Employ-
The backbone of Boston's economic growth has been
in the employment classification called "services". In
Massachusetts, services are considered to be largely export
activities because of the many out-of-state users for the
state's health and education facilities and the extent to
which Massachusetts business services are marketed in the
adjacent New England states. Service activities have also
been demonstrated to be more recession-proof than most manu-
facturing industries, with the strong employment record of
the most recent years as the best evidence. In Boston, as
outlined in Table 2, the largest sub-classes of service em-
ployees are health and hospitals, business and advertising,
and education.
The growth in city, metropolitan area, and state
employment, even during the most recent years of national
recession, is summarized in Table 3.
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TABLE 2
COMPOSITION OF SERVICES
EMPLOYMENT, BOSTON 1980
Service Numbers Employed
Health and Hospitals
Business and Advertising
Education
Professional
(Engineering, Architectural
Research, Auditing)
Social Services
Legal Services
Hotel and Lodging
Membership Organizations
Auto Repair
Personal Service
Amusement and Recreation
Other
TOTAL
59, 776
35,205
24, 112
20,638
12,648
8, 362
5,974
5,617
4, 371
4,127
2,819
4, 342
187.991
SOURCE : BRA
TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT IN BOSTON AND
THE REST OF THE STATE, 1979-1983
SECTOR
Manufacturing
Construction
Transportation
& public
utilities
Wholesale &
retail trade
Finance
Services
Government
TOTAL
Amount of Change
Boston Rest of State
( in thousands
)
(4.9)
0.4
(0.1)
(3.2)
12.9
13.2
(6.6)
11.7
(52.9)
(2.3)
(1.4)
4.3
9.8
76.1
(42.2)
-8.6
Percent of Change
Boston Rest of State
-9 %
+4
-4
+20
+ 7
-7
2 %
-9 %
-4
-2
+1
+ 12
+ 18
-13
%
SOURCE: Boston Employment Share: BRA, August 1983; Boston
Labor Market and Statewide Employment: Massachu-
setts Division of Employment Security.
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The city's largest area of economic growth during
1979-1983 was in services (13,200 new jobs). Boston's per-
centage increase in service employment for this period was
less than the state's -- 7% compared with 18% — but its
initial base was large, almost one-third of the state's
total service employment. The second largest area of
employment increase was in finance (12,900 new jobs, an
increase of 20%). The growth in these two areas was suffi-
cient to offset employment losses in other sectors, and to
result in overall growth in the city's total employment dur-
ing a period in which the state sustained a slight loss.
Overall, Boston is in a good position to capture
the benefits of its strong economy in increasing tax reve-
nues. Growth in the City's tax revenues can come not only
from the valuations of the new downtown office buildings,
but from the valuations of a wide range of other city com-
mercial and industrial properties whose occupants' busi-
nesses are stimulated by a strong, downtown office economy
such as Boston's. Strong businesses create a demand for
space; and, it is the demand for space that generates the
strong economic rents on which 31% of Boston's commercial
property tax revenues are based.
OVERVIEW OF THE CITY'S REVENUES
Fiscal 1984 revenues are noteworthy for three
reasons. It is the first year — probably in the City's
history -- in which the share of Boston's total revenues
expected from property taxes (35%) almost equals the reve-
nues the City will receive from the state (32%). Only four
years ago, in fiscal 1980, property taxes raised 54% of the
City's total revenue and state aid represented 23% of the
total. Fiscal 1984 state aid is $42.1 million above the
previous year amount.
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Boston's Revenues by
Source: FY 1980 to FY 1984
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
I
m (Projected)
Fiscal Year
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Second, $72. 5 million (8%) of the City's fiscal
1984 estimated total revenues is derived from sources that
cannot be repeated in future years. Surplus revenues,
totalling $53.7 million, in two funds — the Disproportion-
ate Assessment Fund and the fiscal 1982 Overlay Deficit
Reserve Fund -- will be transferred to the City's General
Fund.
Additionally, $18.5 million is anticipated from the
sale of city garages. The figures for fiscal 1983 indicate
that other nonrecurring revenues were $20.8 million, and in
the previous five fiscal years they ranged from $253,000 to
$5 million.
The third noteworthy revenue event of fiscal 1984
is that Boston's property levy, in the third year of reduc-
tions after the adoption of Proposition 2-1/2, achieved the
level of 2.5% of total assessed valuations. The amount to
be raised by property taxes in fiscal 1984 is $333.3 mil-
lion, $161 million below the amount of property taxes col-
lected in fiscal 1981, the year prior to the implementation
of Proposition 2-1/2. Property taxes have declined 32.6%
from the fiscal 1981 high point.
The combination of these three fiscal 1984 revenue
events results in above-average revenues for the city. As
summarized in Table 4, fiscal 1984 revenue is $95.6 million
above the average of the three previous fiscal years.
In fiscal 1984, the property tax is Boston's larg-
est source of revenues, comprising 35% of the total. Three
additional taxes, the Urban Redevelopment excise (Chapter
121A), the Motor Vehicle excise, and Boston's share of state
racing taxes, are anticipated to raise an additional 3% of
the City's total revenues. Departmental revenues — from
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TABLE 4
BOSTON REVENUES FY 1979 - FY 1984
(dollars in millions)
Revenue Est.
Source FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984
Total Taxes:
Property $414. 8 $494. 3 $416. 7 $354,.4 $333..3
121-A 11. 6 13. 5 15. 23 , . 1 18..0
Motor Vehicles 16. 4 11. 2 6. 8 7 ,. 5 7 . , 5
Racing n/a N/A N/A 0,.6 0.,6
TOTAL TAXES 442. 3 518. 9 438. 4 385..5 359.,4
Departmental Revs:
City 39. 6 41. 9 51. 8 76.,4 79..6
Health/Hospitals 72. 6 80. 2 93. 7 98,.2 113..8
County 7. 6 6. 3 11. 5..6 5..6
Schools 3. 2 0. 6 0. 7 1..0 0..9
Parking Meters 2. 2. 0. 7 .0 .0
TOTAL DEPART. 125. 131. 157. 8 181..1 199..9
State Aid:
Teachers Pensions 17
.
2 18. 19. 20..0 19..8
Other 163. 4 169. 8 193. 3 237,.3 274..9
TOTAL STATE AIDx v_y x n i—i i_> x n x xj j_ j—/ 180. 7 187. 8 212. 2 257
.
2 294 7
Federal Aid: 22. 5 21. 9 20. 7 18 . 9 18
.
.
Transfers and Other
Available Funds:
Cemetery, other 1. 1 0. 3 5. 2 20..8 0..0
D.A. Fund Surplus • • <.0 34..1
Sales • • .0 18.,5
Overlay Surplus • • *.0 19..6
TOTAL TRANSFERS 1. 1 0. 3 5. 2 20..8 72..5
GRAND TOTAL $722. $859. 8 $834. 4 $863..0 $944..5
SOURCE: FY 1980-FY 1983 — Auditor's Office, Boston; FY 1984
— Tax Rate Recapitulation and "Cherry Sheet" Depart-
ment of Revenue.
several dozen sources of charges, fees, fines and reimburse-
ments — will contribute 21% of Boston's total revenues.
The largest single source, comprising 12% of total revenues,
is from the City's hospitals. Intergovernmental revenues,
from the state and federal governments, represent 34% of
total City revenues. The federal share will be slightly
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below the previous year's fiscal 1983 amount and represents
2% of the City's total.
Own-Source City Revenues
Boston's overall revenue pattern is similar to
other cities'. In fiscal 1981, the most recent year for
which U.S. comparable figures are available, 80% of Boston's
total own-source revenues came from taxes, compared with an
average of 70% for 46 other U.S. cities with populations in
excess of 300,000. Since fiscal 1981, Boston's property and
motor vehicle tax revenues have declined by one-third. It
is probable that the share of Boston revenue coming from
taxes is now below the national average, but that the compo-
sition of its tax revenues -- compared with the U.S. aver-
age -- is unchanged. In fiscal 1981, property taxes repre-
sented 99% of Boston's tax revenues compared with a U.S.
average for other cities of 44%. Even with the one-third
drop in fiscal 1981-fiscal 1984 property taxes, Boston's
heavy reliance on this revenue source exceeds that of com-
parable U.S. cities.
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TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE OWN-SOURCE REVENUES, FISCAL 1981
(percent of total revenues)
Boston U.S. Average City*
TAXES
Property 79 % 31 %
Sales n/a 11
-X. JL
Alcoholic Beverages n/a
Motor Fuels n/a o
Public Utilities n/a 4
Tobacco n/a
Other n/a 2
I income n/a 15
M . V • Licenses n/a 1
Other 1 4
TOTAL TAXES 80 70
FHnna f "i r^n i
n 1J.
XXV^/Of-ZJL LUXC 11-L. JL 3
Seweraae 2 4
Rani faf i on
Parks. Recreation 1JL
Hons i no o 2
Ai rDorts n/a 3
Wafpr Tran^nnrt1rV <_-L l_ Va> J_ XX. <_1 X X O k-' v / X. i_ n/a 1
_I_
Parking 1 1
Commercial N/A
Other 1 2
TOTAL CHARGES 16 18
MISCELLANEOUS
Assessments 1
Sales 1
Interest 3 7
Fines 1 2
Other 2
TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS 4 12
GRAND TOTAL 100 % 100 %
Note: Parts may not sum to totals due to rounding.
0% = less than 1%
N/A = Not Applicable
* Forty-seven cities
SOURCE: Table 8 "Finances of Individual City Governments
Having 300,000 Population or More, 1980-81", City
Government Finances in 1980-81 , U.S. Bureau of the
Census, December 1982.
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PROPERTY TAX REVENUES FISCAL 1985 AND FISCAL 1986
Amount to be Raised in FY 1985
The property tax is the primary source of Boston's
revenues, as it is for all Massachusetts cities and towns.
In the current fiscal year this tax is estimated to produce
$333.3 million for the City, and in fiscal 1985 it is expec-
ted to raise no less than $341.6 million. The minimum
amount of revenue expected from this source is known since
it is a statutory calculation (described below) ; the problem
with the amount is that it allows the City only $8.3 million
in new budgetary revenues, an amount insufficient to cover
increases in the City's fixed costs. This problem of allow-
able property tax increases which barely, or do not, cover
fixed cost increases is a common one for Massachusetts cit-
ies and towns. Each has its own way of coping with the lim-
itation. Boston is among the state's fortunate localities
in that there is a prospect for further revenues.
TABLE 6
BOSTON TAX REVENUES FY 1979 - FY 1984
(dollars in millions)
Revenue Est.
Source FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984
Property Taxes $414.8 $494.3 $416.7 $354.4 $333.3
Urban Redevelop-
ment Excise
(Chapter 121-A) 11.6 13.5 15.0 23.1 18.0
Motor Vehicle
Excise 16.4 11.2 6.8 7.5 7.5
Racing N/A N/A N/A 0.6 0.6
TOTAL TAXES $442.3 $518.9 $438.4 $385.5 $359.4
SOURCE: FY 1980-FY 1983 — Auditor's Office, Boston; FY 1984
— Tax Rate Recapitulation, Department of Revenue.
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Impact of Proposition 2-1/2
Due to the success of Boston's economy, and the
resulting enormous growth in new construction, the estimation
of the City's property tax revenues is still a matter of con-
jecture. If it were not for the expansion of its property tax
base, the calculation of revenues available from this source
would be as routine as it is in most of the state's other cit-
ies and towns since the adoption of Proposition 2-1/2. The
overall property tax rate can be no greater than an effective
2.5 percent of the locality's total assessed valuations, and
its annual increase in the tax levy cannot increase more than
2.5 percent (without an approval through a referendum vote),
with one significant exception. In 1981, the Proposition
2-1/2 law was amended to exclude from the limit on the annual
levy increase, any increases in parcel valuations in excess of
50% of the previous year or a previously exempt property.
Such increases frequently result from building construction
(or reconstruction).
For the past three years, Proposition 2-1/2 forced
the City to reduce the amount of revenue it could collect from
the property tax. Due to these reductions, and also the re-
valuation of city properties, Boston is in a position in 1985
to take advantage of both the allowable annual increase in the
levy (of 2.5 percent) and of the 1981 growth amendment.
The calculation of the allowable increase in revenues
from the annual 2.5 percent increase is a relatively simple
matter; but the calculation of what property valuations may be
coming onto the assessment books for the first time (as of
January 1, 1984) is a considerably less routine issue. The
calculation of the annual increase would be even simpler ex-
cept for one problem still facing the City in fiscal 1985:
its fiscal 1984 effective tax rate is precisely at the 2.5%
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limit and the Commissioner of Revenue has ruled there may be
no allowable levy increase if the ratio of the increased levy
to assessed valuation exceeds 2.5%. In other words, the
effective 2.5% tax rate limit, once reached, may not be ex-
ceeded .
For this report, calculations of possible increases
in both the existing and prospective tax bases were undertaken
to demonstrate the City's potential from these revenue sour-
ces. This section discusses the administrative problems fac-
ing the Assessor's office and addresses why the property tax
is one of the most difficult to collect. This section does
not present the issues concerning the administration of the
property tax. (See Assessing.) In discussing the economic
potential for new tax revenues, even from established in-
creases in property values, the following must be considered:
o Tne difficulties of establishing the
valuations for tax purposes.
o Defending the valuations in instances of
legal challenge.
o Handling the political impact of too
great, or too disproportionate, a tax
change
.
Revenue Projections from the Existing Tax Base
Interviews with persons associated with property
tax administration, both within Boston and at the state
government level, indicated that there is a potential for
property valuation increases in the existing tax base. The
potential is in the extent to which current assessments are
below full fair cash (100%) valuations and in the prospects
for value growth due to economic change. Annual 2.5% in-
creases in the City's tax levy can easily be met, without
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conflict from statutory limits on over assessment, from
increases in the values of existing properties. To develop
this further, to see what sections of the City and what
properties might serve as the resource for this annual levy
growth, figures were developed by ward and property class.
The fiscal 1984 tax rate was set on a total tax
base of $13.3 billion. A breakdown of this base appears in
Table 7. The residential class of properties is the largest
single property class and is comprised of single family
residences (which includes condominiums), two and three
family residences, residential properties containing four or
more dwelling units, and resident ial/commercial properties
(properties in which the ground floor is commercial and
there are one or a few dwelling units above).
TABLE 7
COMPOSITION OF FISCAL 1984 TAX BASE
(dollars in thousands)
Residential $6,169.2
Commercial 4,563.4
Industrial 776.3
Personal 1, 821 .8
TOTAL $13, 330.7
SOURCE: FY 1984 Tax Rate Recapitulation, Department of Rev-
enue
.
In September 1983, the City's Commissioner of
Assessing published a study of the changes in assessment-
sales ratios in the City. The purpose of the study was two-
fold: (1) to document the factors used to increase valua-
tions between fiscal 1983 and fiscal 1984, and (2) to demon-
strate how a future system could be developed, and applied,
for the maintenance of valuations. In reviewing property
sales to determine patterns of economic change, the basic
unit for analysis were trending regions.
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The study's key results, applicable to the present
task of estimating the revenue potential for fiscal 1985,
were the relative percentage changes in property values
among the City's trending regions. The changes are those
which appear probable based on recent economic evidence
(property sales). Although the trending regions differ from
wards — and only ward assessed valuations were available —
there is sufficient conformity between the two to adapt the
study's geographic delineations.
A second resource available for the projection of
property tax revenues from the existing base was a study of
the assessment-sales ratios of properties prior to the
implementation of the revaluation. Although the study was
completed prior to the implementation of the revaluation,
and prior to the factored increases of fiscal 1984, it pre-
sents estimates of full cash values for residential sub-
classes to allow revenue estimators outside of the asses-
sor's office to evaluate single, double, and triple dwelling
unit properties separately from the sub-classes which have
four or more dwelling units. In addition, the study also
presents comparable information on assessment-sales ratios
by the trending regions, extending the evidence of market
value changes over a still longer period of time.
The methodology of estimating a low and high range
of increased property tax revenues for fiscal 1985 from the
existing tax base was as follows:
1. Each ward was assigned an association
with one of the trending regions (of
the Assessor's report).
2. The preliminary assessed value of all
residential properties was adjusted by
a factor (a ratio of 0.77%) calculated
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from the assessed valuation of residen-
tial properties appearing on the recap-
itulation report submitted to the Com-
missioner of Revenue.
3. The assessed valuation of residential
properties with four or more dwelling
units was separated from the total
residential class and aggregated with
commercial and industrial properties.
4. A factor of 2.5% was applied to all
single family residential properties in
the wards which the Assessor's 1983
sales trending study indicated had
average, or below average, value in-
creases .
5. A factor of 5.0% was applied to all
single family residential properties in
the wards which the Assessor's 1983
sales trending study indicated had
above-average value increases.
The resulting projections, using both an across-
the-board 2.5% increase (as the low estimate factor) and a
selective two-level factor approach (as the high estimate)
indicate that it would be economically feasible in fiscal
1985 for the City to raise its tax base in the ranges shown
in Table 8 over the fiscal 1984 levels. The selective fac-
tor approach applies a 5% increase to downtown commercial
properties and to those residential properties which the
trending studies indicate had the highest market value
changes
.
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TABLE 8
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATION OF INCREASES IN THE
EXISTING TAX BASE
(dollars in millions)
Increases at
Valuation Selective
At 2.5% Percentages
Residential $163.7 $231.5
Commercial/
Industrial 138.0 222.5
TOTAL $301.7 $454.0
In fiscal 1985 the allowable 2.5% increase in the
City's levy, above the fiscal 1984 level, totals $8.3 mil-
lion. (See Table 10.) The application of across the board
increases of 2.5% to residential and commercial/industrial
properties, would increase the City's total assessed valua-
tions from $13.3 billion (the amount used by the Commis-
sioner of Revenue in calculating the City's fiscal 1984 levy
limit) to $13.6 billion. To determine whether the City's FY
1985 levy would be under, equal with, or above the overall
2.5% ceiling, the proposed fiscal 1985 levy of $341.6 mil-
lion would be divided by the projected base of $13.6 bil-
lion. The resulting effective tax rate would equal 2.5%.
Even if Boston were to rely solely on its existing fiscal
1984 tax base, the City could use all of the allowable $8.3
million increase in its fiscal 1985 levy.
Estimated Increases from New Construction FY 1985
The source of data on anticipated new properties
for the City's tax base is the Boston Redevelopment Author-
ity (BRA). The BRA receives the estimates for new construc-
tion projects from developers at the time the project's
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plans are submitted for approval. The Authority's listings
arrange the developments by the year in which they are to be
completed and are periodically revised. Such a revision
occurred during the first week in January 1984, and the
results show a significant impact on the revenues the City
can anticipate collecting in fiscal 1985 compared with earl-
ier projections.
From the viewpoint of estimating City revenues, it
is the calendar year preceding the calendar year in which
the fiscal year begins that is significant: For fiscal
1985, new development projects must have been completed
during calendar year 1983 and for fiscal 1986 the relevant
projects are those completed during calendar year 1984. The
BRA's January revision of the projects expected to be com-
pleted during 1983 shows five significant deletions as the
completion was shifted from 1983 to 1984. These projects
and their estimated valuations are: Marriott ($133 mil-
lion), Copley Place ($130 million), Dewey Square ($110 mil-
lion), 53 State Street ($100 million) and Four Seasons ($42
million)
.
The shift in construction dates for the above prop-
erties reflects a number of events which have arisen in
connection with the full occupancy and use of these proper-
ties -- labor disputes, postponed occupancies on the part of
major tenants, under-subscribed leases, as well as normal
delays which frequently impact large (and small) construc-
tion projects. Since the new properties expected on the
City's tax base make a critical difference in the amount of
revenues the City can anticipate in fiscal 1985 — both from
the allowable 2.5% increase in the levy over the previous
year and in the added value of first-time assessments (which
may be added to the levy on top of the 2.5%) — the BRA's
construction listings were reviewed in some detail.
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In constructing an inventory of the valuations of
properties that can be anticipated as new for the fiscal
1985 tax base, there were certain properties included on the
BRA listings which must be excluded for tax review pur-
poses: properties listed as falling under the Chapter 121A
provisions, properties which by their nature (educational,
medical or cultural institutions) are exempt from the prop-
erty tax, and economic development (EDIC) properties subject
to special payment arrangements with BRA. In addition, two
developments on Massachusetts Port Authority properties were
excluded, to be conservative and in recognition of the prob-
ability that legal disputes could arise regarding tax reve-
nues from these sources.
In projecting tax base values from the BRA's list-
ings, it is necessary to apply a full adjustment factor to
account for financing and other development related costs
which do not show up in the amounts submitted by a developer
to the BRA. Since the adjustment factor significantly in-
flates the construction figures, it seemed critical to con-
firm the reasonableness of this adjustment factor. Inter-
views with persons familiar with commercial and industrial
construction projects, with members of the BRA staff, and
with persons holding responsible positions in one of the
City's largest commercial real estate development firms and
in one of the City's largest construction companies, con-
firmed the application of such a factor to account for the
difference between construction costs and the full value of
completed projects. The additional costs were termed "soft
costs". They include the fees of architects, lawyers, and
other specialists plus the cost of borrowing funds. In add-
ition, there is land cost. Since there can be no one per-
centage figure which is equally applicable to all projects,
ranges were chosen which appeared to reasonably approximate
the total of these soft costs for different types of con-
struction and downtown or neighborhood sites.
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For the present purposes of revenue estimating, by
applying different full cost factors it was feasible to
project the values of broad property categories. Rehabili-
tation and conversion properties, although separately iden-
tified by the BRA, were treated as one sub-class. These
properties were instead separated by the size of the proj-
ect, with a separation between those estimated to cost $>5
million or above from those estimated at less than $5 mil-
lion. New construction costing $5 million or above was in a
class of its own. New construction costing less than $5
million was aggregated with rehab and conversion properties.
The justification for regrouping construction proj-
ects into categories above and below &5 million, for the
purpose of applying a full cost adjustment factor, was the
reported fact that the cost of interest (a substantial por-
tion of all soft costs) is less for the smaller projects.
These projects are often able to receive short term con-
struction loans, repayable in less than one year.
The full cost adjustment factor applied to rehabil-
itation, conversion, and new projects costing less than $5
million was 1.18 — reflecting an assumption that these
projects' soft costs approximate 15% of full value. The
full cost adjustment factor applied to rehabilitation and
conversion projects costing &5 million or above was 1.33 —
reflecting an assumption that these projects' soft costs
approximate 25% of full value. The full cost adjustment
factor applied to new projects costing $5 million or above
was 1.54 — reflecting an assumption that these projects'
soft costs approximate 35% of full value.
Another adjustment to the BRA figures was necessary
before estimates could be developed; an estimate was
required to account for the portion of final development
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costs that it was reasonable to believe would have been cap-
tured by the City's assessors in the year, or years, between
the commencement of construction and completion. Based on
interviews with City officials, different assumptions were
adopted in calculating this adjustment. Average deduction
of 20% -- for previous year's tax assessments on properties
costing $5 million or above — was in some instances amended
to 30%. City officials had noted that owners of a few of
Boston's major development projects considered the pre-
completion date assessments on their properties to be
excessive. The $5 million cut-off was adopted on the
grounds that projects costing less than this amount were
likely to be completed in less than one year; or, to be so
insignificant an investment in the first year as not to have
been valued for tax purposes.
TABLE 9
FISCAL 1985 ESTIMATED TAX BASE INCREASE
FROM NEW CONSTRUCTION
(dollars in millions)
Construction Costs as % of Development Costs
Property
Type @ 85% @ 75% @ 65% Total
(1.18) (1.33) (1.54)
Office $36.8 $6.8 $20.0 63.6
Retail 5.9 .0 .0 5.9
Transportation/Parking .0 .0 3.5 3.5
Industrial 2.7 .0 .0 2.7
Residential 13.3 .0 9.0 22.3
Hotels/Other .0 .0 122.3 122.3
TOTAL $58.7 $6.8 $154.8 $220.3
Less Previous FY
Assessment NA (-1.2) -29.2 (30.4)
Plus Full Develop-
ment Cost Factor 10.6 2.0 83.6. 96.2
NET TOTAL $69.3 $7.6 $209.2 $286.1
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The combined total of the three property categories
is $286.1 million (see Table 9), but for revenue estimating
purposes they must be further reclassified. In calculating
how much the City may increase its levy due to new construc-
tion, residential properties must be separated from commer-
cial and industrial, since the calculation of the added levy
allowance from new construction uses each property class's
previous fiscal year tax rate.
New 1983 construction would allow for an additional
$8.9 million in the levy. Combined with the 2.5% increase
of $8.3 million, this would mean $17.2 million in increased
fiscal 1985 property tax revenues.
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED FISCAL 1985 TAX LEVY
(dollars in millions)
Previous Fiscal 1984 Tax Levy $ 333.3
Allowable 2.5% Levy Increase x 1.025
Fiscal 1985 Base Levy
^ 341 g
New Est. Calendar Year 1984 Estimted Net Construction Values
Commercial/industrial (C/l) Valuations $ 259.3
Previous Fiscal 1984 C/l Tax Rate x 32.54
Estimated allowable increase $^ 8.4
Residential valuations (R) $ 26.8
Previous Fiscal 1984 R Tax Rate x 17.10
Estimated allowable increase $ .
5~
Total Est. Levy Increase from New Construction $ 8.9
Total Est. Fiscal 1985 Tax Levy $ 350.5
Total Est. Levy Increase FY1984-FY1985 $ 17.2
An alternative lower estimate, for new calendar
year 1984 construction provided by the Assessor's office in
the last week in December of $175 million, instead of
$286.1 million, would result in $12.9 million in increased
property tax revenues in fiscal 1985 relative to fiscal 1984
instead of the $17.2 million shown in Table 10. A higher
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alternative estimate, one which applies the same full cost
adjustment factor to all new construction (instead of the
lower factors used in the above methodology for projects
costing of less than $5 million), produces an increase in
the fiscal 1985 levy of $0.7 million. The slight difference
resulting from this approach reflects the extent to which
major new construction dominates the total levy increase
(due to new construction completed in 1983).
The amount of new construction used in the revenue
estimate presented here ($286.1 million) when added to the
previous year's tax base of $13.3 billion (used for calcu-
lating the effective tax rate), results in a fiscal 1985
total of $13.6 billion. The fiscal 1985 levy, which would
includes the new construction valuations, would total $350.5
million. The resulting effective tax rate would equal 2.57%
or 0.07% above the allowable percent limit.
The City's existing tax base will have to be in-
creased in its valuations to bring the ratio down. This can
be accomplished by the assessors' office in several ways:
(1) by again assessing the major new construction for which
completion dates were postponed from calendar year 1983 to
1984 at partial-completion valuations (of less than 50%);
(2) by capturing values from the reconstruction of residen-
tial properties (remodeling projects that do not result in
increases of assessed valuations of more than 150% over the
previous year); and (3) by capturing increases in the market
values of existing properties due to inflation and the
effects of capitilization.
Increases in the levy
tions — defined as valuations
the individual parcels property
vious year's assessed value —
which come from new valua-
which increase the value of
by at least 150% of the pre-
provide a growth in the levy
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that exceeds the limits of the basic, annual 2.5% increase.
However, increasing the total levy places a burden on the
assessors to make sure that the existing tax base is also
increased so that the overall effective tax limit is not
surpassed. This will be a distinct, property tax admini-
stration issue for fiscal 1985. In future years, this may
be less of an issue, particularly after the expansion in the
property base which is anticipated in fiscal 1986.
Estimated Increases from New Construction FY 1986
The same methodology of reclassifying BRA reported
construction values and applying full cost adjustment fac-
tors and previous year assessments was used to estimate the
potential for increase in the fiscal 1986 levy. The results
are impressive. The postponed completion (into 1984) of
some of the City's largest development projects, combined
with already scheduled 1984 completion dates for other major
projects, results in an impressive $1.2 billion of new con-
struction that is projected for completion in that year.
(See Table 11.
)
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TABLE 11
FY 1986 TAX BASE INCREASE
FROM NEW CONSTRUCTION
(dollars in millions)
Construction Costs as Percentage of Development Costs
Property
Type @ 85% @ 75% @ 65% Total
\ l . lo ; \ i • j j j
Office $26.1 $27.0 $462.3 $515.4
Retail lo . z n• u ft n n 7ft 7
Transportation/Parking .0 .0 19.8 19.8
Industrial .0 .0 .0 .0
Residential 26.0 .0 29.0 55.0
Hotel & Other .0 14.0 175.6 189.6
TOTAL $68.3 $41.0 $746 .
7
$856 .0
Less Previous
FY Assessment NA (-8.2) (-69.7) (-77.9
Plus Develop-
ment Costs 12.3 13.5 403.2 429.0
NET TOTAL TAX
BASE INCREASE $80.6 $46.3 $1,080.2 $1,207.1
The effect of $1.2 billion in estimated new con-
struction values coming into the tax base for fiscal 1986
has a dramatic impact on allowable property tax revenues for
that year. New construction theoretically could produce an
additional $38.3 million in the allowable property tax levy
for fiscal 1986. (if FY 1983 residential and commercial/
industrial tax rates were the same as for fiscal 1984). The
increase in the levy from new construction, combined with
the allowable 2.5% increase, means that the City may be in a
position to increase its property tax levy by $47.1 million
in fiscal 1986.
Although potentially in a position to benefit from
such a sizeable increase in the levy, the City must meet the
approval of the Commissioner of Revenue by having the ratio
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of its levy to its total assessed valuations not exceed
2.5%. Here the effect of the new construction has a far
less fortunate impact on the City's revenues. The boost in
the levy, which results from new construction, causes the
levy to increase at a faster rate of change (10.9%) than the
new valuations added to the assessed valuation base (8.9%).
The cause for this differential in growth rates is the
application of any tax rate (the previous fiscal year's com-
mercial effective industrial rate) that is greater than
2.5%. The result: Boston's overall Fy 1986 effective tax
rate would exceed the 2.5% ceiling if it were to apply the
full value of the new construction for levy growth (See
Table 12). To use the new construction value in FY 1986,
the City would be required to increase the valuations of its
existing tax base.
TABLE 12
ESTIMATED FISCAL 1986 TAX LEVY
(dollars in millions)
Estimated Fiscal 1985 Levy $350.5
Allowable 2.5% Levy Increase xl .025
Estimated Fiscal 1986 Levy $359.3
New Calendar Year 1985 Est. Net Construction Values
Commercial/industrial (C/l) Valuations 1.100
Fiscal 1985 C/l Tax Rates x32 . 54
Estimated Increase $37.2
Residential Valuations (R) $64.9
Fiscal 1985 R Tax Rate x!7.10
81.
1
Total Est. Levy Increase for New Construction $38.3
Total Est. Fiscal 1986 Tax Levy $397.6
Total Est. Fiscal 1985 Tax Base $13,616.8
Total Est. Fiscal 1986 Valuation Increase From
New Construction $ 1 , 207 .
Total Est. Fiscal 1986 Tax Base $14823.9
Ratio of Fiscal 1986 Levy/Assessed Valuations 2.68
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The situation is a difficult one for the City.
After three years of property tax reductions it is now at
the mandatory 2.5% effective tax rate ceiling. However, it
now finds itself in the bind of either having to annually
increase the valuations of its existing tax base if its
revenues are to benefit from the new construction that will
soon be on its assessment books, or fore go the revenue it
is legally entitled to under the terms of Proposition 2-1/2.
Increasing the valuations of the existing tax base
by the selective application of 2.5% and 5% factors would
not be enought to bring the effective tax rate equal with
the 2.5% ceiling. Higher valuation adjustments to existing
properties would be required.
Of critical concern in the decision of which route
to follow, will be the administrative conditions of the
Assessor's office. There are good reasons to believe that
the City will have the potential to annually increase the
valuations of its existing base in order to enable the levy
to increase. The structure for a computer-assisted apprais-
al system, a necessity in a city the size of Boston if valu-
ations are to be adjusted annually or even biennially, was
inherited from the 1983 revaluation. Of equal significance
is the strength of the City's economy which appears to jus-
tify regular increases in property valuations as a reflec-
tion of increases in the market value of the City's prop-
erties .
The combination of an assessment system still in
the need for substantial modernization and the surge in con-
struction values compressed into two to three fiscal years
may prevent the City from fully benefiting from its own
revenue resources. In future years, there are strong pros-
pects that as the new assessments from new construction
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become part of the base and the levy growth slows to a level
closer to the routine 2.5% increase, the City's effective
tax rate will fall below the 2.5% ceiling and the City will
more easily capture the full value of its developing economy.
IV. BOSTON'S DEPARTMENTAL REVENUES
In fiscal 1984, $199.4 million or 21% of Boston's
General Fund revenues are anticipated from departmental
revenues. "Departmental revenues" is an umbrella title for
approximately 300 fees, licenses, fines, penalties and
charges for services administered by the City. Also includ-
ed in this category of revenue is income from rents, sales,
interest on investments and gifts. It is difficult to sum-
marize such a myriad group and when the City's finances are
debated they tend to be overlooked — in part, for this rea-
son.
This state, and its cities and towns, are frequent-
ly faulted for an under-reliance on these revenues. But it
would appear from a review of the most recent intercity
financial comparisons that Boston is not doing badly in this
area. In fiscal 1981, Boston's departmental revenues were
16% of the City's revenues — below, but only slightly, the
U.S. average of 18% for cities of 300,000 or above.
The City's authorization for fees, licenses, fines
and other charges parallels the state's. Fees may be set at
a level sufficient to recover the service costs for which
the fee is charged, but not beyond. Unlike taxes, these
revenues are not intended as general City revenues. Tax
revenues pay for programs benefiting all residents. Fees
and licenses provide for the recovery of costs for services
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which primarily benefit particular individuals or institu-
tions. A few examples are birth certificates, mooring per-
mits and bicycle registrations.
Since fiscal 1981, the City has increased the cost
of most of its fees, licenses, fines and other charges. In
1981, the Mayor's Office of Fiscal Affairs proposed
increases in two-thirds of the City's fee categories.
Although some proposals were rejected by the City Council,
most were approved and by the close of fiscal 1983 revenues
from these sources were $31 million, almost twice the fiscal
1981 level.
A review of the City's levels of charges should be
repeated. Ideally, a mechanism should be established which
automatically increases these charges in response to escal-
ating costs.
The following are Boston's major categories of
departmental revenues:
1. Health and Hospitals
The City's health and hospital revenues represent
over 50% of Boston's total departmental revenues. Total
revenues from the City's three hospitals (see the Health and
Hospitals chapter) have increased during the past five
years, but the growth is attributed only to Boston City Hos-
pital. Mattapan's revenues have declined and Long Island
Hospital's have been almost level. The patients at Mattapan
and Long Island hospitals are hospitalized for rehabilita-
tion, chronic and geriatric care. The annual patient days
of these two hospitals has been declining Fiscal 1981-1984
— Mattapan, 22% and Long Island Hospital, 25%.
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TABLE 13
REVENUE FROM CITY HOSPITALS
FY 1979 TO FY 1983
(dollars in millions)
FY 1979 FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983
Boston City $40.1 $53.9 $60.8 $74.7 $81.1
Long Island 6.4 9.4 10.4 11.3 10.8
Mattapan 7.4 7.9 8.3 7.6 6.3
Total $53.9 $71.2 $79.5 $93.6 $98.2
SOURCE: Auditor's Office
The principal sources of hospital revenues are
federal reimbursements from Medicaid and Medicare. Payments
from third party insurers are the third principal source.
Presently, there is approximately $15 million in federal
reimbursements which the hospitals classify as being at
risk. The risk reflects a federal audit which claims that
the hospitals over-charged for outpatient services. The
matter has not been settled. Entitlement disputes such as
this are not uncommon between local, state, and federal
governments and they generally require years to be settled.
While it is difficult to assign a probability to the risk
involved, a settlement in favor of the federal government
would generally result in repayment via reduced subsequent
entitlements
.
The City's public hospitals should possibly be con-
sidered for increased local aid. This increase would recog-
nize Boston's financial burden for providing medical care to
many of the City's transient and indigent population. Bos-
ton City Hospital, more than most of the state's municipal
hospitals, serves patients with below-average financial
resources. During the many years in which recipients of the
state's General Relief program were denied state medical
assistance, Boston City Hospital provided the necessary
medical care without reimbursement.
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2. Fees, Licenses and Permits
This general category includes approximately 300
fees, licenses and permits. In fiscal 1984, revenues from
these sources are estimated at $65.8 million, an increase of
5 percent over the previous fiscal year. Revenue increases
in this category occur principally when there are statutory
changes in fee levels, as in 1981. In the interim years,
collections of these revenues are relatively constant.
TABLE 14
REVENUES FROM LICENSES AND PERMITS
BEFORE AND AFTER 1981 CHANGES
(dollars in thousands)
FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983
Bui lding
Permits $1732 $2293 $3306 $5196
Street
Permits 188 N/A 572 616
Health
Inspection 229 N/A 388 477
Alcoholic Bev.
License 1469 1630 1567 1611
Entertainment
License 388 337 562 1175
Misc. Business
License 233 283 308 368
Cable TV N/A N/A N/A 425
Other 146 150 462 433
TOTAL $4,385 $4,884 $7,165 $10,299
SOURCE: Auditor's Office.
The largest subcategory of these revenues, licenses
and permits totals an estimated $10.3 million in fiscal
1984. Building inspections represent the largest item in
this group and generated $5.2 million of revenues in fiscal
1983 compared with $3.3 million for the previous year.
Table 14 reflects both the slow revenue growth of these
sources, and the slight step-up in revenue level which the
1981 law changes produced.
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The second and third largest items in this group
are for entertainment and alcoholic beverage licenses. Each
produced slightly more than $1 million in fiscal 1983. The
cost of alcoholic beverage licenses has not increased in
years and, accordingly, the revenues from this source remain
almost unchanged during the past five years.
3. Interest
The peak year for interest earned on the investment
of City funds was fiscal 1981 when $12.2 million was
received. In the most recent year, fiscal 1983, this had
declined to $9.9 million. Interest rates slowed during the
past year and the amount of City cash available for invest-
ment was relatively low due to the delayed issuance of prop-
erty tax bills. Interest income is expected to improve for
FY 1984 and FY 1985. With the sale of city properties, the
Treasurer will have a sizeable amount of cash available for
investment
.
4. Payments in lieu of Taxes
In lieu of tax payments are received from approxi-
mately two dozen tax-exempt institutions. The largest such
payment is from the Massachusetts Port Authority. The City
negotiated an agreement under which the Authority makes
annual payments based on a formula using passenger embarka-
tion counts and annual changes in the consumer price index,
i.e. a use-based formula with a provision for inflation.
The formula remains in effect for continuous five-year peri-
ods and is changeable only with five-year previous notice.
In the most recent and current years, Massport's in lieu of
tax payments approximate $4.6 million and represent the
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largest of the City's in lieu of tax payment agreements.
The City's in lieu of tax payments include revenues collect-
ed directly by the City under Ch. 121A , amounts which sup-
plement the excise authorized by this Chapter that is admin-
istered by the State.
TABLE 15
PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES
(dollars in thousands)
Source FY 1982 FY 1983
N. E. School of Law $13 $13
N. E. Deaconess Hosp. 42 42
N. E. Medical Center Hosp. 83 Ql.7 X
Digital Equipment 21 64
Redevelopment Authority 50
Blue Cross/Blue Shield 102 88
Old City Hall 259 197
Suffolk University 35 44
Harvard University 502 590
Northeastern University 30
Boston University 11 1,265
Urban Redev. Corp.-Ch. 121A 5,465 6,580
Mass. Port Authority 4,341 4,621
Other 11
TOTAL $10,904 $13,645
SOURCE: Auditor's Office
,
January 9, 1984
In lieu of tax payments exist for a variety
reasons. One such example might involve an educational
institution applying for approval from the BRA for a devel-
opment project on property which had previously been classi-
fied as taxable. An agreement, with no specific statutory
authority, would be negotiated between the applicant and the
BRA for annual in lieu of tax payments upon completion of
the development. The City is on uncertain legal grounds
with these arrangements; but, there are strong feelings on
the part of many that more, rather than fewer, such payments
should take place between the City and the institutions own-
ing properties classified as tax exempt. It is unlikely,
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however, that such agreements will become an area of revenue
growth since the City's educational, medical, and cultural
institutions also represent valuable resources which make a
substantial, and partially indirect, contribution to the
City's economy.
Rents
The City has lease agreements with private parking
operations which produce annual rental income. Recently,
rental income has approximated $3-$4 million per year. This
income should significantly decline in the future due to the
sale of several parking facilities. The City's rental
arrangements reflect different philosophies of property man-
agement. Six of the City's garages are leased on a percent-
age basis — 60% of daily revenues for five, 50% for the
sixth. The remaining 17 garages have been paying fixed
amounts of rent ranging from $3000 a year to $2.3 million.
Only two garages pay over $1 million, the average for the
remaining 15 is $164,000 per year.
The garage sold in fiscal 1984, Government Center,
was the one producing $2.3 million in rent. In fiscal 1985
the second of the two garages with rental income above
$1 million is also planning to be sold, the St. James gar-
age. The other two garages scheduled for fiscal 1985 sale
are Fort Hill and Killby Street, with rentals of $161,000
and $301,000 respectively.
It has proven attractive to the City to benefit
from the large, lump sum payments of the garage sales; and,
it may also be the case that city government is not in a
position to effectively manage commercial, lease proper-
ties. Percentage based rentals would appear preferable to
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fixed rentals; but considering the cash nature of the busi-
ness, these would require accounting and supervisory over-
sight .
6. Property Sales
Two types of City-owned properties have been for
sale in recent years -- abandoned schools and parking gar-
ages. The schools may, in time, become valuable properties
in their new uses, but resale values have been nominal. The
highest price listed among approximately 50 sales was
$225,000. Some schools were transferred for $1. Many sold
for $5, 000-S10, 000, others for $40,000, $60,000, and another
group at the $100,000 level. Some of these sales may pro-
duce future taxable revenues, but a review of disposition
documents suggests that much of these facilities' future use
will also be of a tax exempt nature.
The City's parking garages, on the other hand, have
commanded substantial sales prices. The Government Center
garage was recently sold for $22 million. In fiscal 1986
the City expects three other parking facilities for a total
sales price approximating $41 million.
The City's routine property sales involve fore-
closed, tax title properties. These sales continue to
occur, but at very low prices. The recent "garage sale"
activity producing sizeable revenues for the City will not
always be available in future years.
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7. Parking Fines
The fastest growing source of City revenues in the
past two fiscal years relates to parking fees and fines.
Prior to fiscal 1982, these sources had produced constant
annual revenues approximating $3 million. With the estab-
lishment of an Office of Parking Clerk, the City aggressive-
ly pursued a large backlog of parking tickets. In fiscal
1982 and fiscal 1983, revenues from this source soared to
$20 million and $25 million respectively. In fiscal 1984,
the City estimates collections at $26 million. Monthly col-
lections of 1983 were ahead of those for 1982 at an average
rate of 11.5%.
TABLE 16
REVENUES FROM PARKING FINES
(dollars in thousands)
1983 1982
Total Total
January $ 1,896 $ 1,300
February 317 1,630
March 2,460 1,890
April 1,223 1,514
May 4,929 2,763
June 3,216 380
July 610 2, 192
August 680 1,093
September 646 1,394
October 2,050 1,040
November 1,401 952
December 1,879* 2,461
$21,307 $19, 109
* Receipts thru 12/27/83.
SOURCE: Auditing Department, January 9, 1984
After the collections realized from fiscal 1984,
there could be concern that the backlog of outstanding park-
ing tickets would by now be substantially reduced. However,
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a study, commissioned by the City, estimated that there
would still be $60 million in uncollected parking fine lia-
bilities at the close of fiscal 1983.
The Department of Revenue's experience with tax
collections has demonstrated, however, that with the passage
of time there is a sharp reduction in the probability of
collecting amounts owed. The Department has also learned
from many years of enforcement experience that there is a
declining marginal value in the collection of past due pay-
ments.
For Boston, the hope of sustained, or increased,
revenues from this source is likely to require further
changes in the administration of the collection operation
and amendments to the fines structure. The City's consul-
tant recommended the following:
1. Adopting a ticket fine structure that
matches the fine amount with the seri-
ousness of the parking offense;
2. Making better use of the enforcement
authority of the State's Registry of
Motor Vehicles; and
3. More aggressively pursuing collections
owed by out-of-state residents.
If these changes were to be implemented, it was the consul-
tant's opinion that an additional $20 million per year could
be collected.
LOCAL AID
Boston has benefitted from statewide efforts to
decrease the share property taxes bear of local government
finances. For many years, the words "property tax reform"
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have really meant "more money for cities and towns from the
state" . Local officials have lobbied actively for annual
increases in local aid, and their pleas have been joined by
the academic community, the media, and taxpayers' groups.
The politics of the property tax in Massachusetts have led
to massive increases in local aid approximately 450 percent
from fiscal 1970 to fiscal 1984. Local aid increased 43
percent from fiscal 1980 to fiscal 1984.
Boston's share of total local aid has grown along
with the state's commitment of funds to this purpose. Be-
tween fiscal 1980 and fiscal 1984, the City's local aid
receipts have increased 66%, and its share of total aid has
risen from 13% to 15%.
There was a period in the late 1960 's and early
1970' s when Boston and other cities were penalized by aid
programs which focused on aid to education; non-education
aid was minimal. During this period, Boston received rela-
tively less local aid per capita than many of its surround-
ing towns, since education costs comprised a smaller portion
of Boston's budget than in the suburbs. After almost a
decade of consciousness raising about the financial needs of
the state's older cities, the aid emphasis of the 1980s has
changed dramatically from the early 1970s. Education aid is
still the largest category of the state's local aid pro-
grams, but the state's older cities now receive financial
assistance from two general municipal aid programs Addi-
tional Assistance ($484 million in fiscal 1984) and Lottery
Aid ($96.8 million)
.
In fiscal 1984, Boston's total local aid is esti-
mated to be $295.3 million. Boston's largest local aid
receipts will be from Additional Assistance ($122.7 million)
and Chapter 70 school aid ($96.7 million). The estimate
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source is the state's official notice to local assessors
issued by the Department of Revenue and nicknamed the cherry
sheet. Total local aid is defined here as direct aid
(cherry sheet aid), excluding the Urban Redevelopment ex-
cise. As used here, Boston's aid share also excludes re-
ceipts from retired teachers' pensions (this is classified
as indirect aid for all other cities and towns), and the
City's share of the racing deeds and room occupancy excises.
The cherry sheet includes the amounts the City's assessors
from state pass-through taxes: in fiscal 1984 $18 million
from the Urban Redevelopment Corporation excise (Ch. 121A)
,
$4 million from the City's share of the Deeds and Room
Occupancy excises, and $0.6 million from racing taxes.
There are 27 different aid programs from which Bos-
ton will receive local aid in fiscal 1984. Six, totally
$2.9 million, are described as "reimbursements for loss of
taxes". The largest of these, $1.1 million, is for state
owned land; the second largest is a reimbursement to Boston
for part of the City's cost of providing property tax exemp-
tions to the elderly.
Ten programs, totaling $153.4 million, are de-
scribed as "education distributions and reimbursements".
The largest school-related program is Chapter 70 school aid.
Other sizeable programs are the state's payments for retired
teachers' pensions ($19.8 million) and the City's school
construction projects ($15.8 million). The format of the
cherry sheet has not been revamped in many years, and for
historic reasons that are no longer clear, the state's two
library aid programs — in Boston's case, totally $4.2
million — are included as school and education aid.
Only a small amount of local aid is earmarked for
specific expenditures. In fiscal 1984, $6.6 million (2.2%
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of local aid) represents "reserves for direct expenditures",
or offset items. An example of an aid program that is
reserved for direct expenditures is the $5 million the state
provides to Boston for its Equal Education Improvement Fund
and the $0.7 million for "magnet education". In addition,
the $1.1 million distributed from the state's Highway Fund
must be used for highway-related purposes. The $4 million
from the Deeds and Room Occupancy Excises is restricted for
paying the borrowing costs associated with the Tregor case
(and related property tax abatements). All other local aid
revenues are distributed to the City without spending re-
strictions .
Boston's fiscal 1984 local aid total of $294.7 is
$111.8 million above the City's local aid receipts, (exclud-
ing the Urban Redevelopment excise and other pass-through
tax revenues), of fiscal 1980, an increase of 61.1% While
education distributions and reimbursements only increased
from $140.6 million to $153.4 million (9.1%), the City's
general municipal aid (Additional Assistance and lottery
aid) almost tripled in size, from $34.4 million to $135.1
million.
The outlook for continued growth in local aid to
Boston is good in spite of the potential for disruption
which the fiscal 1983 revaluation presents. The principal
factor behind the equalizing aid programs the state has
adopted during the past 15 years is the ratio of each
locality's equalized (property) valuations per capita rela-
tive to the statewide per capita average. The rationale for
using this ratio has been to provide equalizing aid that
would reduce the differences among the state's cities and
towns in the financial resources they have available for the
support of local services. The equalized valuations per
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capita measure is a guage of relative wealth. Prior to Bos-
ton's revaluation, the City's equalized valuations per capi-
ta were below the state average. Since equalized valuations
are determined biennielly in even numbered years, the 1984
figures — the first since the city's revaluation — could
bring the City's relative property tax wealth close to the
state average. It is possible that a post revaluation
change in Boston's comparative local financial capacity
could reduce its local aid entitlements.
Fortunately for Boston, its revaluation -- with its
potential to negatively impact the City's local aid receipts
-- comes at a time when a new concept is emerging in the
philosophy and construction of local aid formulas. A new
measure, one which takes into account cities' and towns'
relative expenditure burdens, as well as their relative
revenue capacities, is being introduced into 1984 state
legislative proposals. The approach is described as an
"expenditure-needs" based formula. It is persuasively
argued that the composition of some cities' and towns' popu-
lations, properties, work force, and geographic characteris-
tics produce heavy demands for local services. Through com-
puter-assisted analyses, it is said that correlations can be
established between some localities' high levels of expendi-
tures and certain of their demographic, economic, and geo-
graphic characteristics. Examples of these characteristics
include population density and average age of residential
properties. Boston's above-average level of "expenditure
needs" , due to factors such as the number of City employees
relative to its resident population (i.e., commuters), would
result in a heavy weighting in the calculation of a needs-
based formula. It is reasonable to assume that the incor-
poration of an expenditure measure, along with the estab-
lished ratio measuring relative equalized valuations, could
continue to allocate to Boston at least its present share of
the state's total local aid.
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Local aid increases are also probable given the
continued pledge of state leaders, in both the Executive and
Legislative branches, to distribute 40% of the state's reve-
nues from its three major growth taxes (income, sales and
corporate). State revenues from these three tax sources
have been strong even in the recent recession years. The
outlook for growth in these taxes is highly favorable and
should result in parallel growth in the state's local total
aid and in Boston's share.
Federal Revenue Sharing
sharing with local governments in spite of the massive re-
organization of many federal grant programs in the opening
years of President Reagan's administration. Federal revenue
sharing to states did not survive. The last full year of
federal revenue sharing to the state was fiscal 1980. When
revenue sharing began in the early 1970s, it was a fixed
authorization that assured funding for several years. Now
the program is subject to annual reconsideration, and per-
haps discontinuance. The formula governing the distribution
of the revenue among cities and towns has been amended since
the early years. The formula was amended to give weight to
local tax effort, a change which benefited Boston. Now, in
the post-Proposition 2-1/2 era, many cities and towns which
had been high tax effort municipalities have been forced to
reduce their property tax levies. This could result in re-
duced revenue sharing receipts for Boston when the formula
is next calculated at the close of 1984.
The amount of federal revenue sharing authorized
for Boston for federal fiscal year 1984, which ends on Sept-
ember 30, 1984 (the end of the first quarter of the City's
Congress has continued the nation's federal revenue
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fiscal 1985) is $18.8 million. The City's share was just
recently announced and it is $0.8 million above the amount
the City estimated in setting its tax rate.
NEW REVENUE SOURCES FOR BOSTON
Compared with U.S. cities of comparable, or great-
er, populations, the composition of Boston's own-source
revenues is markedly different. In fiscal 1981, the most
recent year for which comparative data is available, 79 per-
cent of Boston's revenues were from property taxes compared
with a national average of 31 percent. There can be no
question about the fact that this heavy reliance has been
reduced in the intervening years — due primarily to prop-
erty tax reductions required by Proposition 2-1/2 and
increases in the Commonwealth's local aid — but the City's
unique position of having no other major revenue sources has
not changed. (See Table 5, Overview of Boston's Revenues.)
For the average U.S. city of population 300,000 or
above, 15 percent of the city's revenues came from income
taxes (FY 1981), 11 percent from sales taxes, 4 percent from
public utility excises and 6 percent from other miscellan-
eous tax sources. Non-property tax resources are the prin-
cipal means by which other major cities have a lower reli-
ance on property taxes than Boston. It is easy to respond
to these statistics with a reflexive cry for "Reform!," but
in a state known for its activist citizenry — where these
numbers, or ones like them, have been common knowledge for
many years — there has been no significant change. Rather
than hand wringing, it may be better first to look at the
reasons why the status quo is so resistant to change.
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VThile adoption of other taxes would be one way for
Boston to collect additional revenues, there are also pos-
sibilities for new non-tax revenue sources and for increases
in existing non-tax revenues. The third category of pos-
sible change is in the City's fiscal relations with the
Commonwealth. The most commonly proposed change is for sub-
stantially increased local aid; but there are other possi-
bilities for financial relief — through the assumption by
the state of local costs and through the revision of state
and district assessments. Unfortunately, as desirable as
each possibility may be from the viewpoint of Boston's
revenues, each has its drawbacks. If discovery of the
resource were all that mattered, Boston would have long ago
been a rich city. Instead, the situation is one in which
least objectionable solutions must be identified, and pur-
sued, if the City's revenue base is to be diversified.
Alternative Taxes
The City already collects tax revenues from three
sources other than property. The largest non-property tax
source is the Urban Redevelopment Corporation excise, also
known as Chapter 121A. This excise is imposed in lieu of
property taxes on qualifying properties requesting this tax
status. The tax was adopted in 1960 to accommodate the Pru-
dential Company's needs for favorable tax treatment, and
certainty, before agreeing to construct the City's first,
major post-WWII downtown development project. During the
five years fiscal 1980-1984, the City's receipts from this
excise increased from $11.1 million to 18 million. The rate
of increase is substantial; however, the gain may well be
offset by the consequent loss in property tax revenues from
new developments that gained tax exempt status through qual-
ifying instead for liability for the Urban Redevelopment
excise
.
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The motor vehicle excise, also considered to be a
tax in lieu of the property tax (the personal property por-
tion), will produce $7.5 million in fiscal 1984 ($8.9 mil-
lion below fiscal 1980, pre-Proposi tion 2-1/2 collections).
The third non-property tax source is Boston's share of the
state's excise on dog and horse track racing. This is a
recently authorized distribution, resulting in fiscal 1983
revenues of $0.6 million.
Since the City's current non-property taxes produce
relatively small amounts of revenue (a conbined 30 percent
of the total) there is still a need for alternative taxes.
The following are five of the most frequently proposed ideas.
Local Income Tax—Some cities have a piggy-back
(to their state's) local income tax. The objections to the
implementation of such a tax in Boston are sufficiently sub-
stantial to cause most persons to be willing to move along
to the next idea; the Massachusetts income tax is uniquely
constructed out of the state's property tax laws, and is
therefore subject to the constitutional requirement for uni-
formity in its administration. This means that citizens may
not be subject to a tax in one tax jurisdiction that is not
imposed on citizens in another. A uniformly imposed income
tax would have to be authorized for all cities and towns.
If this were to occur, it would limit the potential for
growth in the state's personal income tax. Some towns have
residents with high personal incomes, others with below-
average. The income tax resource would tend to benefit
those localities which already have above-average fiscal
capabilities, but the goal of equalizing the state's total
financial resources would not be met. The benefit to the
City, of the state's being the collector of income tax reve-
nues, is that the equivalent of 40 percent of their growth
is distributed back to localities as local aid — and Boston
receives a significant share of this distribution.
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A recent proposal would refine the local income tax
approach by authorizing localities to impose this tax and at
the same time cutting the state's use of this tax by a sig-
nificant cut in the rates. The second step of this proposal
would then call for a cut in local aid to cities and towns
determined to be sufficiently wealthy to sustain their own
financial affairs. The third step would then target the
scarcer state dollars to only the neediest localities.
This, theoretically, could meet the criteria of equaliza-
tion, but it would not meet the constitutional requirements
for uniformity. An amendment to the state's constitution
would be required, and recent history has repeatedly demon-
strated that Massachusetts voters are not receptive to open-
ing up the constitution for proposals that may increase the
use of the income tax.
Payroll Excise— It is suggested that one way
around the constitutional restrictions on a local income tax
would be for Boston to instead have a payroll excise. The
excise would be imposed on Boston employers using a formula
that would (probably) reflect the numbers of employees and
the level of their wages and salaries. The idea behind the
payroll excise is that the City's services are burdened by
commuters — persons who earn their livelihoods in the city,
who have the advantages of its protective services, parks
and streets, yet who only pay for these services in the sub-
urban towns in which their homes are located.
There may be constitutional problems with even this
proposal, since there is a constitutional provision requir-
ing excises to be "reasonable." Excises are authorized on
"any produce, goods, wares, merchandise, and commodities,
whatsoever, brought into, produced, manufactured, or being
within" the Commonwealth. It is far from clear just how a
payroll tax would fit into this definition, and not be view-
ed instead as a back-door income tax.
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Another problem with a payroll excise, a problem
which would also be associated with a local income tax if it
were unique with Boston, is that the economic consequence of
such a tax could well be business flight. The City's geo-
graphic boundaries are so narrow — between the ocean to the
east and surrounding cities and town to the north, west, and
south — that it would be fairly easy for a business to move
away from Boston to a municipality that does not impose such
a tax. The value of office buildings with high vacancy
rates could quickly diminish, pulling the city's property
tax revenues down with them. In all cities, even those with
local income taxes, it is the property tax that is the most
effective generator of local tax revenues. A city's prop-
erty tax base must be protected at all costs — even when it
means rejecting a useful source of new revenues.
Local sales tax—The most recently adopted of the
state's major taxes is its sales tax (1966). When the state
finally resorted to the use of this tax, which had not been
used earlier because it was considered too regressive, the
definition of what was considered to be taxable was con-
structed more narrowly than in almost all other states.
Comparative data for fiscal 1981 indicates that only two
states collected fewer dollars per capita for each one per-
cent of tax rate. The tax is often described as being
under-utilized in this state, a characteristic that enhances
its attractiveness for local use.
A locally imposed sales tax is the most commonly
imposed municipal tax, besides the property tax. Local
governments in the neighboring state of Connecticut have
long relied on this revenue source. A local sales tax is
generally administered as a piggy-back tax on the state's
sales tax, with the state handling its administration.
There is one significant difference, however, between how
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such a locally imposed tax would operate in Boston and in
the nation's other major cities: the City would be uniquely
vulnerable to the exodus of shoppers. In Boston, residents
and commuters could easily shift their shopping to one of
the many malls located on Route 128, or to shopping centers
of the surrounding cities and towns. Only the poor would
have no choice. In other states, where major cities benefit
from a locally imposed sales tax, the tax is frequently
county-wide and the city is surrounded by a sizable buffer
area where there is no tax differential. In the Mid and Far
West, there are also sizeable distances between taxing dis-
tricts. It is not easy to comparison-shop between Tulsa and
Oklahoma City. Boston simply does not have the luxury of
distance between potentially competitive tax jurisdictions.
Parking Excise—At the time of the City's Tregor
crisis, one of the chief proposals for paying back the bonds
the City anticipated issuing was a city parking excise. The
excise would be imposed as a percentage of the parking fee.
Available documentation suggests a rate of 20 percent, would
yield an estimated $13 to $15 in revenues.
This proposal was rejected by non-Boston state
legislators who were unwilling to vote for a tax that their
constituents would have to pay. There were reasons pre-
sented for the tax besides its revenue benefit. It was
argued that commuters should be encouraged to take public
transportation and to leave their cars outside of Boston,
with its crowded streets. It was also pointed out at the
time, although with no evidence, that such an excise would
be subject to collection problems since parking lots and
garages are cash operations that even owners have difficulty
controlling
.
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Local Room Occupancy Excise—Boston now benefits
from the room occupancy excise (hotel tax) by receiving the
amounts the state collects from new (post-August 1981) hotel
rooms located within the city. This authorization was made
in conjunction with the Tregor case, and is scheduled to
expire in 1992 when the debt service costs associated with
this litigation are paid off.
The idea of Boston's imposing an additional tax on
hotel rooms is an attractive one since the tax is generally
considered to be an export tax — one that is paid by per-
sons from outside the state. It is also appealing since
hotel rooms are increasing in the city at such a rapid rate.
Boston's Official Statement (January 1983) projects an
increase in hotel/motel rooms of over 230 percent from 1983
through 1986. Hotel development is a significant part of
the city's economic growth.
If Boston were authorized the use of a piggy-back
room occupancy tax (on top of the state's current 5.7 per-
cent rate on all of its hotel rooms — not just those added
since 1981 — this tax could raise approximately $8.0 mil-
lion if an 8 percent rate were imposed, $12 million with a 9
percent rate, and $16 million with a 10 percent rate. These
estimates are based on current state revenue levels from
this tax, i.e., what Boston would collect if the tax were
already in place. The estimates do not include projections
of future growth. If it develops, as all hope, that there
are high occupancy rates for all of the new hotel space just
recently completed, or under construction, then the revenues
from this tax would exeed these estimates.
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Departmental Revenues
It used to be that those who most vigorously
opposed taxes would propose, if pressed for alternatives,
increases in nontax revenues — fees for services, licenses,
penalties, and other categories of charges for services or
privileges. (This group of revenue sources are also called
departmental revenues.) Unfortunately, the willingness of
tax critics to promote these alternative revenue sources may
be drawing to a close. One of the consequences of Proposi-
tion 2-1/2 has been increasing reliance on these revenue
sources since they are outside that law's restrictions.
Now, it is not unusual to hear complaints that proposed in-
creases in departmental revenues are simply new taxes. It
would be a serious loss for Boston (and for other cities
towns and the state) if these negative views prevail since
appropriate levels of charges for public services — espec-
ially when they are directly associated with benefits to
particular individuals or institutions — are reasonable
recoveries of costs which a government should expect to
receive. Boston has not overlooked these revenue possibili-
ties in its struggle to make ends meet during the fiscal
years it was required to reduce its property taxes, and it
cannot overlook these possibilities in the future.
Boston is restricted by the terms of its own gov-
erning statutes not to collect revenues in excess of the
cost of providing the services. Recent changes in charges
have reportedly brought charges close to, but still below,
the recovery of full costs. One of the principal costs
which have not been fully included have been those asso-
ciated with employees' fringe benefits (health insurance and
pensions). Although it is reasonable to propose that the
city proceed to recalculate programmatic costs, the adminis-
trative costs of such an analysis should be considered. If
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such a revision is undertaken, it would be wise if it were
accompanied with a plan for making future calculations
routine
.
State Assumption of City Costs
Pension Costs—The most serious financial problem
facing Boston, now that it has met the goal of reducing its
property taxes to the mandatory effective rate of 2.5 per-
cent of its assessed valuations, is that the City's fixed
costs are increasing at such a steep rate that they will
absorb much if not all of the allowable 2.5 percent levy
increase. Chief among Boston's heavy, unavoidable costs are
its payments for pensions of retired city employees. Many
years ago, the state assumed responsibility for all retired
teachers pensions, but the pensions of the City's general
municipal employees must be fully covered out of the City's
annual operating budget. Boston is joined by most of the
state's cities and towns in the bind of limited revenue
growth and increasing fixed pension costs. A Senate Com-
mittee on Ways and Means study described these problems as
"a second shock wave" after Proposition 2-1/2:
"Under Proposition 2-1/2 tax levies cannot
increase more than 2.5 percent a year. In
comparison, between FY 1983 and FY 1990 the
pay-as-you-go pension contribution is ex-
pected to increase at an annual rate of 8.6
percent .. .cities and towns eventually will
have no new locally-generated revenues
available for anything but pension cost
increases". (Senate Ways and Means budget
document, FY 1984)
The Senate study cited Boston as one of the
municipalities with the bleakest projections of
costs relative to tax levy growth.
state '
s
pension
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It is generally recognized that the cost to the
state of assuming all local, non-education employee pen-
sions -- as it has teachers' pensions — would exceed reve-
nue capacity. Instead, it is proposed that the state begin
to assume incremental costs, or to begin to pay for a por-
tion of these pension costs through a new state aid program.
A controversial aspect of the pension situation is the
extent to which there has been abuse in pensions being
granted on grounds of disability. This has reportedly mag-
nified normal pension cost growth. The proponents of state
aid for local pension costs would exclude this portion of
the cost base, at least from an agreed-upon current date
forward
.
The present local aid for pensions, provided solely
for teachers, favors suburban cities and towns over the
state's older cities. In Boston, the report states, "only
an estimated 20 percent of the City's pension liabilities
are teacher-related. In the richer towns, by contrast, over
one-half of municipal employees are likely to be teachers,
and teacher pension liabilities constitute a much higher
proportion than Boston's 20 percent." This argument could
be useful in persuading state legislators that partial state
assumption of local pension costs would be in the mainstream
of the state's traditional concern about the equalization of
financial resources among the state's cities and towns.
MBTA Assessments— In fiscal 1984, the charge to
Boston for MBTA district assessments is $40.1 million; the
City's share of total MBTA asessments is 41.8 percent. The
reason for this disproportionate assessment (there are 79
cities and towns in the District) is the factor on which the
assessment formula's calculations are based -- passenger
counts. As the District member with the highest number of
embarkations, Boston's share of the costs is the highest.
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This, of course, is because Boston — as the economic center
of the metropolitan area — is the destination of most pas-
sengers. In the morning/ passengers may embark on buses or
trains in several dozen cities' and towns, but in the evening
they get back on board in Boston.
Few would dispute the argument that since a good
public transportation system is of economic benefit to an
entire metropolitan area, the residents of the cities and
towns surrounding Boston benefit equally — with the City's
residents — from this facility. Why then, should Boston's
property taxes be disproportionately burdened by this ex-
pense? The answers are not satisfactory: 1) thus, it has
always been, and 2) there is no way to construct an assess-
ment formula based on use that does not result in the same
distortion.
There are two possibilities for correcting this
problem. The state could assume 100 percent of MBTA assess-
ments (in fiscal 1984 an amount just under $100 million).
The state already pays a large share of the District's
costs — $92.7 million for the operating deficit, $56.7 mil-
lion for debt service and an additional $4.0 million for the
reimbursement of District member cities and towns with no
service facilities.
The obstacle to state assumption of MBTA assess-
ments, besides the cost to the state, is that it would mean
that Massachusetts residents in all parts of the state would
be paying for the Boston area's public transportation. Not
only do some of these areas have public transit systems of
their own which could use state assistance, it is difficult
to establish the extent to which state residents who live in
the Berkshires or the Cape, for example, can be said to
benefit from the Boston area's public transportation.
1-56
An alternative approach to providing Boston some
needed relief from its heavy share of MBTA financing in-
volves revising the assessment formula. The assumption that
local benefit can only be measured by passenger count is
extremely limited and overlooks the contribution a public
transportation system makes to the economic vitality of a
region.
The property values of member cities and towns are
at least indirectly linked to the transportation facilities
available to local residents. Nobody questions the legiti-
macy of financing state highways from the motor fuels ex-
cise. A formula which uses economic measures of the Dis-
trict's members can be constructed. The state's biennially
reported equalized valuations, which have been subject to
criticism due to the lack of Department of Revenue staffing
to carry out as thorough a research program as would be
desired, are now coming into their own as an acceptable
process. the change is due to the implementation of revalu-
ations in virtually all of the cities and towns and to the
strengthened authority of the Commissioner to enforce prop-
erty tax laws. This measure could again be incorporated
into an assessment formula (this is the measure used for
county assessments for all of the state's county costs, ex-
cept Suffolk). Other possible factors could be population,
the frequency of transit service, geographic distance from
the city and the portion of the work force that is employed.
The construction of local aid and assessment for-
mulas requires a formidable amount of research in order to
acquire accurate data and test the results of alternative
combinations of factors. However, the greatest obstacle is
not the design of a formula but resistance to change.
Clearly, a system in which Boston pays over 40 percent of
the charges has been of considerable financial benefit to
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the other members of the District. With the limitations of
Proposition 2-1/2, there could be serious financial problems
for other localities from an increase in assessments. A
corollary provision could be proposed, that the cost impact
of the formula revision would be exempt from the provisions
of the Proposition. Member towns whose assessments would be
increased would be able to pay for the increase from reve-
nues raised outside the levy limit. Such a proposal would
have its own opponents, those who believe no change (or
"loophole") should occur without voter referendum approval;
but, there is at least the possibility that the reasonable-
ness of this change could prevail.
County Correctional Institutions— In fiscal 1980,
the state assumed the full cost and administration of the
county court system. The shift from the county to the state
was accomplished to provide financial relief to local
governments but also to bring about changes in the adminis-
tration of the courts. A similar dual purpose would be
achieved through state assumption of county costs of cor-
rectional institutions. Since Boston carries 100 percent of
Suffolk county's costs — for all services — the expenses
of the Charles Street Jail and the Deer Island House of Cor-
rections must be fully paid by the City. As the state's
largest city, with a higher percentage of its population
transient than any other Massachusetts city or town, the
above-average costs associated with law enforcement are paid
entirely by Boston.
For fiscal 1984, Boston has appropriated $17.5 mil-
lion for county expenditures. Most of this cost, approxi-
mately $14 million, is for the correctional institutions.
MDC Parks—Through a fiscal 1984 assessment of
$4.3 million, Boston will be paying 22 percent of the MDC
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Parks' total assessments. The District covers boulevards,
parks, golf courses, skating rinks, swimming pools, open
spaces and other recreational facilities located in 37 member
cities and towns. The counterpart to the MDC Parks District
for the rest of the state is the State Recreational Areas
Fund. In recent years there have been perennial proposals
for the state to absorb these functions into the state's Sec-
retariat of Environmental Affairs. Some of the activities,
it is argued, could be more efficiently performed on a cen-
tralized basis.
REVENUE RECOMMENDATIONS
Property Taxes
The backbone of Boston's revenues is its property
tax. The City should build on its strengths:
o the extraordinary development of down-
town properties, office buildings,
hotels, condominiums, retail and cul-
tural facilities, and
o the beginnings of a modern computer-
assisted appraisal program developed
during the revaluation process.
Recommendation #1—The City should commit sub-
stantial funds to the development of a computer-assisted
assessment system for the management of annual readjustments
of property valuations in order to take advantage of
Boston's economic growth.
Time is a critical factor in modernizing the City's
assessing operations. If Boston is to take advantage of the
substantial amount (over $1 billion) of new construction
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scheduled to be completed during 1984 and on the tax list-
ings for fiscal 1986, it is essential for the City Assessor
to have the capacity to implement uniform and full valua-
tions on all existing properties. The Commissioner of
Revenue has made it clear that without this condition being
met, the City's levy increase for fiscal year 1986 could be
seriously imperiled.
Recommendation #2—The City should propose legi-
slation to authorize the assessors of all Massachusetts
cities and towns to enforce requests to taxpayers for the
necessary information for valuing commercial and industrial
properties
.
During Boston's revaluation, a highly-praised
system was developed for valuing commercial and industrial
properties. More than other aspects of the 1983 revalua-
tion, the computer-assisted program for the appraisal of
Boston's commercial properties comes closest to meeting the
requirements of a well administered assessor's office. The
system is fine. What is lacking is adequate, current in-
formation on the City's economic rents. The current statu-
tory authority for the assessors to collect such information
has no enforcement provisions. In other states it is stan-
dard for such an authorization to be granted. In Massachu-
setts, commercial and industrial properties are routinely
undervalued due to the lack of necessary information for the
proper administration of this tax.
Recommendation #3—The City should submit legis-
lation to authorize a parking exise.
It is to the aesthetic, and economic, advantage of
Boston to discourage commuters from driving into the city.
Boston is said to have one of the nation's best metropolitan
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area transportation networks. The transit system would
benefit from increased ridership; the city would benefit
from reduced vehicular traffic.
Since Boston has initiated a program of selling its
garages, a parking excise could substitute for — indeed
surpass — the revenue stream of garage rentals. The City
could collect an estimated $13 million from a 15 percent
excise
.
Recommendation #4—The City should submit legis-
lation to authorize a local piggy-back tax onto the state's
room occupancy tax for all existing hotel room space (not
just the post-1981 rooms, as is currently authorized on a
short-term basis for the repayment of the Tregor bonds).
The burden of this tax would primarily be paid by
out-of-state residents. A large portion of the City's hotel
occupancy is expected to relate to business conferences and
conventions. The imposition of an additonal 2 to 3 percent
to the current 5.7 percent tax rate, would not detract from
hotel demand. The demand for Boston hotel space is a pro-
duct of the City's efforts to rebuild its downtown areas.
The City's attractions have gained a national reputation.
It is only fitting that Boston's revenues should benefit
directly from these efforts and accomplishments.
The City could collect an estimated $15 million
from a 9 percent excise, an estimate based in part on the
projected growth of Boston's new hotel space.
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Departmental Revenues
Recommendation #1—The Mayor should request key
City budget and financial administrators to initiate a
review of the level of fees, licenses, permits, fines, and
other charges for services relative to the costs of provid-
ing the services, privileges, or law enforcement required.
In the process of reviewing the levels of the City's depart-
mental revenues, administrators should attempt to insti-
tutionalize the process of periodic increases, so that
future increases could be more routinely implemented.
The most recent increase in the levels of charges
was adopted in 1981. The costs of government -- partic-
ularly wages, salaries and fringe benefits — have increased
substantially in the intervening years. This increase
should be considered in the charges imposed. Furthermore,
it has been indicated that the full costs of fringe benefits
were not included in the 1981 cost allocations.
Recommendation #2—The collection system of the
City's many (approximately 300 — different fees, licenses,
permits and other charges) should be located in one central
collection office, an office with reporting requirements and
enforcement authority.
The relatively small sums involved with some of the
City's authorized departmental revenues tend to lead to a
lower priority of attention being given to their adminis-
tration. There are "slippage" possibilities, but the more
common problem probably is that administrators of agencies
responsible for the collection of departmental revenues find
revenue collection and enforcement an unpleasant aspect of
their work and are reluctant to suggest fee level increases
which only make their own work harder. A collection review
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study could consider possible incentives for improved fees
management as well as a new system for collections.
STATE ASSUMPTION OF COSTS
Recommendation #1—The state should assume full
costs of assessments for the MDC Parks District.
It is unreasonable for Boston to pay over 20 per-
cent of the total assessments for the Parks district when
there are 37 member cities and towns. The member cities and
towns have no direct voice in the appropriations of the MDC
Parks District. The District's budget is approved by the
state legislature and the Governor, as part of the state
budget. Some of the District's functions overlap with those
of other state agencies. These inefficiencies could be more
effectively corrected if the District were dissolved and its
responsibilities assigned to other state agencies.
The state assumption of MDC Parks Districts assess-
ments would save Boston $4 million, based on the level of
the fiscal 1984 assessment.
Recommendation #2—The state should assume a por-
tion of the City's pension costs, in an indirect local aid
program which would parallel the current program which fully
funds retired teachers' pensions.
The present local aid program, which provides pen-
sion benefits only for teachers, disproportionately benefits
the wealthier suburbs since in these communities the educa-
tion budget is a far larger share of total local expen-
ditures than it is for the state's older cities. It is
reasonable that state assumption would only be partial and
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that a distinction would be made between regular pension
obligations and those granted for disability, since there is
so much inter-city variance in the way in which this aspect
of the pension system is administered.
State assumption of a portion of the city's pension
costs would produce a double benefit for the City since its
heavy, unfunded liability for future pension payments pre-
sents a serious financial detraction to the bond market.
The assurance that the state is assisting the City in meet-
ing this obligation could produce lower interest rates on
Boston's new debt issues.
It is assumed that the City's first fiscal year
share of such a partial-cost assumption program would be
$10 million.
REVISION OF MBTA DISTRICT ASSESSMENT FORMULA
Recommendations #1—Legislation should be sub-
mitted revising the formula for calculating the MBTA Dis-
trict assessments. The revised formual should discontinue
the use of the passenger count factor, instead substituting
measures reflecting the relative property wealth of the mem-
ber communities, the percentage of local residents in the
work force, a municipality's share of the District's total
population, and any other appropriate factors that would
measure the benefit a regional transportaton system brings
to its member localities.
The present disproportionate share which Boston
bears of MBTA assessments (41 percent) is unreasonable con-
sidering the area-wide benefit of the system. A revision in
the formula should reduce Boston's present payments from the
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fiscal 1984 level of $40 million at least in half, for a
savings to the City of $20 million.
Recommendation #2—Legislation should be sub-
mitted to amend Proposition 2-1/2 to exclude from the calcu-
lation of the annual levy increase any increases in local
MBTA assessments due to the revision of the assessment
formula
.
In order to enable other cities and towns in the
MBTA District to absorb increased assessment costs, it would
be necessary to amend Proposition 2-1/2 to exclude assess-
ment increases resulting from a corrective change in the
formula from the annual calculation of the 2.5 percent
annual levy increase. It is politically practical, and
reasonable, that a corrective change in the MBTA assessment
formula should be accompanied with a provision for excluding
the additional costs such a change would impose on other
cities and towns. The amount to be excluded would be rela-
tively small for any one city or town. The financial relief
it is estimated Boston would receive from this change is
$20 million. There are 78 cities and towns in the MBTA Dis-
trict, besides Boston, among which the $20 million increase
would be shared.
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diture Controls

BOSTON'S FISCAL STATE
By failing to plan and control its budget, Boston
will once again have an Operating Appropriation Deficit for
FY 1984. The Operating Appropriation includes all City,
County and School Department expenditures, and represents
that portion of the budget that is "controllable" as opposed
to fixed in nature.
The following table, based on information derived
from budget reports and discussions, shows the basis for a
projection of a $37.2 million Operating Appropriation defi-
cit.
TABLE 1
CITY OF BOSTON
PROJECTED OPERATING APPROPRIATION DEFICIT
FY 1984 ($ in 000' s)
General Government
Public Works
Public Safety
Parks & Recreation
Health & Hospitals
Schools
County
Subtotal
Appro-
pr iat ion
$128.5
39.6
120.3
8.1
106.2
229.7
17.8
$650.2
Projected Collective Bargaining Costs
Projected Operational Appropriations
Deficit FY 1984
Projected
Expen-
ditures
$133 .8
41.5
118.7
8.3
106.2
236.0
18.5
$663.0
Surplus/
( Deficit )
$( 5.1)
( 2.1)
1.6
( 0.2)
( 6.3)
( 0.7)
(12.8)
(24.4)
$(37.2)
The deficit projection for City departments is
based on expenditures to date projected through the end of
the fiscal year. The deficit for schools and the collective
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bargaining costs assumes the acceptance of the Boston Teach-
ers Union contract and anticipated settlement with the
remaining City bargaining units at substantially similar
levels. The total projected cost of collective bargaining
in FY 1984 is $30.7 million, including $6.3 million reflect-
ed in the School Department figure.
This deficit does not take into account possible
deficits or surpluses, including those resulting
sale of municipal garages. The following table
projected revenues versus budgeted for FY 1984.
TABLE 2
CITY OF BOSTON
PROJECTED REVENUE SURPLUS DEFICIT
FY 1984 ($ in 000's)
Surplus/
Budgeted Projected (Deficit
)
Gross Tax Levy $333. 3 $333. 3
Departmental 59. 4 56. 8 (2.6)
Parking & Fines 27. 6 27. 8 .2
Health & Hospitals 113. 3 108. 1 (5.2)
Motor Vehicle Excise 7. 4 9. 1.6
State Aid 306. 7 313. 3 6.6
Federal Revenue Sharing 18. 5 18. 8 .3
Sales of City Assets 18. 5 18. 5
Transfers 53. 6 53. 6
TOTAL $938. 3 $939. 2 $ .9
The City originally anticipated that the sale of
garages would generate between $54 and $57 million and to be
applied as follows:
Balance the budget $18.5
Latin School repairs 35.5
Housing Transit Fund 3.0
57.0
It now anticipates that the sales could ultimately
net approximately $63.0 million, thereby giving the City
revenue
from the
outlines
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additional revenues of about $6 million which could offset
budget deficits. However, only one of the sales had been
completed as of January 1, 1984. This sale, the Government
Center garage, has subsequently been held up by the federal
government, due to a question over development rights. The
remaining garages have yet to be declared excess property
and approved for sale. It is anticipated that if the sales
are completed, the revenues generated will be as follows:
Government Center $22,000,000
Fort Hill 25,000,000
St. James 7,766,400
Kilby Street 8, 000, 000
TOTAL $62. 766,400
These revenues can be applied in a variety of ways
with the exception of certain restrictions as to the amount
that must go to capital projects. The maximum amount avail-
able for current year deficits if all garages are sold is
$42 million.
After taking into account the projected revenue
Surplus of $900,000, the City will be faced with a net defi-
cit of $36.3 million. Historically the City would raise
this deficit by adjusting the subsequent year's tax rate.
However, under Proposition 2-1/2, the total property tax
level cannot exceed a certain amount. Therefore, succeeding
year appropriations for deficits incurred in a prior fiscal
year have the effect of reducing dollar-for-dollar the
amount available for spending on current agency operations.
It is time for the City to stop forcing appropriation defi-
cits caused by the cycle of funding prior year's deficits.
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The severity of the impact of the deficit for any
given year depends upon the status of the various reserves
that are available to fund the shortfall.
Overlay Reserves
Overlay reserves fall into two categories: Current
Overlay reserves and Overlay Deficit Raised reserves. Cur-
rent Overlay reserves represent an amount established annu-
ally, as a part of the tax rate calculation, which is an
estimate of the current fiscal year taxes to be abated.
This amount must be no less than 5% of the Gross Tax Levy,
minus the Current Overlay.
Overlay Deficit Raised, on the other hand, theore-
tically represents an amount expended during the year for
prior year abatements that exceeded the prior year's Current
Overlay reserve. The prior administration initiated a prac-
tice of appropriating the Overlay Deficit Raised account
without a corresponding expenditure during the year. This
had the effect of establishing non-specific Overlay Deficit
Raised reserves. As indicated in Appendix A for FY 1981 and
1982, the administration provided for non-specific Overlay
reserves of $10 million and $40 million, respectfully. In
1983 they liquidated $15.4 million and used $19.6 million as
revenues to balance the budget. An additional non-specific
Overlay Deficit of $5.6 million was raised in fiscal 1984
leaving a balance of $20.6 million.
There also remain unliquidated (unspent) balances
of $20.8, $15.9 and $7.0 million of original Current Year
Overlays for specific years 1984, 1983 and 1982, respective-
ly. Therefore, the total overlay balance available which
can be applied to all abatements granted subsequent to
July 1, 1984 is $64.3 million.
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Reserve for Encumbrances
During the year-end process of closing the City
books, certain current period statutory liabilities, requir-
ing disbursement in future fiscal periods, are established.
A reasonable determination of dollar value is made and an
encumbrance is established. An encumbrance is an accounting
device which sets aside monies for the payment of bills or
obligations which are anticipated, but which are not yet due
for actual payment. The unliquidated (unspent) encumbrances
balance from year-end fiscal 1983 are as follows:
TABLE 3
CITY OF BOSTON
ANALYSIS OF UNLIQUIDATED ENCUMBRANCES
FY 1983 AND PRIOR
(in 000's)
City &
Classi f i cat ion County Schools DH&H Total
Payroll $ 7,990 $1,635 $ 9,625
Edison interest 4,134 4,134
Water & Sewer items 300 482 782
BRA 2,438 2,438
Non-personal 3,588 3,588
Other 9,610 6,288 1 , 140 17,038
TOTAL $24.472 $9,876 $3.257 $37.605
Payroll - Represents amounts identified by depart-
ment heads and the Office of Labor Relations for collective
bargaining, longevity, pending retroactive pay raises, and
unpaid overtime owed to employees. Of the $9.6 million re-
maining in the account approximately $8.1 million is avail-
able to offset deficits due to collective bargaining.
Edison Interest - There is litigation pending to
determine if the City owes Edison interest on bills from
prior fiscal years. It would not be improper for the City
to liquidate this reserve and encumber the funds in the
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Judgment and Claims account in the year in which the Court
judgment (if not favorable) is rendered.
Water and Sewer - This figure includes amounts owed
by the City of Boston Water and Sewer Commission as of
June 30, 1983. Given the substantial balance due to the
City from BWSC, the Auditor should establish a monitoring
procedure to review payments to the BWSC.
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) - This repre-
sents amounts reserved for payments to the BRA. Histori-
cally, the lack of expenditure controls allowed the BRA to
spend the balance of unliquidated encumbrances. Proper con-
trols could ensure that $1 million of this amount would be
available to reduce FY 1984 overspending.
Non-Personnel - This represents the balance of the
School Department reserve request for non-personnel items.
Historically, as in the case of the BRA encumbrance, this
entire amount has been spent if made available. Tightened
budget controls should result in a savings of up to $2 mil-
lion in this account.
Other - This account covers Contracts, Purchase
Orders, Reserve Requests and Service and other items.
Reserve requests represent another area in which stronger
budgetary controls should be established to force department
heads to live within their current budgets. Such measures
could generate savings of approximately $2.1 million.
In December, the Supervisor of Finance for the City
Council issued a memorandum itemizing various reserves which
were outstanding after November 1983, these figures are in-
cluded in the discussion above. A further analysis and up-
date of this memo appears in Appendix B.
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Reserve for Interfund Contingencies
An interfund contingency account of $2,184,000 has
been established for potential disallowed costs in federal
grant accounts.
In the era of Proposition 2-1/2 it is imperative
that the City institute a realistic resource allocation pro-
gram. The constant carryover of prior year's deficits
restricts the ability of the City to project realistic
spending levels and maintain a balanced budget. With a new
administration and a new attitude toward fiscal affairs,
there is an opportunity for the City to apply all available
reserves to the current year's deficit, thus starting with a
clean slate. Some of these reserves cannot be used directly
to offset the deficit. They can be utilized, however, to
reduce the deficit's impact on subsequent years. The
reserve for encumbrances, for example, may be partially
applied to reduce the effect of collective bargaining cost
increases resulting from this spring's contract negotia-
tions. Similarly, the Overlay Deficit may be released next
year and made available as an additional revenue source,
thereby reducing the impact of the prior year's deficit.
The practical effect being to make such funds available to
offset the deficit. An analysis of the net effect is as
follows
:
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TABLE 4
CITY OF BOSTON
ANALYSIS OF DEFICIT IMPACT
FY 1984 ($ in 000's)
Projected Surpluses (Deficit)
Revenue $ .9
Expenditures (37.2)
Net Deficit " $(36.3)
Reserves
Overlay Reserve 20.6
Unliquidated Encumbrances 17.3
Reserve For Interfund
Contingencies 2 .
5
Reserves 40 .
4
Applied Reserves 36 .
3
Effective Net Deficit $ -0-
RECOMMENDATIONS ; FY 1984
Sale of Garages - Although the concept of selling
capital assets to finance current operations is a poor one,
it would be devastating to stop this process at this stage.
The Administration should continue this limited program
expeditiously to ensure available revenues for fiscal 1984.
Immediate Budget Control - To the extent possible
with the current control systems, the Administration must
tighten the purse strings. Such steps as eliminating non-
essential agencies, selectively cutting program levels and
selectively filling personnel vacancies will go a long way
to reducing costs. In addition, a review of all major ven-
dor contracts and alternatives could also serve to reduce
the deficit.
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The tendency, when confronted with a fiscal prob-
lem, is to panic and impose either a hiring freeze, across-
the-board cuts, or both. While the current dollar savings
will be evident immediately, the real social and economic
impact may not surface for years. Across the board cuts and
hiring freezes are indiscriminate by their nature and there-
fore do not distinguish between good and bad programs. They
do not determine necessary service levels nor do they deter-
mine where resources are utilized effectively and where they
are not. They can cause serious harm to certain programs.
Typically, this harm later will require excessive amounts of
resources to rectify.
RECOMMENDATIONS; FY 1985
It is beyond the scope of this section to do a
detailed review of FY 1985. However, unless the Administra-
tion implements a program to improve both the budget process
and expenditure controls, it will soon find itself caught in
the continued cycle of budget deficits initiated by the
prior administration (see Appendix C). The next two
sections discuss some of the reasons for the recurring
problem of budget deficits and some of the solutions to it.
The Budget Process; An Underutilized Tool for Expenditure
Control
One of the best indications of the state of the
City's budget control process is evidenced by Coopers &
Lybrand's management letter of 1979 which stated:
"To properly manage the City's fiscal
affairs, a comprehensive plan of checks
and balances must exist to monitor the
effectiveness of controls over the flow
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of financial resources and information.
We feel such a plan can and should be
developed based on the City's budget
process. Such process, both by design
and practice, should be the mechanism by
which controls are brought to bear. We
feel the City's budget process has not
been as effectively utilized for that
purpose as it should be."
The fiscal 1985 budget process is at hand: yet no
controls exist nor are they planned for the near future.
The lack of a professional budget process leaves the new
Administration in the position of being unable to assert
control over the balance of FY 1984 spending. Consistent
with the past, the City will end the year with a significant
Operating Appropriation deficit, as noted above.
The pressing need for these controls is illustrated
by the recurring operating appropriation deficits. As Dis-
play 1 indicates, for each of the past six fiscal years, the
City has incurred such deficits in excess of $10 million.
These deficits represent a substantial proportion of the
total deficit incurred by the city each year.
A government's annual operating budget is a poten-
tially powerful tool for priority setting and for expendi-
ture control. Boston's present budgetary process, in con-
trast, fails to focus the City's now-limited resources on
the provision of essential, "core" city services (police,
fire, public works and schools). Despite substantial re-
forms mandated by the State Legislature and the City Budget
Department, the current process has a track record of pro-
ducing unrealistically low appropriations for these core
City services, virtually guaranteeing large operating appro-
priation deficits in key agencies. At the same time, the
process has failed to identify and eliminate non-essential
programs
.
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DISPLAY I
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Despite its importance, the City's budgetary proc-
ess is a closed and incomprehensible ritual. This narrative
presents the current process from the initial preparation of
agency budget requests to final allotment and expenditure of
appropriate funds.
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The Boston Budget Cycle
Preparation and Approval—Boston's budgetary
process begins with the preparation of agency budget re-
quests for submission to the Budget Department (the Public
School budget requests are prepared separately, under the
direction of the Superintendent of Schools). Requests are
prepared on standard "activity" budget forms in accordance
with instructions provided by the Department. An "activity"
is a separate program or function performed by a city
department, most of which are responsible for performing
several "activities". The "activity" budget forms, a FY
1984 innovation, require the agencies to subdivide their
departmental requests into "activities" and to further sub-
divide each activity into the following budget groups:
o Personnel Services (permanent and temp-
orary employees, overtime, unemployment
compensation and Workmen's Compensation)
o Energy (heat, light, power)
o Contractual services
o Supplies and materials
o Current charges and obligations (rent-
als, leases)
o Equipment
o Special appropriations
o Structural improvements
o Non-structural improvements
The fiscal 1984 activity budget forms represent a
substantial improvement over previous City budget work
sheets. But the forms are still quite incomplete. The
breadth of data gathered by the Budget Department in its
compilation of the budget is well below that obtained by
budget departments in most major urban governments.
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After City departments file their requests with
Budget, the Director negotiates spending cuts with each
agency head and, based on directions from the Mayor, pre-
pares a Mayoral budget for submission to the City Council no
later than mid-April.
Prior to passage of Proposition 2-1/2, revenues
were flexible, so the Mayor's budget was prepared simply by
aggregating the agency requests, as amended by negotiations
with the Mayor. The property tax levy was then set at an
amount which would produce sufficient revenues to balance
expenditures
.
The Budget Department now refers to a baseline
revenue estimate when developing the Mayoral Budget. In
effect, however, the Office continues to develop the budget
by aggregating agency requests as if revenues from the prop-
erty tax levy were open-ended, when, in fact, Proposition
2-1/2 fixes the levy at a statutory maximum. Revenue pro-
jections are considered informally, after submission of
agency requests to the Department, and do not appear to
shape Mayoral spending recommendations or City Council bud-
getary decision-making.
Submission to the City Council occurs in mid-
April. The Mayor's budget includes recommended appropria-
tions for all City operations, except the public school sys-
tem, and for Suffolk County, the county courts which are
state-funded. Under its autonomous appropriation authority,
the School Committee determines School Department spending
up to a statutory "base" level, currently $224.5 million.
The Mayor may recommend funds for the school system in
excess of this base amount.
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Despite large annual increases in the school
department budget, the department has historically been un-
able to live within its appropriations. Since 1978, school
spending has consistently run over initial appropriation and
has been a major contributor to the operating appropriation
deficit as illustrated in Display 2.
City of Boston
School Department Surplus/Deficit
FY 1978 - FY 1983
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Prior to the passage in 1982 of the Funding Loan
Act, commonly known as the "Tregor Bill," the School Commit-
tee possessed autonomous power to make appropriations from
the City's General Revenue Fund, up to the limit of the
prior year's appropriation, which included any prior year's
supplemental appropriation. The Funding Loan Act eliminated
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the established practice of annual increases in the appro-
priations base. The FLA set the base at $211.4 million,
with further increases in the base subject to Mayoral and
City Council approval. In 1983 the Council increased the
base to approximately $224.5 million, over the Mayor's veto.
Further increases in the base above $224.5 million
are still subject to Mayoral and Council approval. If the
Mayor and the Council act prudently and keep the annual base
at $224.5 million, they will each year obtain greater con-
trol over increases in school spending. Annual inflationary
costs should push the budget above the current base level,
but those incremental increases will no longer be the auto-
nomous right of the School Committee.
By law, the City Council can reduce or reject any
item in the Mayor's budget, but may not increase or add an
item except by request of the Mayor. Though it has the
authority to conduct a detailed review of the Mayor's bud-
get, the Council lacks the basic information necessary to
make rational budgetary allocations. It does not receive
complete copies of the Departmental requests, as submitted
to Administrative Services, and has little independent capa-
bility to conduct a detailed review of City spending.
In late June, the City Council approves a budget
for the City which then is sent to the Mayor for his signa-
ture. Unlike the federal budget, the City budget must be
balanced. To be balanced, the sum of four items (city,
school, and county appropriations; the interest and princi-
pal payments due during the fiscal year on the City's debt;
estimated court judgments against Boston; and estimated
funding required for prior year deficits) must equal total
City revenues, which include monies collected from the prop-
erty tax levy, departmental revenues (parking fine collec-
tions, user fees, etc.), state aid and federal grants and
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reimbursements. The property tax levy must be set in
accordance with the requirements of Proposition 2-1/2.
The Massachusetts Department of Revenue must certi-
fy the tax rate of the City based on a balanced budget. The
Department held up certification of the tax rate for FY 1984
due to the inability of the City to balance the budget and
its prior practice of approving supplemental budgets regard-
less of the availability of revenues to pay for them. In
order to receive a certification the City was forced to sign
a memorandum of understanding with the Commonwealth in which
the City agreed that if the Department of Revenue approved
the issuance of the property tax bills for FY 1983, the City
would submit an estimated Tax Rate Recapitulation Form for
FY 1984 outlining revenue receipts and estimated deficits.
In consideration, the City agreed to:
o provide detailed analysis of revenue
sources available to support any supple-
mental appropriations;
o provide monthly reports of appropriation
orders and revenue sources and a review
of revenue receipts at least quarterly.
The appropriation of agency funds by the City Coun-
cil marks the beginning, not the end, of the agency spending
process. In compliance with the Funding Loan Act, the city
is required to implement an expenditure allotment system for
personnel costs, to reduce the likelihood of overspending by
City Departments. Under the Act, City Department heads and
the Superintendent of Schools must submit to the City Audi-
tor an allotment schedule which indicates the percentage of
the personnel budget the department intends to spend during
each quarter of the fiscal year. For all agencies, except
schools, allotments for personnel for each of the first two
quarters are limited to 30% of the agency's total appropria-
tion for personnel. The final two quarters spending may not
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be less than 21% each. The Act further provides that School
Department personnel spending may not exceed 20% for the
first fiscal quarter or 30% for any of the remaining quar-
ters.
Under the law, if the City Auditor finds that a
department's spending will exceed its allotment, he must
notify the Mayor who, within 7 days, must waive or enforce
the allotment. If the Mayor waives the allotment ceiling,
the department head must reduce agency personnel expendi-
tures for subsequent quarters in order to balance personnel
expenses with appropriations. If the Mayor enforces the
spending limit, the department head must terminate all per-
sonnel expenditures for the remainder of the fiscal quarter.
In FY 1983, no agency exceeded its first and second
quarter allotments. Five city and two county departments
exceeded their third quarter allotments. Two city and two
county departments exceeded their fourth quarter allotments.
The Mayor waived the allotment ceiling in each case.
The Funding Loan Act further attempted to establish
financial control by making city officials who intentionally
spend in excess of appropriations personally liable.
Besides the restrictions of the allotment system,
city agencies are further restricted in personnel expendi-
tures by the requirement that any transfer of funds into
personnel must be approved by the City Council.
The Funding Loan Act attempted to restrict mayoral
flexibility in reallocation of funds outside the personnel
area. The Act stipulates that the Mayor may make no more
than $3.0 million of reallocations among departments during
a fiscal year. The intent of this provision was to check
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the Mayor's ability to supercede the formal budgetary proc-
ess, but allow some flexibility for unexpected expenses.
Currently the only additional budget control is a
process instituted by the City Auditor known as "memo encum-
brance". If a particular Department is in a deficit posi-
tion in a non-personnel account, the Auditor's office will
encumber an amount equal to the deficit in the personnel
line, thereby affecting the allotment system and forcing a
department head to eliminate the deficit or risk exceeding
the quarterly allotment for personnel accounts. In the cur-
rent environment this is an innovative way to gain some con-
trol over spending, but it is a very poor management control
which violates the integrity of personnel and non-personnel
financial information on an interim basis.
Weaknesses in the Current Budget System
This review of the budget process illustrates the
basic lack of information available to all parties in the
process which hinders managemental decision making.
The budget process currently does not inform
Department heads of what type of data they should gather nor
the basis upon which they should make budgetary projections.
Comparisons of different programs become difficult if not
impossible. This lack of information flow stems from the
days when budget resources were allocated based on political
strength rather than substantive program importance. At
that time a department would simply submit a "wish list"
which would be approved (or not). No allocation of limited
resources among competing departments was required.
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Prior to Proposition 2-1/2 the expenditures level
was the driving force in establishing the tax rate, which
would balance the budget. As a result of 2-1/2 the tax
revenues are now set by statute and the controllable expen-
diture must be reduced to balance the budget. Despite this
fact, the city continues to budget operational expenses as
if there were an available revenue source for all expendi-
tures .
This unlimited resource philosophy has also led to
lax expenditure controls, since any operating appropriation
deficit could be raised in the subsequent year's tax levy.
Continued deficit spending compounds the problem in that it
reduces available revenues for the subsequent years.
In practice, current expenditure controls are too
weak to correct this pattern of recurring deficits. Theore-
tically, the Tregor Legislation (Funding Loan Act) imposed
certain restrictions and controls over budgetary spending in
the City. These controls include the personnel allotments
and the Mayoral reallocation limit. Additionally, existing
budgetary requirements that City Council approval be ob-
tained for transfers into personnel line items should have
established sufficient controls over personnel spending in
the City, which represents approximately 65% of the Opera-
ting Appropriation. This is not the case.
There are current budget procedures that circumvent
all of the controls mentioned above. Typically the City
passes excessive appropriations for the personnel line items
in various departments. This gives the department head
uncontrollable flexibility in determining the allocation of
resources between personnel and non-personnel items and also
renders the personnel allotment procedures established by
Tregor ineffective, due to the fact that the allocations are
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based on an inflated personnel number. A department can use
the Contractual Services line for personnel-related services
and circumvent the allotment process altogether. Typically,
people are hired and paid out of the non-personnel area of
contract services for full-time positions, thereby avoiding
charges to the personnel services line. This again allows
department heads total discretion as to allocation of
resources within a department regardless of the administra-
tion's policies or programs. This lack of control is rein-
forced by the use of memo encumbrance by the Auditor, who,
in effect, facilitates line item charges and transfers with-
out formal requests or approvals by encumbering prescribed
funds to pay non-personnel items.
Yet another method to circumvent the controls has
been facilitated inadvertently by the Budget Department.
While implementing a chargeback system, the Budget Depart-
ment instituted a system whereby individual departments, not
the City's central accounts, are charged for unemployment
insurance costs. This forces department heads to carefully
monitor who is eligible for these benefits. However, cur-
rently, Unemployment Compensation is budgeted in the per-
sonnel services group of accounts, while the chargeback is
against non-personnel items. This causes a deficit in non-
personnel items. It is up to the department head to deter-
mine if he wishes to use personnel funds or non-personnel
funds to pay for the chargeback. This effectively allows an
increase in personnel resources without City Council approv-
al.
The lack of the most basic controls indicates a
deep rooted problem that cannot be solved easily. The City
must embark on an entirely new approach to budgeting and
control. One such approach is outlined in the next section.
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THE BUDGET PROCESS AND EXPENDITURE CONTROLS: THE NEED FOR
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM
Yfith the change in administration, the City is pre-
sented with an historic opportunity to end the secrecy and
confusion that surrounds the current budget process and to
end the annual guessing game of "who knows the deficit?"
Budgetary politics is the single aspect of munici-
pal finance most responsible for undermining the public
credibility of elected leaders. The Dukakis administration
has taken the first step by resolving to end the confusion
concerning the local aid formula with its commitment to
release local aid levels by the beginning of the fiscal
year. The past practice of withholding the figures produced
chaos in the municipal property tax system.
It is the City's turn to contribute. There may
never be a better opportunity in Boston's history for its
elected officials to regain the confidence of its citizens.
A New Approach to Urban Fiscal Stress: Two Tiered Budgeting
In an atmosphere of limited resources, rising costs
and increased demands for services, the Administration and
the City are being forced into an era of resource allocation
among a variety of city services, some essential, some dis-
cretionary. Two Tiered Budgeting (TTB) would segregate
these programs and allow resource allocation based on separ-
ate criteria.
As the first tier of the new budgetary process, the
Mayor should work with the Fire, Police, Public Works, other
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essential City Departments and with the School Superinten-
dent to develop a Core Service Budget for submission to the
City Council or, in the case of the public school budget, to
the School Committee. The Council could receive the Core
Service Budget in early April, along with a message from the
Mayor outlining the service levels supported by the budget.
The budget would include funding for debt service, projected
retirement contributions, prior year deficits to be realized
in the coming year, as well as core service appropriations
with such information as:
o minimum manning levels for essential
departments such as police, fire, and
public works;
o minimum levels of service delivery
necessary to continue receipt of tar-
geted federal funds;
o minimum staffing of City Agencies and
review bodies that must be maintained by
legal mandate;
o fixed costs for which the City is
already obligated.
It would be up to the Council, with recommendations
from the Mayor, to determine what level of service would be
required to provide these essential services.
This decision process would require much greater
detail than is currently available within the budget proc-
ess. Detailed projections at varying levels of service
would have to be available for review. The current informa-
tion base, both at the City Department level and the Budget
Department level would have to be improved. Information
regarding federal and state funded programs would be essen-
tial in establishing minimal staffing levels and minimal
service levels. All resources available to fund a particu-
lar program would have to be identified.
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Once the Council has approved a core service bud-
get, the administration would then estimate the resources
available to fund discretionary programs based on projected
revenues and grants, reduced by amounts applied to the core
service budget amounts. The Mayor would then submit a Dis-
cretionary Program Budget for submission to the Council by
May 1. By law the sum of the Discretionary Program Budget
and the Essential Services Budget would have to equal the
total projected revenues.
Under this system everyone involved -- agency mana-
gers, the Mayor, the Council and the public — would be
forced to ask the hard questions, and make the hard choices
about what represents the absolute base of the budget, with-
out which the City cannot survive. That base budget will
represent a commitment to service delivery that will not be
jeopardized if revenue shortfalls develop during the year.
The practice of using essential city services, such as
police and fire, as political pawns in the search for more
revenues or of refusing to cut non-essential programs be-
cause they were politically popular will be practices of the
past
.
Two Tier Budgeting is not Zero Base Budgeting. It
is not Program Budgeting. It is a system that combines the
best, most workable elements of both those systems. And it
is a system that would ensure a level of credibility in and
comprehension of the Boston budget system. It is a system
that will put forth the hard budgetary choices in plain
English, so that all interested parties will be given the
necessary information to develop an annual expenditure blue-
print .
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Control Over Financial Resources; Using the Budget System
Two Tiered Budgeting will function to identify
resources and allocate them to various City services and
costs. However, a comprehensive system of financial con-
trols must also be implemented to monitor the flow of finan-
cial resources and information. For TTB or any budget proc-
ess to be successful a new system of budgeting control must
be implemented.
This will require the Administration to instill in
the departments the importance of the budget process and the
evenhandedness of it. The process and procedures will have
to be fully disclosed and adhered to on a consistent basis.
A formal budget guide, in writing, will need to be developed
outlining each participant's role and responsibility.
Upon final approval of the budget a realistic
spending plan should be developed setting quarterly spending
allotments to serve as a monitor of actual results during
the year. This spending plan should be a joint effort
between the Budget Department and the department heads.
Expenditures should be compared to the plan on a regular
basis and any variances analyzed by both parties.
Requirements must be implemented to ensure that a
formal request and approval process is instituted over
inter-line item transfers which exceed a certain established
base amount. Department heads must have flexibility to
manage properly; but flexibility need not come at the cost
of control.
One critical area that is basic to the success of
the budget cycle is the ability of Boston's financial system
to generate the necessary information in an accurate and
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timely manner. The current account system does not offer
the flexibility necessary to develop information in various
formats. The basic problem is the current system's inabil-
ity to accumulate data in usable form.
In December of 1983 the Auditors office hired the
firm of Ernst and Whinney to assist the City in developing a
City of Boston Accounting Manual. The benefits of these
system improvements will include a coding structure which
allows for flexible management reporting and budgeting as
well as developing acounting policies and procedures for the
Auditing department and the City as a whole which will
facilitate day to day management. This program, in coordi-
nation with the development of a new intergrated financial
management system will help improve the financial management
information available for decision making.
Recommendations - The Budget Cycle
1. Two Tiered Budgeting (TTB)—The new
Administration must work with the City
Council and the department heads to
develop a workable TTB budget process.
It will be necessary to define core
services and minimum service levels as
well as develop the necessary data
base. It may be too late in the pre-
sent fiscal year to fully implement TTB
for FY 1985.
2. Budgeting Total Resources— In an atmos-
phere of limited available resources
for municipal goverment it is important
that the Administration make every
effort to identify and allocate all
available resources. This would
require that during the budget prepara-
tion process department heads identify
and budget all federal, State, capital
and general City resources available.
This comprehensive budget information
will eliminate patchwork allocation and
allow for greater control over funds.
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Expenditure Control—The most critical
aspect of any budget system is its
ability to control expenditure by
receiving timely and accurate informa-
tion for making management decisions
and taking corrective action. The cur-
rent financial system of the City needs
extensive upgrading to meet these
requirements. Some of these systems
are currently undergoing review and
change: however, an extensive financial
system review should be undertaken by
the Administration to identify problem
areas and focus attention on them early.
Spending Plans--The current budget
process offers no means of monitoring
the spending patterns of a particular
department. In order to determine if a
particular level is acceptable requires
more than just allocating on a straight
twelve month basis. The Budget Depart-
ment must work with the individual
department heads to formulate a realis-
tic detailed spending plan based on
seasonal spending cycles.
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APPENDICES
A. Overlay Reserve As a Percentage of Gross Levy.
5-Year Cumulative Summary of Abatement Activity.
B. Review of City Council's Supervisor of Finance's
Memorandum on Unliquidated Reserve Accounts.
C. Summary of Operating Positions, Fiscal 1967-1983.
D. Personnel Services — Budget to Actual Comparison,
Fiscal 1984 at December 31, 1983.
E. Budget to Actual Non-Personnel Expenditures and
Encumbrance, Fiscal 1984 at December 31, 1983
(Preliminary Data).
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APPENDIX A
CITY OF BOSTON
OVERLAY RESERVE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS LEVY
five years commencing 1980
(in thousands)
Levy
Year
Overlay
Reserve Gross Levy
1980 $24,868 $439,540
1981 24,702 518,675
1982 24, 140 440,719
1983 20,229 374,611
1984 20,829 333,268
Overlay Reserve
As a % of Gross Levy
5.66%
4.76
5.48
5.40
6.25
SOURCE: City of Boston Tax Rate Recapitulations.
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APPENDIX B
REVIEW OF CITY COUNCIL'S SUPERVISOR
OF FINANCE'S MEMORANDUM ON
UNLIQUIDATED RESERVE ACCOUNTS
(in thousands)
ENCUMBRANCE CURRENT
NUMBER ENCUMBRANCE TITLE AMOUNT 1 BALANCE 2
9-27-000 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES 1982 AND PRIOR
R-702-82 Non-Contractual $ 250 $ 250
R-750-82 Permanent Employees 51 51
R-1142-82 Police Union Retro 1,735 1,735
SUBTOTAL 2,036 2,036
9-28-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-HOSPITAL 1982 AND PRIOR
R-851-82 Permanent Employees 28 28
R-897-82 Permanent Employees 57 57
SUBTOTAL 85 85
9-31-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES - CITY 1983
M- 845-83 Hospital Ins Est Charges-Schools $488 $ -
M-6111-83 Memo-PFD 26
R- 2004-83 BRA-Salaries 933 933
R- 2005-83 BRA-Unemployment 21 21
R- 2007-83 BRA-Transportat ion of Persons 5 5
R- 2008-83 BRA-Contractual Services 199 199
R- 2009-83 BRA-Office Supplies 44 44
R- 2010-83 BRA-Current Charges 462 462
R- 2010-83 BRA-Misc Equipment 23 23
R- 2012-83 BRA-Special 749 749
R- 2025-83 Postage 137 137
R- 2028-83 Postage 19 19
R- 2031-83 FY 83 P&R/Retroactive Pay 11 9
R- 2064-83 Boston Fire Dept 288
R- 2065-83 Boston Fire Dept 251
R- 2067-83 Treasury Dept 24 24
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REVIEW OF CITY COUNCIL'S SUPERVISOR OF FINANCE'S MEMORANDUM ON
UNLIQUIDATED RESERVE ACCOUNTS, continued
(in thousands)
ENCUMBRANCE CURRENT
NUMBER ENCUMBRANCE TITLE AMOUNT 1 BALANCE 2
9-31-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES - CITY 1983
R-2069-83 Boston Fire Dept 14 14
R-2070-83 Personnel 203 174
R-2071-83 Per sonnel/Overt ime 173
R-2077-83 Permanent Employees 36 33
R-2081-83 Medical/ins Surg. 136 136
R-2084-83 MAC Pavroll #2401-0L X* X V— X XX Y X ^—/ -L J_ TT ™* A XX J_ V 62
R-2113-83 Payroll Temp 13 2
R-2154-83 Pavrol
1
XT U Y X. \J -L _L 18
R-2155-83 ver t iine 39
D_pl Ql _Q "3X\ Z. X J -L O <J Rncf on Pol "i r*duo tu r uii^c 9 g
I\ v J <_> _) IlnVnnwn \7f=* t~iH nyU 11JM1UW 11 V CllUUl 24x* *t 24x. ""I
R-2279-83 Payroll 19 18
R-2280-83 Payroll 5
R-2300-83 Boston School Hpnt 54 54
R-2306-83 Boston School Dent 50 50
R-2330-83 Payroll 6 6
R-2361-83 Holiday Pay 165
R-2362-83 Overtime 600 4
R-2363-83 Workmen 1 s Comp 30 30
R-2377-83 Idemmni fications 118 117
R-2389-83 Payroll 29
R-2449-83 MAC- Payroll 11 9
R-2478-83 Payroll 8
R-2481-83 Various Office Equipment 55 55
R-2490-83 Various Vendors 23 23
R-2595-83 Payroll 425
R-2603-83 Personnel (28355-83) 11 11
R-2621-83 Union Retro Salary Inc. 70 70
R-2622-83 Union Retro/Detective Salary 315
R-2623-83 Union Retro/Patrolmen Salary 2,018 1,959
R-2624-83 Union Retro/Election Workers 15 15
R-2625-83 Union Retro/Housing Inspection 70 70
R-2626-83 Union Retro/Salary Inc. 496 239
SUBTOTAL 9,000 5,747
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REVIEW OF CITY COUNCIL'S SUPERVISOR OF FINANCE'S MEMORANDUM ON
UNLIQUIDATED RESERVE ACCOUNTS, continued
(in thousands)
ENCUMBRANCE CURRENT
NUMBER ENCUMBRANCE TITLE AMOUNT 1 BALANCE
9-32-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-COUNTY 1983
R- 2101-83 Payroll 10 10
R- 2102-83 Payroll 5 1
R- 2103-83 Payroll 20
2104-83 Clotl.Inq Allowance X J
R- 2167-83 Uniform Allowance 18 18
R- 2169-83 Workmen 1 s Comp 13 13
R- 2184-83 Longevity Payroll 15 15
D_S\ 2185-83 Retro w Diff Payroll #5102 Penal D J. 1 7
R- 2186-83 Retro OT payroll #5102 Penal 51
R- 2627-83 Union Retro/Char les St. 153 153
R- 2628-83 Union Retro/Deer Island 209 209
SUBTOTAL JJO
Q_ 33-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-SCHOOL 1983
c- 1600-83 School Dept *U 403 401
R- 2500-83 Personnel 1. 143
R- 2501-83 Non-Personnel 4, 824 3, 588
SUBTOTAL 6, 370 3, 989
9- 34-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-P & E 1983
R- 2502-83 Collective Bargaining Retro 70 1
R- 2505-83 Non-Contractual Serv. 13 13
SUBTOTAL 83 14
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REVIEW OF CITY COUNCIL'S SUPERVISOR OF FINANCE'S MEMORANDUM ON
UNLIQUIDATED RESERVE ACCOUNTS, continued
(in thousands)
ENCUMBRANCE CURRENT
NUMBER ENCUMBRANCE TITLE AMOUNT BALANCE 2
9-35-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-BCH-1983
R-2205-83 Payroll $517 515
9-36-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-MATTAPAN 1983
R-2225-83 Payrolls 47 47
9-37-00 RESERVE FOR ENCUMBRANCES-LONG ISLAND 1983
R-2250-83 Payrolls 81 64
The above listing does not encompass all unli-
quidated reserves See separate analysis.
The change in the balances relates to overtime and
other payments processed and adjustment of encumbrances.
NOTES
1 Amounts indicated on City Council's Supervisor of
Finance memorandum.
Current balance of the reserve item per the records in
the Auditing Department.
January 9, 1984
APPENDIX C
Years
Ending
June 30, 1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
CITY OF BOSTON
SUMMARY OF OPERATING POSITIONS
(in thousands)
Revenue Appropriation
Surplus ( Deficit
)
$(20,819)
(6, 515)
2,293
9,871
25, 757
12,747
390
1974 (18 mos. ) 12,484
$(15,946)
( 36, 703)
(32,295)
(25,000)
(15,227)
(16,043)
(15,000)
(20, 730)
1,447
Net Operating
Surplus (Deficit
)
$(36,765)
(43, 218)
(32,295)
(22, 707)
(5,356)
(16,043)
$10,757
390
13,931
(7, 983)
Dec. 31, 1972
1971
1970
1969
27968 (8,537)
1967
TOTAL
:
(22,829)
(33, 567)
(2,544)
(3,426)
5,315
1, 522
6,889
6,037
4, 104
3,603
1, 103
1,560
177
(3,222)
2,565
(15,940)
(27,530)
(33, 143) $(148,536) $29.380 $(211,059)
NOTE: Property Tax Revenue is reflected on a cash basis through
1972; on a modified accrual basis effective in Fiscal 1974.
Source: Auditing Department
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NOTES TO PRELIMINARY REPORTS
FOR FISCAL 1984 AT DECEMEBER 31, 1983
Settlement of treasury advances and processing of M.A.C.s
(Monthly Adjustment of Compensation) will increase the
expenditures presented in the schedules. Refunded
expenditures will reduce the expenditures and expenditure
transfers which have not been processed but relate to
transactions prior to December 31, 1983 will reclassify
expenditures between departments.
The closing process for the month of December is incomplete
and therefore monthly proofs of expenditures have not been
performed.
Certain manual adjustments have been made to the numbers to
reflect items known to be unprocessed.
Source: Auditing Department
January 12, 1984
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Cash Flow

INTRODUCTION
Major institutional and political consequences
result from the City's cash flow position. The City's vul-
nerability to the timing of cash receipts and expenditure
payments makes cash flow critical to the flexibility of the
City's financial operations. In this context, a principal
purpose of this chapter is to describe the environment in
which the City's current cash position will be judged and
the prospective condition of the City's cash operations
during the early months of the new Administration.
This chapter will cover a wide range of factors
that affect the City's cash flow operations. First, it will
define the major components of revenues and expenditures and
review the way they determine the City's cash position at
any particular time. Second, the chapter will review recent
events that have influenced that cash position and devel-
opments that will affect the City's prospective cash posi-
tion, particularly over the remainder of fiscal 1984.
Third, the chapter will review the susceptibility of the
City's cash flow to outside forces, including State distri-
butions, departmental resources, and the payments of pension
funds and prior years' reserves.
It will be important to consider two key elements
in this analysis. First of all, there is a substantial dif-
ference between cash flow and budget. Cash flow is reality,
while budget represents a plan. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant to understand the factors that made the cash flows for
both 1983 and 1984 exceptional, primarily caused by a delay
in various aspects of the revaluation process, including
State certification. A delay in final completion of revalu-
ation caused the total cash receipts in 1983 to be substan-
tially below those of previous years and the budgeted
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amount, while the receipt in fiscal 1984 of 1983 revenues
made the cash statement for 1984 substantially larger than
would have been expected. Adjustments to both expenditures
and revenues, because of the timing of revaluation, have
created administrative problems in handling the City's cash
condition
.
The discussion which follows covers the major
changes in each month's cash flow for the period July 1982
through December 1983 and looks at projected cash flows
through June 1984. It focuses, in particular, on antici-
pated changes in the projections within the current fiscal
year, including major estimated adjustments, and changes in
the aggregates for the total yearly amounts in each category.
MATTERS AFFECTING THE PREPARATION OF CITY CASH FLOWS
Once a month the City prepares a statement of its
cash flow for the then current fiscal year. The statements
for October, November and December 1983 are attached at the
end of this chapter. This cash flow, except as of the end
of each fiscal year, consists of both projected and actual
cash components by month. Early in the year, most of the
monthly statements are prepared on an estimated basis. How-
ever, as the year progresses and as each month's actual com-
ponents are completed, the City's cash flow reflects more
actual components than projected ones.
The monthly cash flows are prepared by the Collec-
tor-Treasurer's office pursuant to certain loan agreements
with financial institutions that have lent the City funds to
cover cash shortfalls. (City officials indicate that the
City would have refined the cash flow process for purposes
of better financial monitoring even without the pressure of
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the financial institutions to do so.) Generally, a repre-
sentative of the Collector-Treasurer's office reviews mate-
rials and has conversations with individuals critical to the
discharge of City obligations to determine the amount of
actual cash that was distributed during that month. This
material is compiled, and rolling monthly actual figures are
then completed. The Collector-Treasurer's office will, for
each item of the cash flow, analyze the necessary adjust-
ments that should occur to each projected monthly amount for
each category and for the aggregate total for the entire
year. After these actions are taken, the resulting figures
are placed in a data pool which is revised from month to
month, and a new monthly cash flow is printed from the data
pool
.
Until recently, the data pool was maintained and
revised by hand; it is now partially computerized. However,
the data pool still requires a representative from the Col-
lector-Treasurer's office to personally receive information
from each of the departments that affects the cash position
of the City, and most components of the cash flow are not
immediately retrievable from a centralized data source
reflecting all City operations. There is no ability to
retrieve the immediate condition of total expenditures and
remaining estimated payments by category. However, the City
has prepared the basic format and the data pool so that a
fully computerized system for cash flows could be implement-
ed in the near future.
At present, the City does not routinely prepare a
cash flow for the City's capital projects account. (Such a
cash flow would present the current levels of bond and bond
anticipation note funding and relate those amounts to the
capital cash flow requirements.) The only routine informa-
tion available on the financial condition and operations of
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the City's capital projects account consists of the materi-
als presented in the City's annual financial audits. Only
general revenue cash flow statements are prepared by the
City; however, these cover all City operations except for
the capital projects account and directly-funded Federal
programs
.
BUDGET VERSUS CASH FLOW
It is important to distinguish between cash flow
and budget. A cash flow presents the timing implications of
expenditure requirements as compared to resources. In sim-
plest terms, a budget is a plan, and cash flow is reality.
If a governmental entity's financial operations rely princi-
pally on budget, with little regard to cash flow, that
entity could face severe financial problems even though it
had adopted a well-structured operating budget. While a
balanced budget is mandatory for financial integrity, if it
is not combined with a sufficient cash flow, the budget
essentially becomes useless. While public comment on City
finances frequently focuses on budget, the most critical
item in the City's financial picture remains its ability to
pay for current and prospective liabilities. Only a real-
istic cash flow can produce the appropriate answers.
POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY TO
CASH FLOW CONCERNS
Any new administration should look at the role that
cash plays in maintaining flexibility in policy decisions
and financial endurance. Should a city find itself without
the capacity to meet payroll or other contractual obliga-
tions, it subjects itself to the explicit dictates of out-
side institutional and political forces. One needs only to
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look at New York City beginning in 1975 as an illustration.
When New York City was unable to meet its financial obliga-
tions on a timely basis, it became subject to pressure by
external sources of cash, including the State itself, banks
that could lend to the City, the labor unions whose lending
capacity or wage flexibility could provide relief, and the
federal government, which would provide cash assistance
after the State had exhausted its resources. New York City
was no longer master of its own fate.
Like New York, Boston's cash flow is vulnerable to
forces outside of its control. The City must maintain a
constant guard with respect to the potential for erosion in
cash resources. The City's current cash flow projection
shows it maintaining approximately $23.0 million as a mini-
mum cash position over the remainder of fiscal 1984 without
consideration for increased contractual commitments. This
amount is equal to roughly one week of city operating expen-
ditures. In view of the many unforeseen circumstances that
can befall a complex government like Boston — such as court
decisions, labor contracts, or an alteration in the timing
of pension payments — which can create cash management
difficulties, the City's current cash position is tenuous at
best
.
On two different occasions recently the State's
courts have rendered decisions that hurt the City's cash
position. In the first, the court determined that certain
commercial properties had been disproportionately taxed and
that the City was obligated to repay those affected property
owners. The eventual cost of this decision was in excess of
$100 million. Without State assistance, the City's own cash
position might have been irreparably harmed. On a more
recent decision, the courts determined that the City was
required to make certain additional payments to school
personnel
.
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MAJOR FACTORS IN THE CITY'S 1983 CASH FLOW
In fiscal 1983 one important matter dominated the
City's cash position: the effect of the revaluation proc-
ess. The City originally anticipated that revenues from the
revaluation would be received early in calendar year 1983.
The City's official statement, which was issued when tax
anticipation notes were sold, projected that the City would
send out tax bills in December and January of fiscal 1983.
However, the City experienced a series of delays in receiv-
ing certification from the State for the completed revalua-
tion. (The certification was required in order that
property tax bills could be distributed and the City could
collect the property tax receipts.) During the course of
the fiscal 1983 cash flow presentations, the date of antici-
pated receipt of property tax revenues was extended into the
latter months of the fiscal year.
At the same time, another major influence on the
City's cash flow occurred as part of the initial tax antici-
pation note financing undertaken in the fall of fiscal 1983.
By the terms of this financing, sufficient monies were
required to be escrowed in an account by May 15th to repay
the tax anticipation notes, even though the notes themselves
were not due until June 30. Thus, the City faced a loss of
property tax revenues due to the lack of State approval at
precisely the time it required large amounts of funds to
satisfy the note payment account requirement.
Accordingly, in early May 1983, the City faced a
large cash shortage. In response to the need to fund a note
payment account and to finance mandatory operating expendi-
tures through the end of the fiscal year, or until suffi-
cient property tax revenues had been received, the City
developed a unique borrowing program. The City relied on
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certain borrowed funds from the State to provide adequate
monies to meet its note account requirements. To meet oper-
ating expenses, the City was able to borrow $65 million from
a consortium of financial institutions under a rather intri-
cate financing arrangement. Under the arrangement the bank
notes were due on June 30, 1983. However, neither the City
nor the banks fully expected that sufficient money would
then be on hand to repay the notes. Both the City and the
banks expected to refinance the notes as of June 30th.
Because the City could not legally issue notes
beyond the end of the fiscal year, except against uncol-
lected property taxes, it became necessary for the property
tax levy to be in place in order to establish an uncollected
amount against which a borrowing could occur. Thus a cove-
nant was entered into for the purpose of bank financing, as
follows: the City would receive certification from the
State in time for the property tax bills to be sent out
prior to the end of the fiscal year; and a property tax levy
would have been made so that the amount due the City could
be established. Subsequent to State certification, and
before the notes became due on June 30, the City levied its
1983 property taxes, so that renewal notes could be sold
against the uncollected amounts. The renewal notes were
then payable in early August of fiscal 1984.
Because of its inability to receive requisite prop-
erty taxes in fiscal 1983, the City took certain other
actions in fiscal 1983 that affected its traditional cash
flow operations. Taking the cash flow for January 1983, and
that projected for fiscal 1983 and comparing it to the ac-
tuals for the entire period through 1983, certain important
changes should be identified. First of all, as indicated
previously, the property tax differences are substantial:
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slightly over $180 million was actually received, as com-
pared to approximately $370 million which was anticipated
for the year in the January 1983 cash flow. Amounts raised
through motor excise tax and federal revenue sharing differ
by only a few thousand dollars. State distributions were
received as expected. City department receipts were slight-
ly less than anticipated. Health and Hospitals receipts
were reduced by about $7 million. Reimbursements for non-
revenue expenditures were $10 million less than expected.
Tax anticipation notes were substantially greater than anti-
cipated, and the income from Tregor reimbursement was
approximately $5 million greater than expected in January.
With respect to disbursements, while the City
altered the format in general government personnel and non-
personnel items as well as school expenditures over the
course of the year, precise comparisons can still be made in
comparing the January 1983 cash flow to the actuals present-
ed for the fiscal year following June (fiscal 84).
Because of the shortage of cash in late 1983, cer-
tain general government personnel and non-personnel expendi-
tures were delayed or reduced in fiscal 1983, so that these
expenses fell well below the levels anticipated in the Jan-
uary cash flow. There are other items that can be compared
as well. The actual payments for prior years' reserves were
$15 million less than had been anticipated. Debt service
was the same for both cash flows. State assessments were as
projected. Pension costs were down by approximately
$50 million, from $85 million to $34.5 million. Non-revenue
expenditures (operating funds used for capital construction
projects) were increased by approximately $2 million. Prop-
erty tax abatements were approximately $3 million less that
had been expected, with the final figure at $17 million.
And because of the large refinancings at the end of the
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year, the payment for total tax note obligations was sub-
stantially greater than had been anticipated. In January,
the tax note obligation amount was projected at $67.7 mil-
lion, but at year-end, $197.9 million had actually been paid.
With the exceptional characteristics of the large
1983 property tax revenues received in fiscal 1984 and the
substantial 1983 pension payments made in fiscal 1984, it is
important to recognize the volume related to short-term bor-
rowing that occurred in fiscal 1983. In October of 1982,
approximately $63.8 million in tax anticipation notes were
issued to be repaid in June 1983. It was expected that this
amount would be enough to cover any cash shortfalls for FY
1983.
However, as discussed above, the requirement that
the City finance the note payment account in May of 1983,
taken together with the need to cover certain expenditures
for certification, made it necessary to issue an additional
$130 million of notes in May, with half to be held by the
State and half by the consortium of financial institutions.
The $65 million of notes held by the financial institutions
were refinanced in June 1983 to be repaid in August of fis-
cal 1984. Therefore, the City issued $258.8 million of tax
anticipation notes for fiscal 1983, a figure substantially
higher than at any time in recent years.
It should also be noted that because of the large
amount of cash received by the City in early fiscal 1984,
the City had difficulty in showing a cash flow deficiency,
as required by the regulations of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in order to sell tax anticipation notes in fiscal 1984.
As a result, rather than the conventional $65 million tax
anticipation notes during fiscal 1984, the City issued only
$25 million. These notes come due in May 1984 in the amount
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of $25.8 million. Excluding the payment of bond anticipa-
tion notes, the total amount of notes to be paid in 1984
will be $91.3 million, still higher than the $65 million
that the City had issued three out of the five years prior
to fiscal 1983. This figure for 1984 note issuance does not
take into account the sale of bond anticipation notes in the
amount of $25 million which were issued in early fiscal 1984
to finance a series of capital construction expenditures.
To repeat, the three major elements causing the
exceptional nature of the fiscal 1983 and 1984 cash flows
are the impact of revaluation on the collection of property
taxes, the handling of pension payments, and the unusually
high level of note borrowings, in particular tax note obli-
gations .
THE PROSPECTIVE 1984 CASH POSITION
The factors described above had, in many respects,
an opposite effect on fiscal 1984. As a result the total
cash in-flow and out-flow for 1984 will be substantially
larger than for fiscal 1983 and other recent years. For
example, total property tax collections in 1984 are expected
to aggregate about $511 million, with slightly less than 40%
of these revenues coming from the fiscal 1983 property tax
levy collected in 1984. It should be noted that there have
been delays in the distribution of the tax bills for fiscal
1984, also the result of a delay in State certification.
Thus, the cash flow position of the City was thinner in
November and in October than had been projected. For exam-
ple, in August of 1983, the City projected that the current
levy receipts would amount to approximately $37.8 million in
October and $117.6 million in November. However, actuals
received through November amounted to $131,000 in October
III - 10
and $20.1 million in November. These reduced payments con-
tributed to significant adjustments in expenditure levels in
early 1984. This was accomplished principally through a
reduction in pension expenditures in which approximately
$17 million in pension payments were expected to be made in
October, but were delayed to be made in January 1984.
The early November cash flow presented by the
City's Collector-Treasurer indicated thin cash balances for
February and March 1984. In each case, the cash balance was
less than $20 million, equivalent to one week's average City
operating expenditures. However, on December 29th, the City
produced another cash flow which showed larger cash balances
for February and March. The cash flows also showed higher
balances for April and May than had previously been project-
ed. There were several reasons why these results occurred.
While there were certain changes in revenues, the most
important adjustments were on the expenditure side.
With respect to revenues: hospital revenues, prop-
erty taxes, and City department revenues (including garage
sale proceeds), among others, were received at a higher
level than had been projected in the earlier cash flows.
Certain major elements involved expenditure
changes. First, the earlier cash flow estimate assumed a
$17 million pension payment in November. In actuality, how-
ever, no payment was made. In addition, the earlier cash
flow assumed the payment in November of prior years'
reserves in the amount of approximately $9 million. How-
ever, the actual payments for prior years' disbursements
amounted to slightly over $1 million. Moreover, actual
school expenditures were approximately $3 million less than
had been projected. In sum, the November cash flow showed
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total expenditures for November in an amount of $107 mil-
lion, while actual expenditures for November were about
$27 million less.
For December, prior years' reserves had been pro-
jected in the earlier cash flow at $38 million. Property
tax abatements had been assumed to be $2.5 million in the
earlier cash flow but were actually $15.8 million. Most
important, pension payments were assumed to be in the amount
of $17.1 million in November and $34.1 million in December.
However, these payments were assumed in the later cash flow
to be deferred to January. For December under the new cash
flow, total expenditures were expected to amount to approx-
imately $72.5 million, while the earlier cash flow had
assumed expenditures of $124 million, producing a reduction
of about $51.5 million. In total the December cash flow
produced an ending cash balance of $237.6 million compared
to $146 million expected as of the end of December under the
earlier estimate.
Other factors which should be considered involve an
anticipated reduction of $30 million in payments for prior
years' reserves. This reduction occurs in part because the
accounting for certain prior years' pension payments was
shown previously in both the prior years' reserve category
and in the pension costs category. The new cash flow also
presents a modest increase of $2.5 million from non-revenue
disbursements (payments made out of the operating budget for
capital purposes). In total the aggregate cash available
for the year shows a rise from $1,102 billion to $1,113 bil-
lion, while total disbursements for the year also rose from
$1,113 billion to $1,120 billion.
Certain other adjustment in the December cash flow
changed the cash position as presented in November. For
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example, the earlier cash flow had assumed property taxes
from the current levy in the amount of $7.7 million and
$150.4 million in November and December respectively; how-
ever, in the later cash flow, with actuals available through
November, current year levy collections were in an amount of
$20.1 million in November and $138 million in December.
Another factor that bears note is that in November the City
actually received $9.8 million in State aid rather than the
$19 million projected in the November cash flow statement.
Further, the City is projected to receive $108.6 million in
December as compared to $99.3 million assumed in the earlier
cash flow.
A series of factors will impact upon the ability of
the City to achieve the cash flow results projected in the
December 29th statement. Many of the revenues are subject
to substantial change, but the following revenues should be
fairly stable, except for unforeseen events. Total property
tax collections will probably aggregate approximately
$520 million. Federal revenue sharing is expected to be
received in the amount of $18 million. State distributions
have been confirmed by the State at $311 million. Other
revenue sources that tend to be more subject to change are
City departments receipts at $65.6 million; Hospital Depart-
ment receipts at $110 million; parking fines at $26.3 mil-
lion; and motor vehicle excise taxes at $7.6 million.
Proceeds from the sale of City garages in the amount of
$22 million were received in December and have been added to
other receipts in the City departments revenue category.
Generally expenditures of the City are more diffi-
cult to project, or at least currently are more uncertain,
in part because of the continuing wage negotiations. Total
general government personnel and non-personnel expenditures,
including City and school, are expected to aggregate
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$612.4 million, as opposed to the actual expenditures of
$580.4 million in fiscal 1983. Personnel deductions, inclu-
ding Blue Cross/Blue Shield, federal and state withholding,
credit union, and related amounts, are expected to aggregate
$163.8 million as opposed to the fiscal 1983 amount of
$152.9 million.
Total general government expenditures are expected
to increase by $9.5 million from $121.5 million to $131 mil-
lion. General government school expenditures are expected
to rise to $50 million from $44.2 million in 1983. County
expenditures will rise between $1 million and $5 million.
And prior year reserve amounts will rise substantially from
$20.9 million in 1983 to $80 million in 1984. The major
rise in prior year reserve payments results from a delay in
making vendor and other payments at the end of fiscal 1983
due to the cash shortage. Thus, there is a backlog of war-
rants payable and monies due for the reserves for encum-
brances which must be paid in fiscal 1984. Debt service
will decline from $69.5 million to $66.8 million. State
assessments will rise to $47.5 million from $46.3 million.
Pension costs, as previously mentioned, will amount to
$151.7 million as compared to $34.5 million in 1983. Non-
revenue expenditures (or capital expenditures made from
operating funds) will rise from $5.9 million to $10.2 mil-
lion. And property tax abatements, which will include both
Tregor and non-Tregor payments, are expected to increase
from $17.1 million to $60 million. It should be noted that
if further borrowing is needed in fiscal 1984 in the form of
tax anticipation note issues, the tax note obligations could
increase beyond the $91.3 million currently projected.
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ADEQUACY OF 1984 CASH POSITION
It is difficult to determine specifically the
amount of cash that the City should have on hand at any
particular point. This conclusion is a function of the size
and timing of outstanding liabilities and the ability to
call upon external sources of capital in order to meet
unanticipated expenditures.
In general, municipalities that have a high credit
standing will more easily borrow funds than cities with low
credit ratings. In this respect, municipalities with low
credit ratings, such as the City of Boston, should have
higher amounts of cash on hand. At the same time, it is
important to recognize that the City has enjoyed support
from major financial institutions. During recent years,
whenever the City has required borrowed funds to cover legi-
timate cash flow needs, these institutions have been willing
to provide them. However, because of the thinness of the
market for City obligations, the City would be especially
vulnerable to a decision by any one of these institutions
not to provide the necessary monies.
The most recent cash flow indicates that in Febru-
ary the City will have a cash balance of $34 million and in
March, a cash balance of $23.1 million. These amounts are
equal to slightly more than one week of City operating
expenditures. This cash position is adequate if the City
does not experience exceptional financial or cash flow
drains. However, while 1983 and 1984 were exceptional
because of the revaluation process, it is reasonable to
assume, based on recent years, that unusual circumstances
frequently harm the City's cash position.
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Over the recent past, each of the following events
created difficulties for the City's cash flow. Proposition
2-1/2 reduced the availability of revenues. Tregor and
related cases increased expenditures for tax abatements by
well over $100 million; and other recent court decisions
increased the liability level of the City in other areas.
All of these occurred in the wake of the effects of revalua-
tion. It is not enough to have sufficient resources to
cover normal operating requirements. There should be funds
immediately available from external sources, which can be
used to cover any unanticipated cash expenditures. This
approach means the City must rely on a group of financial
institutions knowledgeable in the City's financial opera-
tions and willing to lend in the face of difficult, but
temporary, credit problems. History has proven that unusual
circumstances frequently do arise for Boston. If they do so
again, the City cannot rely exclusively on internal funds to
cover the remainder of the cash requirements for fiscal 1984.
BORROWING PROGRAMS TO FINANCE CASH SHORTFALLS
The City has consistently followed a policy of
maintaining access to the financial market in order to raise
funds sufficient to cover any shortfalls that may exist in
the City's cash position. In general, when an unexpected
cash shortfall occurs or when it has been necessary for the
City to sell tax anticipation notes early in a fiscal year
to cover prospective cash shortfalls during the course of
the fiscal year, the City has, over the recent past, borrow-
ed from a small group of financial institutions, although
one recent cash flow borrowing of $65 million was sold in
the public market (in the fall 1982).
Ill - 16
Short Term Tax Anticipation
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Special credit arrangements were made for the
public market sale (e.g., pledge of State aid, security
interest assigned, etc.) In general, however, the credit
support employed to repay debt obligations incurred by the
City in order to raise funds to pay current expenditures has
been twofold in nature. First, the City has pledged its
full faith and credit to raise sufficient monies to repay
principal and interest on maturity date. Second, the
financial institutions have relied upon the tax receipts
that were expected to be available on or around the day the
borrowing matured. Because historically the City has had
sufficient funds on hand and assigned those funds in a rea-
sonable manner to repay indebtedness, the City has been able
to borrow adequate monies to cover cash flow shortfalls when
they have developed.
Prior to fiscal 1979, the City sold notes early in
the year against property tax collections in November and
then sold them again soon after the November collections
against the collections anticipated in May. This process
was time-consuming, not cost-effective, and reduced invest-
ment income that would otherwise have been available to the
City. In compliance with the regulations of the Internal
Revenue Service, the City initiated a borrowing program in
1979 which has been repeated each year subsequently. Rather
than selling two debt issues in the fiscal year, the City
has sold one issue early in the fiscal year against the
second set of tax collections. This reduced the transaction
costs (e.g., legal expenses, printing costs, etc.) associ-
ated with short-term borrowing and allowed the City to util-
ize the revenues received in November more fully, including
investment throughout the remainder of the fiscal year.
A second reason for the change in the months
against which the borrowing occurred was the fact that
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short-term lenders are more inclined to purchase obligations
that are of longer duration than the three to four-month
maturity available under the previous format. It should be
emphasized that the City sells securities at a tax-exempt
rate, and unless related revenues are needed for meeting
cash flow requirements, they can be invested at taxable
rates with the resultant interest rate differential between
tax-exempt and taxable rates accruing to the City's bene-
fit. IRS regulations currently allow the City to sell debt
equal to the amount of the projected maximum monthly cash
flow deficiency plus the following month's expenditures.
Therefore, at the time the city sold its initial tax antici-
pation notes for 1984, it could only justify a borrowing of
$25 million.
Over the last five years, the City sold tax antici-
pation notes in the following amounts: for 1979 and 1980,
$65 million; for 1981, $90 million; for 1982, $50 million;
and for 1983, $258.8 million. Except for 1983, when extra-
ordinary events arose, as discussed herein, these amounts
have, over this period, represented a major decline in the
size of annual borrowing of tax anticipation notes. In
large part, this decline results from the issuance of debt
against a changed maturity date, but it also represents
greater stabilization in the City's cash position.
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INTRODUCTION
If tomorrow the federal government stopped giving
federal aid to Boston, the City would have to increase its
budget by 17% to maintain present levels of service — an
impossible task. The City simply could not afford to
compensate for the loss of federal dollars. Therefore, it
is important to realize the impact of federal dollars on
Boston's financial stability.
Boston has little control over federal cutbacks in
assistance to the Northeast resulting from policy decisions,
as well as population shifts to the Southwest and Rocky
Mountain states. Yet, the City relies on federal dollars to
fund programs such as economic and urban development, educa-
tion, employment and training and social services. The loss
of federal money means either decreases in levels of ser-
vices provided by affected programs, or the City's operating
budget must somehow compensate.
In FY 84 Federal receipts will have declined 6%
since FY 83, 4% since FY 82, and 20% since FY 81 (see
Display 1 on the following page). The largest cutbacks in
funding from FY 81 to projected FY 84 are for education (24%
decline), employment and training (75% decline), and mass
transit (82% decline).
There are three types of federal assistance and
grant programs that provide funds to Boston: General Reve-
nue Sharing, Categorical Grants, and Block Grants. Through
the Department of Treasury's General Revenue Sharing pro-
gram, funds are allocated to the City based on several
factors, including population and tax effort, with minimal
restrictions on how the money can be expended. Categorical
grant funds are allocated by several federal agencies for
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Boston's Federal Receipts
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specific programs, and can be "formula" or "project" grants.
Funding for formula grants is determined by the government
based on a statutory formula accounting for the population
and per capita income of the targeted area; an example is
funding for public libraries. Funds for project grants are
generally of limited duration; an example is disaster assis-
tance funds.
Beginning in 1966, Congress enacted Block Grants,
which are consolidated Categorical Grants, to allow local
governments greater discretion with allocation of funds.
The grant that provides the highest total federal receipts
to Boston is the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG).
The Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) is especially
important for the services it can provide. Funding for
these programs is based on a statutory formula that accounts
for factors such as total population and percent at the
poverty level.
The amount of federal aid available to the City in
any given year includes not only the fiscal year appropria-
tion but also the funds that are still available from the
previous years' allotments. The availability of federal
funds from all sources is therefore dependent not only on
the federal government's yearly allocation but also on the
process behind the flow of funds within the City, including
contracting, drawdown, and the final auditing report. These
processes will be explained herein.
In this chapter, the CDBG funding program in Boston
will be used as an example of the federal granting process.
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THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
The CDBG program is Title I of the Federal Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, funded under the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . The pro-
gram' s objective is the "development of viable urban commun-
ities by providing decent housing and suitable living envi-
ronment and expanding economic opportunities, principally
for persons of low and moderate income".
Each year, funds are allocated to entitlement cit-
ies, which must have a population over 50,000, according to
a statutory formula based on total population, percent of
same at poverty level, and extent of housing overcrowding.
Funds may not be used for government facilities,
arenas for spectators, schools, airports, hospitals or
general government expenses. They may be used for acqui-
sition of real property for rehabilitation or conservation,
installation of public facilities, rehabilitation of build-
ings, special projects for the elderly and handicapped, and
costs for administration and planning of community develop-
ment activities. There is an administrative cap of 20% and
a 10% cap on CDBG funds spent for public services.
In Boston, the Neighborhood Development and Employ-
ment Agency (NDEA) is responsible for the management of CDBG
funds. Boston has attempted to fulfill CDBG objectives
through a variety of projects. With CDBG funds, which
leveraged over $18 million in private investment, it rehab-
ilitated over 1,300 dwelling units in FY 82 and 1,180 in FY
83. CDBG money has been spent to revitalize commercial
areas, provide security at public housing projects, and
support human service organizations.
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The 10% cap on funds for public services has been
an important issue for NDEA. HUD gave the City a waiver on
this cap for several years but warned that the level of
public service expenditures must be reduced to 10% of the
yearly grant by FY 85. NDEA spends approximately $3 million
yearly to reimburse payroll and overtime costs for the
Boston Police Department for police patrols at 23 Boston
Housing Authority developments. This money was filtered
through the BHA's modernization programs. HUD had agreed to
this in the past, but the future is uncertain. If HUD does
not agree to such an arrangement, NDEA has said "there could
be a crisis for public services" because NDEA will not be
able to absorb these costs in their public service outlays.
(NDEA does take the position that the Police Department
should be absorbing this cost, not CDBG funds.)
Pre-Applicat ion/Application Procedure to HUD
After NDEA gives public notice, public hearings are
held beginning in February to solicit citizen input on the
spending of CDBG funds. These hearings are recorded and
transcribed. The proposal that NDEA submits to HUD certi-
fies there was citizen participation. NDEA then develops a
plan and in April submits an appropriation application to
the City Council for review. If there are no objections, by
mid-May the City Council will have granted authority to
apply for the funding. Expenditure orders are re-submitted
to the Council for review and approval through July. The
final one-page statement will then be sent to HUD.
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Award Process
From February through the end of April, Requests
for Proposals are issued by NDEA to non-profit organiza-
tions, area businesses and units of government. Proposals
are submitted to NDEA and awards are made. In May, negotia-
tions are held with the non-profit organizations and NDEA
begins to process the awards to completion. In June, the
Grant Agreement is signed, the Letter of Credit is received
and appropriations are established. Between June and July,
contract documents are assembled and processed to completion.
Awards to Boston
CDBG funds account for approximately 10% of federal
receipts in Boston, the largest single source of federal
funds. In FY 82, Boston received approximately $25.8 mil-
lion in CDBG funds. In FY 83, the City recommended
$23.2 million. However, the City only received $18.1 mil-
lion, due to a $1.2 million reduction by HUD because of pre-
viously disallowed costs and $3.9 million in questioned
costs. (See the Auditing chapter of this document for com-
plete analysis of this audit.) NDEA reports that FY 84 CDBG
grants total $22,943,000. The breakdown is as follows:
CDBG Entitlement
- Housing $11,975,000
- Fair Housing Commission 550,000
Commercial and Economic Development 3,429,000
- Human Services 2,950,000
Planning and Administration 4,038,600
CDBG Emergency Jobs Bill
Boston Resident Construction and
Job Training $2,174,000
- Rental Rehabilitation 365,000
Commercial and Economic Development 1,781,000
Planning and Administration 1,080,000
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The Emergency Jobs Bill will provide added funds for CDBG
activities. Yet, overall, CDBG funds are expected to
decrease in the future.
Contracts/Disbursement of Funds
HUD grants Letters of Credit to NDEA, and a CDBG
account is set up each year. NDEA then subcontracts the
CDBG money it receives. Each potential subgrantee must
submit a Certified Financial Statement before it receives
the contract. After the contract is negotiated with a sub-
grantee, NDEA draws up an award letter and encumbers part of
the money. After the award letter is approved, the contract
is executed and the encumbrance is increased to the full
amount of the contract.
Drawdown
When funds are required, an invoice is submitted by
the contractor to NDEA, and the drawdown process begins.
The drawdown document is initiated when an approved warrant
is generated by the City Treasurer's Office. Funds are then
removed from the account and disbursed. HUD requires that
all cash be disbursed within a certain amount of time after
receipt of drawdown money, depending on the type of payment
program. Presently, NDEA is trying to initiate the drawdown
process during the Accounts Payable Cycle and to time the
receipt of cash to date of approved warrant. This would, if
implemented, reduce the payment process by approximately
seven to ten days.
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CDBG DRAWDOWN PROCESS
PAYMENT PACKAGE APPROVED
BY APPROPRIATE DIVISION —
RECEIVED IN FISCAL OFFICE
PAYMENT PRE-AUDITED BY FISCAL
AND ENTERED INTO 1-2 days
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
ORIGINALS TO MAYOR'S OFFICE
FOR DEPT. HEAD APPROVAL
FORWARDED TO AUDITING
AUDITING ENTERS PAYMENT
IN A/P SYSTEM —
WARRANT CREATED AND 2-4 weeks
SIGNED BY MAYOR
TREASURY RECEIVES SIGNED
WARRANT — CASH REQUEST
SENT TO NDEA FISCAL
DRAWDOWN INITIATED
BY NDEA FISCAL
CASH RECEIVED
VENDOR PAID
7-10 days
Contract Process - Financial Implications
In NDEA's view, there are a number of problems in
the contracting process. First, money is often encumbered
but not drawn down or expended. The Appropriations Manage-
ment Report provides totals of unexpended balances, unliqui-
dated encumbrances (money that is unencumbered but not
spent) and unencumbered balances (money in the account that
has not yet been committed to any project). However, a
close analysis of each contract made with CDBG funds for the
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fiscal year is needed before an opinion can be formed as to
exactly how much money is available from a previous year's
allotments. The unencumbered balance money may be available
and some of the unliquidated encumbrances which represent
money tied up in contracts that are not moving forward may
be able to be redirected. NDEA recommends that people
trained in contract administration establish this kind of
contract analysis as a priority. The stipulations and
payment plans for each contract must be analyzed so that a
determination can be made about which contracts can be
closed out.
Second, NDEA suggests exploring options such as
"float" loans which would allow federal money to be loaned,
to draw interest, and to be paid back over a short period of
time. This would require careful coordination with the
Treasury Department. Third, one method for increasing the
money available is to cancel contracts or penalize sub-
grantees if productivity levels fall below the expected
level. NDEA believes large sums of money would then become
available. But until an examination is made of the con-
tracts, no estimate could be made as to a possible amount.
Another contracting problem is presented in the
Audit Report of June 19S2 by Zafarano, MacDonald and Savy.
This report states that "the City is losing the use of
federal funds and incurring an unnecessary interest cost for
some period of time as a result of its failure to process
valid reimbursable grant claims on a timely basis". They
recommend that the open invoice be received monthly so all
invoices will be processed. NDEA agrees that the contract
process is slow and, indeed, costs may be incurred because
of timing of payments. The payment process should be
improved to protect scarce federal dollars.
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Monitoring
HUD provides monitoring reports to NDEA each year.
The reports contain recommendations as to how to improve
management of CDBG funds and suggestions for corrective
measures for problems that HUD has identified. Unless NDEA
makes some of the corrections, HUD can judge NDEA ' s manage-
ment to be inadequate. This can result in the disallowal of
costs if HUD feels that NDEA failed to correct the problem.
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NDEA's Compliance Division is responsible for moni-
toring subgrantees ' performance. However, it would be bene-
ficial if an ongoing monitoring system were developed to
review subgrantees' accounting systems both prior to and
during the contract. Subgrantees' violation of grant proce-
dures would result in disallowed costs which the grantee is
required to absorb.
Post Financing Reports
The NDEA is responsible for the CDBG funding proc-
ess from application to final reporting to HUD. Compliance
audits are performed each year by independent Certified Pub-
lic Accountants. Earlier, the federal government performed
audits on CDBG programs. However, because of federal cut-
backs, they no longer perform this function.
The only outstanding audit was performed by the
Regional Inspector General for Audit for the period 7/1/79
through 1/31/82. As a result of this audit, $3.9 million
was held up in questioned or disallowed costs. The audit
focused on CDBG funds expended on non-CDBG activities,
inadequate performance on housing projects, inadequate con-
tracting procedures for professional services, failure to
implement monitoring consultant's recommendation, accounting
for reimbursements, and questionable payroll practices. The
City reimbursed the grantee for disallowed costs, none of
which was restored, according to the Zafarano, MacDonald and
Savy Audit Report, 1982. NDEA is waiting for a final deci-
sion from HUD on whether the $3.9 million will be released
to the City.
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When there are "questioned" costs by HUD, NDEA must
respond, providing documentation to HUD on how the money was
spent. If questioned costs become "disallowed," then the
money must be paid back or HUD will reduce the next year's
Letter of Credit. CDBG funds cannot be used to pay back any
disallowed costs. (For an analysis of ongoing federal
audits, see the Auditing chapter of this document.)
This entire process from the pre-application stage
to the audit is repeated each fiscal year for each of the
ten or so federal departments and agencies that provide
funds to the City. The contributions of other federal agen-
cies to Boston's financial stability are discussed below.
OVERVIEW
The Office of Inter-governmental Relations' report
dated March 1983 on The Impact of President Reagan's Pro-
posed Fiscal Year 1984 Budget on the City of Boston provided
the amounts of actual receipts for FY 81, FY 82, estimated
receipts for FY 83, and projected receipts for FY 84. These
figures are based on budget profiles submitted by the City
departments to that office. The level of accuracy varies
among departments because of differing accounting proce-
dures. Furthermore, the three levels of government operate
on different fiscal years, making verification of federal
receipts problematic at any given time. A central system
should be considered to track federal funding beginning at
the point that the Mayor signs the proposal.
The March 1983 report provides information on the
City's federal receipts for the past three years and the
impact of future cutbacks on levels of service. Total FY 83
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federal receipts were $187.6 million. In FY 84, total
receipts may drop to as low as $176.6 million. Service
levels will decline with the loss of federal money. All
cuts in federal funds will not be made up through the City's
operating budget. However, information on the trends in
grant money to Boston can be used to help the City determine
priorities for the future, including which services can be
cut and how the City can afford to maintain others.
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Department of Agriculture ; Projected FY 84 - $9.0 million
The Boston School Department receives money for the
National School Lunch Program which supplies lunches to
needy school children. The School Department received
approximately $8.3 million in FY 83, an increase of 9.1%
from FY 82. Approximately 35,000 students were served in FY
83. The projected receipt for FY 84 is $8.3 million, an
increase of .6%. Service levels are not expected to in-
crease, however, due to inflation.
Neighborhood Health Centers receive federal funds
channelled through the State for the Feeding Program for
Women, Infants and Children (WIC). In FY 83 receipts
totalled $651,000, a decrease of 5% from FY 82. Funds and
service levels are expected to remain the same in FY 84 or
decline
.
Department of Commerce ; Projected FY 84 - $0.00
Boston receives Title III funds from the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) for studies on economic
development, such as plans for the Boston Redevelopment
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Authority/ and Title I and IX funds for construction of
facilities in low growth areas. In FY 81, Boston received
$4.7 million in Title I funds. With these funds 362 jobs
were generated for renovation and rehabiilitation programs
at the Boylston Building and the Boston Marine Industrial
Park. In FY 82 Boston received no Title I or IX funds, and
in FY 83 no Title I funds. Receipts fell to $149,000 in
FY 83. In FY 84, Boston is not expected to receive any
funds because of the Reagan Administration's opposition to
the EDA. The elimination of this program could damage the
City's economic revitalizat ion efforts. Cuts could force
termination of present employees and reduce future employ-
ment opportunities.
Department of Education ; Projected FY 84 - $16.0 million
The Boston School Department receives Title I funds
from the Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged pro-
gram. In FY 83, Boston received $11.8 million, an increase
of 4.2% since FY 82. The projection for FY 84 is $11.2 mil-
lion, a decrease of 4.9%. Service levels will decrease
through FY 84, and there will be a loss of service for
approximately 754 students since FY 83 and 2,132 since FY 81.
The School Department also receives funds for Adult
and Vocational Education programs. In FY 83, the Department
received $1.6 million. In FY 84, Boston is expected to
receive only $961,000, a decrease of 39.3% a consequent loss
of 1204 students in adult education programs.
Bilingual programs are also supported by federal
money. In FY 83, Boston received $560,000, an increase of
4.3% from FY 82. However, 1984 funding is expected to drop
to $375,000, down 33%. This decline could be significant to
Boston's educational budget. Through the past few years,
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profiles of Boston student populations reveal an increasing
number of students dependent on this program, and with cuts
the Department will not be able to fulfill the demand with-
out rebudgeting.
Department of Health and Human Services : Projected
FY 84 - $15.0 million
The Commission on the Affairs of the Elderly
receives Title III B and C funds through the State as part
of the Older Americans Act. These programs provide many
services to the elderly, including transportation, low cost
meals, and funds for direct support of centers for the
elderly. In FY 83, receipts totalled $2.9 million, an
increase of 6.3% from FY 82, but in FY 84 receipts are
projected to decline 5.1% to $2.8 million. Service levels
are expected to decrease by 9% in FY 84, a reduction of
service to 2,470 people.
Funding and service levels for programs such as the
"Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health," "Maternal Child
Care," "Preventative Health" and "Primary Care" block grants
are expected to remain at current levels.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) :
Projected FY 84 - $95.9 million
This department provides more funds to the City
than any federal agency. In FY 84 the City is expected to
receive $95.9 million, a 4% decline from FY 83. While total
federal support decreased between FY 82 and FY 83, funds
from HUD increased relative to other federal receipts. In
FY 81, HUD receipts were 45% of total federal receipts; by
FY 83, they were 53% of total.
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Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs) are awarded
through a competitive process to localities that generate
economic growth and jobs in distressed areas. Boston
received $13.6 million in FY 83. This amount is expected to
remain the same in FY 84. UDAGs are expected to generate
4600 construction jobs and 11,000 permanent new jobs, and to
provide continued funding for 3400 existing jobs. Projects
have included the Charlestown Navy Yard and Westland Avenue
Apartments
.
Boston receives funds under the Section 8 Assisted
Housing Program for low-income families. Funding in FY 83
was $2.4 million, a 27.4% decrease from FY 82. The pro-
jected receipts for FY 84 are $1.4 million, a 43.7% decrease
from FY 83. There has been a significant cut in the City's
receipts for this program and a continued decline would hurt
the City's ability to provide housing for low and middle
income families.
The Boston Housing Authority receives Public
Housing Operating Subsidies for cost differences between
rental income and total operating expenses of federally
aided low-rent housing programs. In FY 83 receipts totalled
$37.4 million, an increase of 5.3% from FY 82. The pro-
jected receipts for FY 84 are $45.3 million, an increase of
22%. According to the BHA, approximately 39,000 people live
in Boston in housing units subsidized by this money.
The BHA also receives Public Housing Modernization
funds to supplement the costs of the existing public housing
projects, including capital improvements, repairs, and
improved managment and planning. In FY 83 Boston received
$22.4 million, up 43.8% from FY 82. However, it is estima-
ted that in FY 84 total receipts will be only $12.1 million,
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a decrease of 46%, due to the Reagan Administration's pro-
posed consolidation of the Public Housing Operating Subsidy
Program and the Public Housing Modernization Program. The
impact of the consolidation of these programs on total units
of housing available cannot yet be estimated.
Department of Interior ; Projected FY 84 - $0.00
Programs such as Urban Parks and Recreation Recov-
ery, Land and Water Conservation Fund, and the Historical
Preservation Fund have been supported by federal dollars.
The FY 82 total of $464,000 represents a 78% decline from FY
81. Boston is expected to receive no federal money from the
Department of Interior in FY 84 because of the Administra-
tion's recommendation for termination of these programs.
Department of Labor ; Projected FY 84 - $8.1 million
The Commission on the Affairs of the Elderly
receives funds under Title V to provide public service
employment to elderly persons. Projected receipts in FY 84
are $437,000, a 1.8% decrease from FY 83, but levels of
service should remain the same.
Employment and Training—In the summer of 1982,
the Job Training and Partnership Assistance Act (JTPA) was
enacted to replace the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA), which expired in 1982. 1983 served as the tran-
sition year, and JTPA will officially replace CETA in 1984.
The JTPA program is administered by NDEA.
In FY 82, Boston received $12.1 million for employ-
ment and training, down 63% from FY 81. Receipts for FY 83
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totalled $10.2 million, a further decrease of
reports that the FY 84 receipts will drop again
mately 34%. The grant for FY 84 is as follows:
15%. NDEA
by approxi-
Employment and Training (JTPA) Total: $6,673,932
- Title IIA Entitlement
- Title IIA
- Title IIB, Summer Program
- Targeted Assistance - Refugees
- Title III, Dislocated Workers
3,294,291
301,241
2,308,400
720,000
50,000
NDEA and the Boston Private Industry Councils ( P IC)
will coordinate efforts to plan and implement programs for
employment and training. Programs include employment to
youths and assistance to dislocated workers, though the
former will not provide any direct jobs. Together, the PIC
and NDEA will work to develop a tie between JTPA and public
institutions, utilize public school and community develop-
ment, and develop private sector involvement in the employ-
ment and training programs. Such activities require
resources, resources which have declined through the past
three years.
service employment was eliminated, as was the YES program
that provided employment incentives to youths to continue
their education. Service levels were reduced to 5,880 job
and training slots, a reduction of 56% causing termination
of 7,350 people. In FY 83 an estimated 4,100 slots remained
open. The FY 84 service levels are difficult to estimate
because 1983 was the transition year from CETA to JTPA, and
this was accompanied by several programmatic changes. Ser-
vice levels are expected to continue to drop, however.
In its Job Training Plan for 1984 NDEA states that
the resources provided by the JTPA program were inadequate
In FY 82, when CETA was cut drastically, public
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and forced Boston to narrow the range of service models
available to clients and employers. Besides the reduction
of funds from the federal government, the JTPA program was
run on a 9-month fiscal year. Therefore, the $6.5 million
received is a 12-month allotment that must be prorated among
FY 84 (9 months) and FY 85. This cuts down on the money
available for 1984 through June 30, 1985.
Department of Transportation ; Projected FY 84 -
$1.9 million
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) receives operating assistance funds from the Depart-
ment of Transportation. In FY 84, the MBTA is expected to
receive only $1.9 million, a drastic cut of 68.6% from FY 83
and a decrease of 84% since FY 82. The MBTA may have to
increase deficit assessments against member communities, cut
services, or raise transit fares to compensate for the loss
of money.
Department of the Treasury ; Projected FY 84 -
$18.6 million
Boston receives General Revenue Sharing funds that
it uses for public safety, health, and elderly services.
GRS funds are consolidated in the City's general operating
budget, and the money can be used for capital expenditures.
Boston received $18.6 million in GRS funds in FY 82, a
decrease of 14.8% from FY 81 due to population changes.
Funding is expected to remain at the FY 83 level.
The Reagan Administration has proposed that in FY
84, communities be allowed to transfer up to 20% of Commun-
ity Development Block Grant funds to the more flexible GRS
funds. This would allow previously earmarked funds to be
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used in the general operating budget, thus increasing Bos-
ton's flexibility. However, shifting of such funds would
take money away from CDBG targets — programs for low to
moderate income people.
Environmental Protection Agency
The Boston Water and Sewer Commission receives
Wastewater and Sewer Construction grants for construction of
municipal sewage treatment works. Estimating receipts for
fiscal years 1981, 1982 and 1983 is difficult because these
funds are awarded on a cost-reimbursement plan, under which
reimbursement occurs after the project is completed. There-
fore, actual receipts in a given year do not reflect the
actual expenditures for that year.
The federal government reimburses 75% of the costs
and the state reimburses 15%. However, starting October 1,
1984, the federal government will only reimburse for 55% of
the costs. The Boston Water and Sewer Commission believes
that between the years 1981 and 1986 somewhere between $60
and $80 million has been or will be available from the
Environmental Protection Agency. Therefore, it is impera-
tive that the Commission get contracts out to bid and pro-
posals in to EPA before a drop in reimbursements occurs.
CONCLUSION
Using the CDBG and JTPA programs as examples of the
process of grant management and actual federal receipts over
the past three years, a number of recommendations can be
made. The subgranting of contracts should be monitored more
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closely before questioned or disallowed costs arise. A con-
tract review should be done to decide if some contracts can
be closed out, thus freeing up money. Furthermore, CDBG
spending for public services should be kept in check in the
coming years. There have been cutbacks in federal aid for
most programs and services in the City, especially for em-
ployment and training, education, and mass transit. Either
services have to be cut or the City must make up these costs
from the general operating budget.
No central office has complete data on incoming and
outgoing federal funds. Further, actual figures from
different reports do not match. The Office of Inter-govern-
mental Relations compiles its report from budget surveys,
yet discrepancies exist between the Office's figures and
those provided by federal agencies, as well as among its own
yearly reports. There are a number of problems in gathering
information on federal funds at any given point. The advis-
ability of tracking funds from the point the Mayor signs the
proposal is offered as a solution. The Boston Municipal
Research Bureau has recommended that the Mayor develop four
primary budgets, one of which will be of all programs and
services financed by external funds. This would provide a
profile of the needs of each department versus its
resources. Although federal aid (excluding GRS) is not con-
solidated into the general operating budget, these funds are
available to City departments and agencies. Therefore, if
the City is to review the needs of different departments and
establish service priorities both within and among depart-
ments, the use of an accurate profile of federal funds is
essent ial
.
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Assessing

INTRODUCTION
To comply with the mandates of the Sudbury case,
Proposition 2-1/2, and the Classification Act, Boston was
forced concurrently to revalue all its property and to re-
duce its overall property tax levy.
On the last day of FY 1983 (June 30, 1983), the
City implemented the product of its three-plus-year reval-
uation effort by issuing tax bills based on full and fair,
or 100%, assessed values. The subsequent issue of the FY
1984 tax bills in November, 1983 was the end point of man-
dated property tax cuts. FY 1984 represented the first time
the City's overall property tax levy was 2-1/2% of the total
value of all taxable property. The turmoil associated with
levy cuts in FY 1983-84 has come to an end. The problems
associated with levy growth are just beginning.
The maintenance of equity through revaluation and
the establishment of a full value tax base for Proposition
2-1/2 are the responsibility of the Assessing Department.
From the viewpoint of the chief executive, the demands are
two-fold
.
1. To comply with the state classification
law and to maintain assessment equity,
all cities and towns must revalue their
property every three years. For
Boston, revaluation is not behind us
but ahead. The City must revalue all
its property for FY 1986, commencing
July 1, 1985, or less than 18 months
from now.
2. To maintain its property tax revenue
base for Proposition 2-1/2 purposes,
the City must keep its assessed values
abreast of full, or 100%, value. For
FY 1985, assessed values must be fac-
tored up, and the value of all new tax-
able construction as of January 1 must
be fully captured.
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This analysis will focus on these two important
concepts, in terms of where Boston's Assessing Department is
today, and where it must go. The appendices following sum-
marize key assessment statistics.
REVALUATION: EVERY THREE YEARS
Recent History
Massachusetts has a long history of inequitable and
disproportionate assessing practices, exemplified by Boston,
and caused in large part by infrequent community-wide reas-
sessments or reappraisals. However, history has been rad-
ically altered. In 1974, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts mandated that all communities must assess their
properties at full and fair, or 100%, cash value.
The 1979 Classification Act required that all pro-
perty must be reassessed at least every three years. It
also increased the enforcement powers of the Department of
Revenue to ensure that all communities do, in fact, assess
property at full and fair market value.
The Classification Act also allows, after revalua-
tion is accomplished, for different rates of taxation by use
— residential, commercial, industrial, and personal. This
effectively made legal what had been common practice in Mas-
sachusetts cities for decades. Before that, the practice
was to overassess income-producing property compared to res-
idential property. Now the law requires all property to be
assessed equitably (at 100%) but allows it to be taxed at
different rates by general use. The result is the same;
businesses pay more proportionally than homeowners. (It was
the illegal practice of disproportionate assessing before
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the Classification Law took effect that caused the so-called
"Tregor" liabilities, as discussed later in this chapter).
However, to implement classification of property by use,
Boston first had to re- value.
FY 1983 Revaluation
Revaluations in Massachusetts are under the general
statutory authority of the State Department of Revenue and
must meet the minimum standards as set forth in their guide-
lines. To comply with those guidelines and state law, the
City in 1978 established the Office of Property Equalization
(OPE). OPE undertook the first revaluation in Boston in
several decades, utilizing a combination of in-house staff
and technical consultants.
At the eleventh hour, the Department of Revenue
certified the City's tax roll. The total taxable property
valuation of the City was certified at $12.2 billion as of
January 1, 1982. However, property-tax-yielded revenues
fell to $374 million, because of Proposition 2-1/2 limits.
In conjunction with the state certification, the City Coun-
cil and the Mayor chose to implement the Classification Act,
to the full benefit of residentially-classi f ied property.
Business property (the commercial, industrial and personal
property classes) now shoulder approximately 70% of the to-
tal property tax burden while representing only 53% of the
City's taxable valuation base. FY 1983 marked the first
time in recent Boston history that the issue of dispropor-
tionate assessing practices was eliminated. The assessments
of all property were now based on one standard for all pro-
perties — 100%.
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FY 1984
In June, 1983, Office of Property Evaluation was
disbanded as a separate office and merged with the Assessing
Department, the department charged with the administration
of the property tax. The Assessing Department trended-up FY
1983 assessments and added the valuations of all new con-
struction and parcels for the first time. (The trending
process, an alternative to reappraisal, is a process by
which prior revaluations are adjusted across the board to
reflect a number of factors.) This produced a total taxable
valuation of $13.3 billion. The resulting levy of $333 mil-
lion represented an effective tax rate in compliance with
the requirements of Proposition 2-1/2.
The Future: Revaluation Again
The Classification Act requires Boston to revalue
all its property again in FY 1986. (In the interim fiscal
year, 1985, the City plans again to trend-up the general
property value base and to add all new construction.) The
need for a complete revaluation for FY 1986 (less than 18
months away) will require the new Administration to address
a number of issues, including the City's relation to the
State Department of Revenue.
The State Commissioner of Revenue has broad powers
of supervision in the area of local assessment administra-
tion. The Revenue Department's Local Service Division pub-
lishes guidelines, including statistical standards, with
which all revaluation programs must comply in order to ob-
tain approval. On May 31, 1983, shortly before the final
certification of the City's tax rolls, the Commissioner and
City executed a "Memorandum of Understanding". The
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Memorandum states that the City's Computer-Assisted Mass
Appraisal (CAMA) system has "to date been unable to generate
values that meet the minimum standards, statistical and
otherwise, set forth in the guidelines established by the
Department of Revenue".
Two important provisions of the Memorandum are that
the City have a fully operational CAMA system by June 30,
1984, and that the Department of Revenue retain a consultant
over the next three years (paid for 50/50% by City and
State, with City cost not to exceed $25,000 per year) to
monitor the City's progress to this end.
On December 13, 1983, the Department of Revenue
released a request for proposals for A Review and Analysis
of the City of Boston's Revaluation Program . The contract
is to be executed by February 6, 1984, with work to begin
shortly thereafter at the direction of the Department of
Revenue. The proposal requires monitoring of the entire
revaluation process including an initial review of CAMA de-
velopment and analysis of the data base, taxpayer hearings,
valuation, and field review procedures. Monthly written
reports to the Department of Revenue are required and a
final report must address new values and value update cap-
abilities, providing supporting documentation.
The Department of Revenue appears to assume that
the City will complete a new revaluation in time for the FY
1985 tax billing process. However, the City's present plans
are to complete revaluation for FY 1986 in conjunction with
the triennial requirement contained in the Classification
Act. Assessing Department officials, as of this date, ap-
pear unaware of the Department's monitoring proposal. This
issue requires immediate clarification. The Department of
Revenue takes the position that the Memorandum is legally
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enforceable. This proposal should be viewed as a strong
measure by the Commissioner to enforce the Memorandum, as
the state has never before hired an outside consultant to
monitor a revaluation program.
Present City Efforts
The Assessing Department is presently undertaking
some activities of major importance to the 1986 revalua-
tion. Two are required by the Memorandum of Understanding:
1) CAMA system development, and 2) the re-collection or cor-
rection of property data. As to 1), through an initial re-
view done by outside consultants, the City has determined
that the present system is inadequate and that there are
additional software and hardware needs. (See the MIS chap-
ter of this report.) With respect to 2), on December 1, the
Assessing Department released an RFP for the total re-col-
lection of physical property characteristics for residential
properties (one-, two and three-family homes, condominiums,
and residential land) . The Assessing department is of the
opinion that the current base file of the physical char-
acteristics of each residential property is wholly in-
accurate and must be totally re-collected. Ten proposals
were sent out and three bids were received. To re-collect
73,000 residential parcels, the total bids were for
$919,000, $1,292,000, and $1,713,000, or a per-parcel cost
of $12.59, $17.70, and $23.47, respectively. Additional
information has been requested from the bidders, and no con-
tract has yet been signed. The City has been directed to
submit the re-collection contract to the Department of Rev-
enue for review before final execution.
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The Assessing Department is currently undergoing a
major reorganization. The reorganization attempts to
address a number of factors including the merger with the
Office of Property Evaluation, deficiencies resulting from
the loss of the technical managers of the FY 1983 revalua-
tion, and new revaluation responsibilities. The key tech-
nical positions in the proposed new structure remain to be
filled.
Issues Which Remain to be Addressed
A new revaluation is imminent for FY 1986 — less
than 18 months away. The tasks involved in a revaluation
are complex, technical and potentially very costly. The
City's base tools for the FY 1986 revaluation are from the
FY 1983 revaluation.
Yet, as noted, the Assessing Department felt
strongly enough about the insufficiency of its present resi-
dential property inventory base to request bids for the re-
collection of all residential property data (both interior
and exterior). And the Department of Revenue has directed a
verification of the accuracy of the total data base for all
properties
.
The Memorandum of May, 1983 directed the City to
fully implement a CAMA system. City officials have cur-
rently estimated the potential cost of software alone to be
$100,000. The Department of Revenue's directives and the
actions of the Assessing Department demonstrate that the FY
1983 tools are, at best, flawed.
Cost—To date, the complete cost and an analysis
of all necessary resources have not yet been determined.
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The full cost of a 1986 revaluation must be quickly as-
certained. Other questions must be answered as well.
Should the program be completely contracted out, done
in-house, or by a combination of both? Are present bud-
getary levels adequate with a reallocation of resources or
are new appropriations needed? Should the costs of the re-
valuation program be financed by bonding?
Personnel—Personnel decisions will be based in
part upon how much of the revaluation work is contracted out
and how much is done in-house. The present staff of the
Assessing Department is wholly lacking in mass-appraisal
(revaluation) expertise. The "civil service" Assessing
Department was generally excluded from the last revaluation,
as it was administered solely by the Office of Property
Evaluation. As a result, its staff acquired little mass-
appraisal experience.
Many questions remain to be addressed. If it is
done in-house, how will the present civil servants be re-
trained to carry out the revaluation? Should the staff be
reallocated or cut and experienced personnel be hired?
City-Wide Impact— Revaluation will affect Boston
taxpayers directly in at least two ways. First, every pro-
perty in Boston will be visited by an employee or represen-
tative of the City, at least once and possibly more during
the next 18 months. Second, toward the end of the program,
every taxpayer in Boston will receive a new (as of January
1, 1985) 100% assessment of their property upon which FY
1986 bills will be calculated.
The public perception of the FY 1983 revaluation
was generally favorable, although over 7,000 complaints
(abatement requests) remain to be resolved. Because the
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increased assessments were coupled with three years of man-
dated Proposition 2-1/2 cuts, the impact was largely
hidden. After decades of property tax increases, taxpayers
were relieved that their total tax bills were less. How-
ever, in FY 1986, the City will not have the advantage of
the levy cut to soften the impact of new full value assess-
ments .
Other Considerations—A successful revaluation
can produce benefits beyond equitable assessments to the
overall administration of the City. A major component of
the revaluation program will be a total inventory of all
properties of the City. This inventory, properly con-
structed, can be of immeasurable benefit to other City agen-
cies in their efforts in the areas of housing, public
safety, linkage and planning.
THE PROPERTY TAX BASE
The Proposition 2-1/2 Equation
Historically, the largest single source of City
revenues has been the property tax. In 1980, Massachusetts
voters overwhelmingly approved a statewide property tax lim-
itation initiative, commonly known as Proposition 2-1/2.
Under Proposition 2-1/2, the level of property taxation in a
community cannot be more than 2-1/2% of the total taxable
fair cash value of all property in that community. This can
be expressed by the equation:
Total Property Taxes (Property Tax Levy) The Effective
= 2-1/2% Level of Prop-
Total Fair Cash Values (Assessed Values) erty Taxation
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It is a function of the Assessing Department to maintain the
fair cash value portion (the denominator) of the equation.
In FY 1984, Boston's level of property taxation was
effectively at 5.18%, more than double the allowable 2-1/2%
level. By law, the City had to reduce its property tax levy
at least 15% per year until the 2-1/2 level was reached. In
FY 1984, it reached that level by balancing the equation
with a decrease in the tax levy and an increase in fair cash
values
.
The property tax levy (revenues) fell to
$333. 3 million, while its total fair cash value rose to
$13.3 billion:
$333.3 million 9 _, /9 „$13.13 billion L/ *
Now, under the further provisions of Proposition 2-1/2, the
numerator ($333.3 million), represents Boston's tax levy cap
base for future fiscal years.
Growth of the Tax Base
In FY 1985 and future years, the City will be sub-
ject to the 2-1/2% levy cap provisions of Proposition
2-1/2. The property tax levy base ($333.3 million) can only
rise by 2-1/2% per year with the exception of the tax dollar
value of new construction growth.
New construction growth includes property which has
increased in assessed value by at least 50% in the last year
and property that is newly assessed to the tax roles. The
dollar amount of the construction growth that can be added
to the levy base is calculated by multiplying the increased
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assessed values times the previous fiscal year's classified
tax rate (i.e., if a residential property, multiply by the
previous year's residential tax rate; if commercial, by the
commercial tax rate).
To maximize property tax revenues while the tax
levy can rise only 2-1/2% per year, the Assessing Department
must at least ensure that fair cash values also increase
(appreciate) at least 2-1/2% per year.
To increase revenues above the 2-1/2% general in-
crease, all new construction growth as of January 1 must be
accurately and fully assessed. The City's current building
boom provides the substance for this additional tax growth.
However, the importance and difficulties of accurately as-
sessing new construction as of January 1 every year cannot
be overemphasized.
At present, there is very limited coordination
among City agencies -- Assessing Department, BRA, Inspec-
tional Services, and others — who are involved in planning,
inspecting, or valuating new construction. With today's
fiscal constraints, it is very important for financial plan-
ning purposes to have estimates of new tax growth early in
the budgetary cycle. Traditionally, the value of new con-
struction growth has not been accurately known until well
after the City's budgetary planning cycle -- anywhere from
July to October. In the future, it should be determined
annually by March or April to incorporate actual property
tax revenue projections into the fiscal planning process.
However, for property under construction, the ap-
plication of "fair market value" as of January 1 is dif-
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ficult to determine in a legal context. There are three
appraisal approaches to determining fair cash value — mar-
ket, cost and income.
The market approach to valuation is comparing un-
sold property with property that has recently been sold.
Typically, new buildings under construction or just com-
pleted are not sold -- hence the lack of a market approach.
The cost approach, as the name indicates, is based
on the construction or reproduction cost of a building plus
the value of the land, while the income approach is
generally based on the income potential of a property. In
present appraisal/assessment practice, the cost approach
generally yields a higher value than the income approach.
However, the majority of legal and state Appellate Tax Board
decisions generally favor the income approach to value for
income-producing properties unless they are of a distinct
special purpose nature. This is true even for property
under construction or just completed, which has little or no
present income stream. The process is to estimate its in-
come value as if fully completed and occupied, and then to
apply a factor based upon the percentage of completion.
In sum, the legal prescription for the determin-
ation of fair cash value for property newly completed or
under construction is unclear, and oftentimes must be lit-
igated. (For a review of potential property tax revenues in
future years, refer to the Revenues chapter of this report.)
Abatement Liability — Continued Concern
Applications for abatement must be filed within 30
days of the mailing or the tax bill with the Assessing De-
partment by taxpayers who believe that their assessed values
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are not equal to the fair market value of their property.
Applications for abatement are generally filed for reason of
overvaluation, improper classification, disproportionate
assessment, or exemption. Abatement applications which have
not been acted upon within three months may be appealed to
the state Appellate Tax Board. The Assessing Department is
authorized to settle appeals which have been properly filed
with the Appellate Tax Board prior to the Board's
determination. Outstanding abatements and appeals represent
potential liabilities against the City's general funds.
Through the 1970 's and early 1980' s, the abatement
liability of the City grew as a result of the dispropor-
tionate assessing practices of the City. Over the past five
years, abatements worth approximately $100 million have been
remitted to taxpayers. By state law, the monies needed to
fund abatement payments come from the overlay account raised
in the relevant tax year. When this account is deleted, the
overlay deficit must be raised in following tax years.
Before and After Revaluation
The City's abatement liability can be broken down
into two general categories: outstanding cases before the
Appellate Tax Board for tax years prior to and including
fiscal 1982, and abatement applications filed after the im-
plementation of revaluation for FY 1983 and FY 1984.
The certification of the City's revaluation program
by the Department of Revenue in FY 1983 put a cap on dis-
proportionate assessing claims against the City. Prior to
FY 1983 and compliance with the Classification Act, the City
was illegally assessing income-producing property at a
higher proportionate rate than residential property. This
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illegal practice was successfully challenged in the courts,
creating a huge abatement liability. At one juncture, the
liability was estimated to be in excess of $140 million, a
fiscal crisis only mitigated by the "Tregor Bill" passed in
June, 1982.
However, as of June 30, 1983, the liability for FY
1982 and all years prior was calculated to still be approx-
imately $50 million. Though the liability is dropping, a
substantial portion remains. Over 7,000 abatement applica-
tions were filed for FY 1983, and approximately 5,500 were
filed for FY 1984. It is beholden upon the Assessing De-
partment to relieve any liability by properly, fairly and
expediently administering the adjudication of these abate-
ment appeals, with the goal of avoiding future overlay re-
serve appropriations.
However, FY 1983 and FY 1984 abatements have even
further significance for the City's financial position.
Proposition 2-1/2 's equation demonstrated that proper main-
tenance of the City's fair cash value base is necessary to
realize property tax revenue growth. If significant abate-
ments are granted against the FY 1983-84 general value base,
it will necessitate further factoring of assessments beyond
Proposition 2-1/2' s overall average.
At present, there are no complete estimates of the
actual liability involved for FY 1983 and FY 1984, but the
abatement applications filed for FY 1983 (an accounting of
FY 1984 was not made available in time for this report)
represented some of the largest taxpayers in the City. Per-
sonal property abatement applications were filed by Boston
Edison Company, Boston Gas Company, Eastern Airlines, and
others. Abatements on real estate were filed for properties
totaling over $3.5 billion in assessed valuation.
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Table 1 is a list of the largest real estate pro-
perties for which abatement appliations were filed in FY
1983. Included are only the main parcels and reflect total
assessments as of January 1, 1982.
TABLE 1
LARGEST FY 1983 REAL ESTATE ABATEMENT APPLICATIONS
Name Location
Total Assessed
Value
President & Fellows
of Harvard College
John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co.
Bank of Boston
New England Telephone
& Telegraph
Bertram A. Druker Trust
John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co.
Boston Edison Company
Hexalon Real Estate,
Inc
.
Faneuil Hall Market,
Lessee
Robert J. Perriello
Trust
Marriott Urban, Lessee
Teachers Realty
Corporation
474 Brookline Avenue $200,000,000
200 Clarendon Street 198,374,504
100 Federal Street 128,374,504
185 Franklin Street
60 State Street
89,045,000
83,824,508
197 Clarendon Street 82,441,004
658 Summer Street 71,700,000
80 Pearl Street
Clinton Street
22 Pearl Street
70,625,000
55,080,000
52,467,000
100 Huntington Avenue 31,333,500
50 Milk Street 26, 165,000
Roger A. Saunders Trust 54 Providence Street 25,607,000
The above 13 properties alone represent
$1,115,662,020 in assessed value. In addition, Harvard Col-
lege is presently negotiating a Chapter 121A in-lieu-of tax
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agreement for its property, the MATEP Plant, which would
remove $200 million from the general value base. The amount
of total tax liability involved cannot at present be as-
certained. However, it is clear that concerns about the FY
1983-84 overlay accounts and the future fair cash value base
of the City must be fully addressed.
FY 1983 Residential Abatements
A growing concern surrounding the FY 1983 abatement
applications is the issue of inaction, particularly on
residential applications. From the date an abatement ap-
plication is filed, by state law the Assessing Department
has three months in which to act (in FY 1983, by October
1-30, 1983). The demands of the then-pending FY 1984 tax
billing process forced the City to successfully file
home-rule legislation which allowed the Assessing Department
an additional three months to act on FY 1983 abatement ap-
plications (by January 1-30, 1984). Within ten days after
the period for action has expired, the Assessing Department
must notify taxpayers if no action has been taken and that
they may appeal their application to the state Appellate Tax
Board — a quasi- judicial proceeding where filing fees are
required. To date, only an approximate 150 or 2% of all
applications filed for FY 1983 have been acted upon (and
none for FY 1984) and inaction notices are now being mailed
out
.
Residential (excluding apartments) abatement ap-
plications filed in FY 1983 (there were 2,783) represented
39.4% of the total of all applications filed on real
estate. Yet, the 2,783 applications represent only 6.7% of
the total assessed value for all real estate filings. There
was and is sound financial reason to take, and certainly no
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social reason not to take, action on the residential abate-
ment applications. Action from this point forward will be
more costly and complicated for both the City and the tax-
payer .
In conclusion, abatement liabilities, even in the
wake of revaluation, continue to be a major financial and
social problem facing the City today.
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APPENDIX A
FY 1984 TAX RATE COMPUTATION
Total Appropriations and Expenditures $948,056,392
Less Total Non-Property Tax Revenues 614, 788, 273
Net Amount to be Raised by Taxation $333 . 268. 119
State
Class
Class-
ified
% Share
of Levy
Total
Tax Levy
by Class
Total Valua-
tion by Class
Tax
Rate=
Levy
Class
x 1000
Residential 30.0805 $100,248,717 $ 5,862,458,925* 17.10
II
Open Space
III
Commercial
IV
Industrial
V
Pers. Prop.
TOTAL
-0-
7.5791
17.7870
100%
-0- -0-
25,258,724
-0-
44.5534 148,482,278 4,563,421,608 32.54
776,300,474 32.54
59,278,400 1,821,847,318 32.54
$333,268,119 $13,024,028,325
* Total residential valuation for tax rate purposes is less the
value of the residential exemption ($306,696,440)
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APPENDIX B
VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE BY WARD IN FY 1984
WARD PARCELS TOTAL VALUE
1 6 , 343 $ 371,006,688
2 2 ,714 281, 248,471
3 5 , 308 2,934,725,608
4 2,505 1, 165, 210, 992
5 8, 048 1, 727, 966, 063
6 4, 424 458, 066, 342
7 3, 724 199, 178, 718
8 1, 894 137, 161, 824
9 1, 220 77, 716, 187
10 2,003 90, 804, 644
11 3, 092 137, 953, 182
12 2, 242 102, 731,870
13 2, 904 160, 806, 044
14 4, 529 141 ,630, 140
15 3,040 104, 523 , 912
16 5,335 315 , 408, 656
17 4,856 208,481, 141
18 13,414 679, 169,416
19 5, 242 330,760,834
20 12,683 28, 522, 172
21 4, 574 567, 194, 360
22 6, 145 551,610, 183
TOTALS 105,394 $11,508,877,447
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APPENDIX C
VALUATION OF
(in
REAL ESTATE
millions of
BY USE IN FY
dollars
/
1984
Total
Use Land Value
Total
Build-
ing Value Total
Rl (single family) $ 363.5 $1, 319.
5
$ 1.683.0
R2 (two family) 215.0 857 . 1,072.5
R3 (three family) 146.1 633.5 779.5
R4 (4-6 units) 73.1 306.2 379.3
RL (residential land) 57.9 58.
1
A (apartments) 133.6 753.9 887.6
K^LJ \ (_ UHU (Jill 1 111 UHlb ) 952.4 952.4
CP (condo parking) .8 3.3 4.1
RC (residential/
comercial
)
104.6 399.6 504.1
C (commercial) 760.0 3, 311.4 4,071.3
CC (commercial condo) 127.0 127.0
AH (agricultural/
horticultural
)
I (industrial) 87.4 688.8 776.3
TOTAL $2. 155.5 $9,353.4 $11,508.9
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APPENDIX D
NUMBER OF REAL ESTATE PARCELS
ASSESSED BY USE IN FY 1984
USE NUMBER OF PARCELS
Rl (single family) 29,231
R2 (two family) 18,806
R3 (three family) 15,739
R4 (4-6 family) 3,527
RL (residential land) 10,309
A (apartments) 2,548
CD (condominiums) 12,366
CP ( consominiums parking) 441
RC (residential/commercial use) 2,582
C (commercial) 4,872
CL (commercial land) 3,426
CC (commercial condos ) 667
AH (agricultural hort icutural ) 3
I (industrial) 877
Total Items 105,394
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APPENDIX E
MOTOR VEHICLE EXCISE TAX
1958-1983
Year
Assessed
Number of
Motor Vehicles
Assessed Amount of Tax Tax Rate
1958 187,020 $ 5,679,550.60 60.25
1959 188,393 6,223,247.18 64.13
1960 198,357 7, 156,025.76 66.96
1961 202,515 7,553,739.78 66.00
1962 205,963 8, 104, 557.39 66.00
1963 207,627 8,642,967.32 66.00
1964 207,462 8,865,440.05 66.00
1965 207,804 9,453,132.26 66.00
1966 207, 392 10, 169, 753.97 66.00
1967 204,984 10,290,983.95 66.00
1968 209,938 11,066, 712.87 66.00
1970 221,776 12, 391, 716.31 66.00
1971 252, 775 13,400, 723.73 66.00
1972 241,080 13, 704,685.41 66.00
1973 272, 554 15, 359, 734.21 66.00
1974 260,391 15,731,766.80 66.00
1975 261 865 15 817 076 56 66 . 00
1976 255,610 15,662,247.26 66.00
1977 252,512 15, 389,454.57 66.00
1978 243 , 997 15.521.778.12 66.00
1979 252,888 18, 132,986.35 66.00
1980 241,565 20,012,882.82 66.00
1981 261,340 18,836,856.94 25.00
*1982 278,375 10,477,265.76 25.00
1983 272,577 10,950,680.59 25.00
In 1981 Proposition 2 1/2 reduces the MVE tax rate to $25.
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APPENDIX F
VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE, PERSONAL ESTATE,
AND TOTAL CITY VALUATION
FY 1963-1984
rv.ca.-L D /-s v- o ra 1rci oCJIld J_ _ l utal
Year Estate Estate Valuation
<fcl inQ ft^l qnf) J J , ItU , J UU <fci aa^ nnn nnn4>X,'T trJ,UUU,UUU
Xy i "}oa "^9 1 Ann i i r f^7ft Ann1J J| D / O , O UU i Afin nnn nnnX,T-OU,UUU,UUU
1 QCCIl/D J 1 T. R9 "1 ft*3 QDD i -5 7 oi c. i nnIJ / , O X O , 1UU i AQn nnn nnnX, *± U , uuu, uuu
17DD i ^fift n9 r i nnX , JUO f U ^ -> , X UU i A7n Ann i ^nfi aq^ ^nnX, JUu,*T-/J, JUU
1 QA7 1 9ftft n49 7fin1 i ZOO , UHZ ( / UU i A9 Aft nnn1*14 , DUO ) UUU i ^ in 7 i n 7nnll JJU| /XU, /UU
l"OC5 1 A9A 9RQ onnX , Z*± , Z J 7 / .3 UU i Aft nAft 7 nn1HO < U*tO , / UU i "=179 ino nnnX , -> / Z, jUO| UUU
1 Q £. Q 1 co 9^;q 9nnIjz , zoo, zuu i cqq nnn nnnx, Dyy, uuu, uuu
i q "7 n i /icq Qi q tnnx,*±Dy,yxo,ouu i^7 no i Ann1 j / , Uo X , tuu i £. i 7 nnn nnn1 / Dl / , UUU, UUU
1 oniy / x X, D U Z , J X U
,
uuu i 7Q i on nnnx/y, i?u, uuu i Afti nnn nnnX, OoX,UUU,UUU
x y / z X,OJX,OOX,OUU i fti nift 9nnlo j
,
Ojo, zuu l 7i i; 7nn nnnX, / XO, / UU/ uuu
j. y / j i c^a 7n<; Tnnit jJlf /UO, /UU 9n7 aqi innzu / ,**yj, juu i 7A9 9nn nnnx, /tz , zuu ( uuu
1 Q "7 ^iy / 4
I 1st o IuOS . ; i ^ pal 7nnX , J JO , 07l/ / UU 997 inft innZZ / , JUO| J UU i 7ftA 9nn nnnX, /o*i,zuu,uuu
FY 1 9 7 5 * 1 , 556 , 891 , 700 227, 308, 300 1 , 784, 200, 000
FY 1976 1,549,461,400 244,011,600 1, 793,473,000
pv 1 q 7 7
.T ± X .7 / / l ^ i ft 919 nnn 9A£ 7ftft nnn i 7fi^ nnn nnnX, /OJ, uuu, uuu
FY 1978 1 , 498 , 038 , 800 246 , 961 , 200 1, 745 , 000 , 000
FY 1979 1,481,346,400 243,653,600 1,725,000,000
FY 1980 1,494, 316, 500 243,6832,500 1,738,000,000
FY 1981 1,636,587,000 265,413,000 1,902,000,000
FY 1982 1,635,769,200 272,932,300 1,908, 701, 500
I 1983 10,481,679,435 1,695,417,271 12,177,086,706
C 1984 11, 508,877,447 1,821,847, 318 13,330,724,765
In fiscal 1983, the City revalued and began assessing property
at 100% of value.
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APPENDIX G
VALUE OF EXEMPT PROPERTY
FY 1960-1984
Total
Value
Year Exempt
FY 1984 12,130,673,300
FY 1983 10,959,024,590
FY 1982 2,690,883,300
FY 1981 2,658,130,000
FY 1980 2,622,206,700
FY 1979 2,613,036,100
FY 1978 1,209,932,742
FY 1977 2,476,099,000
FY 1976 2,373,294,500
FY 1975 2,272,135,700
1974 2,272,135,700
1973 2,165,178,200
1972 1,934,462,000
1971 1,836,728,000
1970 1,724,695,200
1969 1,561,877,000
1968 1,267,527,300
1967 1,198,430,300
1966 1,117,719,200
1965 1,054,195,000
1964 989,719,500
1963 966,890,000
1962 917,016,000
1961 889,940,600
1960 876,462,800
Fy 1983 the City began assessing property at 100% of value,
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INTRODUCTION
The power to borrow is one of the most important
assets of government. Like all government powers, however,
the capacity to borrow must be used with critical regard for
its justifiable purpose and with a clear understanding of
its safe and reasonable limits. A sound borrowing policy is
one that seeks to conserve rather than exhaust credit. The
ability to borrow when necessary on the most favorable terms
afforded by the market is an objective that applies to gov-
ernment just as it does in the private sector.
A government's credit standing, servicing expenses,
the cost of new borrowing, and its very ability to borrow to
meet anticipated costs or emergency needs all depend in
large part upon how well it handles its outstanding debts.
The consequences of governmental debt management, however,
go far beyond costs of borrowing. Government debt man-
agement affects the community's economic system, its pros-
perity, and the relative welfare of its citizens.
BORROWING PROCESS
Ideally, the procedures for authorizing loans dic-
tate a borrowing pattern reflecting the capital needs and
financial resources of the city. Proper controls need to be
balanced against flexibility and effectiveness. Debt man-
agement, as such, was virtually non-existent in Boston prior
to 1976. While the process from start to finish of estab-
lishing a capital need, selling bonds and spending funds is
not routine, certain generalizations can be made that high-
light the key control and decision points. The scenario
that follows pertains to direct debt or general obligations
incurred by the City to fund a capital project.
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Needs Assessment
The first step in the capital borrowing process is
the determination of need. This should be established sys-
tematically and politically through the capital budgeting
process as described in that chapter of this report. The
Treasurer-Collector should reconcile the capital needs with
the borrowing goal for the fiscal year. The borrowing goal
is an administrative judgment based upon a variety of cri-
teria including: the debt limit, the volume raisable in the
market, the ability of the budget to support the debt ser-
vice, and the impact of the borrowing on the City's future
financial position.
Sizing
The debt limit is presently not a constricting fac-
tor in determining the borrowing goal. The normal debt
limit which pertains to direct general obligation debt of
the City is 2-1/2% of the valuation of taxable property in
the City as last equalized by the State Department of Rev-
enue. This amount can be doubled with the approval of the
State Emergency Finance Board. In addition, there are many
categories of general obligation debt exempt from these
limits and subject to special limits ranging from 1/2 of 1%
to 10% of equalized valuation depending upon the category or
purpose. Within the general category, as of August 1983,
the City could authorize an additional $276.2 million in
debt, substantially all of which would be subject to state
approval
.
The ability of the budget and the tax levy to sup-
port the debt service associated with a borrowing is an ob-
vious limitation upon the borrowing goal for each respective
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fiscal year. In fiscal 1983 the debt service obligation
totaled 74.2 million representing 8.9% of the 835. 3M Statu-
tory Budget. The four previous years were within 1% of that
figure
.
The volume raisable in the capital market has been
a major concern in the determination of bond size and timing
of offerings since the national urban credit crises of
1975-1976. Although demand for the bonds will influence the
size and price of the offering, when investors are concerned
about the safety of the credit, at a certain point there may
be virtually no price at which they can be sold.
The size of an offering is taken by investors as
well as other parties as a statement indicating the degree
of fiscal conservatism and responsibility in the management
of the City. If too many bonds are offered in the market,
it may call into question the administration's prudence. If
too few bonds are offered, the City may be under financing
its capital needs and not doing all it can to maintain its
capital plant.
Submission
Loan orders are authorizations for borrowings that
lead to appropriations for expenditures with regard to spec-
ific projects. While loan orders can originate by depart-
ments, they generally are originated by the Treasurer-
Collector after review by the Law Department. An adminis-
trative directive is controlling the process by indicating
that no business be submitted to the Council in the name of
the administration without clearing the Treasurer- Collector.
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Ideally, after the administrative judgment as to
the borrowing goal is determined, and fit into an overall
financial plan, submissions for loan orders are developed.
The orders are authorizations, not borrowings, and the siz-
ing of the order and the determination of which projects to
request orders for is not directly correlated with the in-
tended borrowing amounts for the fiscal year.
Approval
The Council refers the submissions to the Committee
on Ways and Means. The Committee may hold public hearings.
If the loans are reported favorably, the City Council then
votes twice, at least two weeks apart. Each vote requires a
2/3 majority for approval. If the Council fails to act
within 60 days the order is also approved.
After the Council has approved the order, it is
sent to the Mayor. By law, a 21 day waiting period must
elapse after the Mayor's approval before the loan order is
effective. The waiting period is intended to allow citizens
to petition for a referendum on the loan order. This has
not happened in recent memory. If the loans have been auth-
orized under Chapter 44 of the General Laws as amended, the
planning and budgeting unit must get State Emergency Finance
Board approval (with what has usually been a pro forma vote.)
Spending and Borrowing
After the 21-day waiting period, a loan order be-
comes effective. The Treasurer-Collector can send a letter
of intent to sell bonds to the City Auditor, and the plan-
ning and budgeting unit in consultation with the Auditor can
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establish an appropriation in the accounting system. At
this time, department heads are free to award contracts
without approval. Department heads may, therefore, commit
the City to contracts without any planning as to how and
when bonds will be sold. This practice was a cause of the
City's financial crisis in 1976.
In order to insure that all capital projects can be
properly funded by the City's long-range capital program,
the Mayor must require that capital budget proposals are
published in the City Register after approval by the
Treasurer-Collector. Someone in authority must have the
opportunity to stop expenditures or the issuance of bonds
after the approval has been obtained.
There was, as of December 1983, $166,014,600 in
loan orders authorized but unissued; $71 million of this was
authorized in November 1983. After the authorization pro-
cess, the sizing considerations described earlier are re-
examined and preparations for borrowing are made. A time-
table must be established that weights the need for funds
against the demands of the marketplace. Timing may depend
upon technical factors in the market or it may depend upon
other political priorities. Extensive financial information
must be gathered for a preliminary official statement, and a
strategy for presenting material to the rating agencies and
major investors must be developed. When this is completed
the bonds can be sold.
Variations
The preceding has described the general obligation
borrowing process for a capital project. Examples of other
kinds of borrowings requiring other procedures include other
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forms of general obligation borrowing, revenue bond bor-
rowing, and revenue anticipation borrowing. An example of
the first is the financing of certain school facilities
which requires approval of the State Board of Education.
The approval enables the City to obtain a reimbursement from
the Commonwealth for a percentage of the principal and in-
terest owed on the financing of the project.
Revenue bonds such as those issued by the Boston
Water and Sewer Commission do not require authorization on
the part of the Council as the Commission has its own auth-
orization to issue bonds because the City is not obligated
to pay debt service.
Revenue anticipation borrowings require a loan or-
der not for capital projects but for paying current operat-
ing expenses to the City in anticipation of tax revenue
which does not flow into the City coffers in an even monthly
pattern
.
HISTORY
The following discussion of the history of Boston's
debt management practices assumes an important distinction
between the financing of capital projects and the financing
of operating expenses. The distinction is not only of in-
terest because of the different purposes to which the pro-
ceeds of financings are put to use but because the markets
for the different kinds of financing are decidedly different
and the management issues are clearly distinguishable. Cap-
ital projects involve financing over the useful life of the
project and entail the marketing of serial maturities and
term bonds and planning for the retirement of debt obliga-
tions over many years. The exception to this, Bond Antici-
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pation Notes, are notes that will be paid with the proceeds
of bonds. The financing of operating expenses in antici-
pation of revenues entails the marketing of short term
securities, most often notes that are in anticipation of
property tax revenues. Long term financing is needed for
the provision of essential services and an adequate infra-
structure; short term financing is essential for the pro-
vision of adequate cash flow to meet daily obligations.
The first section below will discuss financing with
regard to capital projects and the second with regard to
cash flow operational concerns.
1962-1975
Since 1962, the City developed an aggressive cap-
ital expenditure program for school construction, urban re-
newal, mass transportation, construction of public buildings
and port development. This led to an expansion of the
amount of direct debt issued by the City for capital con-
struction. As recently as the mid 50' s, the total out-
standing amount of general obligation bonds was less than
$60 million. The amount is presently $469 million. The
large increase in the City's financing of infrastructure
projects was necessary because of the poor physical con-
dition of significant parts of the City's older capital
plant. During the period from 1962-1975 capital expen-
ditures closely paralleled the capital borrowing amounts.
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Bonds Retired, Issued, and
Outstanding 1962-1983
Fiscal Year
Fiscal year changed in 1973 from calendar year to a July 1 through June 30 fiscal year.
Accordingly, 1974 figures cover the period of January 1, 1973 through June 30, 1974.
Display 1
1975-1981
In 1975 and 1976 capital expenditures greatly ex-
ceeded capital borrowing. Expenditures had been rising
since 1970 and peaked in 1976. While the expenditures were
escalating, the markets were closing down credit to Boston
and other snow belt cities. New York City's fiscal problems
combined with the pressure of rising oil prices on interest
rates, and the economic problems of the urban snowbelt to
make the municipal market a difficult place for Boston to
borrow in 1975 and 1976. In addition, Boston was one of a
number of large northeastern cities downgraded in 1976, re-
ducing potential buyers for its securities. Boston was not
able to slow expenditures nor borrow enough to cover them in
1975 and 1976. The resulting $56 million differential was
met by using $33 million in cash reserves from the capital
improvements fund, $14 million in warrants payable (a paper
loan from the general fund), and $8 million from the sale of
City property. By 1977 expenditures were cut and the gen-
eral revenue fund was reimbursed from the capital improve-
ments fund. The annual issuance of long term debt was re-
duced from a high of $85 million in 1976 to $55 million in
both 1979 and 1980.
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TABLE 1
CITY OF BOSTON CAPITAL FUND EXPENDITURES
AND BOND ISSUES 1965 TO 1983
(dollars in millions)
Fiscal Bonds Capital
Year Issued3 Expenditures*3
1965 $12 .
4
$14.
1
1966 16.5 19.8
1967 32 .
2
24 .
6
1968 24 .
9
31.6
1969 39 . 31 .
5
1970 53.8 56 .
8
1971 77 . 76 .
7
1972 84 . 72 .
2
1974c 70.1 70. 5
1975 60.0 92.1
1976 85.0 109.0
1977 75.0 59.5
1978 65.0 51.2
1979 55.0 45.9
1980 55.0 61.4
1981 24.7
1982 7.6
1983 45.0 est. 9.0
SOURCE: Years 1965-79: The Future of Boston's Capital
Plant , The Urban Institute, 1981.
Years 1980-83 (Bonds Issued): Official Statement
relating to the City's $30,000,000 General Ob-
ligation Bonds dated September 1, 1983.
Years 1980-83 (Capital Expenditures): "Services
from Public Capital: The Outlook for Boston's
Physical Infrastructure," Joint Center for Urban
Studies, 1983.
Includes net amount raised through the sale of general
obligation bonds and bond anticipation notes.
Capital improvements fund only.
Fiscal year changed in 1973 from calendar year to a
July 1 through June 30 fiscal year; accordingly, 1974
figures cover the period of January 1, 1973 through
June 30, 1974.
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The credit crises of 1975 and 1976 marked a change
in Boston's debt management. In the face of difficulty in
entering the market and high interest rates, a partially
successful effort was made to reduce annual borrowing
amounts. The goal was to track annual principal retired and
create a steadier borrowing pattern, following the demands
of the market. The crises forced Boston into the position
where it was under-borrowing for capital projects and sup-
porting capital expenditures with the operating budget
rather than supporting the operating fund with capital funds
as in New York.
1981-PRESENT
The responses to the credit crises and recession of
1975-1976, however, were not enough to withstand the second
wave of the recession in '78-' 79, the judicial decisions
leading to property tax refunds and the Proposition 2-1/2
limitation upon the tax levy. These developments led
Moody's to suspend the ratings of Boston and 43 other local
Massachusetts governments on March 27, 1981. Boston's rat-
ing was not reinstated until July 9, 1981, when a Ba, or
speculative, grade was awarded. From November 1980 (the
2-1/2 referendum) until a tax anticipation note offering on
October 15, 1982, the City did not attempt a public of-
fering. Borrowing for capital projects was interrupted from
June 1980 until September 1983.
The City of Boston is overly dependent upon pro-
perty taxes and state aid to make up its revenues. When the
2-1/2 referendum was passed, the City's ability to support
its bonds with its taxing power was in question as was the
form and amount of State aid that would be available to com-
pensate for the mandated reduction in the levy. In
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addition, the judicial decisions awarding property tax
abatements created substantial liabilities that the City was
having difficulty paying out of its operating budget.
The Funding Loan Act of 1982 dealing with the pro-
perty tax abatements led to the City's first bond offering
in over 2 years. Debt service on the $45 million issuance
in January 1983 (which was not to finance capital projects)
was effectively exempted from the 2-1/2 limitation upon tax
revenues and marked the first ever secured bond offering by
the City, as a lien was placed upon certain new and existing
excise taxes. The offering marked a slight upgrade by
Moody's from Ba to Bal. The City was commended for begin-
ning to address its 2 l/2-related problems as well as the
tax refunds and school spending in a stabilizing framework.
In the first half of fiscal year 1984, the City
sold $30 million in general obligation bonds as well as $25
million of bond anticipation notes. These sales provided
the first funding of capital projects since June of 1980. A
significant portion of the funds were used to repay the
$27,700,000 that had been moved from the General Fund to the
Capital Fund. The two financings took place within a month
of each other. The $30 million in limited tax general obli-
gation bonds was a conservative amount. The $25 million
offering was done as bond anticipation notes as a private
placement to avoid testing the long term market for a larger
amount and to provide a lower interest rate. The $30 mil-
lion, which were without the additional support that the
Tregor bonds had, received the same rating and were well
accepted in the public market, attracting some institutional
buyers. This issue will be the only limited tax issue in
the foreseeable future, as the Bond Procedure Act of 1983
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enables the City to issue unlimited tax general obligation
bonds, eliminating the effects of Proposition 2-1/2 on the
payment of debt service.
Revenue Anticipation Notes
Revenue anticipation notes sold prior to the last
month of a fiscal year must mature before the end of that
year. Notes sold during the last month of the fiscal year
must mature within a year of their issuance and the amount
of these notes cannot exceed the uncollected property taxes
assessed during that fiscal year. By staying within these
stipulations the City is limited in its ability to use bor-
rowing to carry one year's deficit over into the next fiscal
year and restricted in its ability to borrow in excess of
anticipated revenues. The aggregate amount of notes cannot
exceed the total tax levy of the fiscal year or, if that is
not established, then 85% of the preceding year's levy.
The City is in the practice of financing a portion
of operating expenses through the sale of such notes. This
can be a risky and at times expensive practice, as credit
problems and market dislocations can make it difficult to
sell notes. Because the obligations are short term in na-
ture, the large sums of money required to meet the obliga-
tions need to be available in a very short time frame. If a
cash flow squeeze necessitates refunding, the broader public
markets may not be available, and private buyers who are
familiar with the City's obligations and credit will be
called upon to "tide the City over".
Unfortunately, short term borrowing is also very
often necessary. The City issues tax bills on a semi-annual
basis and therefore has significant revenues flowing in
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twice a year. In order to smooth the cash flow the City
issues notes in anticipation of these revenues. Even when
it is not absolutely necessary to borrow, the City may
choose to finance to maintain a steady presence in the mar-
ket (which appreciates consistency). A significant bor-
rowing after an absence from the market can be a signal to
buyers and the rating agencies that there is a fiscal prob-
lem. Traders and underwriters are also more willing to make
a market for securities if they can predict that a similar
amount will be available for purchase at the same time each
year. Traders and underwriters are no different in this
regard than any other retailer or wholesaler who likes to be
able to predict inventory levels.
The following table shows the recent history of the
City's short term borrowing in anticipation of tax
revenues — particularly the sizable borrowing in 1976-1978
and again in 1981 and 1983. The decline in the cash
position of the operating and general funds during the
credit crunch in 1976 and 1977 was in part floated by the
short term borrowing in FY 1976 and FY 1977. The bulge in
1981 was in part due to a 12% appropriations increase, to
payment of property tax rebates, and to the fact that the
City was locked out of the long term bond market and had no
other source of funds. It should be noted that while the
volume decreased in fiscal 1982 the City borrowed twice,
paying 13.33% and 11.22% in private placements with a group
of local banks and one out of state bank. These represented
the highest interest rates the City paid for any funds that
this study came across. The volume of notes issued in 1983
related to the difficulties the City had in certifying the
revaluation in order to issue year end tax bills. This also
accounted for the outstanding amount at the fiscal year end,
and was not resolved until the Commonwealth intervened and a
private borrowing was arranged.
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TABLE 2
TEMPORARY LOANS IN ANTICIPATION OF REVENUES
FY 1976-FY 1983
RANs Issued
During FY RAN's
FY Ended RANs Issues3 as Percent Outstanding
June 30 During FY of Levy b at FY End
1976 $160,000,000 47.7% $30,000,000
1977 190,000,000 44.0 15,000,000
1978 100,000,000 24.2 -0-
1979 65,000,000 15.8 -0-
1980 65,000,000 15.7 -0-
1981 90,000,000 18.2 -0-
1982 50,000,000 12.0 -0-
1983 130,000,000 36.5 65,000,000
SOURCE: Official Statment, August 18, 1983.
Other than refunding.
Levy net of reserve for abatements.
BOND RATINGS
In 1983 the long term tax-exempt debt market
reached a record $81.2 billion. The sheer size of today's
public market for corporate and municipal debt has made tra-
ditional word-of-mouth assessment of credit values insuf-
ficient. Preserving credit is a matter of perception as
well as substance. The perceptions of the market place are
based as much, if not more, upon the pronouncements of the
rating agencies than upon the "story" told by the issuer
during the marketing effort. The major bond rating
agencies, Moody's Investor Service and Standard & Poor's
(S&P), provide ratings intended to be an indication of the
degree of risk associated with the bonds, and the pro-
bability of timely repayment of principal and interest. A
high rating indicates little risk, a low rating increasingly
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greater risk. The greater the risk the higher the interest
rate that must be offered in order to attract investors to
buy the bonds. Many institutional investors such as banks
and pension funds can only buy bonds of a specified quality
due to federal and state regulations. Similarly most trusts
and estates are guided by the concept of the "prudent
person" rule in selecting investment bonds.
Moody's and Standard & Poor's rate bonds on request
by the issuer for a set fee based upon time and effort; they
continue to maintain and revew the rating until the bond is
redeemed. The rating agencies rate virtually all types of
general obligation and revenue bonds.
While there are minor differences, Moody's and
S&P's rating scales are virtually identical. Moody's
affixes 1 (e.g., A-l, Baa-1) to identify the strongest is-
sues within specific groups; Standard & Poor's uses
+ and - to indicate, respectively, extra strengths and weak-
nesses. All agencies warn that a rating is not a recom-
mendation to buy, sell or hold a security.
The higher the rating the lower the underwriting
and marketing costs. Today, the cost of selling an AAA bond
to the retail market may be $2.50 less per $1,000 than for a
Baa rated bond. Similarly, the likelihood of selling an AAA
bond institutionally is much greater. An institutional sale
can cost an issuer $7.50 per bond less than a retail sale.
The City of Boston's Rating
Moody's and S&P's valuation of Boston approaches
the bottom of their ratings with a Bal and BBB+ respec-
tively. As the history of the Moody's ratings demonstrate,
VI - 16
the City's credit in the eyes of the agency declined from
1976 and has just recently turned a corner. The City's de-
cline was partly a reflection of a general trend affecting
older cities in the northeast in the 1970 's that was
recognized by the credit markets and the rating agencies in
the second half of the decade. The fiscal crises of New
York City focused attention upon the financial practices of
municipalities and led to a closer examination of municipal
credits. Remarkably, the City of Boston, like other cities,
had not been in the practice of issuing official statements
before offering its bonds in the market place. It simply
had not been necessary. In the same vein, the rating
agencies had not expected the same level of financial con-
trols as they do today.
Rating History
Moody '
s
1938 - 1959 A
1959 - 1973 Baa
1973 - 1974 Baal
1974 - 1976 A
1976 - 1981 Baa
3/27/81 Suspended
1981 Ba
1983 Bal
In addition to a changing economic environment,
Boston suffered a political setback for one of its major
revenue sources with the passage of Proposition 2-1/2. As
noted, the City, as well as other localities in the Common-
wealth, had its rating suspended and later lowered in the
wake of the limitation upon its ability to levy property
taxes to raise revenues. Since 1981 the city has been in
the process of developing management techniques and
improving its financial picture in order to reconstruct its
credit fundamentally and in the eyes of the agencies and the
market place.
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The agencies most recently examined the City in
August 1983 with regard to the $30 million bond issue dated
September 1. In their presentation, the financial officials
representing the City reviewed fiscal year 1983, emphasizing
the completion of revaluation, the allotment system created
by the Funding Loan Act, and the general progress made in
meeting the Tax abatement liabilities and managing the rev-
enue restrictions imposed by Proposition 2-1/2. Projections
for fiscal 1984 were made, stressing a continuing improve-
ment trend with regard to annual fund balances. The credit
quality of the bond issue was discussed as it was the first
issue sold without unlimited taxing power behind it. The
new Bond Procedures act was mentioned as providing the City
with the opportunity to back future bond issues with un-
limited taxing authority.
In their credit reports, the agencies recognized
that the general economy in the area has improved and that
downtown Boston as the region's financial and service center
was well positioned to take advantage of the upswing. How-
ever, while Route 128 and the Quincy Market have done quite
well, the trend for much of Boston has been one of decline.
Population has been steadily decreasing since 1950 and the
median family income, according to the 1980 census, lagged
the Commonwealth and national medians by more than in 1970.
The agencies expressed concern about the City's ability to
generate revenue or take advantage of the increased economic
activity.
Financial Position and Debt Burden of the City
While revenues and expenditures are discussed else-
where in this report, they are of primary concern to this
chapter. The City's credit picture is colored by its depen-
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dence upon property taxes for over 40% of revenues, and
state aid for over 25%, and by the use of nonrecurring rev-
enues in this fiscal year to help balance the budget. In
turn, the additions to the payroll, the difficulties in con-
trolling the school budget, and the looming unfunded pension
liability are all negatives that are mentioned.
The following table shows Boston's low rating
compared to the 19 other largest cities in the nation. The
table shows the population of each city as well as the esti-
mated true value of its property base. In addition, it
shows the overall debt representing all debt outstanding
issued under the City's name, net of all self-supporting
debt, whether by user fees or state reimbursements, and in-
cluding the indirect debt or overlapping debt allocated to
the City. An example of the latter would be the MBTA debt
which includes a portion for which the City is responsible.
The final two columns provide a "quick and dirty" means for
comparing the debt positions of the different cities. One
reflects the overall debt per capita and the other the over-
all debt as a percentage of the valuation figure. The rat-
ings shown are as of November 1983. The data was published
by S&P in June, 1983.
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TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE DEBT BURDEN
vjciici ox
Obli- Popu- Estima- standing
gation lation ted True Overall Per
i/CUL. Xll L 1 lw U 1 ii "inV CL X U C Xll LJC L. X 11 fan-i 4-
=
PaHrn? c a r> r\ c h"i 1 1 i on ^kJ .L X X X Ull o mi 1 1 i on QILL X XX Ijcui. \7^a 1 noV cl X Lie
nous uon a 33 /AAA -L / _> _> 4; AO ft 4; l ^4> X / -> rr J <fc q A q
L> d lido Aaa /AAA 35 854O —J *T 9 A
IjOS /ingcies A -j -5 / A A 9 Q67 £>A 7 7 1 "3/ x o 9 AC\ 1 1X . X
Oall i> i u Aa 1 /AA 898 24 7 236 262>J 9
San Francisco Aal/AA 679 22.7 417 615 2.0
San Jose Aal/AA 629 17.7 218 346 1.0
A 1 / A A
_> O J Qft 1 4. ^*T . J
Od.ll r\li L.QJI1 XU A a / A A+ 7fi £> A "38^ A 7
Milwaukee Aa/AA+ 636 10.8 378 594 3.6
Phoenix Aa/AA 790 16.7 460 583 2.8
Memphis Aa/AA 646 9.2 514 795 5.6
Indianapolis Aa/* 765 11.0 372 486 3.4
Ddic xmor e a i /a 707 O.J. 7 QA "3 7 J . o
New Orleans A/A+ 558 7.8 316 567 4.1
Chicago A/BBB+ 3,005 47.9 2,727 907 5.7
Philadelphia Baa/ BBB+ 1, 650 20.5 1,060 642 5.2
Boston Bal/ BBB+ 563 12.8 464 823 3.6
Cleveland Bal/BBB 574 11.1 273 477 2.5
New York Bal/BBB 7,072 131.9 12, 151 1,718 9.2
Detroit Ba/BB 1,203 10.7 732 608 6.8
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From the table, one can see that the City's debt
per capita is relatively high, although lower than cities
such as Columbus and Houston with higher ratings. The per-
cent valuation is much closer to the median and lower than
cities such as Chicago and Memphis, which bear better rat-
ings. This percentage valuation marks a significant
improvement as a result of the property revaluation.
From the earlier display in the historical section
(Display 1), it is clear that the amount of debt outstanding
has leveled off, largely due to the lack of issuance in 1981
and 1982. The City, however, also retires its debt at an
extremely rapid pace. Boston is presently scheduled to re-
tire over 40% of its outstanding debt in the next 5 years
and over 80% by 1994. The agencies typically consider 25%
and 50% adequate for general obligation debt. While the
City's retirement schedule has been quite conservative, it
has also been restrictive, increasing the annual debt ser-
vice burden and thereby limiting budgetary flexibility. The
Bond Procedure Act of 1983 removes the legal pressure on the
debt retirement schedule.
The agencies are aware the City has underfinanced
its capital plant and that there is a backlog of worthwhile
projects to be financed. The City will be issuing more
bonds, barring unexpected events, in the next five years
than it has in the past five years. The new Administration
can expect the agencies to be looking to see that the selec-
tion of projects and control of capital budgeting is prudent
and that a consistent policy is maintained in approaching
the market. In the last four years the City has been care-
ful in its approach to the market place, in part out of nec-
cesity. The agencies will look for maintenance of this
caution.
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Quality of Financial Management
The rating agencies usually recognize that certain
economic developments are beyond the control of the munici-
pality and they therefore look to the quality of the manage-
ment of the municipality when they evaluate the City's abil-
ity to position itself to respond to change and control
adversity. In recent years the City has made significant
progress in this regard with the addition of the allotment
system to control expenditures, the independent auditing of
its books, improvement in parking revenue collection pro-
cedures, and the development work on interim financials.
Improvement can still be made by establishing a coordinated
capital budgeting process and by fully automating the cash
flow.
Prospective Developments
The City will finance its maturing bond anti-
cipation notes in the spring of 1984. Before this takes
place the new financial management team will need to meet
with the rating agencies. At such a meeting the new Admin-
istration could stress the record and financial management
developments of the preceding years, review the financial
position of the City as in part documented in this report,
and then address its plans for managing the budget in the
late spring as well as capital budgeting requirements over
the life of the Administration. Insofar as a consistent
line can be drawn with the approach of the prior admin-
istration, to gradually increase market participation and
borrow to stay just slightly ahead of the debt retirement,
it would probably be rewarded. For a new Administration, a
demonstration of competence and the intent to conserve the
quality of the City's credit will be most important.
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THE DEBT MARKET
The historical record presented has attempted to
show when the City has borrowed and how much. The presenta-
tion on the rating agencies attempted to show the record
presented to the marketplace. The following section on the
debt market attempts to show who the buyers are and what
their relationship with the City of Boston has been like.
Investors who may purchase the City's securities
make up the tax-exempt market, constituting both its whole-
sale, or institutional, and its retail participants
Households or Individuals
This category of investor has been the most signi-
ficant buyer in recent years. Bond issues of significant
size very often need to demonstrate retail interest before
institutions will feel the price is firm and they want to
participate. While participating in most kinds of of-
ferings, the retail investor plays a proportionally more
important role in the purchase of longer term maturities and
in non-rated and low rated offerings. The reason for this
is the restrictions upon other buyers from buying such
bonds. The individual investor has demanded higher interest
rates since the economic recovery tax act reduced high in-
come individuals' maximum tax bracket. Individuals also
prefer bonds in States or localities which issue securities
exempt from local taxes if these local taxes are sig-
nificant. Individuals may also prefer local securities even
with a lower after-tax yield because of the familiarity with
the credit and the fact that it makes filing their tax re-
turns easier.
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Mutual Funds
Tax-exempt mutual funds have grown significantly in
recent years and have been difficult to classify. They are
retail in that they are marketed to and held by individuals,
yet they are institutional as they purchase in large volume.
Mutual funds or investment trusts are most often purchasers
of long term securities with an A rating or better. Open-
ended investment trusts will on occasion purchase bonds with
a lower rating because they are able to trade their
portfolios. There is a significant distinction between the
interest rates for A and for Baa paper because this group of
buyers rarely purchases Baa paper.
Tax-Exempt Money Market Funds
These funds are a subset of the mutual funds.
Shares are owned by individuals. These funds, however, are
limited by their prospectus to securities maturing in one
year or less or securities which can be put in return for
payment of the par amount in one year or less. These funds
are few in number but large in size and have been growing
rapidly, purchasing an increasingly large portion of the
securities offered with maturities of one year or less. In
rare instances, these purchases do have funds targeted for
specific states to take advantage of a double or triple
exemption. These funds usually purchase high grade paper
but they are allowed to buy weaker credits. Money market
funds can be expected to be an ever more important source of
short term funds as they continue to compete with banks for
what are in essence deposits. One of these funds recently
purchased notes issued by the City.
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Commercial Banks
Historically, commercial banks have been signi-
ficant purchasers of general obligation debt, preferring
shorter maturities up to the ten and twelve year range.
This has been less the case in the last 2 years as their
appetite for tax-exempt income has declined. They are still
major purchasers of tax-exempt note offerings. The banks
are credit conscious. During the credit squeeze for snow-
belt cities in the 70' s many banks reduced their holdings.
Between 1973 and 1976 bank holdings grew quite slowly.
Banks are not only credit conscious but also, according to
Federal Reserve regulations, are to avoid speculative
investments. Banks have at times been willing to support
local government entities with lower credit ratings by pur-
chasing their short term offerings, sometimes on a private
placement basis. The local banks and one major money center
bank have historically played this role for the City. Along
with the Commonwealth, they have been the lenders turned to
when cash flow problems have arisen. The importance of this
role should not be minimized.
Insurance Companies
These companies purchase long-term securities and
have often supported weaker credits. Until 1980, they were
a driving factor in the tax-exempt market. The property and
casualty companies, however, have not been in the profit
swing of their business cycle. The withdrawal of the cas-
ualty companies from the market has contributed to the nar-
rowing of the gap between taxable and tax-exempt interest
rates
.
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Corporations
Corporations are in the short-term market but are
only beginning to buy short-term tax-exempt paper as they
return to profitability and the interest rates begin to jus-
tify themselves vis-a-vis the corporation's tax position.
Corporations are extremely credit conscious, preferring to
purchase triple A securities.
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The different entities described above are the
major participants in the tax-exempt market. Changes in
their participation in the market, and with regard to spec-
ific bond issues, affects the value of those securities.
The specific supply and demand factors of the tax-exempt
market are the "technical" factors that may make the
tax-exempt market move differently than other bond markets.
The following display shows the changing fluctuation in the
percentage of taxable rates achievable in the tax-exempt
market by a BBB credit like Boston. When the percentage of
the corporate or taxable rate in the display is high it
means that cities like Boston are paying high interest
charges relative to other interest rates, and the advantages
of tax exempt borrowing have been minimized.
Municipal Bond Yield as a Percentage of Corporate Bond Yield
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The display also demonstrates that tax-exempt rates
were technically high at the end of 1982 when many issuers
rushed to market to close transactions before registration
was required. Supply is a significant market factor.
December, 1983 saw a similar rush to market by revenue bond
issuers who were faced with being unable to issue bonds
after January 1, 1984, until legislation concerning their
status is clarified. Included in that group are mortgage
revenue bond issuers that constituted 25% of the tax-exempt
bonds issued in 1983. Given the reduction in offerings ex-
pected in the first quarter of 1984, it is expected that
tax-exempt rates relative to other market rates should im-
prove significantly. Boston may wish to take advantage of
this as it prepares to bond out the anticipation notes ma-
turing in the spring.
The City of Boston does not presently have access
to the fullest range of the market. The following display
shows the relationship between the way the City's long and
short-term paper trades in relation to a standard index of
20 general obligation bonds with ratings ranging from BBB to
AAA. The difference in rate between the broker quotations
for Boston and the index shows the interest rate penalty
that the City incurs because of the market and the rating
agencies' perception as to the weakness of the credit.
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Boston is presently selling its bonds primarily to
individuals or to dealers who are stocking the bonds as in-
ventory to sell to individuals. The City has made progress
in its recent issue in reaching the investment trusts or
bond funds and some insurance companies who are willing to
buy lower-rated credits. The distribution of bonds is, not
surprisingly, centered in the major cities of the northeast
and Chicago. However, the ability to retail bonds else-
where, such as Florida, or to sell to an insurance company
in Tennessee, is encouraging. The following table shows the
distribution of the City's bonds from the mid-August of-
fering .
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TABLE 4
CITY OF BOSTON GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
August, 1983
(Sales Distribution Analysis)
Institu- Indi- % of
tional vid- Total
Location Sales uals Dealers Totals Sales
Alabama 5 5 .02
Arizona 35 35 .11
Arkansas 5 10 15 .05
Connecticut 70 70 .23
District of Columbia 65 150 215 .72
Florida 505 10 515 1.72
Georgia 105 105 .35
Illinois 2,930 a 85 1, 960 4,975 16.58
Indiana 30 30 .10
Maine 10 10 .03
Maryland
700 b ' c
30 60 90 .30
Massachusetts 3,960 2,930 7, 590 25.30
Michigan 215 215 .72
Missouri 20 20 .07
New Hampshire 150 150 .50
New Jersey 885 10 895 2.98
New York City 700 a 105 2,695 3,500 11.67
New York 1,895 a 675 630 3,200 10.67
Ohio 65 85 150 .50
Oklahoma 200 c 200 .67
Rhode Island 2,000 d 20 115 2, 135 7.12
Tennessee 1,100 a »e 30 1,130 3.77
Texas 955 e 75 50 1,080 3.60
Virginia 25 25 .08
TOTAL 10.480 7.170 8.705 26.355 87.85*
No. of Transactions 17 299 44 362
* These figures do not reflect undisclosed sales totalling
$3,645,000 (par value).
Investment trusts
Non-financial corporations
Trust companies
Commercial banks
Insurance companies
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The new Administration will want to address the
following
:
o Control over the approval and issuance
of debt
o The record to be presented to the rating
agencies and the investment community
o The borrowing goal for the spring and
the succeeding years of the term
Control Over Approval and Issuance of Debt
The responsibility for debt policy and funding cap-
ital projects in the prior Administration rested with the
Deputy Mayor for Fiscal Affairs and Treasurer-Collector.
Initially, the responsibility could remain there with a
reinst itution of the administrative directives controlling
the approval and appropriation process. Any loan orders
submitted to the City Council without a letter from the
Treasurer should be vetoed and all contracts to be bid for
approved projects must be reviewed by the Treasurer and
published before proceeding.
Whether or not such responsibility remains with the
Treasurer, there needs to be a central responsibility for
determining the borrowing policy and capacity and relating
this to the capital needs. This responsibility should be
exercised on the basis of stated policy, and records should
be maintained so that ongoing accountability and adjustment
is possible. These records would include the status of all
loan orders, not only whether bonds have been issued but
whether funds have been spent or contracts awarded on a
project-by-project basis and on a loan order basis.
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If controls are improved at this level, the loan
orders can be better controlled at the approval stage rather
than just at the expenditure level, the volume of outstand-
ing and antiquated loan orders can be reduced, and requests
for loan orders can be more closely tied to borrowing goals.
If this Administration were to go to the City Council with
an armful of loan orders it wants rescinded, it would demon-
strate an air of responsibility to the Council and the
rating agencies which would only redound to its benefit.
The Record to be Presented to the Rating Agencies and the
Financial Community
The Treasurer should also make whatever progress
possible in improving financial management systems,
specifically in more fully automating the cash flow. This
would facilitate management of short-term debt, and increase
the confidence of the rating agencies and the investment
community.
The Administration should develop its "Boston
Story" as quickly as possible and tell it to the rating
agencies and to the institutions which have supported its
short-term paper or which will be looked to to support it in
the future. The strategies presented elsewhere in this
report for improving the City's revenue position and
controlling expenditures, if adopted, should be emphasized
as part of an improving trend. If the City is to be
upgraded, the impression of a positive trend must be main-
tained and cultivated. In the same vein, the investment
community is attracted to a credit like Boston's if it feels
that it is a "credit play" or an "improving situation". If
investors own Boston paper or bonds during an upgrade, they
make money and they feel good about what they bought.
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Because of the work that will be required to put
the budget together in May and June, work should begin on
bonding out the anticipation notes as soon as possible. The
rating agencies should be approached in late February or
early March and a preliminary official statement prepared at
the same time. This would also provide the City with max-
imum flexibility in entering the market at the most favor-
able time. This is especially important with a credit like
Boston's, which benefits disproportionately from an im-
proving market.
The Borrowing Goal for the Spring and Succeeding Years of
the Term
If Boston can maintain or improve its credit, it
will be able to increase the size of its bond issues. The
City could borrow between $50 million and $60 million this
spring. This would include:
o $25 million to pay maturing bond anti-
cipation notes
o $15 million to $25 million for the cap-
ital projects for which funds have been
substantially committed (see the capital
budgeting chapter)
o $10 million for neighborhood initiatives
recommended by the new Administration.
Because the proposed bond issue would be paying off
notes, $25 million to $35 million could be considered "new
money," part of a new Administration attempt to "catch up"
on capital spending in 1984 and begin its own program.
From the point of view of future borrowing policy,
it should be emphasized that this year's total capital bor-
rowing of $80 million-$90 million would then be equal to the
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peak in 1976 and then should return, all things being equal,
to the 1979 and 1980 level of roughly $55 million a year.
Such a borrowing would represent roughly $10 million more
than the expected amount to be retired each year and would
only increase the outstanding amount incrementally. The
total direct or gross debt outstanding would be raised to
roughly $510 million, still below the peaks of 1979 and
1980. This will not be a significant increase. As far as
the marketplace is concerned, the city has borrowed
$45 million and $30 million at one time successfully and is
ready to increase the size.
The new Administration could develop its marketing
effort, supplementing its customary capital borrowing, to
take advantage of the Bond Procedure Act of 1983 and for the
first time offer a portion of this spring's financing in the
form of mini-bonds backing neighborhood initiatives.
Mini-bonds are bonds sold in $100 denominations rather than
the customary $5,000. As smaller units, the City's bonds
would become more attractive to a wide range of the Boston
community. The bond issue would not only represent an at-
tempt to "catch up" on the City's infrastructure; it would
also be part of a broader effort to start neighborhood pro-
jects while increasing participation by the community in
Boston's affairs. More people would have the chance to
benefit from investing in their City while supporting it.
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APPENDIX
CITY OF BOSTON
RECORD OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
Fiscal Years 1976-1984
Aggregate
Dated Principal Maturity Interest
Date Amount Dates Rates a
FY- 7
6
3/01/76 $85,000,000 1977 9.75%
1978-1980 10.00
1981 9.40
1982-1984 8.00
1985 8.25
1986 8.50
1987-1996 9.50
FY- 7
7
10/01/76 35,000,000 1977-1981 10.00%
1982 7.00
1983 7.20
1984 7.30
1985 7.40
1986-1995 7.75
3/01/77 40,000,000 1978-1981 10.00%
1982 7.10
1983 6.50
1984 6.60
1985 6.70
1986 6.75
1987 6.80
1988-1997 7.25
FY- 7
8
11/01/77 40,000,000 1978-1980 7.75%
1981-1984 6.00
1985-1986 7.00
1987 6.20
1988-1989 6.30
1990-1991 6.40
1992-1997 6.50
Interest rates were often high
enable Boston to sell bonds at
used to pay issuance costs.
in the early maturities to
a premium. The premium was
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CITY OF BOSTON
RECORD OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
Fiscal Years 1976-1984
(continued)
Aggregate
Dated Principal Maturity Interest
Date Amount Dates Rates
4/01/78 25,000,000 1979-1982 7.50%
R ftO
1984-1985 6.00
1986 6.10
1987 6.20
1988 6.30
1989-1992 6.40
1993 6.50
1994-1998 6.60
5/01/79 55,000,000 1980 6.50%
1 QQi _l Q«41701 XyO*t ft SO
1985 6.50
D • DU
1987 6.70
1988 6.75
1989-1990 6.80
1991-1992 6.90
1993-1999 7.00
3/01/80 25,000,000 1981-1999 10.50%
6/01/80 30,000,000 1981-1991 7.75%
1992-1993 8.00
1994 8.10
1995 8.25
1996-1998 8.40
1999-2000 8.50
FY- 7 9
FY-80
FY-1981 No Bonds Issued
FY-1982 No Bonds Issued
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CITY OF BOSTON
RECORD OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS
Fiscal Years 1976-1984
( continued
)
Aggregate
Dated Principal Maturity Interest
Date Amount Dates Rates a
FY-198
3
1/01/83 45,000,000 1985 6.25%
1986 6.75
1987 7.50
1988 8.00
1989 8.75
1990 9.25
1991-1992 9.50
FY-1984 9/01/83 30,000,000 1984-1989 10.50%
1990 9.25
1991 9.50
1992 9.75
1993 10.00
1994 10.20
1995 10.30
1996 10.40
1997 10.50
1998 10.60
1999 10.70
20000-2003 10.75
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INTRODUCTION
Capital budgeting is a multi-step process involving
the allocation of resources to alternative projects. An
efficient capital budgeting system provides procedures for
(i) identifying numerous potential projects, (ii) evaluating
these projects with regard to predetermined criteria, (iii)
ranking these projects, (iv) selecting the "optimal" mix of
projects and (v) monitoring actual performance relative to
budgeted amounts. The City's capital budgeting practices
are fragmented, informal and inefficient. Multi-year plan-
ning is lacking. Through the continued deferral of neces-
sary capital projects, Boston has clearly been disinvesting
in its infrastructure.
The City's capital budgeting practices deviate so
significantly from widely accepted standards as to raise
questions about how many needed facilities remain un-built
due to inefficient management practices. The impact of
fragmented and informal capital budgeting practices cannot
be translated into potholes, cracked sidewalks, closed
bridges or boarded windows — nevertheless, the impact is
real
.
Capital budgeting decisions are important because
they often involve significant sums of money and influence
the ability of government agencies to efficiently provide
designated services in future years. During the period
1965-1983, Boston spent over $1.7 billion on capital expen-
ditures. City-financed capital expenditures during 1965-
1980 cost approximately $800 million, as identified by
component in Display 1.
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Capital Expenditures by Function, 1965-1980
Total Expenditures = $778.4 Million
•, Highway
Urban Renewal and Display 1
Economic Development
This chapter focuses on capital budgeting within
the City of Boston with emphasis on existing procedures,
in-process capital projects, and the short-run supply and
demand for capital resources. This section provides a brief
introduction to the government entities involved in the
City's capital budgeting process. Next, the chapter exam-
ines current capital budgeting procedures in several key
City agencies. The lengthy discussion of procedures
reflects the need to highlight existing weaknesses as a
first step in developing an efficient capital budgeting
system. The third section addresses the backlog of public
capital needs and short-run potential for balancing these
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needs with anticipated available capital resources. Fin-
ally, the findings are summarized and followed by recommen-
dations aimed at significantly improving the City's capital
budgeting process.
Responsibility for Boston's public capital invest-
ment is divided among numerous government entities. Primary
responsibility for the City's public buildings rests with
the Public Facilities Department and, to a lesser degree,
the Real Property Department. Created by state legislation
in 1971, the Economic Development and Industrial Corporation
of Boston functions as the City's lead agency for industrial
development and presently owns and operates three industrial
parks. Responsibility for Boston's physical infrastructure
is fragmented among the City's Public Works Department, the
Parks and Recreation Department, and several special purpose
authorities and commissions discussed below. The Neigh-
borhood Development and Employment Agency oversees and coor-
dinates neighborhood development. Finally, the Boston Re-
development Authority, established in 1957, serves as the
City's planning agency and urban renewal authority, subject
to the powers and duties delineated in Chapter 121 of the
General Laws.
Created by state legislation in 1977, the Boston
Water and Sewer Commission is responsible for city-wide
water distribution and sewer collection facilities. The
Metropolitan District Commission's responsibilities include
selected roads, bridges and parks located within Boston plus
water supply, sewer collection and sewerage treatment facil-
ities. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority oper-
ates regional mass transit and commuter rail systems which
serve Boston and 78 other cities and towns. The Massa-
chusetts Turnpike Authority maintains an express highway
which extends from western Massachusetts to the center of
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downtown Boston, plus related bridges and tunnels. The
Massachusetts Port Authority, established in 1959, operates
Logan International Airport, the Port of Boston, and the
Tobin Bridge. The state Department of Public Works' respon-
sibilities also include several major streets and bridges
located within Boston. Finally, the infrastructure is
affected by an increasing number of corporations including
Boston Edison, Boston Gas, Cablevision and New England Tele-
phone and Telegraph.
CAPITAL BUDGETING PROCEDURES
Among the government entities which are directly
involved in the allocation of Boston's limited capital
resources, capital budgeting procedures vary considerably.
This section focuses on the procedures relating to the iden-
tification, refinement, prioritizing and selection of cap-
ital projects, plus the monitoring of contract compliance by
architects, engineers and contractors subsequent to contract
award. The City's purchasing and contracting procedures are
separately evaluated in another chapter contained within
this report.
Boston Redevelopment Authority
As noted, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
serves as the City's planning agency subject to the powers
and duties delineated in Chapter 121A of the General Laws.
These statutory powers are significant and include:
... the exclusive power (subject to the
approval of the mayor), both before and
after the approval of a project, to grant
from time to time permission for the proj-
ect to deviate from such law (Chapter 180
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of the General Laws), code, ordinance or
regulation if it finds that such permission
may be granted without substantially dero-
gating from the intent and purposes of such
law, code, ordinance or regulation.
The BRA also approves or disapproves all requests to form a
corporation for the purpose of undertaking and carrying out
under Chapter 121A of the General Laws a project in Boston.
In lieu of property taxes, Chapter 121A corporations pay a
certain percentage of gross income to the state each year
and $10 per $1,000 assessed valuation to the city.
As a redevelopment authority as defined in Chapter
121B of the General Laws, the BRA has numerous powers in-
cluding the ability to: (i) take by eminent domain, (ii)
receive loans, grants or other contributions from the fed-
eral government or from any other source, (iii) clear and
improve any property acquired by it, (iv) engage in or con-
tract for the construction, reconstruction, alteration,
remodeling or repair of any clearance, housing, relocation,
urban renewal or other project, (v) make relocation pay-
ments, and (vi) borrow money.
The BRA planning and development process begins, in
part, with the identification of potential development
areas. This identification utilizes input from various
internal and external sources. Based on initial research,
including an evaluation of neighborhood sentiment, some
potential development areas are rejected. The remaining
ones are individually researched and guidelines are devel-
oped (economic feasibility, design features and the like)
and refined through an iterative process involving resources
from the BRA's Policy and Planning, Development, and Com-
munity Development areas.
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Based on the quality of submitted proposals and
presentations, the BRA tentatively selects one developer for
a specific project. The selection must be confirmed by a
vote of the BRA Board of Directors. After meeting specified
requirements, including the substantial completion of draw-
ings and financing arrangements, the developer is given a
"final" designation and contract agreements are signed. The
length of time between the tentative and final designation
of a developer varies for each project with significant
projects frequently requiring six to twelve months.
BRA monitoring of contract compliance generally is
twofold. Compliance relative to employment goals is mon-
itored by the Director's office staff. BRA architects,
engineers and project coordinators are responsible for en-
suring compliance relative to contract plans and speci-
fications .
Public Facilities Department
The City does not prepare a formal multi-year cap-
ital budget. Prior to 1966, each City department was gen-
erally responsible for its own facility construction and,
accordingly, established its own capital budget and hired
its own architects. There was no central planning agency
for capital projects. In recognition of the need for cen-
tral planning and control, the Public Facilities Department
and the related Commission were created in 1966. Chapter
642 of the General Laws provided the Public Facilities Com-
mission with broad powers aimed at the more efficient and
economical construction and alteration of municipal build-
ings. These powers include (subject to selected specific
limitations) responsibility for (i) preparing, and from time
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to time amending, a long-range capital program, (ii) sel-
ecting the site for each new structure and facility, (iii)
preparing necessary plans and specifications, (iv) con-
structing, reconstructing, remodeling and demolishing
structures and facilities, and (v) making major alterations
and major repairs to all structures and facilities belonging
to the City, other than school buildings and their yards.
The PFD's powers include the ability to take by
eminent domain, subject to selected restrictions. In
general the PFD retains title to newly constructed facil-
ities for twelve months. After the warranty period has
expired, the facility's title is transferred to the user
department. Excluding School Department facilities, sub-
stantially all repairs costing in excess of $2,000 are ad-
ministered by the PFD. It also handles major repairs and
renovations to School Department facilities. During the
period 1966-1975, the Public Facilities Department occupied
a significant and increasing role in the capital planning
process
.
Despite the creation of the Public Facilities De-
partment, central capital planning and budgeting remained
relatively ineffective as of 1975. As stated in the CIPMIS
Index to Materials,
In the late fall of 1975 . . . everyone was
clamoring for information about projects.
Existing information systems were poorly
suited to meet these requests . . . The
upshot of the analysis (by an outside con-
sultant) showed that people in the de-
partment (Public Facilities) felt that
there was inadequate project budget con-
trol, a lack of accurate cash flow esti-
mates for the various funds being used,
lack of a thorough and common manner of
presenting capital improvements program
data for all uses, and a need for improved
administration of contract/accounting/
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project relationships as well as a need to
manage project milestones and project bud-
gets.
In response to the fiscal "crisis" of 1975, several
existing procedural controls were reemphasized and selected
additional controls were instituted in 1977. They are out-
lined below. In addition, final development of a capital
improvements program management information system (CIPMIS)
was supported.
o The funding for contracts was limited by
having a designated individual in the
Office of Program Development review all
loan orders before submission to the
City Council.
o The awarding of contracts was limited by
having a designated individual in the
Office of Program Development check all
advertisements relating to capital proj-
ects before publication in the City Rec-
ord .
o Access to capital accounts was restrict-
ed by having the Auditor establish these
accounts only after receipt of a letter
in which the Collector-Treasurer ex-
pressed an intention to issue bonds,
notes or certificates of indebtedness as
authorized by individual loan orders.
o Unliquidated balances and unused loan
orders were recommended for close-out.
The Office of Program Development was established
in 1976 partially for the purpose of further consolidating
the capital planning and budgeting process. Working closely
with the Deputy Mayor for Fiscal Affairs and applicable City
departments, OPR had primary responsibility for defining and
assigning priorities to neighborhood capital improvement
needs and for coordinating these improvements with other
public and private activities. OPR also worked closely with
the Office of Housing, Construction and Development which
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primarily evaluated and monitored the construction schedule
and cash flow for all capital projects. During the period
1976-1983, primary responsibility for capital planning and
budgeting effectively shifted from the Public Facilities
Department to various mayoral offices.
In the fall of 1983, an individual responsible for
capital budgeting resigned from the Office of Fiscal Af-
fairs. This vacancy, coupled with the continued absence of
a responsive project control system and other procedural
weaknesses, has resulted in a relative absence of central
capital planning and budgeting. Capital planning and bud-
geting remains fragmented with project management hampered
by the absence of responsive information. Interagency co-
ordination is dependent upon numerous committees and in-
formal communication.
During the period 1974-1983, the annual operating
budget cost of repairs and maintenance administered by the
Public Facilities Department ranged from $1.9 million to
4>3.4 million. These costs are summarized in Display 2.
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Repair and Maintenance Costs
of Public Facilities Department
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Display 2
Under Section 31B of Chapter 642 of the General
Laws, after obtaining the consent of the mayor, the Public
Facilities Commission is authorized to lease, sublease or
sell, grant or convey any surplus land to various government
entities or, subject to specified advertising requirements,
any person, firm, corporation or trust. Surplus land is
defined to mean "land, buildings and real estate now or
hereafter belonging to the City and in the care, custody,
management and control of said commission (except parks and
playgrounds)," subject to specified limitations. Existing
policies governing the surplus property disposition process
are well documented by the Public Facilities Department and
will not be discussed in this chapter. A summary of Public
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Facilities Department properties which were in various
stages of disposition as of December 1, 1983 follows:
TABLE 1
PUBLIC FACILITIES DEPARTMENT
PROPERTIES AWAITING DISPOSITION
Number of
Description Buildings Lots
Schools 35 16
Real Property 31 5
Police 3 1
Health and Hospitals 3
Library 2
Fire 1 3
Other 6 8
Pending Requests (awaiting transfer
from the Real Property Department) 25 2
TOTAL 106 35
The Public Facilities Department also assumes
responsibility for providing rental office space to depart-
ments on an as-needed basis. The cost of these real estate
rentals is absorbed by the PFD and is not allocated to the
departments in need of space. During the period 1974-1983,
the annual cost of these real estate rentals ranged from
$638,000 to $1,039,000. With the anticipated termination of
a major lease effective December 31, 1983, the annual cost
of real estate rentals absorbed by the PFD should decrease
to approximately $400,000. Departments and agencies are not
required to rent office space through PFD and several rent-
als exist which are paid directly by the user department.
Under Chapter 642 of the General Laws, the Public
Facilities Commission is assigned responsibility for pre-
paring and from time to time amending a long-range capital
improvement program. Section 5 of Chapter 642 requires
every entity to which the City appropriates money to conduct
research designed to define improvements in the services
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offered or provided by that entity if so requested by the
Public Facilities Commission. The long-range capital im-
provement program,
shall specify the capital improvement proj-
ects to be undertaken in the ten years im-
mediately following the year in which such
program is prepared, the estimated cost of
each such project, the proposed commence-
ment and completion dates thereof, and, to
the extent practicable, the proposed or
alternative sites therefor.
While it is unclear whether a formal long-range capital im-
provement program has ever been prepared, no such program
has been prepared for the past five years.
As stated in a procedural memorandum entitled,
"Guidelines for Capital Improvement Planning," the annual
capital budget control process is intended to commence in
early November when departments and agencies are requested
to submit capital improvement project proposals for those
projects which they wish to undertake in the following fis-
cal year. Ideally, these projects should be drawn from a
master plan established by each department and should be
assigned priorities. The estimated cost of each project
should be as detailed as possible with key assumptions
clearly stated.
Upon receipt, the departmental lists of proposed
capital improvement projects are evaluated for reasonable-
ness of work scope and cost by Public Facilities' engin-
eers. The engineers document these evaluations in written
reports. Departments which failed to assign priorities to
proposed capital improvement projects are contacted. During
this same time frame, capital improvement projects proposed
by neighborhood groups and other persons are similarly eval-
uated by Public Facilities' engineers.
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A proposed annual capital budget is developed for
all City departments and agencies by the Associate Director
of the Public Facilities Department. This budget is re-
viewed by the Director of the Public Facilities Department
and the Public Facilities Commission. In this process, at-
tention is focused on the City's estimated capital budget
ceiling established by the Collector-Treasurer. Where pos-
sible, projects are leveraged in order to maximize the use
of federal, state or non-loan funding sources.
Responsibility for monitoring contract compliance
is primarily assigned to an on-site "clerk of the works."
On larger projects, a full-time project manager and consult-
ants, as required, also check to ensure that construction
proceeds in accordance with contract plans and specifica-
tions. When construction problems or disputes arise which
potentially require additional resources, the Associate
Director and Chief Legal Officer of the Public Facilities
Department provide necessary guidance. The Corporation
Counsel's office is rarely utilized by the Public Facilities
Department
.
Public Works Department
The Boston Public Works Department (PWD) is re-
sponsible for the care and maintenance of major components
of the City's infrastructure, particularly the construction,
repair and maintenance of the City's streets and sidewalks,
45 bridges and City-owned lighting system. PWD also ar-
ranges for street cleaning, rubbish removal and disposal
plus snow removal. Originally, the Boston Water Works was
an integral part of PWD. However, with the creation in 1977
of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission, PWD yielded its
responsibility for the operation of Boston's water and sewer
systems
.
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The Public Works Department is functionally organ-
ized into four principal divisions — maintenance, sanitary,
engineering and administration — as summarized below.
Maintenance is the largest of the four divisions
and has five sub-divisions:
o Automotive: responsible for PWD's heavy
equipment and light vehicles.
o Lighting: responsible for maintenance
and care of the City-owned portion of
Boston's street lighting system.
o Bridge: responsible for the care and
maintenance of City-owned structures
including drawbridges and 40 other
bridges
.
o Highway: responsible for maintenance,
repair and construction of City-owned
streets and sidewalks plus snow removal.
o Facilities: primarily responsible for
the care and maintenance of the Frontage
Road Central Maintenance Facility.
Sanitary is responsible for the removal of refuse
and garbage.
Engineering consists of survey, design and plan-
ning, and contract compliance functions.
Administration has various responsibilities in-
cluding a major role in the capital budgeting process.
PWD's capital budgeting procedures commence with
the identification of potential projects. PWD currently
follows a capital planning horizon of 2-3 years. Most
potential projects currently involve street repair work.
These projects are researched by the engineering department
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with emphasis on such factors as traffic flow, current con-
dition of the street or sidewalk, age of the street, and
future planned development and utility work. Based on this
research, a prioritized list of projects is developed.
The next step in the capital budgeting process in-
volves design work and the preparation, in-house, of an
engineering plan and contract specifications. (The City's
procedures governing the award of contracts are addressed in
the Contracts and Purchasing chapter of this report.)
Having developed a prioritized capital improvements
program, PWD attempts to match projects to available funds.
A summary of relevant state and federal government funding
programs, administered by the Massachusetts Department of
Public Works, appears below.
o Chapter 90 — state funds, discussed
later in this chapter.
o Transportation Bond Bill — state funds,
also discussed later in this chapter.
o Public Works Economic Development Pro-
gram — relates to road repairs and
construction in economic development
areas. The city has received funds for
two projects, Lafayette Mall and the
former Boston Army Base.
o Urban Systems Program -a federally
funded program for the repair or re-
placement of the national network of
highways and roads within urbanized
areas
.
o Interstate Program — another federally
funded program for use on repairs and
construction of primary roads which con-
nect the major urban centers.
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City financing is also available for selected
capital projects, subject to economic and political con-
straints. Sources of City funds include general obligation
bonds, the operating budget and revenue generated by street
cut permits (a charge to utilities for opening holes in
streets and sidewalks). Current revenue from street cut
permits is estimated at $750,000.
A consultant's multi-phased review of the street
cut permit fee and deposit system has highlighted the
system's archaic structure and identified a source of
potential additional revenues. Phases I and II are com-
plete. The review's findings include:
o $3.5 million of the current deposit
account balance appears to be over 10
years old.
o Deposits ranging from $3.0 million to
$7.3 million are available for transfer.
o Existence of many unbilled permit fees;
also a significant balance in accounts
receivable
.
A letter to award Phase III work remains unsigned.
The estimated cost ($250,000) of completing the review
should be evaluated in light of the significant management
efficiencies and revenues which may result.
Real Property Department
The Real Property Department (RPD) has a relatively
limited role in the capital planning process, but it is re-
sponsible for (1) the care and maintenance of City Hall and
city buildings which have municipal functions, (2) space
allocations within City Hall and (3) the disposition of
abandoned and foreclosed properties. Prior to the creation
VII - 16
of the Public Facilities Department in 1966, the Real Prop-
erty Department was an integral part of making capital im-
provements to the City's plant.
NDEA
The Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency
(NDEA)
,
acting in conjunction with the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and the Economic Development Industrial Com-
mission, is a major participant in the City's planning and
development efforts.
Created in February 1982, NDEA reflects the con-
solidation of mayoral departments with responsibility for
neighborhood employment and economic development services,
as well as the neighborhood planning role of the BRA. In
December 1982, NDEA assumed the additional responsibilities
of the Mayor's Office of Housing, which became an operating
division within NDEA.
NDEA's operational and program support functions
are financed solely by federal programs, including Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG), employment and training
funds (JTPA), and, to a lesser extent, the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA).
NDEA's capital responsibilities principally involve
stimulating economic activity through targeting of funds
into neighborhoods. A small portion of funds are generally
committed to infrastructure improvements, selected to en-
hance designated development areas with sidewalks, parking
facilities and small parks. Overall, NDEA's role in the
City's overall capital budgeting process is limited.
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EDIC
The Economic Development and Industrial Corporation
(EDIC) was created in 1971 with a mandate "to stem the loss
of industry and industrial jobs in Boston, to revitalize
land and help enhance the tax base." EDIC provides a var-
iety of services to help companies relocate into one of its
three industrial parks, including job training and financial
assistance to eligible companies. EDIC ' s financial assis-
tance primarily relies on industrial revenue bonds, fed-
erally backed securities, federal block grants and private
investment through participating banks.
BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The excess of public capital investment needs over
available public capital resources is well documented. In
order to understand the constraints which govern short-run
capital planning efforts, it is helpful to understand the
historical shifts in public capital investments and re-
sources which have occurred.
Prior to 1965, the City of Boston expended
relatively insignificant amounts on City-funded capital im-
provements due, presumably, to political and economic con-
siderations. This neglect of public capital resulted in
dilapidated municipal buildings and a deteriorating infra-
structure. (As used throughout the balance of this chapter,
infrastructure refers to publicly provided capital systems
including roadways, bridges, tunnels, water and sewer
systems, airports, seaports, plus mass transit and rail
systems.) However, during the period 1950-1965, several
authorities were created and provided with financing mech-
anisms aimed at ensuring that the existing plant was ade-
quately maintained and new facilities were constructed.
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These newly created authorities and their years of estab-
lishment included the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
(1952), the Boston Redevelopment Authority (1957), the Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority (1959), and the expanded Massa-
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority (1964). These auth-
orities used federal, state and local tax revenues, plus
user fees and bond monies, to perform their designated
functions
.
During the period 1965-1976, the City's public
capital program expanded continually. The previously noted
fiscal "crisis" of 1975 resulted in reduced but significant
capital expenditures during 1977-1980. As evidenced by
Display 3, general obligation bonds and bond anticipation
notes provided the monies expended on the City's capital
program during the entire period 1965-1980.
With the passage of Proposition 2-1/2 in November
1980, the City's capital spending was sharply curtailed.
Many design, engineering and construction contracts were
cancelled. Capital expenditures through the Capital Proj-
ects Fund amounted to approximately $24.7 million in fiscal
1981, $7.6 million in fiscal 1982 and an estimated $8-$10
million in fiscal 1983. Between November 1980 and passage
of a $30-million issue dated September 1, 1983, the City
sold no bonds for capital projects. Nevertheless, the
City's need to complete selected in-process capital proj-
ects, coupled with the inability to defer all major repairs
and renovations, required the temporary utilization of Gen-
eral Fund revenues to fund capital expenditures. During
fiscal 1984, the City repaid approximately $28 million from
the Capital Projects Fund to the General Fund to reimburse
it for transfers previously made to the Capital Projects
Funds
.
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A summary of 1965-1980 capital expenditures relat-
ing to bond issues appears in Display 3. Total capital ex-
penditures are reported by fiscal year of expenditure. Due
to apparent differences in the method of classifying capital
expenditures, the annual amounts shown in this table differ
from the amounts listed in the preceding table.
During the sixteen-year period 1965-1980, 38% of
City-funded capital expenditures related to school facili-
ties. These expenditures were partially in response to
state and federally mandated desegregation plans. An addi-
tional 9% of City-funded capital expenditures, relating to
hospital facilities, also reflected externally imposed re-
quirements as Boston City Hospital experienced accreditation
problems. Expenditures on municipal buildings represented
16% of City-funded capital expenditures and include the cost
of constructing a new City Hall, the Boston Public Library
annex, plus new fire and police stations. Expenditures on
urban renewal and economic development projects represented
another 16% of City-funded capital expenditures (but are a
small percentage of the amounts expended in Boston under the
federal urban renewal program and the Community Development
Block Grant program)
.
In addition to the City's capital expenditures fi-
nanced by general obligation bonds, public capital projects
in Boston were funded by several other sources. The cost of
"routine" repairs and maintenance was financed in conjunc-
tion with other operating expenses. The amounts expended on
repairs and maintenance are accumulated on an individual
department level. A meaningful estimate of these costs is
not possible due to the varied nature of costs recorded.
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City of Boston Capital Fund
Expenditures and Bond Issuej
1965 to 1983
(Dollars in Millions)
Fiscal Year Bonds Issued" Expenditures'
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1974c
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Sources: The Future of Boston's Capital Plant, The Urban Institute, 1981.
Official Statement relating to the City's General Obligation Bonds
dated September 1,1983.
'Services from Public Capital: The Outlook for Boston's Physical
Infrastructure/' Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1983.
14.1
19.8
24.6
31.6
31.5
56.8
76.7
72.2
70.5
92.1
109.0
59.5
51.2
45.9
61.4
24.7
7.6
9.
a. Includes net amount raised through the sale of general obligation bonds and bond
anticipation notes.
b. Capital improvements fund only.
c. Fiscal year changed in 1973 from calendar year to a July 1 through June 30 fiscal year.
Accordingly, 1974 figures cover the period of January 1, 1973 through June 30, 1974.
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides direct
financial support to Boston's capital program in two prin-
cipal areas. First, under Chapter 645 of the General Laws,
as amended, the Commonwealth reimburses the City for approx-
imately 50% to 75% of school construction costs and 20% to
75% of interest costs. The cost of school projects ordered
or approved by a court as necessary for desegregation or
such projects as may be required in the judgment of the
Board of Education to reduce or eliminate racial imbalance
are 90% reimbursed by the Commonwealth. In the case of any
school construction project which is financed from the pro-
ceeds of any sale of bonds or notes to the extent of more
than 50% of the cost, reimbursement from the Commonwealth is
paid in equal annual amounts extending over the number of
years the indebtedness incurred is outstanding.
The Commonwealth also provides direct financial
support to Boston's capital program under Section 34 of
Chapter 90 of the General Laws. Chapter 90 provides for the
allocation to cities and towns of a portion of the monies
collected through the gasoline tax, special fuel tax, and
motor carrier tax. The allocation of Chapter 90 monies is
administered by the Commonwealth's Department of Public
Works and is based on a fixed formula which considers local
miles of roadways (50% weight), population (25% weight), and
people employed in the community (25% weight). The popu-
lation component is changed every decade based on census
data; the other two components are re-evaluated annually.
Chapter 90 monies are allocated annually and may be used on
a range of design, engineering, and construction projects
relating to roadways.
The Commonwealth's Transportation Development and
Improvement Program, also known as the Transportation Bond
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Bill, was enacted in 1983. Unlike prior years' Transpor-
tation Bond Bills, this bill authorized and directed the
Commonwealth's Department of Public Works to expend a sum
not less than $40 million for projects for construction and
reconstruction of town and county ways under Section 34 of
Chapter 90 of the General Laws. The $40 million is avail-
able for expenditure until June 30, 1988. Any amounts made
available to cities and towns under this bill represent
direct grants which do not require the prior expenditure of
any funds by the city or town. Boston's portion of this
$40 million is not presently determinable.
The Commonwealth also provides indirect financial
support to Boston's capital program. Several previously
noted authorities and commissions receive financial support
from the Commonwealth, support which facilitates the deliv-
ery of service to Boston and other cities and towns. In
addition, the Commonwealth owns and, accordingly, repairs
and maintains several major streets and bridges which are
located in Boston.
The Funding Act of 1982 (the so-called Tregor Bill)
enables the City's Public Facilities Commission to dispose
of any or all of the off-street parking structures. Sale of
the Government Center garage has been recently completed at
a price of $22 million. Proceedings to sell three other
garages (Fort Hill Square, St. James Avenue and Kilby
Street) are presently in process and estimated aggregate
proceeds of approximately $41 million may be realized within
the next six to twelve months. Under the Funding Act of
1982, the funds from these sales are available to cover all
debt and interest paid or payable on such property. The
excess of sale proceeds over debt and interest on the sold
property is credited to the City's general fund for use in
paying debt service costs. This excess should be used for
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capital projects, thereby helping to restore the City's
fixed assets.
The federal government also participates actively
in financing Boston's public capital projects. More speci-
fically, the federal government finances up to 90% of eligi-
ble highway improvements in Boston, 80% of mass transit
capital improvements, and 75% of the costs of selected
sewerage treatment facilities. Under the Federal Bridge
Replacement and Rehabilitation Program, eligible bridges are
generally upgraded or rebuilt with a combination of federal
and state monies. Finally, the largest source of federal
capital aid to Boston relates to urban renewal and economic
development programs. Prior to 1974, most of this aid was
provided via federal urban renewal program grants. These
grants were replaced by the more flexible federal Community
Development Block Grant program. Additional sources of
federal development assistance include Urban Development
Action Grants and other grants or loans administered by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Although questions exist about the exact historical
magnitude of federal funding for Boston's capital expendi-
tures, federal monies certainly comprise a significant per-
centage of Boston's public capital investment in:
o Urban renewal
o Economic development
o Water and sewer
o Highways and streets
o Mass transit
o Port development
To recap, during the period 1965-1983, the City of
Boston expended in excess of $1.7 billion on public capital
projects. Approximately $800 million of these expenditures
were financed through the City's sale of general obligation
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bonds and bond anticipation notes. The amount of direct
financial support provided by the Commonwealth and the fed-
eral government to Boston's capital program is difficult to
quantify accurately. During the period 1965-1983, indica-
tions are that approximately $200 million was provided by
the Commonwealth as direct financial support to Boston's
capital program. This support primarily related to the con-
struction of public schools and roadways with minor amounts
expended in conjunction with urban renewal projects. During
the period 1965-1983, in excess of $700 million was provided
by the federal government as direct financial support to
Boston's capital program.
The remainder of this section focuses on the con-
dition of Boston's public capital investment with emphasis
on streets, bridges, parks and municipal buildings. The
condition of infrastructure components administered by rela-
tively autonomous agencies is equally important to the City
of Boston but beyond the scope of this chapter, as capital
funding is not directly provided by the City. These agen-
cies include the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Bay Transpor-
tation Authority, the Metropolitan District Commission and
the Boston Water and Sewer Commission.
Streets
The Boston Public Works Department is responsible
for maintaining approximately 780 of the 1,100 miles of
streets and highways. The remaining mileage includes high-
ways and streets maintained by the Massachusetts Department
of Public Works, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and
the Metropolitan District Commission, plus several miles of
small streets which are not public roads. Unlike bridges
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and municipal buildings, streets are not structually evalu-
ated on a periodic basis; rather, priorities are established
primarily through visual inspections and by reference to
neighborhood development plans, community meetings and in-
frastructure planning sessions.
The Boston Public Works Department (PWD) contracts
out all major reconstruction and resurfacing work and some
maintenance work. Reconstruction involves excavating the
existing street and portions of the base. Reconstruction
typically also involves rebuilding adjacent sidewalks,
replacing necessary curbs and performing lighting work.
Resurfacing may involve grinding or reshaping the existing
street before applying one layer of concrete binder (which
levels the roadway) and one layer of asphalt pavement. A
quicker, less expensive method of resurfacing involves
placing a thin layer of asphalt on the heavily trafficked
street center. The cost of reconstruction and resurfacing
is generally financed out of capital funds while maintenance
costs are financed from the operating budget.
The useful life of a street, sidewalk or lighting
system is dependent upon numerous factors and is very dif-
ficult to estimate. Useful lives of 25-50 years are both
possible and frequently cited. Resurfacing probably has a
useful life of 2-10 years depending, in part, on whether a
single skim coat or two layers of asphalt are applied.
Based on the recent level of capital expenditures admini-
stered by PWD, and summarized in Table 3, Boston has clearly
been disinvesting in its streets, sidewalks and lighting
system. The city, state and federal governments contributed
approximately 67%, 8% and 25%, respectively, of these 1978-
1983 expenditures.
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TABLE 3
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES OF BOSTON
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
Type of Expenditure 1978
Reconstruction
Street construction
Asphalt resurface'3
Street repairs15
Sidewalk repairs'3
TOTAL
1979
r 1 sc a. 1
1980
x ear
1981 1982 1983
( & in\ H* All 000 1 s)
2,565 7, 124
220
1,488
150
403
8,527 3,873 1,284 3,402
574
141
374
1, 761
614
424
403
896
180
174
3.654 9 f 385 10,902 5.596 1.464 3.576
SOURCE: Status Report on Infrastructure Planning, a publi-
cation of the BRA Research Department, with data
originally from PWD annual reports and contract
reports
.
a It should be noted that substantial additional invest-
ment in new public ways and lighting were undertaken by
the BRA in the South End, Fenway, and Charlestown. Ad-
ditional street reconstruction was also carried out in
the neighborhood business districts by PWD on behalf of
the NDEA.
b Expenditure figures for reconstruction on public ways,
asphalt resurfacing, and street and sidewalk repairs are
a record of the contracts completed in each fiscal year.
A list of priority projects, dated December 20,
1983, identifies a backlog costing $19.9 million. This in-
cludes numerous reconstruction projects ($12.1 million) and
skim coating projects ($5.0 million) plus limited original
construction work ($1.1 million) and sidewalk reconstruction
($1.7 million). PWD presently has approximately $3.2 mil-
lion in appropriated and unencumbered amounts plus approxi-
mately $25 million in authorized and unissued debt.
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Bridges
As in many other large cities, responsibility for
the upkeep and capital repair of Boston's bridges is divided
among the City, the Commonwealth, and several agencies.
Based on a review of a Massachusetts Department of Public
Works computer printout, Boston appears to have 388 bridges,
pedestrian walkways and viaducts. A recent study by the
Joint Center for Urban Studies identified 362 Boston bridges
and viaducts. The City is responsible for only 45 of these
bridges
.
Under federal funding eligibility requirements, all
bridges must be inspected and rated every two years. The
Massachusetts Department of Public Works inspects all
bridges, including City-owned bridges, at no cost to the
owner. Each bridge is rated according to the standards of
the American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO). The AASHTO rating represents a weighted
average of several factors including structural adequacy and
safety, serviceability and the bridge's importance to the
overall transportation system. In evaluating a bridge's
structural adequacy, attention is focused on the condition
of the deck, superstructure and substructure. An AASHTO
rating of 50 or less means the bridge is eligible for fed-
eral aid to replace the structure. An AASHTO rating between
50 and 75 means the bridge is eligible for federal aid to
rehabilitate the structure.
Table 4 summarizes the condition of the bridges
located in Boston. The poor condition of many Boston
bridges which is reflected in this table is exacerbated by a
reactive and low level of maintenance. A consultant's de-
tailed review (in 1979) of City-owned bridges also cited
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their poor condition and noted severe corrosion and struc-
tural deficiencies on several bridges. The consultant's
summary report, dated October 1980, is summarized in
Display 4. The estimated construction cost for 1981
includes $11.0 million for the Northern Avenue bridge over
Fort Point Channel. The estimated construction cost for
1983 includes $4.5 million for the Summer Street bridge over
Reserved Channel.
Proposed Annual Program of Bridge Repairs
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Display 4
Estimated Total Cost = $29,330,000
VII - 30
TABLE 4
CONDITION OF BRIDGES LOCATED IN BOSTON
Owner Total
State-Owned
Interstate System 97
Primary Aid System 24
Other 60
City-Owned
Federal Aid System 33
Other 12
MDC 46
MA Turnpike Authority 54
Massport 3
MBTA 33
TOTAL 362
Number of Bridges
Con-
Recon- structed
structed Pre-1950
AASHTO Rating
Less
Than
50 50-75
3
18
12
5
47
4
2
30
12
6
16
5 25 9 6
Reliable data unavailable
11 18 6 21
- - 9
2 1-2
Reliable data unavailable
SOURCE: "Services from Public Capital: The Outlook for Bos-
ton's Physical Infrastructure," Joint Center for Urban
Studies, October 1983.
The City of Boston has expended relatively insig-
nificant monies on City-owned bridges in recent years. The
cost of minor maintenance and repair work is paid by Bos-
ton. However, major repair and reconstruction work is
presently being deferred pending available state or federal
funds. On these major repair and reconstruction projects,
Boston frequently pays the design and engineering costs.
The Northern Avenue bridge is currently in the design phase
with federal construction financing.
Parks
The Parks and Recreation Department is responsible
for maintenance of 2,500 acres of the City of Boston-owned
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parks. This includes the care and upkeep of 140 parks and
playgrounds plus several recreation buildings and centers.
As with streets, the condition of parks and recreation
facilities is difficult to evaluate accurately in terms of
specific criteria. However, a significant decline in cap-
ital expenditures by the Parks and Recreation Department
after the passage of Proposition 2-1/2 suggests that neces-
sary repairs and improvements have been deferred. A summary
of recent capital expenditures administered by the Parks and
Recreation Department appears in Display 5. The city and
federal governments contributed approximately 80% and 15%,
respectively, of these 1978-1983 expenditures, with the
balance financed by various trust funds.
The Parks and Recreation Department expends a
portion of its operating budget on maintenance and small
repairs. The annual amounts expended are relatively modest
and approximate $1 million in contractual services. In ad-
dition, the Department has an engineering division staff of
approximately 12 persons which is responsible for preparing
contract plans and specifications, monitoring in-process
contract work and planning for future development.
As noted, in addition to City-funded capital expen-
ditures, the Department utilizes contributions from private
partners plus federal and state grants. Major in-process
projects are primarily financed by the National Park Ser-
vice's Urban Parks and Recreation Recovery Program, federal
Community Development Block Grants, the Massachusetts Divi-
sion of Conservation Services, the Parkman Fund and the Land
and Water Conservation Fund. Separately, the recently en-
acted Capital Outlay Program provides considerable monies
for work on Boston-area parks, including Franklin Park, por-
tions of the "Emerald Necklace," and Urban Heritage parks.
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Capital Expenditures of Boston's
Parks and Recreation Department
3,000 —i
2,500
Repairs to Irrigation Systems
Tree Planting
Installation of Benches,
Fencing and Pavements
Repairs and Reconstruction
of Buildings and Facilities
Reconstruction and
Improvement of
Park Facilities
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Fiscal Year
Display 5
SOURCE: Status Report on Infrastructure Planning, a pub-
lication of the BRA Research Department, with data
originally from Parks and Recreation Department
contract files.
* In addition to BPRD expenditures, from 1978-1983, the
BRA spent over $3.1 million on park construction and
NDEA spent over $200,000 on parks and recreation im-
provements.
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The Parks and Recreation Department recently pre-
pared a projected five-year capital program costing $25.9
million. As presented, during each of the next five years,
the Department would expend $5.0-$5.3 million. The largest
proposed individual capital projects and their respective
five-year expenditures relate to Franklin Park ($3.3 mil-
lion), the Boston Common and Public Garden ($1.5 million),
the Back Bay Fens ($1.4 million), and Franklin Field ($1.3
million). An additional $2.2 million is projected for city-
wide tree planting and maintenance in parks and squares.
The Parks and Recreation Department presently has approxi-
mately $3.5 million in authorized and unissued debt, all of
which relates to loan orders dated before 1980.
Municipal Buildings
The City of Boston has 408 municipal buildings
which are currently active: 282 non-school buildings and
126 school buildings.
The physical condition of these municipal buildings
varies considerably due, in part, to each structure's age
and upkeep. An unpublished study prepared for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts evaluated the physical condition of
City-owned buildings (excluding schools) in 1972. This
evaluation is admittedly partially outdated but a more
recent comprehensive study is unavailable. A summary of
findings from this 1972 review appears below.
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TABLE 5
PHYSICAL CONDITION OF CITY-OWNED BUILDINGSa
Average*3
Number of Average General
Facilities Facilities Age Condition
(in years)
Parks and Recreation Dept. 61 52.7 37.6
Fire Department 46 46.3 39.1
Public Works Department 28 59.6 36.4
Long Island Hospital 24 44.7 35.0
Deer Island Prisonc 20 61.4 35.2
Police Department 19 54.9 40.9
Mattapan Hospital 17 46.1 37.6
Miscellaneous^ 19 41.9 37.6
TOTAL 234 51,0 37.4
SOURCE: Capital Requirements of Boston Infrastructure and
Proposed Financing by the Public Sector: Prospec-
tive Five-Year Period, an unpublished study, Decem-
ber 26, 1978.
a Excludes school buildings.
b Ratings: 30 = functional, major repairs needed
40 = functional, minor repairs needed
50 = excellent condition
c Excludes carpenter shop, private homes and storage area.
d Includes City Hall, et al.
A United Facilities Plan (UFP), released in 1979,
evaluated in detail the physical condition of Boston's pub-
lic schools. This Plan was prepared in response to a U.S.
District Court order requiring the development of a schedule
for school closings, construction, renovations, repairs,
refurbishing and replacement for the years 1977-1986. A
summary of suggested costs relating to the upgrading of
school facilities, contained within the UFP and summarized
below, identified projects costing $143 million. Boston's
estimated share of these costs approximates $49 million.
The $40 million provided for high school projects may be low
since an analysis of ten high schools, prepared as part of
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the UFP, identified $59.6 million in minimum capital
improvements plus an additional $147.6 million in costs
relating to the complete renovation of all ten high schools.
These cost estimates are in 1980 dollars and, accordingly,
should be increased by approximately 30-40% to adjust the
amounts to 1984 dollars.
TABLE 6
COSTS TO UPGRADE SCHOOL FACILITIES (UFP)
($ in 000's)
Priority A - highest $33,420
Priority B 10,891
Priority C 48,933
Recovery of High Schools 40,000*
Necessary Improvements to
Other Schools 10, 000
TOTAL S143. 244
Boston's Est. Share £ 49.000
An updated evaluation of the condition of Boston's
municipal buildings is presently underway. The Boston
Infrastructure Committee's Planning and Policy Subcommittee,
formed in February 1983, and acting in conjunction with BRA
personnel, has distributed a survey to approximately 18
public agencies and private companies actively involved in
planning and developing Boston's infrastructure. The survey
was mailed in June and requested various information includ-
ing profiles of actual 1978-1982 expenditures and planned
expenditures over a 1-, 5-, 10- and 17-year horizon. Many
survey replies have been received and clarified through fol-
low-up meetings. Most replies project capital expenditures
over a time frame of three to five years. A summary of
survey results is anticipated within the next few months.
Given the Infrastructure Committee's in-process and
substantially completed survey, one would simply not expect
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the following to occur in an efficient capital budgeting
system. Under a fiscal year 1984 contract not to exceed
$160,000/ the firm of Wallace, Floyd, Associates, Inc., is
preparing a five-year capital improvements program for the
Public Facilities Department. In preparing this program,
Wallace, Floyd is performing several tasks including an
inventory of municipal property and a preliminary field
survey of selected buildings. The program will ultimately
reflect interviews with selected department personnel,
detailed building surveys and applicable financial con-
straints. The proposed capital improvement program is
expected to be available in the fourth quarter of fiscal
1984. Two additional points should be noted. First, the
proposed capital improvement program will need to be expan-
ded to incorporate all municipal buildings. Second, the
City may need to accelerate the development of this program
to be eligible for state or federal aid on several capital
projects
.
The preliminary field survey of selected buldings
has been recently completed and is documented in an interim
report dated December 20, 1983. This preliminary survey is
based upon an exterior observation of selected buildings
plus an interior observation of a portion of these build-
ings. Numerous buildings are rated as being in fair or poor
condition, with many structures evidencing graffiti, broken
windows and an absence of storm windows. Several older
buildings are described as handsome, elegant and structur-
ally sound, but also neglected and rundown in appearance.
Selected buildings appear to require significant repairs.
One building in this condition is the Engine Company 32,
Ladder 9 Fire Station. Constructed in 1972, it is described
as having "many cracks in the walls most likely resulting
from immediately adjacent railroad use/built-in heating and
cooling fails/no screens or storm windows".
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In evaluating the capital needs of Boston's munici-
pal buildings, the following three additional points should
be considered:
o The City is under court obligation to
significantly improve or reconstruct the
Charles Street Jail at a preliminary
estimated cost of $40 million.
o The City is under court obligation to
significantly improve conditions at the
Deer Island House of Correction at a
cost of several million dollars.
o The cost of improving the accessibility
for disabled persons of Boston's muni-
cipal facilities was estimated at
$11.2 million. This estimate was pre-
pared by the Public Facilities Depart-
ment and assumed improvements to 114
buildings during fiscal 1982-1984. Many
of these projects remain unstarted and
the related costs continue to escalate
with the passage of time.
A shortage of reliable data prevents a meaningful
analysis of recent capital expenditure levels on Boston's
municipal buildings. An analysis of capital expenditures of
the Public Facilities Department (PFD), prepared by the
BRA's research department, identified the amounts listed on
the table below. As described in Note 1 of the table, "the
expenditure figures ... should be viewed only as preliminary
estimates". During the five years 1979-1983, PFD capital
expenditures are estimated at $69.3 million. The city,
state and federal governments contributed approximately 34%,
53% and 8%, respectively, of these 1979-1983 expenditures
with the balance financed by various trust funds. Accurate
information regarding PFD annual capital expenditures is not
readily available from that department.
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TABLE 7
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES OF THE BOSTON
PUBLIC FACILITIES DEPARTMENTa
Fiscal Year3
Type of Expenditure*5 1979 1980 1981 1982
(in 000' s)
School Facilities $25, 384 $13,983 $ 35 $
Health and Hospitals 2,596 1,298 1,254 188
County Courthouse, Jail
and Prison 872 228 234 147
Parks and Recreation 617 1,413 2,239 115
Police Department
Facilities 231 2, 109 718 71
Fire Department
Facilities 245 1,651 167 100
Library Facilities 141 948 110
General Municipal Facil-
ities & Miscellaneous 454 480 528 805
1983
$2,133
5,054
897
677
1, 151
TOTAL $30,540 $22,110 $5.285 $1.426 $9.912
SOURCE: Status Report on Infrastructure Planning, a publi-
cation of the BRA Research Department, with data
originally from PWD annual reports and contract
reports
.
a With the exception of the Auditing Department's Finan-
cial Statements, which provide data on new school and
hospital construction for 1979 and 1980, the expenditure
figures were drawn from advertisements or unverified
estimates of completed projected costs, consequently the
expenditure figures in this table should be viewed only
as preliminary estimations.
b Expenditures in each category include new construction,
renovation, repairs and major new equipment.
The fiscal 1984 operating budget provides the Pub-
lic Facilities Department with $2,790,000 for repairs to
buildings and structures. Substantially all of these monies
are presently encumbered or committed to projects out for
advertisement. The operating budget also provides PFD with
monies to staff 19 planning and development positions plus
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nine alterations and repairs positions,
supplemented, as required, with technical
tise costing in excess of $500,000.
PFD resources are
consulting exper-
PFD is also involved in various capital projects
which are primarily funded through federal grants and is
currently applying for $82.8 million of additional grants,
primarily related to rehabilitation work on Boston Latin
School and construction of a new Latin Academy ($35 million)
plus previously noted work at the Charles Street Jail
($25 million) and the Deer Island House of Correction
($20 million)
.
The Public Facilities
active construction contracts,
contracts totals $14.4 million,
$170,200 (1.2%) from origin
$170,200 represents the net eff
Department currently has 51
The current value of these
an increase of approximately
1 contract amounts. This
ct of seven change orders.
The listing of Authorized and Unissued Debt as of
November 30, 1983 includes approximately $110 million relat-
ing to PFD. A summary of major authorized and unissued loan
orders appears below. Attempts to evaluate historical loan
order activity, relative to originally stated projects and
purposes, proved very difficult. This difficulty reflects
the practice of often establishing one loan order for multi-
ple capital projects and occasionally allocating the cost of
a single project to two or more accounts. Overall, the
relative age of several loan orders, coupled with a PFD-pre-
pared list of active loan orders which total only $43.9 mil-
lion, suggest that several older authorized and unissued
loan order amounts should possibly be rescinded.
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZED AND UNISSUED DEBT
AS OF NOVEMBER 30, 1983
Amount
(in 000' s)
Date of Originally Authorized
General Purpose Order Authorized & Unissued
Remodeling &
Extraordinary
Repairs
- various depts.
- penal dept.
- school dept.
- library dept.
- various depts.
Pre-1980
4-8-83
5-31-83
11-22-83
11-22-83
$ 15,480
2,000
4,000
15,000
10,000
$ 7,505
2,000
2,000
15,000a
10,000b
School Project
Loan Act of 1948
Pre-1974
11-14-83
238,400
35,000
9,040
35,OOOc
Charles Street Jail 10-1-78 15,400 14,000
Public Buildings
- various depts. various 39, 700 15, 810
TOTAL $374,980 $110,355
Includes approximately $12.5 million for the Main
Library.
Includes $1.8 million for a fire alarm system at Boston
City Hospital and $1.8 million for repairs and improve-
ments at the School Department's Central Kitchen Facil-
ity.
Relates to the Boston Latin School and Latin Academy.
Urban Renewal and Economic Development
Capital expenditures in the areas of urban renewal
and economic development are primarily handled by three
agencies: the Economic Development and Industrial Corpora-
tion of Boston (EDIC), the Neighborhood Development and
Employment Agency (NDEA) , and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority. The capital requirements of each of these agen-
cies are briefly discussed below.
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During the six years 1978-1983, EDIC directly
administered capital projects costing $11.9 million. These
projects related to the Boston Marine Industrial Park
($5.9 million), the Boston Army Base ($4.2 million, all in
1983), and the Crosstown Industrial Park ($1.8 million).
The City financed approximately one-third of these capital
projects or an average of $660,000 per year. EDIC 1 s
response to the Infrastructure Committee Survey identified
capital projects costing slightly in excess of $20 million
over the next five years. The sources of financing for
these planned projects are currently unknown. If Boston
continues to finance approximately one-third of EDIC ' s capi-
tal expenditures, City funding will approximate $1.3 million
per year.
During the six years 1978-1983, NDEA directly
administered capital projects costing $5.3 million. These
projects were fully financed by the federal government, and
should continue to be.
During the six years 1978-1983, the Boston Redevel-
opment Authority (BRA) directly administered capital proj-
ects costing $44.9 million. Significant amounts were ex-
pended in the South End ($21.6 million), Charlestown Navy
Yard ($8.1 million), Fenway ($4.3 million), and Charlestown
($3.9 million). The city, state and federal governments
financed approximately 11%, 6%, and 81%, respectively, with
the remaining 2% financed by the Boston Water and Sewer
Commission.
The BRA recently completed a forecast of City-
funded capital expenditures. These projected expenditures
represent an annual average of $11.2 million, a significant
increase from the approximately $825,000 per year expended
by the City on behalf of BRA projects.
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TABLE 9
PROJECTED CITY-FUNDED CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES OF THE BRA
Fiscal Year
Project Area 1984 1985 1986
Jan. -June
($ in 000' s)
Charlestown Urban Renewal Area $ 755 $ 1,440 $1, 560
Charlestown Navy Yard 1,026 3, 060 240
Chinatown 216
Columbia Point i o r> r\1 , zUU 1, 2UU
Lafayette Place 3, 348 1,534
North Station Urban Renewal Area 1,512 960 360
Park Plaza Urban Renewal Area 630 480
South End Urban Renewal Area 540 1, 380 720
South Station Urban Renewal Area 1,080 1,560
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area 119
TOTAL $8,596 $11,764 $4,560
SUMMARY
The capital budgeting process, as described in this
chapter, is not functioning particularly well. A comprehen-
sive multi-year capital improvement program has not been
prepared since approximately 1975. The capital planning
process is divided among a multitude of government agencies
including the City's Departments of Public Facilities, Pub-
lic Works, and Parks and Recreation, plus the Boston Rede-
velopment Authority. Each agency has unique procedures for
identifying and prioritizing capital needs, coordinating
alternative funding sources and monitoring contract compli-
ance. These procedures are usually informal and not docu-
mented in writing. Many agencies have adopted unusually
short planning horizons. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the condition of Boston's infrastructure and munici-
pal buildings is deteriorating. Continued underfunding of
both key maintenance and minor repair items has resulted in
unnecessarily costly later repairs.
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A relative absence of reliable information current-
ly precludes the preparation of a highly refined capital
improvements program. The summary of projected fiscal 1984-
1986 City-funded capital expenditures which appears on the
following page reflects numerous underlying "best guesses".
Accordingly, this summary should be reevaluated as better
information becomes available. More specifically, the fol-
lowing key variables should be closely monitored as each
variable is individually very significant to the City's
short-term capital improvements program:
o Timing of Boston Latin School and Latin
Academy construction
o Timing, and available non-City finan-
cing, regarding the Charles Street Jail
and Deer Island House of Correction
o Continued availability of state and
federal construction financing
Overall, the City's ability to afford annual capi-
tal expenditures of $65-$70 million must be evaluated.
While recognizing that the deferral of multi-year capital
planning and preventive maintenance is relatively easy in
the short-run, its long-run consequences are significant and
costly. Accordingly, before rejecting annual capital expen-
ditures of $65-$70 million as unacceptably high, relative to
historical levels, attention should be focused on potential
alternative financing sources and cost savings which may be
achievable elsewhere.
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TABLE 10
SUMMARY OF PROJECTED CITY-FUNDED
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
(dollars in millions)
Fiscal Year
Description
Streets
Sidewalks
Lighting
Bridges
Comments
Parks
Buildings
-Libraries
-Latin
Schools
•Repair/
renov. at
various
depart-
ments
1984
Jan. -June
Increased emphasis on recon-
struction & sidewalks; assumes
state & federal govts continue
to finance 33% of capital costs
Increased preventive maintenance
& minor repair work; assumes
state & federal govts continue
to finance 100% of major con-
struction costs
Applies historical City-funding
percentage (80%) to amounts de-
tailed in the recently prepared
capital program
Assumes major work at the Main
Library begins in Fall 1984
Assumes the beginning of con-
struction work in Fall 1984 &
a 36-month schedule
Increased emphasis on early
corrective work; assumes
approximately 50% financing
by the City
$4
1985
$9
8
8
1986
$10
12
-Charles
St. Jail
A very imprecise estimate 10 10
BRA
EDIC
Equipment
TOTAL
As detailed earlier in this
chapter, except that the BRA's
FY 86 amount includes $2.5 mil-
lion for presently undetermined
projects
.
Major items only.
9
1
2
$25
12
2
$67 $68
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations which appear below attempt to
create an environment conducive to effective capital budget-
ing. This environment should facilitate the development of
a multi-year capital budget and heighten management account-
ability within the budgeting process. These recommendations
are offered as constructive management suggestions.
1. Multi-year capital budgets should be
prepared annually and updated quarterly.
2. The planning horizon for the capital
budget should be five years with proj-
ected Year 1 expenditures detailed by
month.
3. The cash flow relating to planned Year
1 expenditures should be detailed by
month.
4. The planned total cost of each capital
expenditure should be projected with
the city, state and federal government
components also indicated.
5. The estimated impact, if any, of each
planned capital expenditure on the
operating budget should be quantified
and included with the budget document.
6. The capital budget should, if feasible,
be prepared on a calendar year basis in
order to minimize timing variances.
7. Key underlying capital budget assump-
tions should be documented and included
with the budget document.
8. The multi-year capital budget should be
formally "issued" on an annual basis in
order to increase accountability and
understanding.
9. A comprehensive capital budgeting man-
ual should be prepared in order to
formally document acceptable policies
and procedures.
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10. Standard capital budget forms should be
utilized by all departments.
11. Minimum standards for data collection,
including the level and format for
accurately accumulating capital expen-
diture costs, should be established and
followed by all departments.
12. Applicable departments should be
strongly encouraged to compile accurate
historical capital expenditure and
repair/maintenance cost data subject to
specified guidelines.
13. Consideration should be given to shift-
ing all minor repair and maintenance
costs to the operating budget.
14. Capital project cost data, both histor-
ically and prospectively, should focus
on monies expended during designated
time periods versus less meaningful
data on contracts advertised, contracts
awarded or contracts completed.
15. A chart of accounts should be developed
and implemented which facilitates
multi-tiered analyses of capital expen-
ditures.
16. The existing, but generally unused,
Capital Improvements Program Management
Information System (CIPMIS) should be
revised to reflect recent and planned
changes in accounting systems plus any
design limitations which potentially
reduce the system's interdepartmental
usefulness
.
17. A CIPMIS User Manual should be devel-
oped to assist department personnel in
controlling capital projects.
18. A designated individual should train
selected departmental employees in the
use of the CIPMIS and should be avail-
able to answer ongoing user questions.
19. The Collector-Treasurer and a designa-
ted individual responsible for capital
budgeting should review all loan orders
before submission to the City Council.
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20. The Collector-Treasurer and a designa-
ted individual responsible for capital
budgeting should review the authorized
and unissued debt and prepare a list of
recommended recisions or reallocations
for the approval of the Mayor and the
City Council.
21. A tracking mechanism should be devel-
oped to facilitate the accurate match-
ing of loan orders, bond proceeds, and
capital expenditures by specific proj-
ect and general account activity.
22. A designated individual responsible for
capital budgeting should review all
advertisements relating to capital
projects before publication in the City
Record in order to prevent the award of
unauthorized contracts.
23. The Auditor should continue to estab-
lish capital accounts only after
receipt of a letter in which the Col-
lector-Treasurer expresses an intention
to issue debt as authorized by loan
orders
.
24. A designated individual responsible for
capital budgeting should continually
monitor the historical and anticipated
future impact of non-City funding
sources on Boston's capital projects
and should ensure the City's interest
in pending important legislation (e.g.,
the federal Public Capital Investment
Act) is appropriately noted.
25. Contract compliance with departmental
procedures should be closely reviewed
with emphasis on ensuring the existence
of adequate documented quality control
mechanisms
.
26. Existing procedures which effectively
result in each department resolving its
own construction contract disputes
without the benefit of input from Cor-
poration Counsel should be reevaluated
and revised, as applicable.
VII - 48
27. A designated individual should review
all departmental leases pertaining to
office space in order to ensure that
the lease terms are acceptable and that
alternative, City-owned office space is
not available.
28. The payment cycle to contractors should
be significantly reduced in order to
comply with an existing law (Section
39k of Chapter 30 of the General Laws)
which provides for the payment by the
City of interest to contractors if
periodic pay requisitions are not paid
within 15 days.
29. The Collector-Treasurer and the Com-
missioner of the Public Works Depart-
ment should prepare an updated evalua-
tion of the financial benefit to the
City of purchasing that portion of
Boston's street lighting system which
is presently owned by Boston Edison.
30. The existing practice of matching
street opening deposits, received from
utilities, with subsequent repair costs
should be revised with emphasis on the
following
:
- Shifting the burden for permanent
street opening repairs to utilities
Shifting the Public Works Depart-
ment's primary role from repair-
oriented to inspectional
Revising the permit fee structure
Reclassifying a high percentage of
the street opening deposit account
to revenue in recognition of the age
of many deposits, the actual prac-
tice of repairing major street sec-
tions (versus only street openings)
and the costly manual effort
required to inefficiently match
deposits and repair costs.
31. The fragmented capital planning,
budgeting and development process
should be reviewed and streamlined with
emphasis on the elimination of appar-
ently inefficient and overlapping func-
tions and interagency committees.
VII - 49
32. Pending a redefinition of the capital
planning, budgeting and development
process, key vacancies on the Public
Facilities Commission and the Economic
Development and Industrial Corpora-
tion's Board of Directors should be
filled.
33. Responsibility for many of the pre-
ceding recommendations should be
assigned to an Office of Capital Plan-
ning within the Mayor's Office in order
to (i) signal the importance of capital
budgeting to the new administration,
(ii) increase departmental accountabi-
lity, (iii) improve interdepartmental
cooperation, (iv) facilitate the prior-
itizing of all capital projects within
the City, and (v) integrate the capital
budgeting process, the operating budget
process and the formulation of appli-
cable policies.
34. Private sector experienced personnel
should be utilized, where feasible, to
staff oversight commissions and City-
wide capital budgeting committees.
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Contracts and Purchasing

AN OVERVIEW
As of January 2, 1984, the City of Boston is
committed to the expenditure of almost half a billion dollars
for ongoing contracts to which it is a party. The patchwork
quilt of funding sources and contracting authorities is so
complex and ill- documented that little can be said with total
confidence as to where this money comes from, where it goes
or how it makes the trip. Some useful statistics are avail-
able to provide an overview of Boston's contracting situa-
tion, however, and they suggest that to a great extent the
City awards its contracts without advertising, or on a
"multi-vendor" basis that provides few of the procedural
safeguards afforded by the formal, open, competitive-bid
process
.
The City's contracts in one way or another touch
the lives of all Boston residents. Schools, playgrounds,
fire houses, bridges, roads, sidewalks, police stations,
jails and parks are constructed with materials purchased
under contract, and often built by workers employed by
contractors. Boston contracts with locksmiths, plumbers,
electricians, trash collectors, lawyers, architects and
accountants. Consultants work under contract to advise City
officials on how to insulate municipal buildings, computerize
data and screen applicants for City jobs. Contractors test
soil samples, cater meals, assess property values and launder
clothes for the City. They provide uniforms, computers,
chain link fences, parking meters, paint, paper clips, fire
engines and furniture. A partial list of City departments
and agencies that make contracts is presented in the table
attached as Appendix 1.
Funding for Boston's contracts comes from a variety
of sources: city revenues, federal loans and grants, state
monies, trust funds and bond issues. Tracing the path of all
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of this money from origin to expenditure is an almost
impossible task. The City Auditor's office had to have a new
computer program prepared in order to determine the total
amount of money available to the City from all sources, since
even that information was not readily available. Indeed,
even with that special computer run, the City Auditor's
office could not, in the time allowed, distinguish federal
from state money.
The results of that computer analysis are displayed
in the table attached as Appendix 2. As Appendix 2 demon-
strates, the City of Boston is currently involved in ongoing
contracts the dollar volume of which is $497,772,442.98.
Indeed, this total probably understates the extent of City
contracting, since it omits "memo orders," which are encum-
brances of funds made for a variety of purposes. The com-
puter analysis could not distinguish between contractual and
noncontractual memo orders. According to an official in the
City Auditor's office, memo orders for contracts amount to
$25,000 to $50,000 for each of several departments.
Of the $497,772,442.98 in ongoing City contracts,
$371,635,110.26 is chargeable against current revenues. In
FY 1984, City revenues account for about 37% of the source
money for contracts executed before January 3, 1984; federal
and state funds exceed that figure, totalling around 42%.
Bonds amount to approximately 21% of Boston's contract
funding, and trust funds less than 1%. For a clearer
understanding of the sources of Boston's contract funding,
see Display 1 on page VIII-3.
Appendix 2 also illustrates the unreliability of
the original appropriation as an indicator of the amount
which will eventually be spent. For instance, as of January 3,
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Distribution of 1984 Funding
For Boston's Contracts
Total Funding = $497.7 Million
Trust Funds
$1.1 Million
Display 1
1984, the dollar volume of executed contracts funded by trust
revenues had already exceeded the "Original Amount"
established for the entire fiscal year, which was then only
half over. Similarly, the current appropriation ("Current
Amount" plus "Balance") for City- funded contracts exceeded by
27% the "Original Amount." These apparent increases in
appropriation demonstrate that the original City budget
cannot provide more than an extremely rough idea of the
contents of the final budget.
As will be more fully explained in succeeding
sections of this Chapter, City contracts are awarded in any
of three ways. Some are advertised and awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder. Others are awarded without formal
advertisement. And still others are repetitive services
contracts, which can involve either a single vendor or two or
more vendors (a "multi-vendor contract"), such as a contract
enabling an agency to obtain plumbing services from certain
plumbers as needed. The award process for multi-vendor
contracts bears an appearance of fairness and openness that
masks the reality of arbitrary discretion. While virtually
any private contractor can, by merely responding to an
advertisement, get his name on a contracting agency's list of
approved vendors of a particular repetitive service, the
agency may thereafter favor a handful of vendors on that
list. In farming out particular jobs under a multi-vendor
contract, the contracting agency is obliged to obtain bids
from just three vendors on its list -- and telephone bids at
that. Disfavored vendors may remain on the list indefinitely,
without ever receiving an invitation to bid, and there is
little incentive and often no procedure for reviewing the
taking of informal bids.
Definitive figures on what percentage of Boston's
contracts are advertised, unadvertised and repetitive
services are not available. The City Auditor's office
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conducted a computer analysis to break down the dollar volume
of City contracts according to the process used in awarding
them. That analysis will not be discussed at length here
because it only distinguishes between advertised and unadver-
tised contracts and does not contain a separate category for
repetitive services contracts, which may be advertised or may
not. Repetitive services contracts appear generally to be
counted in the computer report as advertised. Even with this
classification of repetitive services contracts, the computer
printout still concludes that unadvertised contracts exceed
advertised contracts in both number and dollar volume.
Statistics have been compiled on the relative
number and dollar volume of City- funded contracts that are
advertised, unadvertised and for repetitive services, based
on the City's Encumbrance Open Order Listing ("EOOL"). The
EOOL lists all contracts for which the City Auditor had
"encumbered" funds by certifying that money was available as
of December 16, 1983. Unfortunately, the repetitive services
contracts shown on the list include some single-vendor
contracts, some of which are advertised and some of which are
not. A further qualification is that time constraints
required the exclusion of Purchase and Service Orders,
leases, all contracts funded by sources other than City
revenues, and contracts executed before FY 1984.
Of the 1446 contracts surveyed, 556 are shown on
the EOOL as unadvertised -- a full 39%. Repetitive services
contracts account for 468 -- 32%. Fifty-one contracts (3%)
are not identified as to award process. The total number of
advertised contracts is 371, just 26% of the whole. In sum,
only about a quarter of Boston's City- funded contracts go
through the formal process of advertising and open,
competitive bidding. These figures are presented in Display
2 on page VIII-7.
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Even more significant than the gross number of
contracts awarded without advertising is the dollar volume of
those contracts. Unadvertised contracts account for
$37,691,385.58 in contractual spending -- 53% of the dollar
value of the contracts funded by City revenues. Repetitive
services contracts and those contracts which were not iden-
tified as to award process each amount to about 6% of the
sum, totalling $4,110,909.23 and $4,234,510.53 respectively.
Thus, only 35% of the contract money goes to advertised
contracts -- a total of $24,737,508.82. These figures are
presented in Display 2 on page VIII-7.
Although extrapolation from these figures may
present some problems, the above analysis suggests that more
than half of the nearly $500 million in outstanding City
contracts may well have been awarded without formal adver-
tising and open bidding. It also suggests that almost a
third of the total number of contracts may have been made
through the loosely-regulated multi-vendor process.
In sum, Boston's contracts are awarded and
monitored with an informality hardly befitting the enormous
amount of money at stake. Although the City Auditor's office
possesses much information on the subject, no central record-
keeping system exists to answer some of the simplest ques-
tions about contract funding, such as exactly how much
federal money is used to pay for the City's contracts and
what agencies benefit. The advertised, open bidding proce-
dures necessary to keep public contracting honest and effi-
cient are applied to a very small minority of the total
number of City contracts.
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PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
As detailed above, the City of Boston is currently
a party to contracts totalling almost half a billion dollars.
The City's contracts and contractual and purchasing
procedures were analyzed in some detail in an effort to
determine whether the City's substantial expenditures are
resulting in maximum value and services to the City and its
residents
.
This study was not designed to detect wrongdoing,
and this Chapter does not assert that the system is corrupt.
The study has however discovered and the Chapter describes,
an inefficient, bureaucratic system that is susceptible to
abuse. The problems identified are so serious that
incremental adjustments and piecemeal reform may be
ineffective. Therefore, while the specific recommendations
advanced in this Chapter should be adopted as valuable
interim measures, serious consideration should be given to a
fundamental restructuring and system-wide reorganization of
the contracting procedures for all the agencies of the City
of Boston. Such change could require many months, if not
years, to achieve.
The goal sought by the recommendations in this
Chapter is a contracting process for the City that, while
operating fairly, openly and honestly, obtains needed
services, goods or construction of the highest quality at the
lowest appropriate cost for the City, from as widespread a
group of Boston private contractors as possible. Contracting
procedures were examined to identify those that did not serve
this goal or were susceptible to abuse or inefficiency.
Individual contracts were looked at for the light they shed
on the effectiveness of the present procedures, but with the
limited time and without access to subpoena or records of the
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private contractors, the investigation was not designed to
detect criminal misconduct.
The investigation consisted of three distinct
phases. The first phase of the investigation involved
collecting the various legislative acts, municipal ordinances
and contract manuals governing City contracts and contract
procedures, and general background information and numerous
documents from various sources throughout the City.
Information and documents were obtained from a wide range of
City offices, including the City Audit, or Budget Division,
and Law Departments, as well as the Boston Municipal Research
Bureau and the Boston Finance Commission. The first phase
culminated in detailed analyses of the various statutes,
ordinances and contract manuals and the general documentation
previously gathered with a view to determining the adequacy
of these procedures and controls. Personnel in all City
departments cooperated generously with this effort, and the
series of briefings by City officials were very helpful.
All systems and controls, no matter how well
designed, must be followed and properly implemented to
achieve their intended purpose. Therefore, in the second
phase of the investigation, additional information and
documentation were gathered and analyzed, including approval
forms, bid forms, Award Letters and contract documentation,
in order to identify formal or informal contracting practices
and procedures, with particular focus on comparing the
written procedures against performance in actual practice.
Separate attention was devoted to those contracts that are
advertised and competitively awarded through public advertis-
ing, multi-vendor or repetitive services contracts and
unadvertised contracts, as each of those types of contracts
is subject to different controls and procedures. Moreover,
each of them poses unique problems and concerns that must be
addressed individually in order to design and implement
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adequate controls and procedures to ensure maximum return on
the City's contractual expenditures. The second phase also
included extensive interviews with various City
representatives
.
While an attempt was made in the third phase of the
investigation to conduct a general overview of contracting
and contracting procedures, the limitations of time during
the transition did not permit an exhaustive analysis of each
of the City's departments and each of its voluminous
contracts for FY 1984. Rather, an attempt was made to make a
more limited, and hopefully more accurate, review of certain
departments selected to obtain a representative sample of
general departmental contracts, subjects of contracts, and
implementation of contract procedures. Particular attention
was paid to the City's Administrative Services Department
(including the Purchasing Division), Fire Department, and
Public Facilities Department in order that a representative
view might be obtained of the efficiency of contractual
procedures in the areas of construction, purchasing of goods
and delivery of services and the degree to which the City's
formal contract policies are complied with in actual
practice. The third phase of the investigation, therefore,
included a survey and analysis of individual contracts
throughout the City's various departments and the subsequent
compilation of relevant material, with particular attention
directed to contracts not competitively awarded following
public advertising. All Award Letters relating to FY 1984
no-bid contracts were reviewed individually.
As mentioned above, during the third phase the in-
dividual contracts of the Administrative Services, Fire, and
Public Facilities Departments received detailed analysis.
More specifically, the review of individual contracts
included an examination of every contract on file with the
City Auditor for each of these three departments which was
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executed by the appropriate department official and filed
with the Auditor on or after July 1, 1983. The following
information was recorded for each of these contracts: a) the
business name of the contractor; b) the address of the
contractor; c) the name of the person signing the contract on
behalf of the contractor; d) the vendor number and contract
number; e) the type of contract ( e.g . , fixed price, time and
material, or hourly rate) and a brief description of the
subject matter of the contract; f) whether the contract was
formally advertised; g) if advertised, the number of bidders
and whether the low bidder was chosen; h) if not advertised,
the reason given for not formally advertising the contract;
i) the date and nature of any change order or amendment, as
well as the reason given for the change order or amendment;
j) the date the Award Letter was signed by the Mayor; and k)
the date(s) the contract was signed by the contractor and by
the authorized City official as well as the term or time
period of the contract.
Detailed profiles of the contracts examined for
those three departments are attached as Appendices 3, 4 and 5
to this Chapter. Without reciting in full all contracting
information, the following presents some of the more relevant
information culled from this investigation:
Administrative Services
The examination of contracts for the Administrative
Services Department was concluded on December 22, 1983. As
of that date, a total of 30 such contracts had been examined,
having an aggregate value of $475,836. The services to be
provided under these contracts include plumbing repairs,
electrical work, printing, computer programming, career
development, legal assistance, City- facility maintenance,
program development and policy research on City government.
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There were 13 contracts which had been awarded
without public advertising, having an aggregate value of
$369,836. The remaining 17 contracts were repetitive services
contracts, having an aggregate value of $106,000. None of
the contracts examined for this Department had been awarded
after public advertising. Additional statistical information
regarding the contracts examined for this Department is
presented in Appendix 3 to this Chapter.
Fire Department
The examination of contracts for the Fire
Department was concluded on December 29, 1983. As of that
date, a total of 70 such contracts had been examined, having
a total value of $633,283. The services to be provided under
these contracts include repairs of vehicles, electrical
equipment, and plumbing and heating systems, building and
grounds maintenance, laundry service, uniform supplies,
consulting services relating to the Augmented Fire Service
Availability Project, property inspection, psychological
screening and legal assistance.
There were three contracts which had been awarded
after public advertising, having am : aggregate value of
$60,973. There were 14 contracts which had been awarded
without public advertising, having an aggregate value of
$153,510. The remaining 53 contracts were repetitive
services contracts, having an aggregate value of $418,800.
Additional statistical information regarding the contracts
examined for this Department is presented in Appendix 4 to
this Chapter.
Public Facilities Department
The examination of contracts for the Public
Facilities Department was concluded on December 23, 1983. As
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of that date, a total of 136 such contracts had been
examined, having a total value of $5,695,142. The work to be
provided under these contracts includes construction,
heating, architectural, engineering, testing and inspection
services
.
There were 28 contracts which had been awarded
after public advertising, having an aggregate value of
$4,012,813. There were 28 contracts which had been awarded
without public advertising, having an aggregate value of
$1,184,329. The remaining 80 contracts were repetitive
services contracts, having an aggregate value of $498,000.
Additional statistical information regarding the contracts
which were examined for this Department is presented in
Appendix 5 to this Chapter.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRACTING PROCESS IN THE CITY OF BOSTON
A basic understanding of the various types of
contracts and the existing contract processes in the City of
Boston is essential to a reasoned analysis of existing
contract systems and procedures. The following is a brief
overview of contract types, applicable rules and existing
contract processes.
Types of Contracts
The contractual undertakings of the City of Boston
may be categorized, generally, either as advertised or
unadvert ised . Advertised contracts are those contracts that
are awarded after compliance with the formal public
advertising requirements outlined below. Unadvertised
contracts, on the other hand, are those contracts that are
awarded without formal advertising.
Although unadvertised contracts often are referred
to as "no-bid" contracts, they nevertheless may be subject to
various procedures designed to foster competition through
less formal "bids" than those obtained through public
advertising. Thus, depending upon the dollar amount of the
contract, the availability of competitive sources and/or the
dictates of time, "unadvertised" contracts may be awarded on
any of the following bases: (1) without public advertising
or solicitation of oral price quotes or written quotations;
(2) without public advertising, but after solicitation of
oral price quotes; or (3) without public advertising, but
after solicitation of written quotations.
Another category of contract, which may be either
advertised or unadvertised, is known as a "repetitive
services" or "requirements" contract. These are contracts
for work (such as vehicle repairs, building and equipment
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maintenance, snow removal and advertising) that may be needed
from time to time, but the scope of which cannot be precisely
determined in advance. These types of contracts may be
awarded in either of the following methods depending upon the
particular department's needs: (1) to a single qualified
contractor to perform all necessary work for the term of the
contract on an "as required" basis; or (2) as a "multi-vendor
contract" to a number of qualified contractors who express an
interest in performing work as may be required throughout the
fiscal year.
Laws Applicable to the City's Contracting Procedures
The contracting procedures of the City are governed
by numerous special legislative acts that have been
incorporated into the City of Boston Code (the "CBC") and
statutes of broader application which are contained in the
Massachusetts General Laws.
City officials are generally forbidden to make
expenditures or "involve" the City in contracts requiring
future expenditures in excess of sums duly appropriated,
except in emergencies and in limited circumstances at the
beginning of a new fiscal year. More particularly, in the
period after the end of the fiscal year and before regular
appropriations have been made, City officials authorized to
make expenditures may do so out of existing City funds,
charging such expenditures against the next appropriation,
but within specified limitations. In addition, contracts for
services or supplies recurrently needed may, within specified
limitations, be made in advance for up to the first three
months of the next fiscal year.
The general form of many City contracts is also
prescribed by the CBC. Contracts for two thousand dollars or
more require written approval by the Mayor and certification
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by the City Auditor, on the contract instrument itself, that
an appropriation is available for the contract or that a
cited statute permits execution without appropriation.
Special statutory requirements exist for contracts
covering the design, construction, alteration, repair or
demolition of public buildings or public works. CBC
provisions regarding these categories of contracts have been
supplemented or superseded in some respects by various
provisions of the Massachusetts General Laws.
The Contract Manual
A. Procedures for Contractor Selection and Contract Award
In November, 1979 the City's Corporation Counsel
issued a "Manual of Forms and Procedure for the Preparation
and Processing of Routine Contracts," generally referred to
as the Contract Manual. By what appears to be a
contemporaneous Executive Order, the Mayor made use of the
Contract Manual mandatory.
The Contract Manual constituted the first major
attempt to standardize and simplify the manner in which the
City enters into contractual relationships for at least the
more routine types of contracts, but it did not purport to
govern all City contracts. By its own terms it does not
apply to contracts covering design, construction, alteration,
repair or demolition of public buildings or public works,
which are governed by their own statutory provisions. In
addition, it does not apply to "any other contracts which, by
their nature, as determined by the Offical and/or the
Corporation Counsel, cannot be adequately documented by the
use of the standard forms and conditions in this manual."
Such contracts will continue to be awarded and processed in
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accordance with applicable statutes and procedures, including
approval in each instance by the Corporation Counsel.
Despite these exclusions, the Contract Manual
represents a useful compilation of City contract policy, as
well as a relatively comprehensive guide to the City's
contracting procedures. Without attempting to detail all of
the information contained in the Contract Manual's 68 pages
of text or to describe in general its additional 61 pages of
forms, certain of the information contained in the Manual is
of special note, both in understanding the City's contract
policies and procedures and in evaluating their actual
implementation.
The Contract Manual first focuses in some detail on
the circumstances in which formal written contracts are
required by the City Charter. Such contracts must be
obtained for all purchases of goods and services which equal
or exceed $2,000 in value and must be approved by the Mayor.
In order to avoid an obvious means of circumventing this
requirement for formal written contracts, the Contract Manual
also explains at length that this requirement includes
situations where costs of goods or services (and similar work
or goods which properly should be included in the same
contract) that may be purchased from time to time over the
course of a fiscal year are expected or may be estimated to
equal or exceed $2,000 during that fiscal year.
The Contract Manual also places great emphasis on
the significance of final contract approval and award. The
Manual states that an Award Letter signed by the Mayor is an
essential prerequisite to the execution of a valid contract
on behalf of the City. The Manual explains that, because of
the importance of Award Letters in the contract process, they
must be carefully drafted to describe the nature and purpose
of the contract, its basic terms and conditions and the basis
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for the award. The Manual then goes on to describe more
specifically the contents of the Award Letter for contracts
awarded pursuant to public advertising.
For contracts awarded without public advertising,
the Award Letter must also adequately justify dispensation by
the Mayor from the advertising requirement. The Manual also
reminds City officials that, by statute, no authority to
dispense with advertising can be given by the Mayor unless
the requesting department or official furnishes him with a
signed statement giving in detail the reasons for not using
the advertising process. The same statute also requires Law
Department approval before the Mayor can authorize a City
department or official to dispense with advertising. This
emphasis on the presumption in favor of public advertising
absent a dispensation based on clear justification is
highlighted by the Manual's admonition: "Always advertise
unless the Official [usually the head of the originating or
procuring department] has determined, and has supported that
determination with clear and persuasive reasons, that
publicly advertising a contract is inappropriate or would
serve no useful public purpose."
The Manual goes on to indicate that some of the
factors to be considered in deciding whether advertising
should be dispensed with are whether (1) the service or
product is unique, (2) the services are personal or
professional in nature, (3) the services are available only
from a particular source, (4) specifications for competitive
bids are not feasible or practical to prepare, or (5) an
economic advantage would inure to the City by using a
particular product or service. The Manual also gives three
illustrative examples of "reasons" which are not adequate
bases for making an award without advertising. These reasons
are (1) the fact that the City has used this service or
product in the past with satisfactory results; (2) the fact
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that this contract was advertised in the past and there were
no bidders or only a sole bidder to whom the contract was
awarded; and (3) a general belief that there are no other
qualified bidders.
In the case of repetitive services contracts
awarded to multiple vendors, the Manual emphasizes that if
the past experience of a department indicates that it will
expend $2,000 or more during the course of the year for a
particular kind of service such as building maintenance,
auto body repairs, electrical repair work, or micro- filming
then public advertising is necessary. The Manual also
provides that each instance of work covered by a repetitive
services contract must be less than $2,000 in cost;
otherwise, an Award Letter signed by the Mayor will be
required. With regard to actual performance of services
under multi-vendor contracts, departments are instructed to
obtain, for each job as it arises, at least three bids from
approved contractors holding such contracts and to award the
job to the lowest bidder. In emergencies, departments are
permitted by the Manual to accept the offer specifying the
earliest completion date of the work, rather than the lowest
price
.
Some repetitive services contracts are awarded to a
single vendor, after public advertising, on the basis of the
lowest unit price bid- - e . g. , rate per hour, rate per page,
etc. However, most repetitive services contracts are of the
multi-vendor kind. Even when they are publicly advertised,
all qualified candidates who apply are normally awarded such
a contract. However, it is not the award of a multi-vendor
contract, but rather the issuance of a Service Order by the
contracting City department, that creates an obligation to
perform work and a right to get paid. Thus, a firm may hold
a multi-vendor, repetitive services contract in a given year
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and yet actually perform no work and receive no payment from
the City.
Contracts, whether advertised or not, for the purchase
of materials, goods or supplies of any kind (including
printing and binding), and for the lease or rental of
equipment, are required by the Contract Manual to be
processed through the Purchasing Agent. In the case of
leases of real property, the Manual refers the interested
department to the Public Facilities Department for
information and assistance.
The necessity for strict compliance with
requirements for formal written contracts and the need for
formal contract award as a prerequisite to the validity of a
City contract are given special emphasis in the Manual.
Indeed, the Manual cites, and quotes at length from,
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of The Commonwealth
of Massachusetts holding that contractors are not entitled to
any compensation for services rendered or goods supplied
prior to, or in the absence of, a valid formal contract
award. That emphasis is particularly noteworthy in light of
the relatively routine practice, described below, whereby
contractors are regularly performing, and in some cases
completing, contracts prior to formal contract award, and in
some cases prior even to formal contract initiation.
B
.
Procedures for Contract Processing
The contract processing function is described in
considerable detail in the Contract Manual and can be broken
down into two major segments -- (1) the award letter stage
and (2) the contract review and execution stage.
VIII - 20
1. The Award Letter Stage
a. Advertised Contracts
Where the low bidder is to receive a publicly
advertised contract, the Award Letter is prepared by the
originating department, submitted to the Budget Division for
review and then to the Mayor for his approval. If approved,
the Award Letter is signed by the Mayor and returned to the
originating department.
b . Unadvertised Contracts
In the case of unadvertised contracts, the Award
Letter goes through the above-mentioned process, but with
three additional steps which are presumably intended to
achieve greater scrutiny and control. These are as follows:
1. The originating department must prepare a
letter to the Mayor requesting his permission to dispense
with advertising and setting forth its reasons for so doing.
2. The Award Letter must, as a matter of law, be
approved by the Law Department. However, the statute does
not set forth any criteria to be applied by the Law
Department in granting or withholding its approval.
3. After approval by the Law Department and
transmission to the Mayor's office, the Mayor's office then
sends a copy of the Award Letter to the Finance Commission
for an advisory recommendation.
c
. Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts
Multi-vendor, repetitive services contracts may or
may not be publicly advertised, depending on the particular
circumstances, but they are not in any event "competitive" in
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the accepted sense of that term since, as a general rule, a
contract is in fact "awarded" to every qualified firm which
"applies" for one within the time specified. However, award
of such a contract does not necessarily assure the recipient
that he will in fact perform any services for the City during
the contract period, since the City has no legal obligation
to order services from the holder of such a contract. The
significant event is the issuance of a specific Service Order
to the holder of such a contract. That is what authorizes
him to perform work and entitles him to get paid.
d . Purchase Contracts
As noted above, purchase contracts, whether
publicly advertised or not, are handled through the
Purchasing Division, with the originating department
preparing a purchase requisition describing the item and
including any necessary contract requirements and
specifications. After funding approval has been granted by
the Budget Division, the subsequent handling is determined by
the estimated value of the transaction. If the value is $500
or less, the Purchasing Division buyer gets telephone
quotations from three or more responsible suppliers and makes
the award to the lowest bidder meeting the specifications.
If the value is more than $500 but less than $2000, the buyer
follows the same procedure outlined above, except that the
quotations must be in writing. If the value is $2000 or
more, then the Purchasing Division prepares a public
advertisement and proceeds through the advertising process.
After the necessary steps have been taken and a contract has
been signed, a separate Purchase Order is prepared and sent
to the vendor.
e
.
Contract Processing Flow Chart
The charts attached to this Chapter as Appendices
6, 7, 8, and 9 show the process flow, through both the Award
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Letter and the contract review and execution stages, of
advertised contracts; unadvertised contracts; multi-vendor,
repetitive services contracts; and purchase contracts. As an
indication of the amount of time which the process is
expected to take, the Contract Manual recommends that
contracts be initiated at least 90 days in advance of the
date performance under the contract is to begin.
2 . The Contract Review and Execution Stage
After an approved Award Letter is received from the
Mayor by the originating department, the procedure for the
review and execution of the contract itself is substantially
the same for advertised and unadvertised contracts. The
originating department prepares a standard contract form,
together with any pertinent attachments, and sends them to
the contractor for execution, along with a cover letter
advising the contractor of any additional documents required.
After return of the signed contract from the contractor, the
originating department reviews all documents for completeness
and accuracy, inserts pertinent information such as
appropriation data, and forwards the documents to the City
Auditor's office. The City Auditor certifies the
availability of funds, encumbers the necessary funds and
forwards the contract documents to the Law Department for
review as to form. Upon completion of its review, the Law
Department returns the contract documents to the originating
department for signature and appropriate distribution.
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FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For clarity, the Findings, Analysis and
Recommendations will be divided into the five sequential
stages through which a contracting transaction between the
City and a private contractor passes. These phases are:
A. Needs assessment, planning, budgeting, and
description of contract scope and technical
requirements
;
B. Contractor selection and award process;
C. Contract management and oversight after award;
D. Payment by the City; and
E. Resolution of contract issues between the City
and the contractor.
A. Needs Assessment, Planning, Budgeting and Description
of Contract Scope and Technical Requirements
Unless a proper job of needs assessment and
planning is done, the City may end up with goods or services
which are unnecessary or which do not adequately meet its
true needs, regardless of how efficiently it may have managed
the procurement of those goods or services. Similarly,
unless realistic and intelligent budgeting is done in
advance, the City will never know at the outset what a given
project can reasonably be expected to cost. Thus the City
will be deprived of the ability to make meaningful choices
among different projects competing for the same funds.
The description of the scope of a contract and of
its technical requirements also deserves careful attention by
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contracting authorities at the outset of the contracting
process. In the case of a purchase of standard commercial
supplies, this step is the relatively simple one of
describing the item and identifying the number of units to be
purchased. But even a simple transaction of this kind
reflects, or should reflect, management decisions on a number
of pertinent questions. For example, should the item in
question be centrally purchased and kept in stock for all
departments? If so, what inventory levels should be main-
tained at the central issuing point? What are the most
economical quantities in which to order such an item?
In the case of the purchase of services, a careful
description of the scope and type of services required is an
essential factor in the process leading to the selection of
the contractor and also in drafting the contract. Pertinent
questions include: are the services truly needed; can they
be performed by regular City employees or should a person be
hired as a City employee to perform the services; can an
outside contractor prepare only an initial study or work plan
and then have the work plan implemented by City employees;
can City employees be trained by the outside contractor to
perform the services; and can City employees work under the
direction of the outside contractor?
Where the subject matter of the contract is highly
complex, as in a construction project, the description of the
scope and technical requirements of the job becomes a
critical factor in selecting the design consultant. In such
a situation, the issuance of clear, internally consistent
technical requirements, which set out the City's real needs
and require them to be met in the most economical manner,
without unnecessary frills, can play a major role in the
efficient financial management of the City's contracting
activities
.
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At the stage of selecting the contractor for the
construction phase, the specifications and drawings and
description of a contract's scope and technical requirements
are obviously critical; these factors dictate the minimum
cost of a project. Although the quality of a contracting
authority's work at this stage can have a major effect on
whether the City spends or saves millions of dollars, the
process for review and decision-making at this point appears
under existing practice at the Public Facilities Department
to be an informal one.
In complex projects there is some interaction
between the City department with responsibility for the
project and the architect-engineer who initially develops the
proposed specifications and drawings. However, in large,
complex projects, including virtually all major construction
work, a formal process of review of the plans, specifications
and technical requirements should be established before the
contract is let out to bid. This process should include
senior representatives of the architect-engineer, the
responsible City department and the ultimate user and should
be designed to assure that the technical requirements are
clear and consistent, that they will meet the real needs of
the ultimate user, and that the project can be accomplished
within the established budgetary limitations.
B
.
Contractor Selection and Award Process
The stage at which the contractor is selected, the
price is established and the terms and conditions of the
contract are set is crucial to a successful end result. The
decision of which private contractor or vendor wins the
contract is obviously critical to the contractor and the
City: critical to the prospective contractor, since any
chance of profiting from City work depends on that decision,
and to the City since it offers an opportunity to reward
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those prospective contractors upon whom it looks favorably,
whether purely for the quality or cost of their work or for
other proper or improper reasons.
The selection of the contractor is the stage of the
contracting process most susceptible to abuse. For motives
probably both good and ill, this potential has been realized
in practice. Even when contracts are advertised, the low bid
is sometimes passed over in favor of a higher one for reasons
that are unpersuasive . At times, all bids are thrown out and
the contract is awarded without competition because of a
technical deficiency in the low bid. Unadvertised
contracting, contemplated by law as exceptional, has instead
become the norm. With alarming frequency, departments resort
to multi-vendor contracting, which in practice enables them
to evade the requirements of truly competitive bidding while
presenting the facade of a fair process. Unduly cumbersome
procedures and official foot-dragging result in delays in
contract approval that are so long that work is often done
before the contract is authorized. For these and other
reasons, many potential contractors are unable or unwilling
to do business with the City. Instead of the robust, open
competition for municipal contracts that should exist, too
often there is a sedate allocation of awards to a small
number of repeat players.
A review of the Department of Public Facilities'
awards of construction contracts is illustrative of
circumstances which may contribute to a public perception
that the system is closed, and highlights current practices
that are susceptible of abuse. As an overall matter, a
relatively small number of contractors bid on and received
Public Facilities construction contracts and a majority of
the work that was awarded went to three vendors. More
particularly, based upon a review of executed contracts on
file with the City Auditor's officer as of December 23, 1983,
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a certain construction company was engaged in FY 1984
construction projects aggregating $2,301,588, which repre-
sents 40% of the amount committed by Public Facilities to all
such executed contracts in FY 1984 and 65% of such Public
Facilities executed construction contracts in FY 1984. The
company was also involved in projects initiated prior to FY
1984, but still ongoing. Its share of all ongoing Public
Facilities contracts amounts is about 19%. The company is
thus clearly the dominant construction contractor for the
Public Facilities Department.
According to published business reports, the
company was founded in 1980 by a 26-year-old engineer
employed by a construction company that was one of the
leading construction companies contracting with the Public
Facilities Department. The founder of the new company
apparently is the son of the owner of the other company. The
new company has experienced considerable success, with
revenues increasing from approximately $275,000 for its
fiscal year ending March 31, 1981 to $2,400,000 for the
fiscal year ending March 31, 1983. This new company also
reported a 100% revenue increase and a 700% profit increase
from FY 1982 to FY 1983. Much of those revenues appear to be
derived from its contracts with Public Facilities. Indeed,
as noted above, in the first 6 months of the City's 1984
fiscal year, Public Facilities awarded the new company
contracts in excess of the new company's revenues for all of
FY 1983; moreover, this new company also is the low bidder on
at least $660,000 in additional FY 1984 contracts that have
not yet been formally approved. Finally, this new company,
in at least two cases, has been awarded contracts when lower
bids were found to be "technically deficient" in one case and
"unrealistically low" in the second. One low bidder appealed
its disqualification, but was unsuccessful.
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The old company run by the father apparently has
not bid against his son's company on any Public Facilities
contracts during this period and, thus, has received a
steadily decreasing number of Public Facilities contracts.
The father's company is, however, the construction contractor
on the largest ongoing Public Facilities contract, in an
amount in excess of $4 million.
Finally, the father's company and the son's company
have received a substantial portion of the change orders
granted in ongoing Public Facilities projects. In the
aggregate, they have been granted 4 out of the 7 change
orders that involve cost increases executed on ongoing Public
Facilities projects, representing more than 70% of the total
dollar value of all such change orders.
1. Competitive bidding could be undermined by existing
procedures for rejection of bids on advertised
contracts
.
The Contract Manual requires rejection of
"technically defective" bids received in response to public
advertising. Unfortunately, the Contract Manual does not
provide any guidance as to the meaning of the term. If this
term is interpreted to mean "fatally defective," as
distinguished from merely containing minor irregularities
which may be cured after bid opening, the Manual's direction
probably is correct. The Manual however, makes no attempt to
define "technically defective" bids and, thus, makes no
express distinction between fatal defects, such as
non-responsiveness, and less significant, even trivial
"defects". The Manual thus leaves a large void which is
susceptible to erroneous or even arbitrary disqualification
of competitive bids. It thus provides the originating
official with options that would foster the allowance of a
truly non-responsive bid to a favored vendor or the
disallowance of the low bid of a non- favored vendor for
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insignificant, or even trivial, bidding defects. Moreover,
the Manual goes on to say that if the bidder who submitted
the low but "technically defective bid is otherwise
responsible and qualified, the contract may be awarded to
that bidder if the originating official rejects all bids and
requests the Mayor's permission to award the contract without
advertising." The Manual in effect vests relatively
unfettered discretion in the originating official as to
whether a low, but "technically defective" bid will be
awarded as an unadvertised contract.
While this course of action seeks to obtain for the
City the benefit of the lowest price, it does not constitute
sound procurement policy. This unfettered discretion, and
the incentive for abuse it creates, must be eliminated.
Initially, fixed, definitive guidelines should be established
for determining whether a bid is fatally defective, which
should be clearly defined as "non-responsive" to the bid
request or otherwise flawed in some respect that cannot be
cured. Such fatally defective bids should be rejected and
the award should be made to the next lowest bidder, assuming
that his bid complies in all significant respects with the
requirements of the bid invitation. If the spread between
the defective low bid and the second low bid is considered
excessive, and if time permits, all bids should be rejected
and the procurement should be readvertised
.
Those bids which are technically, but not fatally,
defective under the new guidelines should not be
automatically rejected. Rather, the bidder should be given a
reasonable time to cure those technical defects. If, for
some reason, the bidder fails or refuses to cure the defect,
the procedure outlined above for fatal defects then may be
followed
.
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More generally, controls must be established to
implement these guidelines and to ensure that a contract is
never awarded to anyone but the low bidder unless the award
has been closely scrutinized and found justified. The
contracting authority should bear the burden of proving to
the City Auditor, Law Department and Mayor's office that
compelling reasons require that the low bidder be bypassed.
For construction contracts, the system of prequalification of
bidders mandated by state law provides a vital review of the
qualifications of bidders before they are permitted to bid,
and serves to assure that all bidders authorized to bid are
qualified for the particular project. Those prequalification
guidelines could be very helpful in determining whether any
request to bypass a low bidder is justified.
2. A great number of the City's contracts are unadvertised
and are frequently awarded improperly or with perfunc-
tory justification, in many cases after work already
has been started and, in some cases, completed.
As outlined in the Contract Manual, the City of
Boston's contract process is designed with the presumption
that, absent compelling circumstances, all contracts should
be awarded on the basis of competitive bids submitted after
public advertising. It recognizes, however, that there are
unique circumstances in which the needs of the City and its
residents require that goods and services be purchased
without competitive bidding. This limited exception has
provided the means by which the purposes to be served by
competitive bidding are, at best, ignored and, at worst,
deliberately defeated.
A review of unadvertised contracts by City
departments over the past several years reveals dramatic
increases in the level of contracts awarded by the City
without benefit of public bidding. By way of example, 1043
Award Letters for unadvertised contracts were processed in FY
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1981. In FY 1983, 1979 such Award Letters were processed.
The escalation of unadvertised contracts by the City
continued during the first six months of FY 1984. During
that six-month period, 1044 such Award Letters were
processed, thus exceeding the number of such unadvertised
contracts in the 12 month period of FY 1981.
Even more startling than the number of unadvertised
contracts are the dollar amounts expended by the City for
goods and services without competitive bidding. In the first
6 months of FY 1984, unadvertised contracts accounted for
almost $37.7 million in contractual spending -- 53% of the
dollar value of contracts funded by the City. Contracts
awarded through public advertising, on the other hand,
accounted for only $24.7 million. Thus, only 35% of the
City's expenditures for contractual goods and services were
pursuant to public advertising and bidding.
A detailed review of contracts in the City's
Department of Administrative Services also confirmed
relatively large volumes of unadvertised contracts.
Forty-three percent (13 of 30) of the Administrative Services
contracts reviewed were awarded without public advertising.
Those no-bid contracts accounted for 77% (approximately
$370,000 of $476,000) of the total dollar value of
Administrative Services' FY 1984 contracts.
By statute, and under the terms of the City's
Contract Manual, detailed reasons for not using public
advertising are required. Those reasons must be such as to
justify the conclusion that "advertising is inappropriate or
would serve no useful purpose or for any reason a contract is
not to be awarded to the lowest bidder following adver-
tising." Moreover, the Award Letter must "adequately justify
dispenation by the Mayor from the advertising requirement."
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The justifications that are generally provided are,
at best, perfunctory. As a result, there is little or no
basis for determining whether an unadvertised contract is
appropriate. For example, a review of the unadvertised
contracts for the City's Department of Administrative
Services reveals a practice of providing conclusory
statements that "no useful purpose will be served by public
advertising," thus parroting the conclusion required by the
Contract Manual, but providing little or no factual
information which would justify such a conclusion. This
practice seems to be common in the numerous unadvertised
contracts of other City departments reviewed during the
investigation.
Indeed, unadvertised contracts appear to be
regularly approved for reasons that are clearly stated by the
Contract Manual as "not 'clear and convincing' reasons to
award without advertising". (Emphasis in original). For
example, one of the FY 1984 Administrative Services contracts
in the amount of $28,000 was awarded without advertising
based on satisfactory past performance, while another
contract in the amount of $30,000 was awarded on the apparent
general belief that there were no other qualified bidders.
Each of those reasons, in and of itself, is expressly invalid
under the Contract Manual.
The award of unadvertised contracts on bases
clearly deemed inadequate by the Contract Manual is
symptomatic both of the lack of controls in the existing
system for awarding unadvertised contracts and the failure to
adhere to those systemic controls that are in place. Under
the present contracting procedures, requests for awards of
unadvertised contracts are submitted to the Finance
Commission for its review. The Finance Commission's
recommendation, however, is advisory only; thus, its review
does not ensure any meaningful control. Moreover, even that
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limited role is frequently undercut. A significant number of
contracts reviewed in the course of this study appeared not
to have been submitted to the Finance Commission prior to
approval. One of those unadvertised contracts was in the
amount of $3 million.
A second means by which the Finance Commission's
role is undercut is untimely submission of unadvertised
contracts. In 31% of contracts reviewed, the contract period
had commenced prior to submission of the contract to the
Finance Commission. In late December, 1983, this problem was
even more severe -- the contract performance period had
already commenced in more than 85% of the contracts submitted
to the Finance Commission; in more than 30% of the contracts
submitted, the contract completion date already had passed.
Under existing practice, unadvertised contracts are
submitted to the Finance Commission at the same time that
they are delivered to the Mayor. Thus, another and more
important control, the approval authority of the Mayor as
compared with the advisory role of the Finance Commission,
also is effectively bypassed by untimely submission of
unadvertised contracts. Indeed, more than 50% of the
unadvertised contracts awarded in FY 1982 reached the Mayor
for approval after the contractor had started the work
covered by the contract.
While the City in theory has the right to reject an
unadvertised contract under which work has already started or
been completed, this right has rarely been invoked. Further,
contractors would be reluctant to deal with the City, or to
accommodate the City's needs for prompt performance, if there
were a possibility that technical deficiencies or delays in
processing the unadvertised contract might result in
non-payment by the City.
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It is true that contractors should not be penalized
for delays by the City in processing unadvertised contracts.
That is a problem that should be solved and eliminated by the
City itself. There is a possibility, however, that the level
of untimely processing of unadvertised contracts is not
solely attributable to delays in processing. In the course
of preparing this Chapter, a significant number of
unadvertised contracts were found which had not been
submitted until after the work had apparently commenced and,
in some cases, after the work had already been completed.
The possibility exists, therefore, that untimely submission
of unadvertised contracts is a deliberate attempt to avoid
the possibility that the contract might be deemed to require
competitive bidding and to ensure that the contract is given
to the vendor chosen by the originating department.
Both the timeliness of submission and delays in
processing of unadvertised contracts must be closely
monitored. To the extent that delays in processing are
systemic, changes to the routing and approval systems should
be considered. Insofar as delays in processing are
determined to result from individuals within the system,
however, those delays can be eliminated, or at least
minimized, by close monitoring. This monitoring can be done
through the internal audit procedure recommended later in
this Chapter.
Strict monitoring should also identify contracts
which are not submitted promptly and City departments that
routinely fail to submit unadvertised contracts until after
the work has commenced. Appropriate action then can be taken
to ensure that departments promptly submit such unadvertised
contracts. In the event it is determined that certain
contractors routinely and knowingly are involved in
commencing work prior to contract approval, the City should
consider denying payment to those contractors. The City's
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refusal to pay, if limited only to those contractors who
routinely and knowingly engage in those practices, should not
harm the City's relations with the many valued contractors
who may from time to time inadvertently perform work prior to
approval, but in a legitimate attempt to accommodate the
City's need for prompt services.
The majority of unadvertised contracts are for
personal services. The City's Contract Manual provides:
"although what constitutes 'clear and convincing' reasons
will depend upon the nature of the particular contract, some
factors to consider are whether . . . (2) the services are
personal or professional in nature." The Contract Manual
does not attempt, however, to define "professional services"
or "personal services," or the distinction between them, nor
does it indicate the effect or weight to be attached to those
characterizations in determining whether an unadvertised
contract is warranted.
Although "personal services" or "professional
services" are specifically designated by the Manual as only
one factor to consider in determining not to advertise a
contract, those designations alone routinely form the basis
for awards of unadvertised contracts. That is especially
true of contracts for "professional services," which appear
almost always to be awarded as unadvertised contracts. By
way of example, 8 of the 13 FY 1984 unadvertised contracts
awarded by Administrative Services were awarded for the sole
reason that they involved professional services.
Undoubtedly, there are certain types of contracts
and unique services that from time to time justify a contract
award without public advertising. The use of unadvertised
contracts must, however, be kept to a minimum, and limited to
those circumstances where the needs of the City or its
residents, or the nature of the services to be provided,
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warrant foregoing the benefits of price competition to be
achieved by public advertising.
At the outset, more detailed and specific policies
and guidelines must be developed regarding the circumstances
that justify an unadvertised contract. The examples set
forth in the guidelines as "factors" to be considered provide
little guidance concerning the City's policies and criteria
that determine the appropriateness of an unadvertised
contract, and virtually no guidance as to the weight to be
assigned to the various policies and criteria. More detailed
criteria not only will ensure a more uniform policy regarding
unadvertised contracts in the various departments throughout
the City, but also will provide the basis for stricter and
better informed monitoring of the award of those contracts.
The reasons advanced for award of unadvertised
contracts also must be subjected to close scrutiny to ensure
that there are valid reasons not to require public
advertising. The current practice of allowing conclusory
justifications for failure to advertise must be eliminated
forthwith, and the existing statutory and Contract Manual
requirements of detailed factual reasons must be strictly
enforced
.
Even in those circumstances where an unadvertised
contract is appropriate, there is no reason to dispense
entirely with all systemic controls. Relatively few letters
requesting a waiver of formal advertising indicate that the
requesting department obtained price quotations from any
other vendor. Likewise, few letters give any indication
whatsoever of any efforts to locate a competing supplier.
The awarding department should be required to detail its
efforts to locate competing sources and to solicit, and
submit with its request for a waiver of advertising, at least
three written quotations from other sources. The awarding
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department also should be required to detail the basis upon
which any competing vendor or price quotation was rejected.
The fact that a contract is for "personal services"
should not, in and of itself, justify failure to advertise.
Rather, such contracts should be subjected to the same
requirements of detailed justification and strict scrutiny as
other unadvertised contracts presumably will receive. In
many cases, personal services contracts may ultimately be
determined not to require public advertising, but that
determination should be made on the basis of all relevant
factors, including other available competitors, their
qualifications and the uniqueness of the services that are
the subject of the contract.
The result of awarding professional service
contracts without a structured competitive process is that
there can be no assurance that the City in fact is getting
the best combination of qualifications, background and
expertise, capability to accomplish the particular project at
hand, and ability to deliver the highest quality performance
within the required time period at the lowest reasonable
cost. Moreover, without a structured selection process, the
City department is not compelled to develop a precisely
focused needs assessment and description of the services it
requires. Finally, the absence of a structured review within
the department, an orderly and competitive selection process,
a documented record open to the public of that process and an
independent internal review of the selection not only invites
a lack of care and discipline in the process, but also causes
uncertainty in the public mind as to the integrity of the
process
.
In fact, the award of contracts for professional
services does lend itself to an orderly, structured,
competitive process even though it may not lend itself to the
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publicly advertised, price- competitive bid process set forth
in existing statutes. The problem, however, is that no such
orderly, structured, competitive process has been established
by executive action. It exists now only where the
establishment of such a process has been required by law, as
in the case of award of design contracts in connection with
major construction projects.
It is recommended that the Mayor direct the City
Law Department (or the Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer) to
develop formal guidelines establishing a structured, open and
competitive process for the award by any City department of a
professional services contract. The Mayor should then
promulgate such guidelines by Executive Order to apply to all
City departments. As a general practice, with the exception
of cases involving unique qualifications, professional
services contracts should not be approved by the Mayor unless
the selection has been made in accordance with such
guidelines
.
The guidelines may include, but not be limited to,
the following:
1. The department should prepare a detailed
statement of the reasons for the need for the services
contemplated, a description of the services contemplated and
an analysis of why the services cannot be performed by
regular City employees.
2. The department should prepare a detailed
Request for Proposal (RFP) setting forth the scope of work,
qualifications sought, selection criteria and any other
pertinent provisions.
3. The department should identify for each such
RFP appropriate trade, professional, and general circulation
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publications in which notice of the RFP would be appropriate
in order to obtain more widespread responses and, as
appropriate, cause notices to be published in such
publications. The department should also identify and notify
persons, firms or other organizations which should receive
notice of the RFP. Notice of the RFP should be published in
the City Record and in the Central Register published by the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, and in any other publications
deemed appropriate. The department should also take any
other steps to encourage maximum response from potential
contractors
.
4. The department should establish a review
committee to receive and evaluate proposals in response to
the RFP.
5. The department should make its selections in
accordance with the selection criteria set forth in the RFP
and state in writing the basis for its selection, which
statement should be a public record.
6. The guidelines should further provide,
pursuant to existing law, that professional services
contracts be reviewed and approved by the Law Department.
7. The guidelines should include provisions
regarding professional services contracts which involve
former officers or employees of the City.
8. The guidelines should require that each
department file quarterly reports with the Law Department (or
Mayor's Contracts Policy officer, or an office designated by
the Mayor) listing all professional services contractors
performing services for the department, the nature of such
services, the compensation paid to such contractors and such
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other information as the Law Department (or other designated
office) may require. Such reports should be public reports.
This proposal is based on a recently enacted New
York State law requiring public agencies in New York State to
adopt guidelines for awarding professional services contracts.
The law, Section 2879, Contracts for Personal Services of the
Public Authorities Law, which was signed by Governor Mario
Cuomo on August 3, 1983, regulates "the use, awarding,
monitoring and reporting of personal services contracts."
Personal services contracts are defined to include legal,
accounting, management consulting, investment banking,
statistical, research, public relations, design, or other
personal services of a consulting, professional or technical
nature
.
3. Under existing practices, a select group of vendors may
be awarded a disproportionate amount of work under
multi-vendor contracts.
As previously noted, a department that determines
that it will need services performed over the course of a
fiscal year may advertise for submission of applications to
provide these services. The department may then enter into a
multi-vendor, repetitive services contract with each
"responsible and qualified" vendor who submits an
application. However, the mere execution of a contract does
not guarantee the vendor that he will receive any work under
the contract. Before one of the vendors is actually selected
to perform the specified work, the department official is
required by the Contract Manual to solicit bids from at least
three vendors and to award the contract to the lowest bidder
or, in the case of an emergency, to the vendor who can
provide service in a timely manner. However, multi-vendor
contracting practices are, in fact, largely unregulated and
vary from department to department. Further, there are no
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system-wide guidelines for monitoring these contracting
practices
.
A total of 80 multi-vendor contracts for the Public
Facilities Department were examined in the course of this
study, having an aggregate value (based on the amounts
certified by the City Auditor as being available for payment
under the contract) of $498,000. According to the Public
Facilities Department, a contract was entered into with every
"qualified" applicant, as determined by the project manager.
The project manager is also responsible for selecting the
contractor that will actually perform the work. Although the
project manager is required to solicit bids for each job from
at least three of the vendors who have signed such a
multi-vendor contract, the selection of these three vendors
is left to the project manager's discretion. While a large
number of vendors under these repetitive services contracts
reportedly have received work during FY 1984, there are no
system-wide controls to prevent the project manager from
repeatedly contracting with the same vendors, to the
exclusion of other, less favored vendors. In addition, the
Contract Manual does not prescribe any monitoring system to
ensure that the requisite number of bids have been solicited
and, except in emergencies, the lowest bid accepted.
The Fire Department also makes substantial use of
repetitive services contracts. A total of 53 repetitive
services contracts for that department were examined, having
an aggregate dollar value (based on the amounts certified by
the City Auditor as being available for payment under the
contract) of $418,800. It was discovered that the Fire
Department's procedures for repetitive services contracting
differed from those for the Public Facilities Department in
several respects.
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In order to understand one of these differences, a
few aspects of the standard form of contract must be
explained. Each such contract contains a face amount and an
amount, specified by the department, which is approved by the
City Auditor as being available out of the department's
appropriation. If the certified amount is less than the face
amount of the contract (as it is for multi-vendor, repetitive
services contracts), the certified amount may be increased or
decreased at any time by delivery to the contractor of a
written notice which is signed by a department official and
approved by the City Auditor. Therefore, the certified
amount may have no relationship to the amount ultimately paid
to the vendor over a fiscal year.
The face amount of each repetitive services
contract entered into by the Public Facilities Department for
a particular service equalled the total amount which the
Department expected to spend on the service; however,; the
amount initially specified in the contract for certification
by the City Auditor often varied. By contrast, not only the
certified amount but also the face amount of repetitive
services contracts entered into by the Fire Department tended
to vary even though the contracts ostensibly involved the
same services. This variation in the face amounts of the
contracts may be significant to the extent that they are
intended to impose a ceiling on the cniount to be awarded a
particular vendor, thus perhaps depriving him of the
opportunity of bidding on the type of service specified in
his contract.
Another difference was found in examining the Award
Letters for repetitive services contracts entered into by the
Public Facilities and Fire Departments. The Public
Facilities Department issued one Award Letter for each set of
multi-vendor, repetitive services contracts to be entered
into for a specified, advertised service. By contrast, the
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Fire Department issued one Award Letter for 36 repetitive
services contracts for a variety of services which had been
the subject of several different advertisements. This may be
indicative of the wide variety of services required by the
Fire Department. However, it was somewhat difficult to
determine by reading the Award Letter which vendors were, in
actual practice, to provide the same services. Also, this
Award Letter seemed to indicate that at least one of the
services was to be provided by a single vendor, even though
it proclaimed itself to be an Award Letter for multi-vendor,
repetitive services contracts.
The Fire Department indicated that, like the Public
Facilities Department, it entered into a contract with every
qualified applicant. Again, none of the contractors who
signed a repetitive services contract was guaranteed work.
Rather, the selection of the contractor to perform the work,
as well as the identification of those vendors who would be
asked to submit bids for the job, was left to the discretion
of a Fire Department official. However, the Fire Department
indicated that it had provided work to many of the vendors
with which it had contracted.
The study revealed that there were relatively few
vendors for many of the services to be performed under the
multi-vendor contracts which were examined. On the average,
there were fewer than five vendors for the multi-vendor
contracts which were reviewed for the Public Facilities
Department. Based upon an examination of a list maintained
by the Fire Department of vendors available to provide
services on a repetitive basis during fiscal year 1984, the
average number of such vendors for a specified service was
approximately 4. In three instances, only two vendors were
listed to provide a specified service to the Fire Department
and in two instances, only one vendor was so listed. There
may therefore be situations where the Fire Department does
VIII - 44
not obtain any bids for a particular service, but rather
awards the job, presumably, to the only vendor who filed an
application with the Fire Department to provide the service.
Unfortunately, this practice may not ensure the City that it
will necessarily obtain the lowest competitive price for the
particular service.
The information which was received regarding
multi-vendor contracts suggests that the practice is
susceptible to abuse. It is recommended that guidelines be
promulgated regarding the selection of contractors to provide
services under multi-vendor contracts. These guidelines
should include a requirement that, except in specified
circumstances, each contractor be given an opportunity to
submit a bid for the performance of work which must be per-
formed. These guidelines should also specify the criteria
for selecting a contractor if, for example, the bids
submitted by two or more contractors are identical.
Furthermore, some guidance should be given for the situation
in which less than three contractors have submitted
applications for a particular service. It is further
recommended that an effective, central system for monitoring
the actual operation of repetitive services contracting
procedures be established to ensure that these guidelines are
being followed.
4. Excessive delays in contract approval and in payment by
the City are routine. These delays not only may be
discouraging businesses, especially small businesses
and businesses owned by minorities and women, from doing
business with the City, but also may be costing the City
substantial sums which are in effect "finance charges"
for the anticipated delay in payment by the City.
The average time period between the dates of the
Award Letter for the contracts which we examined and the
dates on which the contracts were executed by the appropriate
department official was more than 75 days. We have been
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informed by an official of the Public Facilities Department
that, because of the long processing period for contracts and
the need to have the work performed, services have been
provided under contracts before the contracts have been
executed. This practice may be typical. For example, the
Fire Department sent to the Mayor two letters, dated
September 8, 1983 and September 9, 1983, requesting
permission to award repetitive services contracts to a total
of 51 listed vendors. However, the contracts with virtually
all of these vendors were not executed until the following
December even though the Fire Department probably had an
immediate need for the services covered by the contracts.
Not surprisingly, as many as 20 vendors under these contracts
may have commenced work before their contracts were executed
by the Fire Department. In addition, many, if not all, of
these 20 vendors may have submitted invoices for these
services prior to the contract's execution by the Fire
Department. Indeed, a vendor mentioned in one of these Award
Letters had submitted 15 separate invoices for payment, one
of which was dated as early as July 13, 1983, and yet no
executed contract for this vendor was on file with the City
Auditor as of December 29, 1983.
According to the Finance Commission, more than 50%
of the unadvertised contracts awarded in fiscal 1982 reached
the Mayor for approval after the contractor had started the
work covered by that contract. Such delays in processing
contracts, and the resulting practice of starting work before
the contract has been fully executed, can produce both
managerial and financial problems for the City.
No payment can be made under a contract until it is
fully executed and filed with the City Auditor. Some idea of
the complexity of the contract approval process can be
obtained from the flow charts attached as Appendices 6, 7, 8
and 9, which illustrate the cumbersomeness of executing an
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advertised, unadvertised , multi-vendor or purchase contract.
In view of the time required to process a contract and the
possible practice of performing work before the contract is
fully executed, there may be a significant gap between the
date on which the contractor performs the services and the
date on which he is paid for such services. This delay in
payment may deter small businesses (including many minority
businesses) from contracting with the City since they
generally have more acute cash flow requirements than larger
businesses. Indeed, even larger businesses may decide not to
seek contracts with the City if they are expected to provide
services before the contract is fully executed at the risk
that they will not be paid for such services if the contract
does not ultimately obtain all necessary signatures.
Finally, those businesses that are willing to perform
services for the City may be including in their contract
prices a financing charge to compensate them for such delays
in payment. In view of the large dollar volume of the City's
activities, such financing charges may be substantial.
The reasons for delays in contract processing
demand further investigation. Such delays must be minimized
if the City is to avoid implicit financing charges and
promote greater competition for municipal contracts. On the
basis of this investigation, several modifications to
streamline the contracting process appear to be called for,
some of which will probably require legislative approval.
These recommendations are:
(a) Review the appropriateness of the $2,000 floor
for formal written contracts and for publicly advertised
bids- -a figure which was originally adopted in the 1890' s.
Consideration should be given to whether such a change would
decrease opportunities for wider participation in City
contracting by small businesses and businesses owned by
minorities and women.
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(b) Consider whether the Mayor should delegate
authority to sign Award Letters, at least up to specified
dollar amounts, in the case of publicly advertised contracts.
(c) Review the organizational flow chart for Award
Letters and contracts and consider eliminating steps in the
process that are not essential to an orderly system or to
systemic controls.
(d) Require the Finance Commission to prepare a
quarterly report on unadvertised contracts awarded during the
preceding quarter, with particular emphasis on the existence
and application of criteria for selection, persuasiveness of
reasons given for dispensation from advertising and for
selection of contractor, and extent of management review of
unadvertised contracts within the City administration.
5. The existing contract system is unduly complex and
time-consuming and is in practice closed to many
prospective contractors, particularly small businesses
and those owned by minorities and women.
The City's contracting system, as practiced,
appears to cause the widespread belief among many potential
vendors and contractors that City contracting is effectively
off-limits to them. Among the most telling pieces of evidence
are the advertised contracts that draw just one bidder to
them. According to the Award Letters for 28 contracts
publicly advertised and put out for competitive bid by the
Public Facilities Department, an average of only 2.7 bids per
contract were received. Two of the three contracts advertised
and publicly bid by the Fire Department resulted only in one
eligible bid; the third, only three bids. Regrettably, the
cynicism that apparently underlies such nonparticipation
appears to be well-grounded in fact. The widespread use of
unadvertised, no-bid contracts saps the contracting system of
its credibility and, in the long run, makes abuse inevitable.
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One of the theoretical checks on the power of
unadvert ised contracts to corrode faith in the system is the
publication in the City Record of all Award Letters for
no-bid contracts. In theory, publication opens the process
to public scrutiny, ensuring that at least some blatant
abuses will be exposed and thereby creating the possibility
that others will be deterred. In fact, however, Award
Letters are published without a date, and sometimes not
published until up to two years after the contracts to which
they relate were executed. Public attention is thus not
focused on some unadvertised contracts until the work has
been done and paid for -- long after potential bidders and
the press have lost whatever interest they might have had.
Such delay enables contracting authorities to escape respon-
sibility for their actions, and thereby perpetuates the
unwarranted use of no-bid contracts, and the impression among
outsiders that there is no point in applying for City
contracts
.
Ironically, even multi-vendor contracts reinforce
the wall between insiders and outsiders in the world of City
contracting. The very contracts that are designed to spread
municipal work around among many contractors instead permit
contracting authorities to select those with whom they will
deal without any formal bidding process or written guidelines
or selection criteria. Multi-vendor contracts could conform
to the Biblical maxim, "Many are called but few are chosen,"
in that virtually any business can get its name on a
department's list of approved vendors, but thereafter the
department exercises nearly unlimited discretion in deciding
whom on the list to favor.
Even those businesses that are not frozen out of
contracting by lack of access to those City managers making
selections of contractors or discouraged from entering by the
experience of others on the "outside" often cannot afford to
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do business with Boston. The contractor selection and award
process is so complex and time-consuming that many who might
otherwise be interested do not apply. The very act of
learning enough about City contracting to become a plausible
competitor is so daunting to some that it becomes a
substantial entry barrier. Little or no effort appears to be
made to help educate small businesses and businesses owned by
minorities and women in the intricacies of public
contracting
.
Those who understand the system are not necessarily
in any better position to participate in it, for being a City
contractor also often requires the financial resources to
wait for payment until long after the work has been
completed. As stated above, a review of the Fire,
Administrative Services and Public Facilities Departments has
identified many instances in which contractors had been
required to start work on projects before the Award Letters
had been approved by the Mayor and before their contracts
with the City were executed. In such cases, the contractors
had no legal right to be paid at all if the contracts were
disapproved. Small businesses in particular are ill-equipped
to "carry" the City for so long a period or run the risk of
not being paid at all. Usually, only big firms have
sufficient cash- flow security to permit such an involuntary
extension of credit. The advantage of the large over the
small in this respect does not owe to legitimate economies of
scale, but to wholly unnecessary inefficiency in the City.
Moreover, this situation places the contractor at the mercy
of the City which decides when and indeed whether to pay at
all for work already performed. The situation creates
further potential for abuse by allowing City administrators
to exercise such unreviewed discretion over public
contractors
.
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The study that was conducted suggests that instead
of growth over recent years, there appears to be some atrophy
in municipal contracting with businesses owned by women and
minorities. Specific factors leading to this poor record
include in addition to those mentioned above:
1. Absence of an affirmative program to
include businesses owned by minorities or
women among the three prospective vendors
required to be contacted for written bids
by purchasing department for requisitions
under $2,000 and for oral bids for
contracts under $500.
2. Excessive reliance on disqualifying the
low bidder for inability to supply goods
to meet specific "time of the essence"
contracts negatively impacts on
businesses owned and operated by
minorities and women. Such businesses
tend to be small and relatively new and
unable to fill contracts with unrealistic
time constraints.
3. Delay by the City in paying vendors
impacts with greatest severity on small
businesses
.
4. Failure by the City to advertise
contracting opportunities in media
serving the minority community or to run
bilingual advertisements effectively
limits access to the system by
minorities
A compilation of numbers of minority businesses
from three sources -- the Boston Urban League, the
Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA) and the
Department of Commerce and Development discloses
substantially more than 10,000 minority businesses in Boston
and the surrounding area. Yet an analysis of purchase orders
conducted by the City Purchasing Division for the first
quarter of FY 1984 revealed that there were no minority
vendors on bid contracts with that division during that
period. Officials of the Purchasing Division have taken
positive steps to remedy this situation by:
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1. attending a Minority Assistance
Opportunity Conference;
2. contacting the NAACP and Urban League to
outline the Division's program;
3. meeting with the State Office of Minority
Business Assistance;
4. monthly contact with the New England
Minority Business Council;
5. publishing the City's proposed bids in
the State Office of Minority Business
Associations' weekly listing; and
6. researching various private companies'
resources of minority vendors.
These steps are important and should be continued by the Pur-
chasing Division and other departments or agencies
responsible for contracting.
The City Auditor has also begun a positive effort
to identify minority businesses already working with the
City. This effort however is presently incomplete. It will
require greater coordination, and leadership by responsible
department personnel, if the City Auditor's efforts to
identify such businesses are to be more successful.
Inclusion in the municipal contracting process of
small businesses owned and operated by women and minorities
should be a high-priority contracting policy of the City.
Senior staff should be given responsibility and resources to
implement that goal. Progress toward the goal should be
traced in quarterly reports to the Mayor. Consideration
should also be given to adopting a minority municipal
contracting program of "set asides" similar to a program now
in place in Atlanta, Georgia. The City's efforts to increase
minority participation in municipal contracting should also
extend to professional as well as non-professional services.
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The closed nature of Boston's contracting system is
not just a detriment to the many businesses, minority or
otherwise, that could, but do not, compete for City contracts
-- it may also be a problem for the City's taxpayers. An
example from the Fire Department illustrates this point,
though the problem is endemic to the entire contracting
system and no attempt is made here to single out the Fire
Department. When the Fire Department advertised a laundry
contract in March, 1983, only one bid was received. The bid
which was accepted quoted a price of 60 cents per sheet for
laundering 30,000 sheets for the current fiscal year and a
price of $3.50 each for laundering 1,000 blankets. Even a
cursory survey of laundry prices within the City uncovered
one launderer willing to launder sheets for 35 cents apiece,
another who would charge 22 cents a sheet, another who would
launder blankets for 66 cents each, and others who would
launder similar blankets for prices ranging from $1.50 to
$1.75 apiece. The loss to the taxpayers in one year from the
amount apparently overpaid for laundering Fire Department
sheets and blankets is relatively small -- conservatively
$7,500 on sheets (30,000 sheets at 350 a sheet) and
$l,750-$2,500 on blankets (1,000 blankets at $1.75 per
blanket). However, if this contract were continued from year
to year, the loss to the City over the four-year course of
the new Administration would be $44,000 on these two items
alone. If other City departments, with much wider use of
sheets and blankets, such as hospital services, public
shelters and prisons, were also overpaying for laundry
services the excess cost to the City taxpayer could be very
substantial. The issue for concern, as much as the dollars
lost in this case, is why only one vendor was aware of this
contracting opportunity and willing to bid on the job.
Many of the recommendations made elsewhere in this
Chapter will serve to open the contracting system to
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businesses currently disenfranchised. Some such steps
include
:
1. Streamline, and speed up, the process of
contractor selection and award.
2. Increase the appearance of openness and
fairness in the contracting process by minimizing the use of
unadvertised contracts and adopting and following public
guidelines for multi-vendor and no-bid contracts.
3. Establish an educational outreach program to
help interested business people -- especially minorities,
women and those involved in small businesses -- to understand
how to do business with the City.
4. Require that when advertisements draw only one
bidder, action be taken to encourage broader participation --
such as re-advertising the contract, if time permits.
5. Mandate that in those few instances where
contracts must legitimately go unadvertised, the contracting
authority make reasonable efforts to obtain some competition
as, for example, by contacting three or more likely
contractors for price quotations. Freedom from advertising
should not mean freedom from accountability.
6. Make clear on a regular, consistent basis,
both inside and outside City government, that the Mayor is
personally committed to opening up the contracting process in
the City of Boston and that this commitment will be followed
up vigorously and on a continuing basis.
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C . Contract Management and Oversight
1. Systems for reviewing performance after award are, in
general, relatively informal, and control over change
orders is unduly lax and creates the opportunity for
abuse, including subversion of the competitive bidding
process
.
Another phase of the contract process that is most
important in terms of cost and satisfactory result is also
the phase to which the least public attention is usually
devoted. Contract management and oversight is a topic that
lacks political appeal and, being a fact-bound,
nuts-and-bolts matter, lies largely beyond the reach of
legislative initatives. Yet it is here that mismanagement,
inefficiency and lack of vigorous oversight can cost the City
the most dearly. The functions of a well-designed system for
contract management and oversight include ensuring that: the
job is performed in full compliance with the technical and
quality requirements of the specifications and drawings; the
City fulfills its contractual obligations (such as for site
availability or City- furnished materials or equipment) and
avoids interference with the contractor's performance; change
orders are not abused; the contractor is properly paid; and
the contractor complies with the administrative and
socio-economic requirements incorporated into the contract.
a . Supervision of Contractor Performance
During the course of this study, the procedures
employed by two departments, Fire and Public Facilities, in
supervising contractor performance of major projects were
reviewed. One Fire Department project that was examined
involved the purchase of a fire engine. The specifications
for that apparatus were drawn up by the Fire Department
itself and bids were solicited by the Purchasing Division on
an advertised, competitive bid basis. The contract was
awarded by the Purchasing Division to the low bidder. Though
the normal contract administration functions remained with
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the Purchasing Division, the Fire Department did provide
inspection services in connection with that purchase. An
inspector from the Department inspected the fire engine once
while it was in the process of manufacture and again when
manufacturing had been completed and the apparatus had
received its final coat of paint. The apparatus then had to
be driven over the road (not shipped) from its place of
manufacture to Boston, where it was again inspected to assure
that it had withstood the stresses and strains of the trip
over the road without adverse effects. While the purchase of
an elaborate, custom-built item might require prolonged
on-site inspection during manufacture, a fire engine is a
sufficiently standardized product so that the inspections
performed by the Fire Department appear to be adequate.
In the case of the Public Facilities Department,
contractor supervision procedures were examined in the
abstract rather than by focusing on a specific project. With
major projects, the Department centralizes control and
responsibility in a project manager. Major projects also
have an on-site clerk-of - the-works whose principal function
is to monitor performance by the contractor and keep a
detailed written log of activities pertaining to progress of
the work. In addition, in complex jobs supervision of the
contractor's construction activities is normally included as
a part of the contract with the architect-engineer who
developed the contract specifications and drawings. Over and
above the inspection functions performed by the
clerk-of -the-works , a site engineer is assigned by the City
on a full-time basis to major construction projects, with one
of his key duties being to inspect the construction
contractor's performance of work in order to confirm that it
meets contract requirements.
On paper, the procedures for project management and
on-site inspection by a clerk- of - the-works appear reasonable
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and, inasmuch as they are consistent with and modeled upon
recently-adopted monitoring procedures for state projects, in
fact appropriate for projects to which they apply. Whether
the procedures work in practice depends of course largely on
the qualifications, expertise and diligence of the persons
serving as project manager and clerk- of - the-works . In the
limited time available, however, the actual qualifications
and performance of the Public Facilities Department project
managers or clerks-of- the-works have not been reviewed.
b . Control Over Change Orders
The danger posed by change orders is twofold:
first, that a contractor may seek extra payment for
performing a task he is already obligated under the contract
to perform, by camouflaging that task as a change; and
second, that a contractor who is entitled to a change order
may seek an unduly high price for the change, since he is at
that point in the contracting process free from the
constraints of competition. Careful, honest, objective
monitoring of change orders is critical to the City's
interests because the confidence a contractor feels about his
ability to obtain change orders and thereby increase the
amount paid to him by the City affects his original bid. If
he knows that he can obtain approval of his change orders
after he is awarded the contract, he may submit an
artificially low bid, thereby increasing his chances of
winning the contract, secure in the knowledge that he will
ultimately be paid more than his low bid. Such a practice
obviously would undermine the competitive bid process.
Current procedures to protect against these dangers may not
be adequate.
In a review of ongoing Public Facilities construc-
tion contracts, a pattern was found for change orders which
warrants further investigation. As described above, more
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than 70% of all the change orders granted on current
construction contracts went to two businesses whose owners
are related. All of these change orders were granted shortly
after the contracts had been executed. Discussions with
officials of Public Facilites suggest that there were
plausible justifications for these change orders. If in fact
the change orders had been wrongful, the absence of an
effective review mechanism makes it likely that they would
not have been caught. In the absence of such reviews, the
possiblity exists that excessive costs may be imposed on the
City, and even that fraud or wrongdoing may be committed. A
system-wide process for monitoring change orders should be
instituted consistent with the recently-adopted state
practices regarding change orders. Its function should be
the application of a consistent litmus test to all change
orders, inquiring as to whether the requested change is
legitimate, and whether the price is fair.
D. Timeliness of payments and miscellaneous other issues.
Persistent complaints have been received that the
City delays excessively in paying its contractors. While
there are some occasions when the City deliberately delays
payment because of its cash flow at the time, this would seem
to account for only a very small proportion of delays in
payment. Though it is difficult to identify the precise
causes of these delays, it appears that they were largely due
to an inefficient, unwieldy and poorly- controlled
bureaucratic process, rather than to unavoidable
circumstances. Available data indicates that the time lag
between a contractor's submission of an invoice and his
actual receipt of payment is substantial. For example, a
review of multi-vendor contractors with the Fire Department
disclosed that many have not been paid yet for work performed
last April.
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Although it is impossible to quantify the dollar
amount, excessive delays in payment must be costing the City
large amounts of money on account of hidden finance costs
which are built into prices quoted to the City. Contractors
who are well aware of the City's record on timeliness of
payment know that they will have to finance contract costs
for a longer period than that provided by the contract. They
therefore must, as prudent businessmen, take the cost of
money and the timeliness of payment into account in
determining the prices quoted to the City.
Not only does this practice cost the City large
amounts in hidden finance charges, but it also reduces
competition since, according to some City officials, many
firms decline to bid on City contracts because of these
payment practices. In addition to reducing competition
generally, the City's payment practices are especially
detrimental to small and minority businesses. These
businesses simply cannot afford in many cases to bid on City
jobs of any significant size since they do not have the
financial resources to "carry" the City for the length of
time which has apparently been customary in the past.
Correction of the unsatisfactory payment situation which
currently exists should be a high priority.
The City presently makes no provision in the
standard contract for requiring contractors to reimburse the
City for use of City office space, materials, or equipment.
In certain cases, it may be appropriate for the City to be
reimbursed for such use, and the City should consider
including such provisions in future contracts.
E . Resolution of Contract Disputes
Although an issue can arise in the course of any
contract, the most difficult and costly issues usually
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involve complex projects of high dollar value. Difficult
judgments, involving a balancing of competing considerations,
must be made. For example, if the City does not vigorously
enforce its rights and require a contractor to fulfill his
obligations under the contract, then the City is not getting
full value for its contracting dollar. On the other hand, if
the City is overly aggressive in insisting that it has no
liability and that all problems encountered are the respon-
sibility of the contractor, the City may well end up
incurring sizable litigation costs in a losing cause. Such
aggressiveness may also further discourage contractors from
doing business with the City and thus reduce competition.
The remaining discussion on this subject refers to the actual
experience of the Public Facilities Department in dealing
with contracting dispute resolution.
Questions regarding interpretation of
specifications or other contract requirements arise
infrequently during the period of contract performance, and
they are usually resolved at the working level between
contractor and City representatives, without ever becoming
major issues. If the particular question cannot be resolved
at the working level, the matter is taken up by the
contractor at a meeting with the architect-engineer, the
department's deputy director and its chief engineer. Neither
the department's lawyer nor the contractor's lawyer, if he
has consulted one, participate in this meeting, which is
viewed as being a management effort on both sides to resolve
the particular problem. If the meeting does not result in a
mutually acceptable resolution of the problem, and if the
contractor is represented by counsel, the department's lawyer
then will usually discuss the matter by telephone with the
contractor s lawyer. They will exchange views of the
positions of both parties and see whether some resolution can
be worked out that is considered reasonable and acceptable by
both parties. If no settlement can be reached, then the
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issue between the parties would have to be resolved by
litigation. While relatively few issues require resort to
the courts, the issues which ultimately end up before a judge
usually are the ones involving the greatest complexity and
the largest dollar amounts.
When an issue is resolved on a management basis,
and a contract amendment must be processed to increase the
price by the amount of the settlement, the department
prepares a detailed written justification for the course of
action proposed which sets forth the dollar amount involved.
This justification is sent to the Law Department for approval
in conjunction with the processing of the necessary contract
amendment documents as required by the Contract Manual. A
Law Department attorney may raise questions concerning the
department's justification memorandum. However, as a
practical matter, in light of his workload and limited,
familiarity with the types of contracts involved, the Law
Department attorney relies heavily on the department's
expertise. Therefore, he will usually approve the
department's recommended action.
The conduct of litigation on behalf of the City is
the prerogative and responsibility of the Law Department.
Thus, in cases where it becomes evident that settlement
discussions at the contractor-department level are not
producing results and that litigation is likely to be the
ultimate outcome, the department's lawyer will normally
advise the appropriate Law Department attorney of the status
of the matter and of the probability that litigation will
result. Overall management of any resulting litigation
remains the responsibility of the Law Department, rather than
the operating department. As a result, the Law Department
decides whether to handle the litigation in-house or retain
outside counsel. If the Law Department does decide to handle
the litigation, the department's lawyer, in light of his
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background in the subject matter of the dispute, may also
assist the Law Department in developing and presenting the
City's position.
While it is difficult to generalize from the
practice of a single department regarding the resolution of
disputes with contractors during contract performance,
several observations can be made. First, the relationship
between the operating department and the Law Department
regarding the resolution of issues without litigation appears
to be entirely informal, but it reportedly works. Second,
while resolution of day-to-day issues at the
department / contractor level is probably the most efficient
approach and should be encouraged, it appears that legal
counsel should be brought into the process somewhat earlier
than is now the case.
Before positions have hardened on both sides,
counsel can play a valuable role in setting the stage for
reasonable negotiations by the contractor's and department's
management. Counsel's role at this stage should not be
solely that of an advocate arguing the department's position,
but should also be that of an advisor pointing out to the
department: the weaknesses as well as the strengths of its
position; the benefits of a reasonable settlement over
litigation, taking into account the cost, time and resources
required for litigation; and the lawyer's judgment of a
reasonable settlement range.
Additional Recommendations
1
•
Establishment of Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer and
Internal Contract Auditing Group .
Strong public steps should be taken to signal an
intention to change the City's contracting system as
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described in this Chapter. These steps should include
appointing a Contracts Policy Officer in the Mayor's Office
and establishing an Internal Contract Auditing Group which
reports to the Mayor.
The Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer would advise
the Mayor regarding all matters pertaining to contracting
policy by City departments. Such officer would also assist
individual departments in establishing guidelines for the
award of contracts and particularly in establishing criteria
and procedures for awarding unadvertised or multi-vendor
contracts and Service Orders; assist in establishing
information systems in departments in order to enable them to
keep track of what contracts have been awarded and to whom;
monitor particular contractors' performance and assure that
such information is made available to the public; assure that
the contracting process itself is a public process and that
records of contract awards and selection processes are open
to public inspection; and devise methods of increasing
participation in City contracting by contractors and vendors
previously excluded or discouraged from participation,
including assisting departments in recruiting new applicants
for contracts. Such officer would also review all contract
matters which require the Mayor's approval.
The Internal Contract Auditing Group would have as
its fundamental function monitoring compliance by City
departments with established policies and procedures. Such
group would: review procedures used by City departments to
assess contract needs, to monitor contractor selection and to
oversee the performance of contractors and vendors; review
procedures and contract awards to identify aspects of the
contracting process most susceptible to misconduct or waste;
develop and implement auditing techniques to detect and deter
such abuse; and review selected contract awards and the
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performance of vendors on selected contracts to ensure
compliance with guidelines.
Establishment of these two separate functions is a
small investment to increase the City's ability to administer
and oversee almost one-half billion dollars of City
contracts
.
2 . Commencement of a Survey of Ongoing City Contracts
The first assignment of the Mayor's Contracts
Policy Officer should be to cause a review of all ongoing
City contracts by City departments. As described above in
the Scope of Investigation
,
of the many City departments
engaged in awarding contracts and thereby obligating the City
to spend public money to pay selected vendors for performing
services or providing goods or construction, the ongoing
contracts of only three representative departments were
examined in detail in the course of this study. If the Mayor
is truly to gain some control over the ongoing contracts pre-
viously entered into by the City, which contracts his
administration will be contractually bound to honor unless
discontinued, a review of all ongoing contracts is critical.
The only way that a complete list of all ongoing
contracts can be compiled is if the contract Award Letters
and the contracts themselves for each department are
examined. The task of reviewing all contracts within most
departments once the contracting system is understood is not
excessively time-consuming or complicated. Therefore, the
Mayor, through his Contracts Policy Officer, should direct
each of his department heads to prepare a schedule of all
outstanding contracts originating with each department. For
each contract, information should be collected similar to
that assembled for this study and which is described on page
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VIII-11 of this Chapter. The data should first be recorded
from copies of contracts at the departments and then checked
against copies of the contracts filed with the City Auditor.
All contracts should then be separated by categories:
publicly advertised, competitive bid contracts, unadvertised
contracts, repetitive services contracts (including multi-
vendor contracts), and purchase contracts.
Once data sheets have been completed for all
contracts, each department head should then review such
contract forms for his department and make a determination
whether to recommend continuance or termination of each
contract on the schedule. Each department head should then
submit a list of all contracts within his department to the
Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer, accompanied by the
recommendation of whether the contract should be continued or
discontinued. The Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer should
review the determinations of the department heads regarding
continuance or termination of that agency's contracts.
Obviously, before deciding to discontinue any contract, a
review should be made to determine whether the City has the
legal authority under the terms of the particular contract to
do so. In that regard, Article 8.4 of the General Conditions
of the City's Standard Contract provides for termination "at
any time for the convenience of the City" on at least 7 days'
written notice. The contractor is, of course, entitled to
payment at the contract rate to the date of termination.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
As of January 2, 1984, the City's ongoing contracts
total almost half a billion dollars. Those contracts in one
way or another touch the lives of all Boston residents, from
the student who does his homework on paper purchased by the
City, to the elderly resident of public housing who depends
on elevators that are maintained by a City contractor, to the
taxpayer for whom the cost-effectiveness of City contracting
is a significant, if underappreciated, determinant of the
taxes he pays.
The patchwork quilt of Boston's funding sources and
contracting authorities is so complex and ill -documented that
little can be said with total confidence as to where this
money comes from, where it goes or how it makes the trip.
Boston awards contracts in any of three ways. Some
contracts, including those for purchases, are advertised and
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Others are awarded
without formal advertisement. And others are repetitive
services contracts which may be executed with single or
multiple vendors. Of 1,446 ongoing, City-funded contracts
surveyed, a full 39% were unadvert ised , 32% were for repeti-
tive services and just 26% were advertised. Unadvertised
contracts accounted for 53% of the dollar value of those
contracts, with advertised contracts amounting to only 35%.
Extrapolating from these figures to City contracts funded
from all sources suggests that more than half of the nearly
$500 million in outstanding City contracts were awarded
without formal advertising and open bidding.
The study of this vast, complicated field was not
intended to detect wrongdoing. Rather, its purpose was to
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assist the City Administration in establishing a contracting
process that operates fairly, honestly and openly at the same
time that it obtains needed goods, services and construction
of the highest quality and at the lowest appropriate cost to
the City, from as widespread a group of Boston-based contrac-
tors as possible. Toward this goal, the study consisted of
the following three phases: (1) review of the various
statutes, ordinances and contract manuals governing City
contracts; (2) examination of documents revealing the ways in
which these governing rules are implemented throughout the
City, including bid approval forms, award letters and
contract documentation; and (3) intense study of the
individual contracts of three departments believed to be
representative, namely, Administrative Services, Fire and
Public Facilities, as well as a more general review of the
contracts of other departments throughout the City, with
particular emphasis on unadvertised , and no-bid, contracts.
Among other things examined in this third phase review were
30 Administrative Services contracts with an aggregate value
of $475,836; 70 Fire Department contracts totalling $633,283;
and 136 Public Facilities contracts amounting to $5,695,142.
In addition to the specific findings described in
the next section of this Summary, there was a general finding
that a serious need exists to open up the process by which
all three kinds of contracts are awarded. Although the small
minority of contracts that are advertised appear to be
awarded under adequate procedures, the scope of participation
in the bidding process is dismayingly narrow, e.g. , an
average of only 2.7 contractor bids on contracts advertised
by the Department of Public Facilities, and just 1.7 on Fire
Department contracts.
A much greater problem than the advertised
contracts, however, is posed by the roughly three-quarters of
all contracts that are not subject to the requirement of
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advertising and public bidding. Unadvertised contracts are
highly susceptible to abuse because there is little or no
effective monitoring of contractor selection. Specifically,
no written guidelines were found for such selection, no
stated criteria, no requirement of a public statement of the
reasons for selection of a particular contractor, and no
effective independent review. The few checks and controls
that exist in theory often do not operate in fact. For
example, the reasons given by contracting authorities for
dispensing with advertising were frequently perfunctory and
unconvincing, and in some cases were even expressly declared
by the City's Contract Manual to be invalid. Publication of
Award Letters in the City Record
,
required by law for all
unadvertised contracts, occurred in some cases up to two
years after execution of the contracts to which the letters
related. Although all unadvertised contract awards are
supposed to be routed through the Finance Commission, many
inexplicably were not.
Multi-vendor contracts permit contracting authori-
ties to select those with whom they will deal without any
formal bidding process or written guidelines or selection
criteria. Such contracts may conform to the Biblical maxim,
"Many are called but few are chosen," in that virtually any
business can get its name on a City department list of
approved vendors simply by responding to an advertisement,
but thereafter the department exercises nearly unlimited
discretion in deciding whom on the list to favor. The
popularity of this form of contracting among City departments
is demonstrated by the record of the Public Facilities
Department, more than half the contracts of which are multi-
vendor .
Unnecessary delays in approval and payment of
contractors are the price that contractors have learned they
must pay when doing business with the City of Boston. More
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than half the unadvert ised contracts issued in FY 1982
reached the Mayor for approval after the contractor had
started the work covered by the contract. Lengthy delays in
payment are routine. As a result of these delays, the City
pays implicit "finance charges" on many contracts, such a
charge representing the amount of the contract price added by
the contractor to cover his interest costs during delays in
contract processing and payment. Small and minority- owned
businesses often lack adequate cash-flow to "carry" the City
during these delays, and so cannot afford to deal with the
City.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the new Adminis-
tration in the area of contracting is to make the system as
open in reality as it is on paper. There is evidence of a
widespread belief among business persons that the supposedly
open, public, competitive system of City contracting is in
fact closed, private and uncompetitive. This perception,
nourished by the prevalence of unadvertised and multi-vendor
contracts, helps to create the reality that it reflects. In
the end, the closed system fails to promote the vigorous com-
petition necessary to ensure that the City obtains quality
goods and services at a reasonable cost.
Summary of Findings
o The City of Boston is currently committed to payments
totalling at least $497,772,442.98 under ongoing
contracts
.
o Approximately 26% of City- funded contracts are
awarded through formal competitive bidding;
these competitively-bid contracts account for
$24,737,508.82 (approximately 35% of the
dollar value of City-funded contracts) of the
City's contractual expenditures.
o More than 39% of the City's contracts are
awarded without formal advertising; these
unadvertised contracts account for
$37,691,385.58 (53% of the dollar value of
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City-funded contracts) of the City's con-
tractual expenditures.
o Before the end of the first six months of FY 1984, the
dollar volume of executed contracts funded by trust
revenues had already exceeded the original appropriation
for the entire fiscal year.
o Within the same period, current appropriations for City-
funded contracts exceeded the original appropriation by
27%.
o A relatively small number of contractors compete for
contracts awarded by the City through public adver-
tising .
o A majority of the construction work awarded by the
Department of Public Facilities went to three vendors.
o Within the first six months of FY 1984, one
construction company was awarded over $2.3
million in Public Facilities construction
projects, which represents 40% of the amount
of all executed FY 1984 contracts and 65% of
executed FY 1984 construction contracts.
o This same construction company is the low
bidder on at least $660,000 in FY 1984 Public
Facilities construction projects that have not
yet been formally awarded.
o The owner of this construction company founded
the business in 1980 at the age of 26.
Revenues increased from approximately $275,000
for its 1981 fiscal year to $2.4 million in FY
1983. The company also reported a 100%
revenue increase and a 700% profit increase
from FY 1982 to FY 1983. Much of those
revenues appear to be derived from Public
Facilities contracts.
o The owner of this new construction company is
the son of the owner of another construction
company that was one of the leading
construction companies for Public Facilities.
The father's company apparently has not bid
against his son's for Public Facilities
contracts. Although the number of the
father's company's contracts with Public
Facilities has declined, it holds the largest
ongoing Public Facilities construction
contract in an amount in excess of $4 million.
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o The father's company and the son's company
have been granted four of the seven change
orders for cost increases on ongoing Public
Facilities projects representing more than 70%
of the total dollar value of all such change
orders
.
o Competitive bidding could be undermined by the rela-
tively unfettered discretion vested in City representa-
tives to reject low bids that are "technically
defective .
"
o Unadvertised contracts have become the norm rather than
the exception and are the means by which the purposes of
competitive public bidding are, at best, ignored and, at
worst, deliberately defeated.
o A great number of the City's contracts are
unadvertised and are frequently awarded
improperly or with perfunctory justification,
in many cases after work already has been
started and, in some cases, completed.
o During the past several years, there have been
dramatic increases in the level of awards of
unadvertised contracts, e.g.
,
from 1,043 in FY
1981 to 1,979 in FY 1983.
o During the first six months of FY 1984, 1,044
unadvertised contracts were processed, which
accounted for almost $37.7 million in expendi-
tures .
o 43% of the Administrative Services contracts
reviewed were awarded without public adver-
tising; these unadvertised contracts accounted
for 77% (approximately $370,000 of $476,000)
of Administrative Services' FY 1984 contracts.
o A significant number of unadvertised
contracts, including one for $3 million,
apparently were not submitted, as required, to
the Finance Commission prior to approval.
o More than 50% of the unadvertised contracts in
FY 1982 reached the Mayor for approval after
the contract performance period had commenced.
o 31% of unadvertised contracts reviewed were
submitted to the Finance Commission after the
contract period had commenced.
o During late December, 1983, 85% of unadver-
tised contracts were submitted to the Finance
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Commission after contract performance had
commenced; in more than 30% of those con-
tracts, the contract completion date had
passed.
o The majority of unadvertised contracts awarded
were for personal services.
o Contracts for professional services routinely
are awarded as unadvertised contracts- -8 of 13
FY 1984 contracts awarded by Administrative
Services were awarded for the sole reason that
they involved professional services.
Under existing practices, a select group of vendors may
be awarded a disproportionate amount of work under the
City's multi-vendor contracts.
o Although virtually anyone can get on the
multi-vendor list, City department officials
need only solicit bids from three vendors on
the list chosen at the discretion of the
department
.
o No controls exist to ensure that three bids
are received or to prevent City departments
from repeatedly soliciting bids from the same
selected vendors.
o In general, there are relatively few vendors
for many of the services performed under
multi-vendor contracts- -of the multi-vendor
contracts reviewed, an average of less than
five contractors placed themselves on the list
to be one of the three vendors selected to bid
on services performed under a multi-vendor
contract
.
Excessive delays in contract approval and in payment by
the City are routine, and those delays not only may be
discouraging businesses, especially small businesses and
those owned by minorities and women, from contracting
with the City, but also may be costing the City substan-
tial implicit "finance charges" to compensate contrac-
tors for anticipated delays.
o The average time period between the dates of
the Award Letter and contract execution for
contracts examined was more than 75 days.
o Fire Department contracts with 51 vendors for
services needed were not executed for more
than three months after init xated- -as many as
20 of the vendors may have commenced work
VIII - 72
before the contracts were executed; many, if
not all of them, submitted invoices before the
contracts were executed; and one vendor may
have submitted as many as 15 separate invoices
before execution and filing of the contract
with the City Auditor, starting as early as
five months before.
o The City's existing contracting system is in practice
"closed" to many prospective contractors.
o For 28 contracts publicly advertised and put
out for bid by the Public Facilities Depart-
ment, an average of only 2.7 bids per contract
were received.
o Two of the three contracts publicly advertised
and put out for bid by the Fire Department
resulted in only one eligible bid; the third,
only three bids.
o The resulting lack of bids and competition may
result in unnecessary expense to the City and
its taxpayers. For example, the Fire Depart-
ment received only one bid on a 1983 contract
for laundering 35,000 sheets and 1,000
blankets over the course of the year. Even an
informal, cursory review during this study
yielded several launderers who quoted prices
for those services that would have saved the
City $10,000 per year.
o While virtually any business can get its name
on a department ' s list of approved vendors
under multi-vendor contracts, the department
exercises nearly unlimited discretion in
deciding whom on the list to favor.
o The City's contractor selection and award
process is so complex and time consuming that
many businesses that might otherwise be
interested in contracting with the City do not
apply.
o These complexities and substantial delays in
payment by the City especially discourage
small businesses, including those owned by
minorities and women, from contracting with
the City.
o Although there are more than 10,000 minority
businesses in Boston and the surrounding area,
no minority businesses received Purchase
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Orders from the City's Purchasing Division
during the first quarter of FY 1984.
o Systems for reviewing performance after award are,
in general, relatively informal; control over
change orders is unduly lax and creates the oppor-
tunity for abuse, including subversion of the
competitive bidding process.
Summary of Recommendations
o Establish a comprehensive information control
system on publicly advertised contracts.
o Provide for pre- advert ising review by a central
authority of plans, specifications and technical
requirements for large, complex contracts,
including all major construction contracts.
o Establish fixed guidelines for determining whether
defective bids are "fatally" or just technically
defective
.
o Require that when the low bid received on a
contract is fatally defective, that bid be rejected
and the next lowest be accepted, unless the latter
is deemed unreasonably high, in which case the
contract should, if time permits, be readvertised
.
o Set a policy that, where only one bid is received
on an advertised contract, the contract is to be
readvertised, time permitting.
o Make unadvertised contracts the exception rather
than the norm.
o Require legitimate, persuasive justifications
for the few contracts that must be awarded
without advertising.
o Require that contracting authorities obtain
three written price quotes before awarding an
unadvertised contract.
o Formulate specific guidelines as to what kinds
of contracts need not be advertised.
o Monitor the timeliness of submission and
processing of unadvertised contracts.
o Establish a structured, open system for
awarding contracts for professional services,
including clearly defined selection criteria
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and recruitment of competitors for such
awards
.
o Consider denying payment to contractors who
routinely commence work before the contract for
such work is approved.
o Streamline the contracting system by:
o modifying the policy that the Mayor sign every
City contract and adopting other measures as
outlined in this Report;
o reviewing the appropriateness of the $2,000
floor for formal, written contracts, with a
view toward increasing the minimum.
o Provide written guidelines for, and effective
review of, the award of multi-vendor contracts.
o Open up the contracting system by:
o reducing delays in contract processing and
payment, so that small and minority-owned
businesses can afford to deal with the City;
o establishing an education outreach program for
small and minority- owned businesses;
o making greater participation by businesses
owned and operated by women and minorities a
high priority;
o considering implementation of a program
setting aside certain municipal contracts for
minority- owned businesses.
Establish City-wide monitoring of change orders consis-
tent with recently adopted state practices in that
field.
Appoint a Mayor's Contracts Policy Officer to: assist in
establishing criteria and procedures for unadvertised
and multi-vendor contracts; advise the Mayor on matters
relating to contracting; assist in establishing informa-
tion systems to keep track of contracts; monitor
particular contractors' performance; devise methods of
increasing participation in City contracting; and review
all contract-related matters requiring the Mayor's
signature
.
Create an Internal Contract Auditing Group to monitor
closely compliance with established policies and proce-
dures, and selected individual contracts.
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o Review all ongoing City contracts to determine whether
to continue or discontinue them.
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Appendix 1
Partial List of City and County Departments and Agencies
Engaged in Contracting
Administrative Services
Assessing
Auditor
Boston Committee
Boston Redevelopment Authority
Cemetery Division
City Council
City Record
Commission on Handicapped Community Services
Elderly Affairs
Election Department
Emergency Shelter
Environment Department
Fair Housing
Fire Department
Freedom Trail
Health & Hospitals
Inspection Services
Law Department
Library Department
Licensing Board
Mayor's Office
Parks and Recreation
Penal Institutions
Police Department
Public Facilities
Public Works
Real Property
Rent Control Division
Registry
Retirement Board
School Department
Suffolk County Jail
Traffic and Parking
Treasury Department
Veterans Services
Workmen's Compensation Services
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Appendix 2
SOURCES OF BOSTON'S CONTRACT FUNDING
Source Original Amount Current Amount Balance
City-
Current $171,763,298.97 $136,306,141.38 $81,826,846.71
Federal &
State 356,228,085.76 156,369,584.96 46,694,528.59
Trusts 1,029,646.62 1,035,877.98 251,407.71
Bonds 84,045,443.15 77,923,505.94 36,367,033.66
City-Past
Years 165,625,096.89 126,137,332.72 14,137,296.42
Total $778,691,571.39 $497,772,442.98 $179,277,113.09
EXPLANATORY NOTES
The new computer run derived the above information
from the City's Encumbrance Open Order Listing ("EOOL") as of
January 3, 1984, which lists all contracts for which the City
Auditor had "encumbered" funds by certifying that money was
available for payment. The City Auditor has said that the
EOOL is the best central source of information on outstanding
contracts
.
The vertical column in the above chart labelled
"Original Amount" shows the original appropriation for
contracts, including purchase and service orders and leases.
The "Current Amount" column shows the dollar volume of such
contracts outstanding. The "Balance" shows the amount of the
most recent, total contract appropriation not yet committed
to executed contracts. According to the City Auditor's
office, if the sum of the "Balance" and the "Current Amount"
differs from the "Original Amount," the original appropria-
tion must have been changed.
The first four horizontal rows of the above chart 2
show the source of the funding of all outstanding contracts
executed in fiscal 1984. The fifth horizontal row reflects
City-funded contracts executed before fiscal 1984 but still
outstanding. Since appropriations for these contracts were
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Appendix 2
made in prior years, they are not chargeable against the 1984
City budget. The figures are totalled in the sixth row.
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Appendix 3
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DEPARTMENT
Ending Date of Examination: December 22, 1983
Number of Contracts Examined: 30
Advertised Contracts:
Unadvertised Contracts: 13
Repetitive Services Contracts: 17
Total Dollar Value of Contracts Examined: $475,836
Unadvertised Contracts: $369,836
Repetitive Services Contracts: $106,000
Types of Services Under Unadvertised Contracts and
Percentage of All Unadvertised Contracts, by Dollar
Value, to be Paid For Each Type of Service:
Computer Program Development: 38%
Legal Assistance: 33%
Career Development Program: 10%
Maintenance of City Facilities: 11%
Policy Research on City Government: 8%
Types of Services Under Repetitive Services Contracts
and Percentage of All Repetitive Services
Contracts, by Dollar Value, to be Paid For
Each Type of Service:
Plumbing Repairs: 6%
Electrical Work: 14%
Printing: 80%
Reasons For Waiver of Formal Advertising and Number
of Contracts in Which Each Reason Was Stated:
Professional Nature of Services Provided: 9
Unique Capabilities of Vendor: 3
Past Performance by Vendor: 1
Quality of Vendor: 1
One contract cited two reasons -- professional
nature of services provided and unique
capabilities
.
Average Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service) of
Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts: 5.6
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Appendix 3
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DEPARTMENT
(Continued)
Median Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service) of
Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts: 4
Average Number of Days Between Date of Award Letter
and Date of Execution by Department Official for
Unadvertised Contracts: 79
Repetitive Services Contracts: 68
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Appendix 4
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT
Ending Date of Examination: December 29, 1983
Number of Contracts Examined: 70
Advertised Contracts: 3
Unadvertised Contracts: 14
Repetitive Services Contracts: 53
Total Dollar Value of Contracts Examined: $633,283
Advertised Contracts: $60,973
Unadvertised Contracts: $153,510
Repetitive Services Contracts: $418,800
Types of Services Under Advertised Contracts and
Percentage of All Advertised Contracts, by Dollar
Value, to be Paid for Each Type of Service:
Laundry service: 55%
Uniform supplies: 30%
Telecommunications: 15%
Types of Services Under Unadvertised Contracts and
Percentage of All Unadvertised Contracts, by Dollar
Value, to be Paid for Each Type of Service:
Fee implementation of Augmented Fire
Service Program: 48%
Property inspection: 33%
Psychological screening: 12%
Legal assistance: 5%
Rental space for radio equipment: 2%
Types of Services Under Repetitive Services Contracts
and Percentage of All Repetitive Services
Contracts, by Dollar Value, to be Paid for
Each Type of Service:
Auto-truck-boat repairs: 58%
Electrical equipment repairs: 14%
Plumbing and heating repairs: 13%
Alarm and radio repairs : 4%
Building and grounds maintenance: 11%
Average Number of Bids for Advertised Contracts: 1.7
Median Number of Bids for Advertised Contracts: 1
Bid statistics are based upon Award Letters
for contracts examined.
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Appendix 4
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT
(Continued)
Reasons For Waiver of Formal Advertising and Number
of Contracts In Which Each Reason Was Stated:
Professional Nature of Services Provided: 13
Unique Capabilities of Vendor: 2
Past Performance by Vendor: 1
Two contracts provided two reasons --
professional nature of service and past
performance cited in one contract; unique
capabilities and professional nature of
services cited in the other contract.
Average Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service)
of Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts: 4.4
Based on grouping by service as shown on
list of repetitive services contracts for FY
1984 provided by the Fire Department.
Median Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service) of
Multi-Vendor Repetitive Services Contracts: 3
Based on grouping by service as shown on
list of repetitive services contracts for FY
1984 provided by the Fire Department.
Average Number of Days Between Date of Award Letter
and Date of Execution by Department Official for
Advertised Contracts: 58
Unadvertised Contracts: 69
Repetitive Services Contracts: 102
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Appendix 5
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES DEPARTMENT
Ending Date of Examination: December 23, 1983
Number of Contracts Examined: 136
Advertised Contracts: 28
Unadvertised Contracts: 28
Repetitive Services Contracts: 80
Total Dollar Value of Contracts Examined: $5,695,142
Advertised Contracts: $4,012,813
Unadvertised Contracts: $1,184,329
Repetitive Services Contracts: $498,000
Types of Services Under Advertised Contracts and
Percentage of All Advertised Contracts, by Dollar
Value, to be Paid for Each Type of Service:
Construction: 86%
Heating services, energy conservation: 7%
Security and miscellaneous other services: 7%
Types of Services Under Unadvertised Contracts and
Percentage of All Unadvertised Contracts, by Dollar
Value, to be Paid for Each Type of Service:
Architectural and engineering: 42%
Gasline services: 27%
Consulting services: 16%
Stenographic systems and miscellaneous
other services: 15%
Types of Services Under Repetitive Services Contracts
and Percentage of All Repetitive Services Contracts,
by Dollar Value, to be Paid for Each Type of
Service
:
Trade services: 51%
Architectural and engineering: 32%
Testing and inspection: 6%
Surveying and miscellaneous other
sen-ices: 11%
VIII - 84
Appendix 5
STATISTICAL PROFILE FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES DEPARTMENT
(Continued)
Average Number of Bids for Advertisted Contracts: 2.7
Median Number of Bids for Advertised Contracts: 2.5
Bid statistics are based upon Award Letters for
contracts examined.
Reasons For Waiver of Formal Advertising and Number
of Contracts in Which Each Reason Was Stated:
Professional Nature of Services Provided: 20
Unique Capabilities of Vendor: 6
Past Performance by Vendor: 1
Emergency Nature of Service: 1
Average Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service) of
Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts: 4.4
Median Number of Contractors for Each Group (by Service) of
Multi-Vendor, Repetitive Services Contracts: 4.5
Average Number of Days Between Date of Award Letter
and Date of Execution by Department Official for
Advertised Contracts: 74
Unadvertised Contracts: 87
Repetitive Services Contracts: 164
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CONTRACTING PROCEDURE;
Appendix 6
WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN BEFORE A CITY CONTRACT IS SIGNED
* Stages where considerable discretion exists and where definitive written
policy guidance, criteria and procedures and/or top management oversight
appear to be very limited or non-existent
Advertised Contracts
Originating Department
Originating Department
1
* (Originating Department
Budget Division^
Prepares public advertisement describing ser-
vices required.
Receives and publicly opens bids.
Reviews bids and prepares Award Letter if
award to lowest eligible bidder recommended;
may have opportunity to reject low bidder.
Reviews Award Letter.
^Mayor's Office
J
* ( Originating Department9
(^Contractor
J
Originating Department
Auditing Department
Law Department
Originating Department
Mayor approves award and signs Award Letter.
Prepares standard contract documents and
sends to contractor with instructions; terms
of contract critical to city and contractor.
Signs and returns contract. Furnishes other
required documents and information.
Reviews documents.
Certifies availability of funds and encumbers
necessary funds.
Reviews contract documents as to form.
Signs contract. Distributes copies.
VIII- 86
Appendix 7
CONTRACTING PROCEDURE; WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN BEFORE A CITY CONTRACT IS SIGNED
Stages where considerable discretion exists and where definitive written
policy guidance, criteria and procedures and/or top management oversight
appear to be very limited or non-existent
Unadvertised Contracts
(
Originating Department
Budget Division
I
Law Department
Mayor's Office
I
Finance Commission
Mayor's Office
Originating Department
(
^Contractor
Originating Department
Auditing Department
Law Department
I
Originating Department
Determines public advertising inappropriate.
Prepares Award Letter requesting Mayor's per-
mission to dispense with advertising.
Reviews Award Letter.
Approves Award Letter.
Sends Award Letter to Finance Committee.
Makes advisory reconmendation to Mayor.
Mayor approves award and signs Award Letter.
Prepares standard contract documents and
sends to contractor with instructions; terms
of contract are critical to city and contrac-
tor.
Signs and returns contract. Furnishes other
required documents and information.
Reviews documents.
Certifies availability of funds and encumbers
necessary funds.
Reviews contract documents as to form.
Signs contract. Distributes copies.
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Appendix 8
CONTRACTING PROCEDURE; WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN BEFORE A CITY CONTRACT IS SIGNED
Stages where considerable discretion exists and where definitive written
policy guidance, criteria and procedures and/or top rranagement oversight
appear to be very limited or non-existent
Multi-Vendor Repetitive Services Contracts
Originating Department
Originating Department
Originating Department
Budget Division
Law Department
Mayor's Office
Finance Commission
Mayor's Office
J
Originating Department
i
Prepares public advertisement describing ser-
vices required or with Mayor's approval may
dispense with advertising.
Receives applications filed by time
specified.
Reviews applications for responsibility and
qualifications. Prepares Award Letter
covering all successful applicants.
Reviews Award Letter.
Approves Award Letter.
Sends Award Letter to Finance Commission.
Makes advisory recommendation to Mayor.
Mayor approves awards and signs Award Letter.
Prepares standard contract documents and
sends to contractors with instructions; terms
of contract critical to city and contractor.
Continued on
following page
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Continued from
previous page
i
Contractors
Originating Department
I
Auditing Department
Law Department
Originating Department
* (Originating Department
Sign and return contracts. Furnish other
required documents and information.
Reviews documents.
Certifies availability of funds and encumbers
necessary funds.
Reviews contract documents as to form.
Signs contracts. Distributes copies.
Issues Service Orders from time to time for
performance of actual services required.
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Appendix 9
CONTRACTING PROCEDURE
t
WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN BEFORE A CITY CONTRACT IS SIGNED
* Stages where considerable discretion exists and where definitive written
policy guidance, criteria and procedures and/or top management oversight
appear to be very limited or non-existent
Purchase Contracts
Originating Department
Budget Division^
Purchasing Division
Prepares Purchase Requisition, with any
necessary contract requirements and specifi-
cations.
Grants funding approval for Purchase
Requisition.
•If $500 or less, buyer gets telephone quotes
from three or more responsible suppliers,
with award to lowest bidder meeting specifi-
cations.
-If more than $500 but less than $2,000, sane
as above except that quotes must be in
writing.
If estimated cost is
$2,000 or more...
i
Purchasing Division
Purchasing Division)
Office^
Purchasing Division)
T
Continued on
following page
Receives and publicly opens bids.
Reviews bids and prepares Award Letter if
award to lowest eligible bidder recommended.
Mayor approves award and signs Award Letter.
Prepares standard purchase contract and sends
to vendor with instructions.
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Continued fran
previous page
i
Vendor
Purchasing Division
I
Auditing Department
Law Department
Purchasing Division
Purchasing Division
Auditing Department
Purchasing Division)
Signs and returns contract. Furnishes other
required documents and information.
Reviews contract and related documents.
Approves contract with respect to availabil-
ity of an appropriation.
Reviews contract documents as to form.
Signs contract. Distributes copies.
Prepares Purchase Order.
Encumbers funds. Retains copy of Purchase
Order.
Sends original copy of Purchase Order,
signed by Auditing Department, to vendor
with a standard invoice.
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Management
Information Systems

INTRODUCTION
Computer technology is the invisible sleeping giant
of Boston's government. For most Bostonians, it can't be
seen, felt or heard directly — computers do not appear in
uniform to direct traffic or in vans to deliver hot meals.
But computer technology touches the lives of those who live
and work in the City in many ways. Police emergency dis-
patching, vehicle ticketing, tax billing, and hospital lab
testing are among tens of thousands of tasks that are ac-
complished daily by Boston City employees with the help of
computers
.
Nevertheless, the costs of moving to computers must
be recognized and controlled. In FY 1984, the City will
spend about $15 million for computer systems and services,
including hardware, programming, staff and contracted ser-
vices. This level of spending is estimated to represent an
average annual increase of over 30% in the past five years.
Tight budgetary control over future expenditures for com-
puter technology is the only way to be sure that this level
of spending is really to the City's benefit.
RECENT HISTORY
Past performance in introducing the use of com-
puters into the management of City activities has been
checkered. It did not begin until the late 1970s. when it
did, it failed to take the necessary time to plan for their
successful introduction. As a result, considerable effort
will be required to achieve desired automation.
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Display 1
Since the late 1970s, the City has undertaken sev-
eral major computer-related projects. They include:
o a new parking violation system;
o a new system to track personnel and make
payroll disbursements;
o several systems to assess and collect
property taxes;
o two major efforts to upgrade the City's
main IBM computer; and
o a multifaceted effort to computerize the
City's accounting procedures.
Several of these projects have provided substantially im-
proved controls and have boosted the City's revenues. How-
ever, all have provided, through trial and error, an ex-
pensive education in the use of computers. Computer tech-
nology has costs as well as benefits, including dollar out-
lays and staff morale problems.
In 1980, despite the fact that the MIS Department
operated a large IBM computer, the City's accounting was
being done on a 1960s vintage bookkeeping machine. Vendor
payments, personnel records, property assessments and tax
bills were entered essentially by hand. Some line de-
partments, including Treasury, Health and Hospitals, and
others, manuevered to buy their own computers or contract
with outside service bureaus. The resulting computer system
was one which was costly, fragmented, and over which the
Mayor's Office had little control.
However, in September 1981, an Executive Order of
the Mayor established the position of Director of City Man-
agement Information Systems, centralizing (at least on
paper) the authority and responsibility "to direct, sup-
ervise, and plan all data processing activities for the City
of Boston."
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The Director — who was also to head the MIS De-
partment -- was responsible for developing a comprehensive
plan to upgrade and integrate the use of computer technology
in the City. The Mayor assigned this task to a veteran City
data processing professional. In June 1982, the MIS De-
partment released a five-year plan, which it refers to as
its Five Year Migration Plan . This document was, at the
time, a giant step forward in articulating computer prior-
ities for the City. It inventoried computer systems, ser-
vices and expenses. It evaluated the various options for
purchase of and control over hardware ("migration" refers to
the phased upgrading of the use of computer technology by
the City). And it outlined an ambitious program for cost-
saving and system development.
Unfortunately, there has been little resemblance
between the plan and actual events since 1982. First, the
MIS Department failed to follow a number of its own key re-
commendations in a timely manner. Second, the plan lacked
effective means of implementation. Third, proposed cost
savings have not been realized. For example, the main com-
puter in the MIS Department was running in 1982 at a peak of
about 50% capacity, but in 1983 the Department abandoned it
for a new IBM model four times as powerful. Finally, the
plan itself was incomplete. Several key computer projects
then underway in the City were given insufficient attention;
for example, the multimillion dollar project to process par-
king tickets was barely addressed. The plan has, in any
event, become obsolete, leaving to the new Administration
the responsibility of charting new directions for the
future. The four case studies that follow hold clues as to
how decisions were made in the past as well as lessons for
the future.
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COMPUTERS IN THE CITY
Parking Ticket Collection
The introduction of computers has led to a complete
overhaul of the procedures for collecting parking tickets.
Before the overhaul, less than 20% of all tickets were col-
lected, and annual revenues from tickets were well under
$10 million. Since the overhaul, collection rates have ap-
proached 50%, with annual revenues in excess of $20 million.
The introduction of computers was facilitated by a
transfer of collection responsibilities from the Boston Mu-
nicipal Court to the City, which began in early 1981 and was
completed in March 1982.
The City MIS Department provided limited assistance
to the Court prior to the transfer. However, beginning in
May 1981, the City contracted with a service bureau to pre-
pare master lists of tickets and to maintain records of col-
lection activities by the staff of the newly created Office
of the Parking Clerk.
In July 1982, the Office contracted with Datacomm
to carry out a package of services. Under the contract,
which has been extended to June 30, 1984, Datacomm:
o logs in all tickets within 48 hours
(about 7,000 per day);
o matches ticket data with Registry of
Motor Vehicle files and data banks of
other states (1/4 of all tickets issued
are for out-of-state vehicles);
o processes receipts in cooperation with
State Street Bank;
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o sends out dunning notices to overdue
accounts
;
o maintains a list of Denver Boot-eligible
vehicles
o provides terminals and printers to allow
access to the Datacomm data base.
Datacomm has automated parking ticket collection
for other cities. It appears to have established itself as
the predominant vendor in this specialty. Although the con-
tract is expensive — total income to Datacomm in FY 1984 is
expected to exceed $4.5 million — only one other firm sub-
mitted a bid last summer when the Parking Clerk asked for
competitive bids.
Highlights of Boston's new parking ticket col-
lection program include:
o earns over $20 million per year;
o annual take has tripled since pre-1982;
o 1.6 million tickets issued in FY 1983 --
95% in downtown Boston;
o 3 out of 4 tickets issued to non-Boston
residents
;
o total due to City now — $70 million.
Computers in Assessing
Since the early 1970s most political jurisdictions
hve used computers as key tools in professionalizing pro-
perty assessment. Computer-Assisted Mass Appraisal —
CAMA — systems have become increasingly more powerful, re-
liable and affordable. It is inconceivable that a City the
size of Boston would be able to maintain legally defensible
property assessments without a computer to perform key func-
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tions. Yet until the early 1980s the City's assessing pro-
cedures were almost entirely manual. Data on over 100,000
parcels was recorded by hand or typewriter. The procedures
were vulnerable to error, delay, and abuse — as judicial
decisions, academic studies, and professional audits have
concluded
.
A computer can help in many ways. It can make nu-
merous checks on the quality of the data collected in the
field: for example, flag a record showing a five-floor
house with one bathroom, or highlight for a field worker
recent sales of properties he or she has reviewed. It can
also compute proposed assessments using a program that log-
ically compares each assessment to all other assessments,
thus ensuring a modicum of consistency. In addition, a com-
puter has enormous flexibility to prepare reports for a va-
riety of purposes, including taxpayer reviews, court de-
fenses, and assessment projections.
For at least three years the City, through the spe-
cially created Office of Property Equalization (OPE), tried
to acquire such a computer. These years present a checkered
history of expensive on-the-job training.
In December 1980, OPE requested bids from vendors
for a CAMA system for the City's upcoming 100% revaluation
program. After reviewing eight bids, it selected a vendor
and, in June 1981, signed a contract.
The contract stipulated that the vendor was to de-
liver a working CAMA system by the summer of 1982, at a cost
not to exceed $145,000. City documents indicate that OPE
subsequently awarded the vendor a $1,153,000 contract for
work through January 1983. However, according to the City
Assessor, the computer system contracted for was not used
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for the 100% revaluation, and the Department has since ter-
minated all business with the vendor.
In May 1983, the City and the State Department of
Revenue, which oversees municipal assessments, signed a for-
mal memorandum in which the signatories agreed that the
"City's CAMA system has to date been unable to generate
values which meet the minimum standards, statistical and
otherwise, set forth in guidelines published by the De-
partment of Revenue." They also agreed that the City would
acquire and use a satisfactory CAMA system to help generate
entirely new assessments.
The City and the State are now in the process of
deciding how to install a new CAMA system: The Assessing
Department is starting up an acquisition project, while the
State is hiring a consultant to monitor the City's pro-
gress. Meanwhile, the Assessing Department's computer, on
which the CAMA system is presumably to operate, has been
brought within the operational control of the MIS Department.
Personnel/Payroll System
The City's first comprehensive professional audit
triggered a recommendation in August 1979 to create a new
centralized data bank for all City workers. In the language
of the auditors,
A new personnel system is being designed
and implemented and the conceptual design
of an integrated EDP payroll/personnel sys-
tem has been conceptualized for some
time...A new EDP payroll system should be
designed and implemented ... Such a system
should be capable of being interactive with
the personnel and appropriation accounting
systems to provide effective position and
budgeting controls.
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In other words, stop talking about a system and start build-
ing one.
In June of 1981 the same auditors dusted off their
recommendation and submitted it again:
We continue to recommend the design and
implementation of an integrated EDP-based
payroll/personnel system... We are cog-
nizant of the City's recent focus in this
regard.
At the time the auditors submitted this reminder,
the City was processing over 600 payroll runs per month.
The names on the runs were not being merged. The total num-
ber of individuals paid by a specific department was not
known. Nor was key personnel data, such as accrued vacation
and sick time, kept centrally.
The "recent focus" noted in the August 1981 report
was a decision by the Administration to contract out for a
pre-developed, or packaged, personnel/payroll system. A
request for proposals for a system to collect this data went
out in March 1981. While the MIS Department reviewed the
bids, it contracted with a consulting firm to install quick-
ly a "summary" payroll system on the MIS Department's com-
puter. The system, installed in July 1981, was a "stopgap"
measure to allow the City to have a single list of persons
receiving paychecks.
The review of package systems ended with a request
by the MIS Department that it itself be allowed to design
the system from the beginning, using MIS Department staff
and consultants. The leadership of the department was
anxious to prove that its staff could deliver on a high vi-
sibility project. Its request, accepted and implemented by
the Administration, was a turning point not only for the
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management of the City's work force but also for the MIS
Department
.
Departmental staff and consultants prepared an ini-
tial version of a permanent system and had parts of it oper-
ating by July 1982. Since then, according to the City Audi-
tor's Office, every person receiving a paycheck has had his
or her record on a single data bank, and all payrolls have
been checked against the data bank prior to their release.
The MIS Department makes changes to the system on
an ongoing basis. The City's independent auditors made a
detailed inspection in 1982, in which they pointed out the
areas in which improvements were needed. The system cur-
rently works well in certain respects; for example, res-
ponding to on-line inquiries about individual employees, and
producing employee rosters on short notice.
However, the system does not log attendance data,
and the accrued sick and vacation information in the data
bank is viewed as unreliable. Nor does it carry Health and
Hospital personnel data. This data is handled by a service
bureau at an annual cost in excess of $200,000. These
shortcomings illustrate the two steps forward, one step back
nature of the innovation in the computer systems: a system
is introduced to solve some pressing remedial problems, but
is not fully exploited because the data collection is
flawed, or because major departments don't use it. This
important system will require continuous monitoring, tech-
nical adjustments, and visible sponsorship from the highest
levels of the Administration for some time to come.
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SETTING COMPUTER PRIORITIES
Advice at the Top
There is an essential and increasingly acknowledged
relationship between the political processes by which City
policy is set and the computer technology which is required
to implement that policy. For example, in order to process
the property tax refunds ordered by the Court in Tregor v.
Assessors of Boston , the City is required to use computers.
And certain Mayoral directives, such as personnel hiring
guidelines and spending freezes, are not enforceable in the
absence of automated personnel and financial management sys-
tems .
The new Administration will need to create and in-
stitutionalize this source of advice, as it does not exist
presently within City Hall. The MIS Department is itself a
contender for resources and computer activity because of its
own natural concern with maintaining at least its current
level of staffing and operations. The City Budget Office
has developed no noteworthy expertise in computer tech-
nology. As a result, it is unable to provide independent,
internal review of proposals regarding computer technology
presented in annual budget requests. Furthermore, the City
has no formal mechanism for monitoring the development of
multi-agency and multi-year systems, and they are difficult
to track through the annual budget process. One way to
create this source of advice would be to appoint a full-time
Special Assistant for Information Systems reporting to the
Director of Administrative Services.
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Computer Resource Planning
The new Administration has an opportunity to cor-
rect deficiencies in the City's current procedures for pri-
oritizing the resources assigned to computers. Every budget
for spending on computer technology reflects tradeoffs be-
tween competing line items — staff, programming of new ap-
plications, updating old applications, specialized systems
software, hardware, communications, and contracted main-
tenance. The Five Year Migration Plan , which was designed
to give some overall resource planning guidelines, is now
obsolete. Much of the recent spending on computers was
barely mentioned in the Plan: for example, office automa-
tion equipment, whch has cost the City about $1.5 million,
the new MIS Department IBM computer (a $2.5 million item),
and an $800,000 mapping system. Nor did the Plan envision
that millions of dollars would be spent on custom-developed
programs for the City Auditor, the School Department and
other departments.
However, a new, more credible plan cannot be
created overnight. The following tasks need to be under-
taken first:
o Inventory resources. Find out what
equipment, software, personnel and con-
tracted resources are being assigned
today.
o Inventory the current backlog of work in
progress to upgrade old systems or ac-
quire new systems. Do a careful ac-
counting of the real costs of these pro-
jects.
o Set up a planning mechanism to focus on
the most important issues — as defined
by the Mayor's programmatic priorities,
statutory mandates, and budgetary con-
straints. Lend support and visibility
to the planning team.
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Managing Computer Projects
One of the early challenges of the new Adminis-
tration will be to gain an indepth understanding of how City-
agencies are managing computer projects. It can then be
more confident of harnessing the computer to meet its ob-
jectives. For every use, or application, of the computer —
paying bills, tracking personnel, appraising property — the
City acquires a combination of hardware and software. It
will be necessary to define precisely what is required,
choose among alternative approaches, negotiate contracts,
and install, test and operate the system. Bringing on-line
a single application may require a project effort measured
in many man-years and an implementation plan with hundreds
of individual tasks.
Some of the most important application acquisitions
in recent years (each costing over a million dollars) in-
clude the property appraisal system, the personnel/payroll
system, the parking ticket system, the Health and Hospitals
system, and the continuing effort to upgrade financial con-
trols in the School Department.
Previously, no formal City-wide roadmap for plan-
ning, budgeting, supervising and reporting on projects was
issued. Nor did the important computer-based agencies, such
as MIS and the City Auditor, create such roadmaps for their
internal use. This means that the new Administration will
not find a useful inventory of current computer projects,
but will need to create one. Nor will the Administration
easily discover how much these projects have cost to date.
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The Administration may therefore have to develop a
complete set of standards for managing computer projects.
By establishing practical rules and assuming coordination of
the most important projects, the Administration will be bet-
ter able to harness the computer to meet its own priorities.
Recommendations for the new Administration ;
Project Plans and Budgets—Computer projects do
not appear to undergo a formal process of financial review
by the Budget Office, or a technical review by the MIS De-
partment. The result is that there have been budget over-
runs in excess of 500% for some projects.
One step toward better project control would be to
require departments to submit project plans, thus ensuring a
minimum level of independent review of those plans. This
step would permit at least certain questions to be asked
about the merits of the project: Are the project expec-
tations realistic? Has the best case been made for under-
taking the project at the proposed time? Who will be ac-
countable for project management? Are the project budget
and project timetable realistic? These are the questions
for which the Administration will want answers for all pro-
jects that are pending or in progress.
Another step towards better overall control of com-
puter expenses, which are growing at an extremely high rate,
would be to require departments to submit annual computer
budget requests that break out their computer expenses into
industry-accepted categories. The departments would thus
have to show how much they expect to spend on new system
projects as compared to projects to maintain old systems,
contracted services provided by computer vendors, contracted
programming, and contracted planning consultation. Budget
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forms used today lump computer costs into meaningless aggre-
gates .
Balanced Assessment of Alternatives—The City can
substantially improve its track record by making balanced,
objective assessments of all the logical options in computer
systems before selecting among them.
Growth in computer systems can usually be handled
in at least two of the following ways: custom programming
of software to run on a previously installed computer, pur-
chase of packaged software to run on either the current or a
new computer, a contract with a timesharing firm to provide
application via phone link, or a contract with a service
bureau to provide application by exchange of physical docu-
ments.
The new Administration may want to consider how it
can provide internal technical oversight to ensure that all
logical alternatives are studied. If a balanced assessment
between alternatives is made, the odds are improved that the
true costs and benefits of the proposed application will be
better known, and that the implementation schedule will be
more realistic.
Tighten Up the Contracting Process—As of De-
cember 1983, the City had many contracts outstanding for the
procurement of computer services, valued individually from
several thousands to millions of dollars. As a result,
there has been no consistent, City-wide oversight given to
these contracts to provide quality control.
The City spends over $2 million a year on the pur-
chase of software packages and custom programming alone.
Complex, time-consuming and risk-prone ventures are common,
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but as yet no office has City-wide authority to oversee the
negotiation and monitoring of contracts. Some of these con-
tracts involve so many extensions and revisions of original
work plans that they effectively become open purchase
orders. For example, Department A may be serviced by a con-
sultant originally hired to work for Department B, under a
contract signed years before. Or, the total sums expended
under a contract may be 500% to 1,000% of the originally
agreed-to amount.
Topping anyone's list of possible improvements is
sharper oversight and technical assistance by Corporation
Counsel and the MIS Department for software acquisition pro-
jects costing more than $25,000. Also, payment for services
should be tied to the delivery of well-defined projects, not
simply to the expenditure of time. If the project is com-
plex and subject to contingencies, points for full-dress
project reviews by people other than those engaged directly
on the project should be built into the service contract.
Leading candidates for improved contractual controls include
the financial management system and the property appraisal
system
.
Time Is Running Out
The inability of the City to establish City-wide
priorities and project management discipline has led to time
pressure in meeting the City's critical needs. Two examples
are worth examining briefly.
Parking Ticket Processing—The City now spends
about $4 million a year for outside processing of parking
tickets. A consultant to the City has estimated that pro-
cessing the tickets on the MIS Department's computer could
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save the City close to $2 million a year. If the City
wishes to have its own in-house system in time to realize
savings in the FY 1985 budget, a major concentration of MIS
Department resources will be required.
Property Revaluation—Boston's ability to obtain
timely certification by the Commonwealth of its revaluation
of property is critical to the City's fiscal stability. The
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Commonwealth and
the City on May 31, 1983, requires that the City have a com-
puter-assisted mass appraisal "...fully operational
and. .. implemented on or before June 30, 1984." Today, fewer
than six months of the original 13 months remain to meet
this mutually agreed-upon requirement. Yet, the City has
not even issued a request for proposals to qualified vendors.
AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
Listed below are major computer planning and man-
agement issues which will arise within the first 100 days of
the new Administration and may require prompt decisions.
1 . MIS Department Review
Key concern: adequacy of departmental
management controls.
Key persons to contact: MIS Department
staff, user departments.
(1) Inventory all hardware and analyze
usage. (2) Analyze workload of staff.
(3) Review organizational structure.
(4) Review planning policies. (5) Re-
view priorities for projects. (6) Re-
view project management practices. (7)
Make changes where required in equip-
ment, staffing, structure and practices.
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2. Budget Office MIS Oversight
Key concern: adequacy of procedures
and staff to review FY 1985 computer
technology budget proposals.
Key persons to contact: Budget Office
personnel
.
(1) Analyze current practices regarding
computer technology budgets. (2) An-
alyze staffing requirements. (3) Make
changes where required.
3 . Computer Contracts
Key concern: adequacy of controls over
contracts (City-wide).
Key persons to contact: Corporation
Counsel, City Auditor.
(1) Inventory and review current com-
puter technology contracts. (2) Estab-
lish procedures for ensuring specifi-
cation of deliverables, and reimburse-
ment conditioned upon delivery.
4. Parking Ticket System
Key concern: adequate control over
computer costs.
Key persons to contact: Parking Clerk
personnel
(1) Clarify Administrative Service's
responsibility for parking ticket sys-
tem. (2) Do joint review of computer
operations
.
5 . Assessing Department CAMA System
Key concern: credible project controls
over CAMA acquisition.
Key persons to contact: City Assessor,
MIS Department, liaison with City As-
sessor .
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(1) Clarify Administrative Service's
responsibility for CAMA system. (2)
Review Memorandum of Agreement with
Commonwealth re: CAMA. (3) Do joint
review of agreement to run Assessing
Department's computer. (4) Do joint
review of CAMA project management. (5)
Make recommendations to ensure effec-
tive project management.
6 . Financial Management System
Key concern: MIS Department's respon-
sibilities for development and opera-
tion of system.
Key persons to contact: City Auditor,
MIS Department liaison with Auditor.
(1) Clarify Administrative Service's
responsibility for the Financial Man-
agement System. (2) Do joint review of
status of system in operation (person-
nel/payroll, accounts payable) and in
development (appropriation control,
general ledger, purchasing). (3) In-
ventory MIS Department involvement in
system (programming, hardware, etc.).
(4) Develop plan and budget for provi-
ding future services.
7 . Health and Hospitals System
Key concern: Understanding of computer
requirements and options.
Key persons to contact: Director of
Health and Hospitals, MIS Department
liaison to Health and Hospitals.
(1) Clarify Administrative Service's
responsibility for Health and Hospital
computer system. (2) Do joint review
of systems in operation and in develop-
ment .
8. School IBM Computer
Key concern: continuing incompati-
bility between School and City IBM in-
stallations .
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Key persons to contact: School De-
partment officials, MIS Department li-
aison with School Department.
(1) Clarify City-School MIS relation-
ships. (2) Do joint review of system
development projects supported by MIS
Department. (3) Decide whether and how
these projects should be supported in
the future. (4) Do joint review of
computer interface requirements. (5)
Decide whether, when and how to make
interface improvements.
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APPENDIX A
INVENTORY OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS
No complete, continuously maintained, City-wide
inventory has ever been undertaken. Therefore, what follows
is an estimate only of Boston's present investment in com-
puter technology. The City currently owns about 15 large
and medium-sized computers and between 30 and 50 smaller
systems. It has entered into service bureau contracts in
excess of $1 million. Roughly 200 employees are engaged on
a full-time basis in computer management. They are assisted
by consultants who are paid through approximately 50 con-
tracts.
The total cost of using computers was estimated in
FY 1982 to be $8.5 million, allocated among nine departments
including the MIS Department. Today, annual expenses are
probably close to $15 million, as many more departments are
incurring computer-related expenses.
Management Information Systems (MIS) Department
This department has the largest staff dedicated to
computers: 75 full-time employees plus consultants, the
most powerful computer, and the broadest scope of computer
activities. It is located within the Administrative Ser-
vices Department, but its primary function is to service
other departments, such as Personnel, Auditing, and Trea-
sury. It services its many user departments mainly on its
IBM computer — a 3081-D, one of the largest of IBM's pro-
ducts. The 3081, which was installed in late 1983, is four
times more powerful that the 3033 it replaced. The 3033 was
installed in 1981 to replace a 370.
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Also subject to the Department's control are se-
veral other computers which are dedicated for use by other
departments. These include the computer of the Collector-
Treasurer, the Assessing Department's computer for property
assessment, and a recently purchased $800,000 system to pre-
pare City maps.
The MIS Department actually controls about one-
third to one-half of the City's total computer operations.
Other departments with major computer budgets are described
below.
Office of the Parking Cleric
This office is responsible for the collection of
parking violation fines. Since the Office's official open-
ing in 1982, it has relied upon a service bureau for pro-
cessing of parking tickets. As is typical of service bureau
arrangements, the servicer uses its own equipment and does
not operate on City premises.
School Department
The Department owns a mid-sized IBM computer (4341)
in its central headquarters, as well as numerous mini-
computers and personal computers located at school sites.
The School Department and the MIS Department have
selected different operating systems for their respective
IBM computers. (An operating system is a master program
that executes the commands of the individual application
programs.) As a result, the programs stored on the two com-
puters cannot easily be shared.
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Health and Hospitals
Boston City, Mattapan and Long Island Hospitals
have contracted with a service bureau to provide a wide ar-
ray of computer services. The servicer processes most of
Health and Hospitals' patient bills and payroll and ac-
counting records. Boston City Hospital also owns several
computers that are dedicated to specific medical functions,
such as reporting lab results.
Police Department
One of the first City departments to invest in com-
puters, the Police Department currently owns several IBM and
Data General computers. The IBM installation is designed to
communicate easily with the MIS Department's IBM computer.
The most demanding function of the Department is police dis-
patching; the computers are also used for numerous special-
ized tasks.
City Auditor
The City Auditor uses the MIS Department's IBM com-
puter to process its accounts payable, payroll, general led-
ger, and other accounting tasks. It does not own any com-
puter equipment except for a word processing system. The
computer expenses of this Department, which include person-
nel and consultant expenses, have not been estimated for
this report.
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Personnel Department
This department uses the MIS Department's computer
to process its personnel records. Its computer expenses
(personnel and consultants) have not been estimated for this
report.
.
Assessing Department
This department inherited the Digital Equipment
computer (VAX 11/780) owned by the Office of Property Equal-
ization when OPE was dissolved. The computer, recently
transferred to the MIS Department for day-to-day operations,
is used for property records and revaluation. The Assessing
Department has retained its staff of programmers.
Collector-Treasurer
The Collector-Treasurer owns and operates a Digital
Equipment VAX 11/780 to process the recording of the City's
receipts. The computer is also used by the Boston Redevel-
opment Authority and Public Facilities.
Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency
This federally funded agency operates a federally
owned Digital Equipment PDP 11/70 computer, which processes
the participant and payroll records of federal jobs programs
in the City.
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Boston Public Library
BPL has one large Digital Equipment computer and
one small IBM computer to help in circulating and cata-
loguing books, and in accounting.
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APPENDIX B
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; HISTORICAL
HIGHLIGHTS
1978-1979 Coopers and Lybrand, City's auditors, docu-
ment numerous problems with financial
controls
.
Jan. 1981 City Auditor contracts with consulting firm
to plan and help implement a comprehensive
automated financial system.
July 1981 Consultants install packaged general ledger
system on MIS Department's IBM computer;
bookkeeping machine is retired.
July 1981 Automated system to monitor the City's 13,000
vendors is installed.
Summer 1981 City decides to design its own personnel/
payroll system. Stop-gap system installed to
provide first 100% count of persons on pay-
roll.
Spring 1982 City decides to design its own accounts pay-
able system.
July 1982 City-designed personnel/payroll system goes
into operation on MIS Department computer.
Fall 1982 City-designed accounts payable system goes
into operation on MIS Department computer.
1983 Continuous modifications are made to general
ledger, personnel/payroll, and accounts pay-
able system.
Aug. 1983 School Department launches project to upgrade
its appropriation control and accounts pay-
able system, to run on its own computer.
Nov. 1983 Consultant advises City Auditor to purchase
or create new appropriations control system.
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INTRODUCTION
There are approximately 21,000 City employees whose
combined wages and fringe benefits constitute 70% to 75% of
the City's operating budget.
During the Proposition 2-1/2 crisis, the City laid
off 2,700 employees and "saved" $39 million. Since that
time City employment has continued to rise:
as of January 12, 1982 the City employed 18,958
as of January 11, 1983 the City employed 20,308
as of June 30, 1983 the City employed 21,113
(See Appendix A for 1983 hiring and attrition figures.)
SOURCE: Boston Municipal Research Bureau (BMRB) payroll count
As personnel costs are such a large proportion of
the budget, force reductions are one way to reduce or elim-
inate the deficit. The BMRB has in fact recommended a re-
duction of 850 City employees by June 30, 1984.
This chapter examines the City's personnel policies
and practices. After providing a brief background on the
state-level civil service system applicable to Boston and,
in particular, the rules relating to provisional employees,
the chapter reviews in depth the City of Boston hiring pro-
cess, affirmative action rules and figures, and employee
compensation plans. The report also includes a benefit-
by-benefit analysis of non-wage employee compensation and a
review of the City pension system. Whenever possible, the
chapter attempts to distinguish between the City's "theoret-
ical" personnel policies and the actual municipal practice.
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Personnel Costs' Share of Boston's
FY 1 984 Activity Budget
Total = $421.7 million
Salaries and Fringes
$304.6 million
Other Costs
$117.1 million
Display 1
Number of City Employees
30,000
^ 25,000
V) >-
s -
E
v
LJ C
c
•5|
E m
3 fl>Z -C
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
1973 1978 1982 1984
Year
Display 2
X - 2
ORGANIZATION
The Personnel Division of the Administrative Ser-
vices Department is comprised of six units: the Administra-
tive Unit, which maintains statistics and records and over-
sees Civil Service rules and regulations; Position Control;
Recruitment and Referral; Affirmative Action; Employee Dev-
elopment and Assistance; Classification and Compensation.
Although it is a division of the Administrative Services
Department, the Group Insurance or Hospitalization/Insurance
Plan has a separate budget. Each City department has its
own personnel officer. The duties assigned to these offi-
cers vary. Some personnel officers are full-time and per-
form most personnel-related functions, while others are
part-time and exercise only payroll-related responsibilities.
RESIDENCY
Employees of the City are required to live in Bos-
ton. With the exception of department heads, who have six
months' leeway, the residency requirement applies as of the
starting date of employment. Initial responsibility to as-
certain residency rests with the department head. There-
after, the employee has responsibility. Each February, em-
ployees sign a card certifying they live in Boston.
The lone exception to this rule concerns persons
employed by the City at the time the rule was enacted. A
grandfather clause exempted them from coverage, but if such
an employee is promoted, this clause no longer preempts ap-
plication of the residency requirement.
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CIVIL SERVICE
This year is the centennial anniversary of the Com-
monwealth's civil service law, which applies to both State
and municipal personnel systems, including Boston's. The
law and the regulations under which it has been implemented
have evolved since the legislation's initial enactment. The
most recent civil service amendments were contained in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1981, which became law on Janu-
ary 4, 1982. Under the law, as amended, positions with var-
ious state agencies as well as with cities and towns of the
Commonwealth are designated civil service positions, which
are subject to the requirements of the civil service law and
rules. The law specifically exempts certain positions from
coverage
.
Provisionals and Section 26
A main criticism of the Boston civil service system
is the lack of eligible lists from which appointments and
promotions can be made. Many eligible lists have expired
and few examinations have been offered in recent years.
Consequently, thousands of people provisionally appointed
and provisionally promoted are filling permanent and tem-
porary positions. Figures for the City of Boston show over
1,000 provisional appointees and over 500 provisional pro-
motees as of November 4, 1983.
One approach used by the state legislature involves
exempting positions from civil service as discussed above.
The other approach, Section 26 of the Civil Service Law,
provides for examinations for certifying eligible provi-
sional employees to permanent civil service positions.
First, to be eligible for certification, provisional ap-
pointees must:
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o be currently employed and occupy a civil
service position on a provisionally ap-
pointed or promoted basis;
o have served on provisional appointment
from December 1, 1980 to June 1, 1981.
To be eligible for certification, provisional pro-
motees must:
o have been serving on a provisional pro-
motion on January 4, 1982;
o have had continuous service for the two
years immediately preceding, i.e. since
January 5, 1980.
Upon passing an examination which demonstrates
qualifications, the employee shall be certified in pref-
erence to all others for permanent appointment to the
title. The City is responsible for submitting the list of
those employees eligible as "Section 26 Designees." In both
cases, the position title occupied on January 4, 1982 is
considered the eligible title for the Section 26 examination
procedure
.
A two-step process for certification follows. The
appointing authority must certify that the provisional ap-
pointee or promotee has met the statutory dates of eligi-
bility. The employee will then be declared a "Section 26
Designee" and must subsequently pass an examination for the
position title occupied provisionally on January 4, 1982.
While the statute and guidelines outlined above
appear clear, a good deal of confusion actually surrounds
these certifications of eligibility. Last fall, the City's
Personnel Division requested each agency to compile a list
of eligible employees. These lists were sent to the State
Department of Personnel. Apparently, little effort was made
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by either personnel office to check these lists against rec-
ords. In a number of departments reviewed during December
1983, many supervisors and department heads had requested
Section 26 designation for employees who did not appear to
meet the eligibility dates. As summarized in Table 1, only
31% of the Section 26 employees appeared to meet eligibility
requirements
.
TABLE 1
SUGGESTED SECTION 26 DESIGNATION
(SELECTED DEPARTMENTS, DECEMBER 1983)
# of # of # Req. Actual
# of Prov. Prov. for # Eli-
Di vis ion Empl
.
Appt s
.
Promns
.
Desig . gible
Licensing Board 14 12 2 7 1
Law Department 75 57 18 15 7
Treasury 57 22 35 34 16
Assessing 199 158 41 30 4
Veterans 32 13 19 13 3
99 31
Any new administration inherits employees from the
previous administration, most notably those on civil ser-
vice. This allows for continuity but also creates inflexi-
bility in the system. Retention of all inherited provi-
sional appointees, however, places an unreasonable financial
burden on the new administration. The extent of this burden
is illustrated by the department personnel figures reviewed
in this study. Of the personnel sample reviewed, 60% hold
permanent civil service positions at salaries lower than
those for the positions they currently occupy, and 40% are
provisional appointees. Of those permanent employees, many
had been certified by their department heads as eligible for
Section 26 designation at the higher salary level. A simi-
lar situation exists for the provisional promotees.
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Civil Service Examinations
Ideally, the State Department of Personnel Admin-
istration gives periodic, open competitive examinations for
entry to civil service positions (labor service and pro-
fessional recruitment are alternative methods of access).
Depending upon their experience and education, persons may
apply to take examinations for particular job titles. Ap-
plicants will be notified of their performance within 60
days of the test date. It may, however, take up to 18
months before a list of persons who passed and are "eligi-
ble" for the position is certified. These lists are subject
to periodic expiration.
HIRING AND PROMOTION PROCESS
All City departments follow a standard hiring and
promotion process, outlined below and illustrated by Display
3, except for Health and Hospitals, Boston Redevelopment
Authority, Library Department, School Department, the
County, and the Water and Sewer Commission. Emergency em-
ployees (hired for up to six weeks) and Mayoral appointees
also are excluded from this process.
Step 1— When a vacancy occurs or when a new
position is created, the department head can fill the open-
ing or postpone filling it to save money in the department's
personnel budget. The department head cannot transfer this
money to non-personnel budget items without City Council
approval
.
Step 2— The department personnel officer noti-
fies the Personnel Division of the vacancy by submitting
Employment Opportunity Form 1 and Job Posting Information
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Form 1A, or a Promotional Bulletin. If the department head
chooses to make the position open and competitive (anyone
can apply), Forms 1 and 1A are used. In a Civil Service
department, the position may be restricted to permanent em-
ployees in that department, in which case a Promotional Bul-
letin is utilized. Some departments, such as Public Works,
only promote in this way.
The department head's discretion to make promo-
tional positions open and competitive was firmly established
in a 1981 arbitration decision. The City had inserted em-
ployees into promotional openings in several departments.
AFSCME went out on strike. The arbitrator held that the
City has a right to open promotional positions to talent
outside the department. In the 1981 contract negotiations,
AFSCME successfully advocated for the Promotional Bulletin
process
.
The department head may check a box on Form 1 or on
the Promotional Bulletin requesting the Personnel Division's
assistance in obtaining affirmative action candidates.
While the Affirmative Action Unit's (AAU) role is normally
prompted by a department head's request, on occasion the AAU
initiates a search.
Step 3—The Personnel Division time-stamps the
forms and assigns a posting number.
Step 4—The Control Desk (within the Personnel
Division) logs the forms into its tracking system.
Step 5—The Deputy Director of Personnel assigned
responsibility for that department confirms that an opening
exists. The deputy reviews the forms to ascertain whether
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the specified duties and responsibilities are consistent
with those approved for the position and whether the salary
and stated minimum qualifications are also consistent. The
deputy also determines eligible job titles. The deputy as-
signs a posting date, and sends the forms to the Classi-
fication and Compensation Unit.
Step 6—The Classification and Compensation Unit
reviews the forms to ensure the job title is valid and re-
veals enough about the position to inform a potential appli-
cant whether or not to apply.
Step 7—As Promotional Bulletins arrive, they are
sent back to the department for posting. Every Friday, the
Control Desk assembles open and competitive posters for the
Printing Division.
Step 8--Printing picks up the open and compet-
itive posters, prints copies and sends them to all depart-
ments .
Step 9—The job is posted on the second Wednesday
following its arrival at the Personnel Division. The job is
posted for 5 working days (Wednesday 9:00 am to Tuesday 5:00
pm) . Open and competitive positions are posted in all de-
partments and in other locations, depending on how wide a
circulation is desired. If affirmative action assistance
has been requested, circulation includes such agencies as
the NAACP and ABCD.
Newspaper advertisements are seldom used. With the
Supervisor of Personnel's permission, ads may be placed for
technical positions, jobs generating few applications, or
positions failing to attract appropriate candidates.
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Promotional positions available only to Civil Ser-
vice employees are posted via Promotional Bulletins. The
Bulletin specifies the Civil Service titles eligible for the
promotion.
Although written policy dictates that all openings
should be posted, exceptions occur in three situations: (1)
vacancies where the departing employee had recently assumed
the position (not wanting to repeat the hiring process, a
department head may call the assigned deputy for permission
to contact a former applicant); (2) when the department head
wishes to hire an affirmative action candidate and the post-
ing fails to yield a qualified minority or woman; and (3) if
the department head is not interested in hiring any of the
applicants
.
In the latter two instances, recruitment con-
tinues. As mentioned, this may include newspaper adver-
tisements. Also, department heads may call Personnel for
permission to interview someone they know personally. Ini-
tial applicants receive notification after selection is made.
Applications are filed during the five-day posting
period. Persons eligible for promotion submit a Form B Ap-
plication for Promotion to the department head. Open and
competitive applications are received only in the Personnel
Division. The applicant may include any documents, such as
a resume, that could be helpful to the selection process.
Step 10—The deputy assigned to that department,
or the personnel officer in the case of Promotional Bul-
letins, determines whether the number of applicants is suf-
ficient. If not, the deputy asks the personnel officer
whether to re-post the position, place newspaper adver-
tisements or solicit affirmative action assistance. Al-
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though the City retains "blind" applications, those sub-
mitted for no particular opening, it makes no attempt to
match such applications with current openings, due to its
own shortage of personnel to perform such tasks.
Step 11—The assigned deputy, or the personnel
officer in the case of Promotional Bulletins, reviews the
applications to be certain applicants meet the minimum qual-
ifications stated in the job posting. Applicants who do not
meet the qualifications are notified by letter, and their
applications are retained.
Step 12--Applications are forwarded to the per-
sonnel officer. Personnel does not interview candidates
unless specifically requested to do so by a department head
or if a department head has difficulty finding acceptable
candidates. If applicable, the Personnel Division admini-
sters skills tests.
Step 13—The assigned deputy sends a list of
qualified applicants (Form 2) and their applications to the
personnel officer. There is no limit to the number of can-
didates that can be referred.
Step 14--The personnel officer calls each promo-
tional or other candidate to schedule an initial interview.
Step 15--Initial interviews are conducted by the
personnel officer.
Step 16—The personnel officer calls back some
applicants for in-depth interviews.
Step 17--The department head interviews final
candidates. Usually, a final selection is made at this time
and the candidate is informed.
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A starting date and salary are established at this
time. The Personnel Division has asked department heads to
start employees two weeks from the final interview in order
to allow enough time to process necessary paperwork. While
most department heads cooperate, some start employees im-
mediately. In these instances, the department head gener-
ally obtains the Personnel Division's approval.
Step 18—After the interview, the candidate meets
with the personnel officer, or occasionally with a super-
visor, to fill out forms and discuss available fringe bene-
fits.
Step 19—The personnel officer completes the em-
ployment papers, which include the Personnel Action Report,
W-4 forms, and health and retirement benefits forms. This
should be done on the day selection is made, again to ensure
a timely first paycheck. However, not all personnel offi-
cers process the paperwork promptly, often accounting for
delays in receipt of the first paycheck.
Step 20—The department head signs the paperwork
and forwards it to the Personnel Division.
Step 21—The Front Desk time-stamps the paperwork.
Step 22—The Control Desk logs it into the track-
ing system.
Step 23—The assigned deputy determines whether a
Civil Service classification list exists. If there were
such a list, it would render the entire process up to this
point moot. However, this has not been an issue because so
few examinations have been offered in recent years. The
deputy also reviews the paperwork for accuracy.
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Step 24—The Supervisor of Personnel signs it.
Step 25—The Director of the Administrative Ser-
vices Department, through the Executive Secretary, signs the
papers
.
Step 26--A personnel assistant in the Personnel
Division enters the employee information into the integrated
payroll system.
Step 27—The employee begins work on a Wednes-
day. It usually takes one to five weeks to receive the
first paycheck. The average time is three weeks, but there
are isolated instances where check processing has taken as
many as twelve weeks.
Criteria for promotions are dictated by Civil Ser-
vice law and collective bargaining agreements, which provide
that where ability and qualifications are relatively equal,
seniority shall be the determining factor. As of October
1982, attendance statistics must be considered. Discretion
to determine ability and qualifications rests solely with
the appointing authority, provided the responsibility is not
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. Be-
cause the City has no performance appraisal system, except
for attendance records, promotion decisions can be highly
inconsistent and subjective.
Boston City Hospital (BCH)
The hiring process at Boston City Hospital is simi-
lar to the process noted above with two important differ-
ences. When a vacancy occurs at BCH, an in-house personnel
committee, as opposed to the department head, decides
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whether to fill the opening. The other difference occurs
after the employee has been hired but has not yet received
the first paycheck. At BCH, the policy is to make an ad-
vance of money to the new employee after the first week to
help through the typical lag time.
Process for Adding and Deleting Positions in Mid-Year
The position control system, or quota system, is a
component of the integrated payroll system and helps control
position additions and deletions that occur in mid-year and
are not reflected in the budget. The process for adding a
position in mid-year includes nine steps:
Step 1--The department head determines the need
for a new position.
Step 2--The personnel officer completes a Request
to Amend Personnel Quota Form and a Form 30, which describes
the position, and forwards them to the Personnel Division.
Step 3—The Front Desk in the Personnel Division
time-stamps them.
Step 4—A personnel assistant assigns a position
control number.
Step 5—The Deputy Director of Personnel assigned
responsibility for that department checks the forms for ac-
curacy .
Step 6—The Supervisor of Personnel signs the
request forms.
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Step 7—The request forms are forwarded to the
Budget Division, which determines the availability of
funds. If funds are available, the Budget Director signs
the forms.
Step 8—The Budget Division enters the change in
the position control system.
Step 9—The department receives a copy of the
approved request form.
The process for deleting a position, rarely used,
is identical except there is no need for Form 30, assigning
a position control number and determining availability of
funds (Steps 2, 4 and 7).
Creation of a New Job
Occasionally, a department head wishes to create a
new job that has not been classified and assigned a grade.
The procedure is set forth below.
Step 1— In a letter to the Supervisor of Person-
nel, the department head requests that a new job be created.
Step 2--The Supervisor of Personnel approves or
denies the request.
Step 3—The Classification and Compensation Unit
of the Personnel Division composes a job description.
Step 4—The department head signs the job des-
cription.
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Step 5—The Classification and Compensation Unit
conducts a job audit, determines a grade for the position
and recommends this grade to the Supervisor of Personnel.
Step 6—The Supervisor of Personnel accepts (or
rejects) the recommendation. A letter is written to the
Mayor requesting that the job be created and assigned the
stated job grade.
Step 7—The Mayor signs an executive order creat-
ing the job.
Step 8--Personnel files the order.
Step 9--The personnel assistant receives a copy
and changes the records.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The City of Boston has fallen short of meeting its
goals for minority representation in the City's workforce.
In terms of both the total number of minorities employed by
the City (utilization rate) and the total number of minority
employees hired in a given year (hiring rate), the minority
and female population has not been fully represented. In
addition, while procedures exist, there is no official sys-
tem for handling discrimination complaints filed by City
employees against the City.
The City of Boston's policy for affirmative action
is clearly stated in a January 1, 1983 Executive Order prom-
ulgated by the prior Administration:
It is the policy of the City of Boston to
see that each individual, regardless of
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his/her race, color, religious creed,
marital status, military status, handicap,
children, national origin, sex, age, an-
cestry, sexual orientation or source of
income shall have equal access to employ-
ment; and to encourage and bring about
mutual understanding and respect among all
individuals in the City by the elimination
of prejudice, intolerance, bigotry and dis-
crimination in the area of employment.
(Source: Administrative Services Depart-
ment: Personnel Division, Executive Order,
dated January 1, 1983.)
The Director of Affirmative Action, who is res-
ponsible for coordinating and overseeing the City's Affirm-
ative Action efforts, works in the Personnel Division. As
stated in the January 1983 Order, the Supervisor of Per-
sonnel and the Director of Affirmative Action supervise the
following programs and requirements:
o Department heads and deputy directors
are required to attend at least one
Affirmative Action Management seminar
annually.
o Each department head must submit to the
City's Supervisor of Personnel and the
Director of Affirmative Action a per-
sonnel utilization analysis for the de-
partment and work with them to develop
and implement annual hiring goals and
timetables
.
o An Affirmative Action Advisory Board,
consisting of six voting members who
hold regular monthly meetings, must be
established by the Mayor. The Board's
responsibilities include: (i) reviewing
Boston's Affirmative Action policy and
progress; (ii) receiving a quarterly
report from the Director of Affirmative
Action; (iii) monitoring each depart-
ment's utilization analysis, implemen-
tation of goals, timetables and recruit-
ing plans; and (iv) reporting on a semi-
annual basis to the Mayor on the Board's
activities and findings.
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During the past year, however, most department
heads have failed to comply with the Executive Order. As
recently reported by the Director of Affirmative Action,
only one of the numerous department heads attended an Af-
firmative Action Management seminar. In addition, the
Affirmative Action Advisory Board has not met every month as
required. In fact, it has met only once since the Order was
issued one year ago.
Hiring Policies
The City's Affirmative Action Policy is designed to
ensure that the number of minorities and women working for
the City reflects Boston's population mix. As shown in
Table 2, the City has significantly improved its hiring and
utilization of minority employees over the past five years.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF MINORITY EMPLOYMENT:
1979-1983
Fiscal Year
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Minority Hiring Rate 28% 31% 38% 38% 37%
Minority Utilization
Rate 18% 19% 21% 23% 25%
SOURCE: City of Boston, Departmental Communication, dated
August 2, 1983.
Despite improvement in the City's minority employ-
ment, the City has not reached its goals in minority repre-
sentation (see Appendix B). Of the City's population, 33%
are minority and 53% are women. The minority population
consists of approximately 22% Black, 7% Hispanic, 3% Asian,
and 0.2% Native American. The 1983 minority and female
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utilization rates of 25% and 45%, respectively, fall well
below the percentage of minority and female representatives
living in Boston (Source: Director of Affirmative Action).
To ensure continued improvement in the represen-
tation of minorities and women in the City of Boston work-
force, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD) has developed suggested hiring rates for City depart-
ments. These rates depend on the percentage of minorities
and women currently employed in a department. These rates
seek to ensure that minorities and women are employed
equally throughout a department at all salary levels.
According to the City's Personnel Division, since
July 1, 1983 eight jobs paying in excess of $25,000 per year
have been awarded. Six of those positions were filled by
white males, one by a white female and one by a black fe-
male. As of mid-November 1983, only 3.8% of City jobs over
$25,000 were held by minorities and only 8.0% were held by
women (see Display 4). This data clearly suggests that the
City has been slow to promote minority and female employees
to upper management positions.
Discrimination Complaints
The City of Boston currently does not have an of-
ficial Affirmative Action Complaint Process. An Executive
Order on Employment Discrimination Complaints has been in
draft form for over a year.
According to the Director of Affirmative Action, an
individual wishing to file a complaint against the City must
do so through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or the MCAD within 180 days of the act of discrimi-
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nation. A summary of 1982 MCAD employee discrimination com-
plaints appears in Table 3. The departments or facilities
with the most complaints filed against them include: Boston
City Hospital (8), the Fire Department (7), the Department
of Health and Hospitals (5), and the Police Department (5).
TABLE 3
1982 MCAD EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTSa
Complaints
Cases Closed
Cases Settled
Pending
Source: MCAD
Not including School or County employ-
ees.
Reflects the following complaint
classes: race (27), sex (19),
national origin (5) and age (3).
These figures do not add to the above
total of 52 because two complaints
fall into more than one complaint
class
.
52b
20
1
31
COMPENSATION
Compensation plans for Boston employees originate
from several sources. City ordinances and statutes estab-
lish salaries for certain positions. The Executive Employ-
ment Policy Manual governs the compensation of appointed
officials and employees of selected departments. For man-
agers in Civil Service departments, the Management Devel-
opment and Compensation Plan determines compensation. Col-
lective bargaining agreements cover members of collective
bargaining units. In addition, the Executive and Management
compensation plans incorporate by reference the Rules for
Administering Pay Schedule. The extent to which these rules
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are incorporated into union contracts, if at all, is unre-
solved, as arbitrators have interpreted contracts dif-
ferently.
The compensation structure for employees other than
appointed managers whose salaries are fixed by ordinance or
statute is a grade/step system. The Classification and Com-
pensation Unit of Personnel assigns each position a job
grade (e.g., R-14, MM-5) based on a standardized point sys-
tem called the Hay method. Each job grade has a salary
range that is divided into steps. A person at the first
step of a job grade earns the minimum salary for that
grade. Someone at the highest step makes the maximum
amount. Normally, an employee enters a job grade at the
first step and advances in one step increments.
In Civil Service departments, the process for rais-
ing salaries is known as the "9(f)" process, from Rule 9(f)
of the Rules for Administering Pay Schedule. An identical
procedure, 15(f), covers the County. The "9(f)" process,
which applies to all employees, is outlined below and is
diagrammed in Display 5.
Step 1—The department head decides to offer the
position at a salary higher than the minimum. This usually
occurs at an applicant's final interview. City policy pro-
hibits department heads from promising a higher rate to a
prospective employee until approved by the Supervisor of
Personnel. Any increase is made retroactive from the ap-
proval date to the employee's starting date. In practice,
many department heads do not wait for approval. This fail-
ure to wait often results in grievances relating to prom-
ised, but rejected, increases.
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Step 2—As when filling any opening, the per-
sonnel officer completes the Personnel Action Report (PAR)
and forwards it with the other paperwork to the Personnel
Division. The PAR places the employee at the first step of
the job grade.
Step 3—The department head signs the PAR.
Step 4—The Front Desk at Personnel timestamps
the PAR.
Step 5—The Control Desk logs it into the track-
ing system.
Step 6—The PAR is reviewed for accuracy and ini-
tialed by the assigned Deputy Director of Personnel.
Step 7—The Supervisor of Personnel signs the PAR.
Step 8—The Director of Administrative Services
(by his Executive Secretary) signs the PAR.
Step 9—A personnel assistant enters the salary
information into the integrated payroll system. It takes an
average of three weeks from the time Personnel receives the
PAR to this step.
Step 10—The personnel officer writes a 9(f) re-
quest which states the reasons the employee merits a higher
salary.
Step 11—The department head signs the 9(f) re-
quest and sends it to the Personnel Division.
Step 12—The Front Desk time-stamps it.
Step 13—The Control Desk logs it in.
Step 14— It is reviewed for accuracy by the as-
signed deputy.
Step 15—The Supervisor of Personnel approves or
denies the request.
Step 16— If it is approved, the Director of the
Administrative Services Department (through his Executive
Secretary) signs the request.
Step 17—A copy of the approved request is sent
to the department. Three weeks is the average time elapsed
from Personnel's receipt of the 9(f) request.
Step 18--The personnel officer completes an Ad-
justment in Compensation form and forwards it to the Per-
sonnel Division. This form will generate the move from the
lowest to the higher step.
Step 19—The department head signs it.
Step 20--The Front Desk time-stamps it.
Step 21--It is logged in by the Control Desk.
Step 22—The assigned deputy reviews the form for
accuracy and initials it.
Step 23—The Supervisor of Personnel signs the
form.
Step 24—The Director of the Administrative Ser-
vices Department (through the Executive Secretary) signs it.
Step 25—A personnel assistant in the Personnel
Division adjusts the integrated payroll system to reflect
the increase. The average time elapsed from Personnel's
receipt of the Adjustment in Compensation form to this final
point is three weeks.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Holidays
City employees receive 13 paid holidays while most
private industry employees receive 10 holidays. Employees
may take religious holidays off, but must use their own
vacation days for this purpose. Some departments try to
reschedule workdays for employees taking the religious holi-
day. Each holiday costs the City approximately $1.25 mil-
lion.
Vacation
On January 1, 1984 any employee who is currently on
the payroll and has been continuously employed by the City
since June 1, 1983 will be credited with a 1984 vacation of
10 days. Also, employees who work from January 1, 1984
through May 31, 1984 will be credited with their 10 days of
1984 vacation. An employee who leaves the City's workforce,
other than one discharged for cause, receives prorated vaca-
tion pay in proportion to the months of service since June
1. Employees who have worked 4 years and 5 months before
June 1 receive 15 vacation days. Those with 9 years and 5
months service before June 1 and 19 years and 5 months be-
fore June 1 receive 20 and 25 vacation days, respectively.
The average vacation leave is 3 weeks.
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Employees in managerial level jobs receive 4 weeks
vacation time after fulfilling the eligibility requirements
(1 year in a manager's position). After 19 years and 5
months of service, managers receive an additional week of
vacation
.
Vacation leave must be used annually except upon
approval of the Supervisor of Personnel (1980 memo) and the
employee's department head. Some departments do not allow
vacation at crucial periods of the year (e.g., Assessing at
tax time; Public Works at snow removal time) and these em-
ployees are often permitted to carry over vacation time be-
tween fiscal years. In the past, managers could carry over
their unused vacation time until it was used or they could
receive compensation of up to 10 days unused vacation in any
one year. This policy was discontinued 2 years ago but was
reinstated by the previous administration to give the ap-
pointed employees a maximum of six paid vacation weeks (4
weeks that managers receive and 2 accrued over the years).
The estimated cost for this vacation time is $1,735,000.
Sick Leave
Sick leave is accrued at the rate of 1-1/4 days
each month of employment, not to exceed 15 working days in a
year. A new employee may not charge sick leave or receive
sick leave pay until completing 6 months of service and ac-
cruing 7-1/2 sick leave days.
Abuse of sick leave time before and after weekends
and holidays has been a major problem. Supervisory per-
sonnel are supposed to monitor this practice and if a pat-
tern of absenteeism is detected, then the employee is
subject to disciplinary action.
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Boston's employees averaged 13.5 sick days in 1981.
The projected 1984 average is 8 days of sick leave per em-
ployee. A Boston Municipal Research Bureau study to be re-
leased in February shows the average number of sick days at
the School Department was 14 days in 1982 and 12 days in
1983. The work year for teachers is 180 days compared to
240 days for other City employees. Private industry av-
erages 5-6 days sick leave per employee.
Personal Days
Employees who qualify for personal days must ar-
range with their supervisor before taking the day(s). Mana-
gers are permitted to take two personal days per year. Some
union employees such as the Police are also entitled to this
benefit. These personal days are charged to employees' sick
leave time.
Attendance
The City began to confront its absenteeism prob-
lems, after the 1978 publication of a Boston Municipal Re-
search Bureau report which concluded that Boston's sick
leave program was characterized by poor supervision, exces-
sive wages, frequent abuse, and high cost. Effective Sep-
tember 1979, the City instituted the Managing Attendance
Program. The Program standardized attendance policies and
procedures throughout the City. To ensure enforcement, the
program made managers and supervisors accountable for the
attendance of their employees and made employee attendance a
factor in evaluating supervisors for promotion.
For the first couple of years, the program had
little effect. Reflecting the impact of Proposition 2-1/2
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and its draining effect on employee morale, Boston's employ-
ees averaged 13.5 sick days in 1981, as noted above. This
figure closely approaches the 15-day yearly allowance. In
additon to reflecting low morale, the number indicates an
attitude that sick leave entitles an employee to 15 extra
days off each year and represents an abuse of the sick leave
provision.
The pr ,gram was reemphasized in 1981. It is still
in operation and apparently has significantly reduced ab-
senteeism and its costs. The Boston Municipal Research
Bureau has conducted an extensive assessment of the pro-
gram. The expected release date of the BMRB report is
February 1984.
Carryover of Vacation and Sick Leave
The present policy of vacation time carryover pro-
hibits the accrual of vacation time between years absent the
approval of the Supervisor of Personnel and the employee's
department head. Department heads are responsible for send-
ing a list of names and days accrued to the Personnel Divi-
sion. If days are carried over, they must be used by March
1 of the next year. An investigation of the Traffic and
Parking Department indicates that this policy is not fol-
lowed in practice. One employee had accrued 175 days, and
another 40 days. Both were on vacation, while department
records showed them to be at work.
Sick leave can be carried over for many years to
protect employees in the event of a long-term illness.
An additional expense to the City is the practice
of retiring or resigning employees taking accrued vacation
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or sick leave just prior to their departure. The City pays
current salary levels for the days these employees accrued
years before at a lower salary.
In the case of an extended absence, the employee
one level below the absent employee moves up to perform the
departed employee's job, and so on down the line of employ-
ees. The City must pay these workers the rate of pay com-
mensurate with the job actually performed, typically a 1/12
higher level of pay than their previous wage level.
Sick Leave Buybacks
As noted above, employees have the right to accrue
sick leave to protect against a long-term illness. However,
many employees are entitled to varying policies of sick
leave reimbursement referred to as "sick leave buyback .
"
Employees employed on or before January 1, 1983, who used
fewer than 5 days of sick leave during the previous year
were eligible for reimbursement in a lump sum payment. Per-
sons employed since July 1, 1983, were eligible on a pro-
rated basis. Employees must have been on the payroll as of
December 31, 1983, to be eligible.
The employee fills out a "Sick-leave reimbursement"
form which is then signed by the department head. The Per-
sonnel Division approves or denies the payment and returns
the form to the originating department. The number of days
pay reimbursed plus the number of sick days used equals a
total of five (5) days of cash redemption. For example, if
zero (0) sick days are used, the employee may receive five
(5) days pay in cash redemption; if four (4) sick days are
used, the employee may receive one (1) day's pay in cash
redemption.
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The payment of the 1982 sick leave buyback was
postponed until 1982 because of Proposition 2-1/2. The pay-
ments for 1981 and 1982 were paid within several months of
each other. A summary of recent years' sick leave buybacks
follows
:
1981 $ 118,000
1982 327,000
1983 (detailed in Table 4) 327,000
1984 est. 300,000-400,000
TABLE 4
CITY OF BOSTON
SICK LEAVE BUYBACK EXPENDITURES
JUNE 30, 1983
(in thousands)
Department Actual 1983
General Government $74
Public Safety 81
Public Works 29
Property & Development 15
Parks & Recreation 32
Library 18
Inspectional Services 42
Veterans' Services 6
Health & Hospitals 2
County 22
Employee Benefits 6
TOTAL $327
SOURCE: Payroll - Personnel System
January 9, 1984
Upon retirement, voluntary resignation or death of
an employee with fifteen or more years of service, a portion
of the employee's accrued sick leave (includes credit for
service in State or County government) shall be paid to the
employee or his estate in cash. This portion computes to
between 15% and 30% of days accrued. The employee's rate of
pay is obtained by averaging the base pay for the three
years in which the employee's base pay was the highest.
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The payment for unused sick leave or vacation time
at the time of retirement, resignation or death is included
in the employee's last paycheck and is subject to income
withholding tax. Managers have not received their buyback
long-term accrued money since Proposition 2-1/2 went into
effect
.
At retirement, Boston Police Detectives are paid
for 15% of their accumulated, unused sick days up to a maxi-
mum of 200 days at the daily rate in effect at retirement.
The Boston Police Patrolmen's rate is the same.
Upon retirement or death, employees of the Fire
Alarm Division are paid for 15% of their accumulated sick
leave. The rate of pay is equivalent to 1/4 of an employ-
ee's regular weekly compensation at the time of retirement.
At the School Department, sick-leave reimbursement
is referred to as "severance pay." Boston Teacher's Union
(BTU) members and the Boston Association of School Admini-
strators and Supervisors (BASAS) with ten years of service
are paid severance pay when they leave, at the rate of 40%
of their final per diem pay for each accumulated sick leave
and personal day. In the past, there was unlimited accum-
ulation of sick days, but under the terms of the new con-
tract the maximum accrual will be 400 days. The "severance
pay" budget for the 1982-1983 school year totalled
$1,975,000.
Health and Life Insurance Benefits
Employees have a range of health insurance
options. They may elect coverage by a Blue Cross/Blue
Shield Master Medical Plan, by one of the Blue Cross/Blue
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Shield affiliated Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO), or
by one of three independent HMOs. Also, retirees and the
252 working employees over 65 years of age who qualify for
Medicare A and B are eligible for a City Medicare Supplement
which serves as Master Medical Coverage.
In fiscal 1984, the City allocated over $27.3 mil-
lion to cover the health insurance costs for 26,000 City
employees, spouses, family members and retirees. The School
Department's budget for this item includes an additional
$9.1 million. The working rates used for budgeting purposes
are $115 per month for single individuals and $270 per month
for families. If an employee's costs for an illness exceed
$75,000, the City is protected from further liability
through its reinsurance policy.
The City pays 75% of the premiums for an employee
who subscribes to the Master Medical Blue Cross/Blue Shield
Plan. It pays 100% for HMO coverage, because premiums are
considerably lower than those of the Master Medical Plan.
Nevertheless, 86% of all City employees choose the Master
Medical Plan.
In 1980, the City replaced a premium payment system
of insurance with a cost reimbursement plan. Savings have
resulted each year since the change, including $6 million
the first year, $3 million the second year and $5 million
the third year. In each of the next three years, the City
has the right to negotiate the rates with Blue Cross/Blue
Shield based on utilization.
All employees receiving health insurance benefits
carry a basic $2,000 life insurance policy, with an option
for additional insurance. The Boston Mutual Life Insurance
Company is the insurer. The City pays 50% of the cost of
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the basic life coverage. The
$1.23. The current premiums
November 1989.
monthly cost
will remain
per employee is
constant until
Workmen's Compensation Disability
The state Workmen's Compensation Act applies to all
employees in the Commonwealth unable to work because of job-
related injury. Approximately 300 persons are presently on
the City's Workmen's Compensation roll at an estimated
annual cost of $3 million. Of the 300, approximately 75 are
widows of City employees who died of job-related injury. As
long as the survivors are not fully self-supporting or have
not remarried, they receive an allowance, an amount for
minor children plus funeral expenses up to specified maximum
amounts. Another 75 employees are totally and permanently
disabled and will receive benefits for as long as they
live. The remaining 150 are temporarily and totally dis-
abled. Some of these persons may eventually be declared
permanently and totally disabled.
The State Industrial Accident Board can remove re-
cipients of workmen's compensation from the rolls if they
are proven no longer eligible. Alternatively, individual
employees may voluntarily remove themselves from the rolls.
A temporarily and totally disabled person receives
disability compensation equal to 67% of the average weekly
wage, the maximum being $309.29, plus medical costs during
the recovery period. Employees can receive their full wages
by supplementing this compensation with sick leave allow-
ance. When an employee has received the maximum allowable
compensation ($75,000 in 1983) a doctor may declare the em-
ployee permanently and totally disabled. The employee will
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continue to receive a weekly stipend. A seriously injured
employee can be proclaimed permanently and totally disabled
immediately after the accident.
The permanently and totally disabled person is en-
titled to receive an accident disability pension upon re-
tirement. Compensation equals 67% of wages received during
the three years of highest pay, the maximum being $309.29,
plus the difference necessary to equal the full pension
(paid by the Retirement Board). The employee cannot obtain
work elsewhere while receiving accident disability compen-
sation, unless the employee has veteran's disabled retire-
ment status.
Overtime
During fiscal 1983, overtime costs (excluding the
School Department) totalled $7.3 million. This amount re-
flects City and Suffolk County overtime of $6.3 million and
$1.0 million, respectively. The fiscal 1983 appropriation
for overtime costs was $7.5 million. The fiscal 1984 budget
provides $9.5 million for overtime.
Training/Education/Careers
The Personnel Division is responsible for employee
training and development. Five full-time employees concen-
trate on training and employee assistance activities. In
addition, a few departments have internal training resources
and programs funded by the individual department.
Over the last few years, management training has
received little attention. In 1977, the Personnel Division
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retained the American Management Association to design mana-
gerial courses in conjunction with the Management Develop-
ment Council, a group of City managers. The effort col-
lapsed apparently because managers perceived no need for
training their peers how to manage, although they did be-
lieve supervisors would benefit from such training.
In 1978, several employees in one department parti-
cipated in a program called Managing for Productivity. The
City purchased a pre-packaged program which has not been
given to other departments.
The City has held affirmative action seminars, in-
cluding a one-day workshop in 1982. VThile heavily attended
by department personnel officers, only one department head
participated. (See the Section on Affirmative Action.)
In September 1983, the City initiated a career dev-
elopment program. The four-day program, given after regular
working hours, was open to all City employees. Topics in-
cluded interviewing skills, resume-writing, how to research
a company, networking techniques, and individual career
counseling. The City retained an outside firm to develop
and conduct the program at an initial cost of $38,000. It
was projected that 100 to 200 people would attend. When
approximately 400 employees showed interest, the contract
was extended for an additional $20,000. The contract fur-
ther provided that the consulting company would train cer-
tain City employees to conduct the career development course.
The City has never formally addressed the integra-
tion of new employees, other than within the Department of
Health and Hospitals. The Personnel Division is in the pro-
cess of developing an orientation program. As the program
is envisioned, supervisors will learn to conduct programs
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within their departments and the Personnel Division or de-
partment personnel officers will give periodic half-day ori-
entations in such areas as health insurance benefits, re-
tirement benefits and sick leave procedures. An employee
handbook is also being developed and is in the final stages
of composition.
Some union contracts provide for joint union/
management committees, including committees on training and
productivity, but these committees have yet to be formed.
Tuition Reimbursement
All Boston employees receive tuition reimbursement
benefits for job-related courses although coverage varies
among groups of employees (see Table 5). The City offers
full tuition reimbursement for certification programs in
cases where employees must take courses to remain certified
(e.g., nurses). Personnel budgeted $60,000 for tuition re-
imbursement in fiscal 1984.
TABLE 5
TUITION REIMBURSEMENT
Employee
Managers
Personnel Division
Employees
Reimbursement
Percentage
100%
100%
Course Grade
Requi rements
Regardless
of grade
Regardless
of grade
Non-managerial employees
(other than in Personnel
Division)
75%
60%
45%
50%
A
B
C
Pass/Fail
(must pass)
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On December 8, 1983, Personnel notified employees
that all allocated funds had been committed and that no ap-
plications received after December 7 would be honored. This
does not necessarily mean that the entire allocation has
been used. In committing funds, Personnel assumes it will
pay out the maximum amount. In addition, employees fre-
quently decide not to take a course after they submit the
initial request for reimbursement.
TABLE 6
TUITION REIMBURSEMENT - FISCAL 1984
Number of Expected Expected
Employees Total Reim Reim
Partici Cost of bursement bursement Allo-
pat ing Tuitions Rate Rate cation
Employee
Management 27 $ 8,002
Personnel
Division 6 3,215
Other employees 116 54, 040
Subtotal 149 $65,257
Miscellaneous
Expenses
TOTAL
100%
100%
75%*
$ 8,002 $10,000
3,215
40, 530
$51, 747
6,000
4,000
40,000
$54,000
6,000
$57, 747 $60.000
* Rate assumes that all employees receive an "A 1
course
.
in the
DISCIPLINE
Following is an overview of the principles and pro-
cedures developed to ensure the effective and fair imple-
mentation of discipline. The rules apply to supervisors as
well as to line employees.
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Before taking any disciplinary measures, a super-
visor must find just cause and must establish that the
supervisor gave forewarning of possible disciplinary ac-
tion. The supervisor must also demonstrate that the rule
violated was related to orderly, efficient and safe conduct
of operations, that an objective and thorough investigation
was conducted, and that the supervisor has applied rules,
orders and penalties even-handedly , fairly, and without dis-
crimination .
The City adheres to a policy of progressive dis-
cipline, also referred to as corrective discipline. Under
this policy, management informs the employee in question
that there has been a violation of an accepted work policy
but offers the employee a chance to correct behavior. Cor-
rective discipline entails the progressive use of coun-
seling, oral warning, written warning, suspension, demotion
and termination. Counseling is used to prevent the develop-
ment of poor or unsatisfactory patterns of behavior and to
redirect employees to a satisfactory level of behavior. An
oral warning is given when a first infraction of the rules
has occurred, and the employee is put on notice that behav-
ior needs to be corrected. If the infraction is not a first
offense or is serious enough to warrant a more severe dis-
cipline, an oral warning need not be given. The written
warning is given when an employee has failed to improve be-
havior in a stated period of time or for a more serious
first time incident. The warning must include a citation of
previous warnings and an indication of the consequences of
further misconduct. The warning becomes part of the employ-
ee's permanent file and the employee is permitted to file a
counter statement.
A supervisor, with the approval of the department
head, may suspend an employee by notifying the employee and
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providing a written explanation of the reasons for suspen-
sion. Suspensions of less than five days are given when
warnings have failed to correct misconduct. A suspension
may also be given when a serious incident or "overt act"
(misconduct which is willful and deliberate) has occurred.
Examples include insubordination, refusal to work, refusal
to carry out direct orders and abusive, disruptive or vio-
lent behavior.
In all but the most extreme cases, suspension for
more than five days or discharge is not considered unless
the previous measures have failed to improve the employee's
job performance. In the case of suspension of five days or
more, or of discharge, the employee is suspended with pay;
given a written statement of the specific reasons for the
contemplated action; provided with Massachusetts General
Laws, Chapter 31, Sections 41-45, if the employee is a Civil
Service member; and given notice of a hearing. Suspension
without pay is more commonly used.
Demotion is a means of placing an employee in a
position of lower responsibility and pay. However, if an
employee is clearly capable of performing the current job
but fails to improve after adequate warnings, resignation or
discharge may be preferred to demotion. Discharge may re-
sult from commission of a grave offense. More often it
occurs after an accumulation of minor offenses and the fail-
ure of the employee to react positively to corrective ef-
forts .
Externally Funded Personnel
In 1978, the Boston Municipal Research Bureau
(BMRB) reported that the City was reducing the number of
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employees paid from City funds and significantly increasing
the number of City workers paid through federally funded
Comprehensive Employment and Training (CETA) and Community
Development programs. This trend has since been reversed.
From 1976-1978, City-funded employees decreased by
1,118 while CETA-funded employees increased by 915. In
1978, over 2,400 City employees were funded by CETA (40 de-
partments had CETA employees in numbers ranging from 1 to
366). Community Development funded in excess of 200 addi-
tional positions in City departments and partially funded
many more. A summary of recent employee position totals
appears in Table 7.
Federally-funded employees who provide services to
Boston are not well monitored or tracked by City officials.
Financial discussions often focus on the operating budget,
cash flow or capital needs. None of these areas directly
involves federally funded personnel. Thus, it is possible
that employees being paid by federal funds are "hidden", and
that when a department requests additional personnel to per-
form a certain task, it is not known whether these services
are already being performed by federally funded personnel.
Better information on federally funded personnel is needed
for a comprehensive assessment of budgetary needs.
PENSION SYSTEM
Boston participates in the State-Boston Contribu-
tory Retirement System. The system's goal is to provide
retired city employees with benefits sufficient to maintain
a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during ac-
tive working years.
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYEE POSITIONS a
Employees Funded By :
June Jan. Jan. June
1981 1982 1983 1983
Community Development
Block Grant — 169 97 82
Community Schools -- -- 76 58
Eastern Regional
Library — 52 64 65
EEPA — 81 76 84
Mayor's Office of
Housing — 109 96 67
Senior Aides Project — 90 89 90
Others — 28 28 28
Total Externally
Funded Positions 954 529 526 497
City-Funded Employees 13,040 10, 298 11,452 12,325
Total: All Employees 13 , 994 10,827 11,978 12, 822
Externally Funded as
% of Total Personnel 6.82 4.88 4.39 3 .87
SOURCE: Boston Municipal Research Bureau.
a Excludes the School Department.
b A breakdown of externally funded positions is una-
vailable.
Organization
Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws estab-
lishes the organization of the system, the composition of
the Retirement Board and uniform benefit formulas to cover
all public employees.
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The three key participants in the administration of
State-Boston's retirement system are the Boston Retirement
Board, the Commissioner of Insurance, and the Contributory
Retirement Appeals Board. The Department of Banking and
Insurance has general supervisory responsibilities for the
Commonwealth's Retirement System.
The State-Boston Retirement System is administered
by a three-member retirement board composed of the City aud-
itor; a retired or contributory member of the system, elec-
ted by the members of the system; and an individual chosen
by the other two members. The Board's responsibilities in-
clude determining each employee's eligibility and retirement
benefits, coordinating the payment of such benefits, and
investing the Fund's assets. A member of the actuarial
staff of the State Division of Insurance monitors the Re-
tirement Board's operations. The Board is required to main-
tain an accurate report of each member's date of birth,
length of employment and amount of compensation as well as
other pertinent information.
The State Commissioner of Insurance is required to
inspect and examine the retirement system at least once
every three years to make certain of its financial condition
and its ability to fulfill pension obligations.
The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) is
responsible for ruling on appeals of local retirement
boards' decisions brought to it by any employee. CRAB is
composed of three members: the Director of Bureau of Ac-
counts, the Commissioner of Insurance, and an Assistant
Attorney General.
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Membership
With the exception of elected officials who may or
may not choose to participate, and temporary or part-time
employees whose eligibility is determined by the retirement
board, most of the City's 13,324 employees (at June 30,
1983, exclusive of School Department employees) are members
of the system.
Funding Policy (Contribution)
City employees hired after January 1, 1975 con-
tribute 7% of their salaries to the retirement system.
Those hired before January 1, 1975 contribute 5% of their
salaries. For fiscal 1982 and 1983, employee contributions
totalled $24,566,000 and $26,130,000, respectively.
The City funds its cost of pension liabilities on a
pay-as-you-go basis mandated by statute. The annual cost of
contributory pensions is established by the State Division
of Insurance and is a legal obligation of the City which
must be included in the tax levy. Boston is reimbursed an-
nually by the State for the portion of the City's annual
pension contribution paid in the prior year for retired
teachers. For fiscal 1982 and 1983, City contributions were
$84,897,000 and $84,818,000 respectively.
The net unfunded actuarial liability of the City of
Boston at June 30, 1983 was $1.3 billion. This amount re-
presents the estimated accumulated cost of all benefits al-
ready earned by existing pensioners and current employees
but not yet funded. Actuarial assumptions used in the cal-
culation of the unfunded liability include: life expectancy
of employees; retirement age assumptions by group; and an 8%
rate of return on invested assets.
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Benefits
Retirement benefits are paid to members with at
least 10 years of service who are at least 55 years of age.
The amount of benefits is affected by an employee's years of
service, average salary and a statutory percentage. Re-
tirees may elect one of three benefit options for receiving
retirement allowance: a full retirement allowance on a
monthly basis; a benefit 3% to 5% less than the full allow-
ance with the difference paid to a beneficiary at the time
of the employee's death; or a "Joint and Last Survivor" al-
lowance paid to the retiree for life with 67% of the allow-
ance paid to the surviving beneficiary.
If an employee dies before retirement, a death ben-
efit equal to the value of the employee's accumulated deduc-
tions is paid to the employee's beneficiary. Employees who
become totally disabled generally receive a pension equal to
72% of the annual rate of regular compensation.
Analysis
The four major financial issues surrounding the
future viability of the State-Boston Retirement System in-
clude :
o The pay-as-you-go funding approach
o The legal and institutional constraints
on investing pension fund assets
o Superannuation benefit levels
o Disability retirement awards.
The statistical and actuarial information necessary
to demonstrate the bottom-line impact of the financial is-
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sues on the State-Boston Retirement System was unavailable
and, therefore, further study is needed.
Pay-As-You-Go Funding Approach—The 5% and 7%
contributions by Boston employees, together with the income
earned on those contributions, constitute only 10% of the
retirement benefits to be paid. The remaining 90% is pro-
vided by the City from its annual operating budget. City
contributions are made only when retirement benefits become
due. As noted, Boston faces a net unfunded actuarial lia-
bility of $1.3 billion.
Concern over the pay-as-you-go method is not re-
lated simply to the existence of an unfunded liability, but
also reflects the anticipated rate of growth in this un-
funded liability. Employment increases and/or salary level
rises will cause an acceleration in the rate of growth,
while a decline in the City's revenue base (as with Proposi-
tion 2-1/2) will place a further burden on future revenues
available to fund pension liabilities. The results will be
an enormous burden on the local tax base. Under the con-
straints of a 2.5% annual tax base growth, pension costs in
Boston will exceed local tax levies within the next ten
years
.
Pay-as-you-go financing adversely impacts Boston's
credit rating, causing the interest rates charged on long-
term borrowings to increase. When lowering Boston's rating,
Moody's Report cited several factors, including the impact
of pension costs.
Legal and Institutional Constraints on Investing
Pension Fund Assets—Chapter 32, Section 23 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws imposes four constraints on investment
fund managers in making investment decisions: the legal
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list, which lists permissible investments; percentage limi-
tations which set ceilings on the amount of assets that may
be committed to each investment category; minimum investment
return; and fiduciary responsibility. These restrictions
provide little investment flexibility. Although the intent
of the restrictions is to ensure conservative and prudent
investment and thereby minimize the risk to principal, this
relative inflexibility results in a suboptimal investment
portfolio
.
Superannuation Benefit Levels—A comparison of
superannuation benefits in Massachusetts to public pensions
in other states and to private sector pension plans suggests
benefit levels in Massachusetts are generous. Benefits paid
to typical retirees in Boston are considerably higher than
those paid in other public systems without Social Security.
Disability Retirement
of disability retirement in the
tern: accidental disability and
Awards—There are two types
State-Boston Retirement sys-
ordinary disability.
Ordinary disability retirement is awarded to em-
ployees who become "totally and permanently disabled" from
the performance of their duties through an accident or other
medical condition or problem which is not job-related. An
ordinary disability award is only granted employees who are
less than 55 years of age with 15 or more years of service.
Minimum benefit awarded is 22.5% of final salary.
Accidental Disability awards are granted to em-
ployees who become totally and permanently disabled while in
the performance of duties. Unlike ordinary disability, an
accidental disability is available to any member who is dis-
abled in the line of work, regardless of the member's years
of service. Accidental disability retirement allowance
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equals 72% of average salary received over the last twelve
months. In addition, a $312 annual allowance is given for
each dependent under age 21. A cap of $36,000 is placed on
the accidental disability allowance.
Findings by the JFK School of Government in a study
entitled "Evaluation of the Local Public Pension System in
Massachusetts" pertaining to disability included the fol-
lowing :
o Disability retirement allowances are not
awarded uniformly.
o The average proportion of retirees
awarded disability retirement allowances
is greater than the average proportion
of retirees receiving disability retire-
ment benefits in other states.
o The retirement boards are empowered by
broad discretionary authority to deter-
mine disability awards. At the same
time, the boards do not use firm stan-
dards or guidelines in making these
ordinary and accidental disability de-
terminations .
o Accidental and ordinary disabilities
have increased between 1976 and 1980
based on a compariosn betwee the number
of employees retired due to these disa-
bilities and the total active work force.
o Accidental disabilities are awarded ap-
proximately two to four times more fre-
quently than ordinary disabilities.
o Ordinary disability payments are not
growing in relation to all retirement
benefit payments, but accidental disa-
bility shows a steady increase from 1976
to 1980.
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SUMMARY
As noted, a variety of structures comprise the
framework of Boston's hiring and promotion policies and
practices. They include Civil Service and discrimination
laws, Civil Service guidelines of the State Department of
Personnel Administration, union contracts, and broad discre-
tionary powers and authority of the department heads. While
the complicated formality of the process may be adhered to,
department heads often follow it merely as a formality, hav-
ing already decided whom to hire or wishing to exercise com-
plete control over hiring.
1. A primary vehicle allowing for hiring
process control is the department
head's discretion to restrict promo-
tional vacancies to department em-
ployees. This discretion should be
abolished. All vacancies should be
open and competitive. Opening promo-
tional positions will increase oppor-
tunities for minorities and women to
assume middle and high level positions
and will otherwise facilitate efforts
to develop an employee population re-
presentative of the City population.
2. Another potential tool for improving
the hiring and promotion process is a
performance appraisal system. The City
should develop such a system to enhance
morale and productivity and to en-
courage communication between managers
and their employees. Where possible,
performance appraisals should be used
in selecting candidates for promotion.
Civil Service Law and union contract
provisions (i.e., qualifications and
ability being equal, seniority shall
prevail) may restrict its use in promo-
tions .
3. The City also should commence a study
to evaluate positions. The study's
emphasis should be on evaluating jobs
traditionally filled by women on an
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equal basis with comparable positions
held predominantly by men. While this
could be costly, current initiatives in
other states may result in legislative
mandates that would affect Boston.
The Personnel Division should confirm
whether Civil Service classification
lists exist when it receives notice of
an opening rather than when the hiring
process is almost complete. Existing
policy mandates this check, but under
current practice the check is not made
until the department sends Personnel
the paperwork for a newly hired em-
ployee .
In the area of affirmative action, the
City has made some accomplishments but
remains short of its goals. The minor-
ity employee utilization rate has in-
creased nearly 10% in the past five
years. However, representation of min-
orities and women in all levels of City
government is low, particularly in top
management positions.
The Executive Order promulgated January
1, 1983 should be amended to provide
that the Affirmative Action Director
reports directly to the Mayor and has
the power to recommend approval or dis-
approval on all appointment forms and
personnel requisitions.
The Affirmative Action Unit should be
strengthened to offer viable technical
assistance to department heads in the
recruitment and hiring of minorities
and women. The Unit should play a key
role in assisting the Personnel Divi-
sion to create a pool of qualified can-
didates for affirmative action purposes.
To increase the levels of • minorities
and women in higher level positions,
promotional vacancies should be tar-
geted for affirmative action hires
where appropriate. Although the hiring
and utilization rates for women and
minorities have increased over the past
five years, overall, many departments
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have not complied with affirmative ac-
tion hiring and utilization rates. An
incentive or punishment system should
be created to ensure department heads
and personnel officers adhere to the
hiring formula for minorities and women
and to stimulate greater overall inter-
est in affirmative action.
As Civil Service examinations are given
and lists are developed, the City
should take full advantage of the Civil
Service provisions which could assist
in furthering its affirmative action
goals
.
The attendance of department heads at
affirmative action training sessions
and meetings should be mandated.
Health insurance costs are a tremendous
drain on Boston's financial resources.
The City should explore the possibility
of self-insuring health care insur-
ance. The Boston Health Plan, one of
the City's HMO alternatives, could be
the basis of a self-insurance plan.
Many employees have avoided this Plan
because of its BCH location. If Plan
utilization can be increased, through
creating incentives, then self-
insurance may be feasible.
Another means to reduce health in-
surance costs is to quickly remove em-
ployees who have left City employment
from the health care insurance roll.
While the City has training and employ-
ee development resources which have
produced some important programs, these
resources have been underutilized.
Some training efforts have suffered
from lack of interest on the part of
managers. Others have lacked long-term
and widespread benefits because they
are given only once. The City's train-
ing staff possesses the capacity and
skills to expand training and employee
development
.
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One area requiring particular attention
is management training. The City
should develop an on-going program. No
such training exists, and many managers
achieve their status for political rea-
sons or for their worker skills, not
for managerial skills. New managers
should receive the training within a
few months of their becoming managers.
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APPENDICES
A. City of Boston Monthly Employee Count - 1983 (by
Department
.
B. Affirmative Action Figures (December 1983).
C. New Hires: July 1, 1983-December 31, 1983.
D. City of Boston Payroll Analysis for the Years
Ended June 30 (1982, 1983).
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APPENDIX A
CITY OF BOSTON
MONTHLY EMPLOYEE COUNT - 1983
(By Department)
Due to the conversion of payrolls from the "old"
payroll system to the new Integrated Personnel/Payroll Sys-
tem, employee data for the months of January, February and
March is unavailable due to the fact that this information
is not captured under the "old" payroll system. During the
first quarter of 1983 (calendar year), the following depart-
ments were still on the "old" payroll system: Police De-
partment, Fire Department, Public Works Department, Library
Department, and School Department (Teachers, Administration,
Custodians and Per Diems).
The Grand Total figures do not include the School
Department or the Department of Health and Hospitals. Em-
ployee figures for the School Department cannot be provided
by this office because the School Department did not convert
to the Integrated Personnel/Payroll System until September
1983. The Department of Health and Hospitals payrolls are
processed by an outside private agency. This office main-
tains Hospital payroll records pertaining only to the gross
dollars of weekly payrolls and the total number of payroll
checks generated.
The figures listed as total terminations and total
adds may be overstated due to the fact that some employees
are terminated from one position and hired to another posi-
tion within the same period. Total terminations that oc-
curred during the first ten (10) days of January 1984 are
listed; however, this figure is overstated because some of
the employees that were terminated from their positions dur-
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ing this time period were, in fact, "hired in different posi-
tions. Additionally, some of these positions will, neces-
sarily, be filled by the new Administration.
Department information pertaining to the number of
employees in the department has been obtained from actual
payrolls processed by this office. Information pertaining
to the number of terminations and new hires has been taken
from the Personnel Transaction Report (a weekly report that
lists all transactions, input by the Personnel Division,
that affect employee/payroll status).
January 9, 1984
SOURCE: City of Boston, Personnel Division.
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APPENDIX B
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FIGURES
DECEMBER 1983
Total Em- # of Min- # of Fe-
ployees or i ty Em— % .of TTlr* 1 PiTl—1UQ J. C XJlll % iof
Department in Dept. ployees Total ployees Total
153
-J_ -J >s 13 8 .5% 9 ftz o 18 .3 %
EnvironmentJ—I AAV -L, An v—' 4 111Lw X A V— 16 3 18 .75 1 1 68 .75
Put) 1 i r Tmn. Comm. 13 1 7 .7 6\J 46 .15
T^a "i T" HniKi nrri- ll iiu U D 1 liy 17 ft 47 .0 oo 4 .7
PuV)l ir» VJorlcsA. U A-/ -A- -L V— FT >.—/ J_ Ik t_3 745 186 25 .0 36 4 .8
NDEA 161 56 34 .7 57 .14
Office of Housing 66 17 25 .75 26 39 .0
Penal Dept
.
198 57 29 .0 12 6 .0
Pol i rp-Ci vi 1 ian 507 56 11 .0 280 55 .0
Pol "i c* c±— TTn"i fnrm 1 833/ U J J 2ftfi 15 .6 l on 5 .4
AHm Q y- \/ -i r** c± ctWJiiW m ucl ViLco 27 3 11 .0 1 3 48 .0
Dafa Prnpp^Qi nrr
-LV C_i l_ d A, A. W V_ COO 1 11M 67 ft 12 .0 29 43 .0
Rn o ^ t" 23 2 8 .7 10 43 .47
HealtTi Ins.A A \,r ^—A J_ V— A A -»- X A k_J • 19 10 52 .6
Labor RelationsJ—1 V—I A_/ v—/ J_ J- \—-
-A. S^A 1— -1- v—' A A
—
1 12 1 10 .0 5 50 .0
Personnel 38 12 31 .5 25 65 . 78
Pr i nt i na 64 1 1 .5 9 14 .0
Purchasing 24 3 12 .5 11 45 .8
Adm. Complaints 18 1 7 . 1 4 28 . 5
Assess i ng 202 36 17 .82 108 53 .46
Auditing 51 14 27 .45 31 60 .78
Ret i rement 44 4 9 .0 23 52 .0
Traffic/Parkina 276 49 17 .75 112 40 .0
J A Q.7 17 .64 3 5 68 .62
Fiscal Affairs 14 1 7 .1 6 42 .85
Inspection Serv. 219 23 10 .5 30 13 .6
Vet. Services 32 6 18 .75 12 37 .5
City Clerk 11 1 9 .0 6 54 .0
Registry 25 2 8 .0 21 84 .0
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APPENDIX B
( continued
)
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FIGURES
DECEMBER 1983
Total Em- # of Min- # of Fe-
Department
ployees
in Dept.
ority Em
ployees
- % of
Total
male Em-
ployees
% of
Total
Public Facil. 160 25 15. 62 36 22. 5
Comm. Schools 119 33 27. 7 7 66, 3
Treasury-Coll
.
32 3 9. 37 15 46. 87
Treas-Treas
.
25 2 8. 8 32.
Election 46 4 8. 6 12 26..0
Fire-Civilian 126 4 3. 1 33 26..0
Fire-Uni form 1, 569 257 16. 3 257 16 .3
Law Department 55 6 10..9 34 61..8
Law-Workmens Comp. 8 1 12..5 6 60 .0
Public Library 478 73 15..2 259 54..18
Licensing 14 3 21..42 10 71 .42
Elderly 115 23 90\j . 68
Mayor 1 s Office 16 2 12 .5 10 62 .5
Rent Control 21 1 4 .7 11 52 .38
Comm. Services 11 1 9 .0 7 63 .0
EDIC 9 3 33 .3
Consumer Services 14 2 14 .28 7 50 .0
Public Info. 14 1 7 .0 6 42 .85
Policy Management 31 4 12 .9 20 64 .51
Parks & Rec. 424 105 24 .7 52 12 .0
SOURCE: City of Boston Personnel Office
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APPENDIX C
NEW HIRES
JULY 1, 1983 - DECEMBER 31, 1983
Salary Total Percent
Range Employed Employed
Non-Minorities
:
Total $13,000 349 70.4%
$13-25,000 97 70.8
$25,000 + 7 87.5
Male $13,000 195 39.3%
$13-25,000 69 50.4
$25,000 + 6 75.0
Female $13,000 154 31.0
$13-25,000 28 20.4
$25,000 + 1 12.5
Minorities
:
Total $13, 000 147 29. 6%
$13 -25, 000 40 29..2
$25, 000 + 1 12..5
Male $13, 000 67 13..5
$13 -25, 000 27 19..7
$25, 000 +
Female $13, 000 80 16..1
$13 -25, 000 13 9..5
$25, 000 + 1 12..5
Black $13, 000 110 22 .2%
$13-25, 000 30 22..0
$25, 000 + 1 12..5
Male $13, 000 51 10..3
$13 -25, 000 20 14..6
$25, 000 +
Female $13, 000 59 11..9
$13 -25, 000 10 7..4
$25, 000 + 1 12..5
Hi spanic $13, 000 18 3..6%
$13 -25, 000 7 5..1
$25, 000 +
Male $13, 000 9 1..8
$13 -25, 000 5 3..6
$25, 000 +
Female $13, 000 9 1..3
$13 -25, 000 2 1..4
$25, 000 +
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APPENDIX C
( continued
)
NEW HIRES
JULY 1, 1983 - DECEMBER 31 , 1983
Salary Total Percent
Range Employed Employed
A ^ "i r\ n $13 . 000 18 3.6%
$13-25 000 3 2 2
$25 000 +
1 lu J- V-^ $13 . 000 6 1 2
$13-25, 000 2 1 .
5
*25 000 +
Female $13,000 12 2.4
$13-25,000 1 0.7
$25 , 000 +
xAlll t: L 1 L- a. 1
1
<fcl 3 000 ? %.
Indian $13-25,000
$25, 000 +
Male $13,000 1 0.2
$13-25,000
$25,000 +
Female $13,000
$13-25,000
$25,000 +
TOTALS $13,000 496 100.0%
$13-25,000 137 100.0%
$25,000 + 8 100.0%
SOURCE: City of Boston Personnel Office
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Collective Bargaining

INTRODUCTION
Under state law, employees of all cities and towns
in the Commonwealth have the right to organize into bargain-
ing units and bargain collectively (through representatives
of their choosing) with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. The law permits munici-
pal employees to engage in certain concerted activity to
achieve their ends, but prohibits municipal employee strikes.
As of November 1983, the City of Boston, including
the School Department, Suffolk County and City Departments,
employed approximately 21,249 employees. Of these, approxi-
mately 16,812, or 79%, were organized into 36 bargaining
units represented by 23 different unions, most of which are
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor-Congress on
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). The great majority of
employees other than police, firefighters, and teachers are
represented by two large unions: the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 93;
and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local
285. Most Boston police, most firefighters, and all teach-
ers are represented by the Boston Police Patrolmen's Asso-
ciation (BPPA), the International Association of Firefight-
ers (IAFF), Local 718, and the Boston Teachers Union (BTU),
respectively. Table 1 presents the total membership and
selected demographics statistics (sex and race) of all
unions representing City of Boston employees. (See Table 1
on next page
.
)
The importance of collective bargaining costs to
the City's future fiscal health led to this comprehensive
review of the City's collective bargaining process and the
appropriation process used to fund cost increases which
result from contract settlements. The Chapter explains the
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TABLE 1
(Page 1 of 2)
MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHICS FOR UNIONS REPRESENTING CITY OF BOSTON EMPLOYEES
CITY/ SUFFOLK COUNTY DEPARTMENTS
(Percentages based on estimated total membership)
Total
Member- % % % % % % Contract
Name of Union ship Male Female White Black Hisp. Other Status
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association 1, 500 93. 4 6. 6 81. 4 15. 1 2. 6 9 Expired 6/30/82
Boston Police Superior Officer s Fed. 9 7 2. 2 QQJO. L . cJ • A** • A4 hxpi red o/ju/oz
(sergeants* lieutenants and captains*
including two employees in acting
capaci ty
)
Boston Police Detectives Benevolent Soc,,1 247 98. 2. 90. 2 0. 3 1. 5 Expired 6/30/82
o Detective Patrolmen Bargaining Unit - 2 12 NA* NA NA NA NA NA
o Detective Superior Officers
Rarna i n i n i~t Fin i +Dd L y a 1 11 1 iiy U I 1 1 L -3 5 NA NA NA NA NA NA
i 1 1 U c I lid L 1 Ulld 1 nobUL la L 1U1I
of Fire Fighters Local 718 1,657 100
.
o 0** 83 . 4 14
.
3 2 . 1 2 Expired 6/30/83
International Brother hood
of Fire Fighters and Oilers 43 100. 0..0 100. 0. 0. 0. Expired 6/30/83
(includes two bargaining units,
nno f r\y f i + \/ a n ^ r~\r*i ~f r~\Y~ f fn 1 Vtyllt; L kj 1. J.i_y a I lu unc iui jul luin
County employees)
oervice innp-i-oyees .Lnternat londi union
2 975 49 8 50.,2 86
.
3 10 3 g 5 M ,
. . ...Mediation —Ail
o City Bargaining Unit (clerical. NA NA
technical and professional) -1 , 800 NA NA NA NA pire 6/30/84
o County Unit - 300 NA NA NA NA NA NA but are sub
o Registered Nurses NA NA NA ject to wage
o Public Health Nurses -45 NA NA NA NA NA NA negot iat i ons
o Licensed Practical Nurses -240 NA NA NA NA NA NA commenci ng
7/1 /Rl
American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees^ Council 93 3,415 65.,6 34..4 78. 1 18. 2 2. 3 4 Med i at i on--Al
1
o Corrections Officers (Deer Island) -162 97..5 2..5 70. NA NA 30. contracts ex-
o Jail Officers and Nurses pire 6/30/84
(Charles Street Jail) -123 88..6 11 .4 72. 2 NA NA 27. 8 but are sub-
o Library Non-Professionals -310 46.,1 53 .9 75. 5 NA NA 24. 5 ject to wage
o City-wide Unit -3,066 60.,0 NA NA NA NA NA negot iat ions
commencing
3/15/83 or
7/15/83 .
International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 103 13 100..0 0,.0 92. 3 7. 7 0. 0. Expired 5/30/82
Boston Typographical Union No. 13 23 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Expires 6/30/84
open for wage
negotiation
since 8/15/83.
Graphic Arts Local 600 (Bookbinders) 21 76.2 23.8 90.5 0.0 4.75 4.75 FACT FINDING
expires 9/30/84
open for wage
negotiation
commencing
7/15/83
Graphic Arts Local 67 (Pressmen) 18 100..0 0..0 94..4 5.6 0..0 0..0 Expires 9/30/84
open for wage
negot iation
commenci ng
8/15/83.
Boston Public Library Professional
Staff Association
127 34..6 65..4 93..4 3.6 1.,5 1..5 Expires 9/30/84
open for wage
negotiation
since 3/15/83.
Boston Environmental Sanitation Inspec-
tors Association (housing inspectors)
65 100..0 0..0 79. , 7 18.8 1..5 0..0 Expires 6/30/84
open for wage
renegotiation
since 7/5/83.
Boston School Traffic Supervisors Assoc.
(part-time crossing guards)
101 NA NA NA NA NA NA Settled through
6/30/84.
House Officers Association
(hospital interns, residents)
272 68 .4 31..6 95..6 NA NA 4..4 Settled through
6/30/84.
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TABLE 1
(Page 2 of 2)
MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHICS FOR UNIONS REPRESENTING CITY OF BOSTON EMPLOYEES
SCHOOL DEPARTMENT 3
(Percentages based on estimated total membership)
Total
Member- % % % % % % Contract
Name of Union ship Male Female Whi te Black Hi sp. Other Status
Boston Teachers Union 4,479 36.0 64.0 71.2 20.8 5.4 2.6 Settled through
(2 bargaining units) August 1986
( supplemental
appropr i at ion
requi red
)
Boston Association of School
Administrators and Supervisors
285 74. 8 25..2 78. 5 18. 3 2.,1 1. 1 Expi red 6/30/83
Schools Department Planning and
Engineering Local 285
35 100. 0..0 96. 8 3. 2 0. , . Expi red 8/31/83
Boston Public Schools Custodians
(store deliverymen and storekeepers)
481 99. 2 0..8 91
.
7 8..3 0..0 0.,0 Expi red 8/31/83
Administrative Guild
(telephone operators)
316 2. 4 97..6 86. 3 8..3 2. 3.,4 Expi red 8/31/83
Supervisors of Attendance (Mass. Teachers
and National Education Association
af f i 1 iat ions
)
10 100. 0..0 90. 10..0 0,.0 0.,0 Expi red 8/31/83
Lunch Hour Monitors 240 NA NA NA NA NA NA Expi red 8/31/83
Food Service Association Supervisors 3 NOT STATISTICALLY MEANINGFUL Expi red 8/31/83
Cafeteria Workers, AFSCME, Council 93 400 1
.
6 98..4 81 7 18..0 0,.0 0..3 Expi red 8/31/83
Boston Schools Police Association 86 NA NA NA NA NA NA Expi red 8/31/83
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP 16,812
* Not Available
** One Female
FOOTNOTES :
1. Demographic breakdowns by bargaining units unavailable.
2. AFSCME demographic figures based on a sample of 2,488 union members
(73% of bargaining unit membership) for whom union dues payroll deduc-
tions were recorded on 11/4/83. Hospital employees were not included
on the printout. Figures, therefore, may not be representative of
overall union demographics.
3. Table does not contain figures for the inactive (no members), but duly
certified units, including the Plant Administration Association and
Bus Monitors Association.
SOURCE: Membership totals and demographic percentage breakdowns contained
in Table I represent the Financial Transition Team's best esti-
mates, as computed from City of Boston, Administrative Services
Department, Data Processing Division records, conversations with
union members. Office of Labor Relations files and, where avail-
able. School Department records.
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current bargaining process in detail, presents the terms of
contracts between the largest Boston municipal employee
unions and the City and projects the FY 1984 costs of all
collective bargaining settlements. Finally, the Chapter
compares Boston's contract negotiation process and budgetary
practices to those of four other major eastern U.S. cities.
Based on that comparison, it recommends that the Administra-
tion make significant changes in its present approach to
collective bargaining, particularly in the area of funding
of incremental costs of contract settlements.
THE FISCAL MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COSTS
From a fiscal standpoint, it is unfortunate for
Boston that nearly all collective bargaining agreements be-
tween the City and the unions representing City employees
are subject to full or partial renegotiation in FY 1984 or
earlier. One set of contracts expired on June 30, 1983 and
has yet to be renegotiated. Another set will not expire
until the end of FY 1984 but requires renegotiation of wage
levels during FY 1984. In addition, the School Department
Bargaining Team and the BTU recently settled a contract with
an estimated incremental cost of $17 million for FY 1984.
Only the Boston School Traffic Supervisors' Association and
the House Officers' Association (hospital interns and resi-
dents) have firm agreements through FY 1984. The impact of
collective bargaining increases will be especially severe
this year in light of the projected City agency appropria-
tions deficit in FY 1984 and similarly pessimistic projec-
tions for FY 1985.
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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS IN BOSTON
Governing Law
The Public Employee Labor Relations Act (Chapter
150E of the Massachusetts General Laws) governs bargaining
between the City of Boston and the labor organizations re-
presenting City employees. Under this comprehensive law,
administered by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission
(the "Commission"), all non-managerial state, county, and
municipal employees may bargain collectively on questions of
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
Employees are considered "managerial" only if they partici-
pate to a substantial degree in the preparation for or con-
duct of collective bargaining on behalf of a public employer
or if they are substantially responsible for exercising in-
dependent judgment in administering collective bargaining
contracts or the City's personnel system. "Managerial" em-
ployees, elected and appointed officials, including board
and commission members and department heads and representa-
tives of the employer, may not organize into bargaining
units. As noted above, the Act prohibits strikes by munici-
pal employees.
Employee Representation
In Boston, as in all Massachusetts communities, the
collective bargaining process begins with the determination
of appropriate bargaining units and recognition by the City
of an employee organization (union) as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the unit. (See Display 1).
To be "appropriate, " a bargaining unit must be composed of
employees who have a community of interests. This require-
ment is intended to safeguard the rights of all employees to
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THE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
CITY OF BOSTON
Labor Relations Conmission certifies union as
exclusive representative of Bargaining Unit
/Office of labor Relations or School Coitnu.tteeN
[
Bargaining Team develops city proposals and
I the unions develop employee proposals for
\. contract terms .
Negotiations commence
Civilian negotiations
/Board of Conciliation and\
Arbitration determines
I existence of impasse J
Mediation
Fact-finding
waived ^Fact-finding^
7
(Voluntary interest
arbitration >
Continued impasse in\
absence of agreement
to arbitrate J
Employees continue under
terms of prior contract
Police and fire-fighter negotiations
' Joint Labor-Management Committee
>
determines existence
v of impasse J
Mediation
/ Binding, final last
J best offer interest
I arbitration
f Interest \
arbitration
Police
Fire-fighter
(^Contract signed
/"Mayor submits appropriation^
\^ order to City Council J
City Council rejects\
appropriation ordery
C
City Council binds the City by
appropriating funds for the contract2
c
Grievance arbitration and
contract administration
Display 1
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efficient and effective representation. No unit may include
both professional and non-professional employees unless, by
majority vote, the professional employees agree to join. To
obtain recognition as the exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit, a union must either receive voluntary
recognition by the City or petition the Commission for cer-
tification of the union as exclusive representative. The
City cannot recognize a union as the exclusive representa-
tive unless it has been so designated by a majority of em-
ployees in the unit. Sometimes, two or more unions compete
for the right to represent a particular unit. The Commis-
sion resolves such disputes by holding elections and certi-
fying the union which receives a majority of the votes cast.
A duly-certified union has the right to negotiate
agreements covering wages, work hours, fringe benefits, and
other terms and conditions of employment for all employees
in the unit. Members of a unit may not be required to join
the union or participate in union activities, but they must
pay a service fee to cover the union's cost of collective
bargaining and contract administration. In Boston, the City
Treasurer deducts these service fees from agency payrolls
and pays the deducted funds directly to each union. Like
majority shareholders of corporations who have a fiduciary
duty to safeguard the interests of other shareholders, the
exclusive representative of a bargaining unit has a duty to
represent all of its employees without discrimination and
without regard to union membership or activity.
Occasionally, some or all employees challenge the
"representativeness" of their union by filing a petition
with the Commission. There have been two such successful
challenges by Boston employees in recent years, both invol-
ving the police unions. In 1982, the Boston Police detec-
tive patrolmen broke from the BPPA and formed the Boston
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Police Detectives Benevolent Society patrolmen's unit.
Police Superior Officer Detective supervisors also broke
from the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation and
formed a separate Superior Officers unit, also represented
by the Detectives Benevolent Society. In addition, the
National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) attemp-
ted unsuccessfully in 1982 to form a separate bargaining
unit for Long Island Hospital security guards; they con-
tinue, however, to be represented by AFSCME.
Several traditionally managerial employees have
discussed the formation of a middle management bargaining
unit. However, no petition for certification of such a unit
has been filed with the Commission. The formation of a man-
agement bargaining unit would appear to violate the State
Public Employee Labor Relations Act.
Employer Representation
Once certified as exclusive representatives, City
employee unions have the right and duty to negotiate with
their employer. By state law, the Mayor or his designee
represents the City in negotiating collective bargaining
agreements with all City employees other than School Depart-
ment employees. The 13-member School Committee represents
the School Department in its contract negotiations. (See
Display 1
.
)
City Departments—In practice, the Mayor does not
play a direct role in the contract negotiation process. By
City ordinance, the Office of Labor Relations (OLR), a divi-
sion of the Administrative Services Department, represents
the Mayor with respect to all contracts (except, in 1983,
Boston City Hospital nursing contracts), in all employment-
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related litigation (other than discrimination suits) and in
other aspects of the employment relationship. Frequently,
OLR hires outside counsel to conduct the negotiations. Out-
side counsel represented the Mayor on various issues which
arose during FY 1981 and 1982, including layoffs and appeals
procedures, and in FY 1982 and 1983 contract negotiations
with AFSCME and Local 285. Outside counsel also represents
the Police Commissioner on a number of other matters, in-
cluding negotiations over the FY 1983 police deployment plan.
In addition to contract negotiation and court re-
presentation, OLR is responsible for interpreting contract
terms, notifying City department personnel of the terms and
conditions of employment for all employees, training mana-
gers to minimize contract violations and to resolve disputes
informally, and acting as liaison between unions and depart-
mental management.
Despite its importance, OLR has been plagued by
staff shortages, including vacancies in top supervisory
positions. As Table 2 illustrates, OLR staffing has de-
clined dramatically since 1978, when the Office had a super-
visor, four Assistant Corporation Counsels (negotiators and
in-court representatives), two Labor Relations Analysts and
three clerical staff as well as several part-time law stu-
dents. As of January 1, 1984, the OLR had no supervisor,
one Deputy Director, and only one Assistant Corporation
Counsel, leaving the City without an effective, in-house
negotiating arm at a time when all its contracts are due for
renegotiation. (See Table 2 on following page.)
XI - 9
TABLE 2
OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS
STAFFING PATTERN
(calendar years)
Positions 1978 1983 1984
Supervisor of Labor Relations^ 1
Deputy Director 1 1
Assistant Corporation Counsel 4 53 1
Labor Relations Analysts 2 1 1
Clerical Staff 3 2 2
TOTAL EMPLOYEES 10 9 5
1 As of January 1, 1984.
Chapter 1, City Ordinance 5, Section 4 provides that the
"supervisor of labor relations shall, under the direc-
tion of the Mayor and in consultation with the director
of administrative services, review all aspects of the
labor relations of the City and make recommendations for
their improvement, represent the Mayor in all collective
bargaining in which the City is involved, and by himself
or through assistants appear in all grievance, arbitra-
tion and court proceedings involving labor relations."
3 The office had three Assistant Corporation Counsels for
most of 1983, two of whom subsequently resigned.
SOURCE: Office of Labor Relations, Administrative Services
Department, City of Boston.
This situation is as upsetting to the unions as it
is unfortunate for the City, because no OLR staff member has
the formal authority to represent the City and to negotiate
agreements with the unions. By City ordinance, such author-
ity is vested in the Supervisor of Labor Relations, under
the direction of the Mayor. This position along with at
least two Assistant Corporation Counsel posts should be
filled immediately to ensure that the City is directly and
adequately represented in collective bargaining negotiations
this spring.
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School Departments—Like the Mayor, the School
Committee delegates responsibility for conducting collective
bargaining negotiations to an administrative unit and, in
many cases, to outside legal counsel retained under a per-
sonal services contract. Direct responsibility for the
negotiations with the School Department employee bargaining
units rests with the School Committee Bargaining Team. The
bargaining team includes labor attorneys and personnel/labor
relations analysts from the School Department, and an out-
side attorney who serves as chairman. Generally, the Mayor
and OLR play no role in School Department negotiations. At
the Mayor's direction, OLR representatives did attend the
BTU negotiations for the FY 1976-1978 and FY 1978-1980 con-
tracts, but did not attend either the FY 1980-83 or the
recently completed FY 1983-86 sessions.
Contract Negotiation
OLR, on behalf of the Mayor, and the School Commit-
tee Bargaining Team, on behalf of the School Committee, are
responsible for meeting and negotiating with the employee
bargaining units. Both parties have a duty to bargain with
each other in good faith and to participate in efforts to
resolve impasses in negotiations. Agreements reached be-
tween the parties are valid only to the extent that they
govern wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment;
they must not intrude into areas of "management preroga-
tive." Of course, what is and is not "management preroga-
tive" is an open question frequently decided by the courts.
In 1982, for example, the state Supreme Judicial Court ruled
that a collective bargaining provision restricting the
School Committee's ability to determine annually the size of
its teaching staff was an unenforceable invasion of exclu-
sive management prerogative.
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Before commencing negotiations, OLR and the School
Committee Bargaining Team (the "Team") canvas Departmental
managers and school principals for their opinions of the
existing contracts. Line managers submit critiques of the
contracts, focusing primarily on non-wage items (work rules,
for example), and these critiques are considered when the
OLR and the Team develop initial negotiating proposals.
Typically, the Mayor and the Vice-Mayor review all proposals
before they are offered to the unions. Similarly, the
School Committee formally adopts proposals developed by its
Team prior to submission to union representatives.
Although the parties may conduct formal bargaining
sessions, much of the negotiation takes place in smaller,
informal meetings between OLR's negotiators, typically out-
side counsel, and principal union officials. Though the BTU
was the first union representing a large number of employees
to settle this year, School Department settlements have
never established a pattern throughout the City. Histori-
cally, the AFSCME and SEIU Local 285 have set the pattern
for settlements between the City and other civilian employee
representatives. Typically, AFSCME settles first, followed
within several weeks by Local 285. Both organizations
represent the same kind of employees in the same kind of
agencies and thus almost always agree to identical wage
terms, thereby setting a pattern for all remaining civilian
negotiations. Nurses, however, have received more favorable
wage treatment in recent years principally because of the
nationwide nursing shortage. Partly as a result of this
differential treatment, the City has been able to hire 200
additional nurses.
The two non-civilian employee groups
—
police and
fire— follow a somewhat different negotiating process than
other unions. As in other cities around the nation, Bos-
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ton's police and fire union representatives seek parity.
The Commissioners of Police and Fire take a more active role
in negotiations than do other department heads, meeting
informally at City Hall with the unions and OLR negotiators.
Impasse Resolution
If the City and the unions reach agreement, they
may sign a contract covering no more than three years. Most
contracts for City of Boston employees are for two years.
If the parties fail to reach agreement after a reasonable
time, then either party or the parties together may petition
the state Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (the
"Board") for assistance in resolving the impasse if it
involves civilian employees or the Joint Labor-Management
Committee if it involves municipal police or firefighters
(See Display 1). The Joint Labor-Management Committee is
free to refer disputes involving police and firefighters to
the Board for resolution. However the Board may not accept
any petition from a party to a police or fire negotiation if
the petition has not first been reviewed by the Committee.
If the Board, or the Committee, in the case of
police and firefighter contract negotiations, determines
that an impasse exists, it will appoint a mediator, or the
parties may agree to select their own mediator, who then
works with the parties in an attempt to resolve their dis-
agreements. As of last month, both AFSCME and Local 285
were mediating their wage negotiations with the City.
If the impasse continues after mediation, either or
both parties to a dispute involving civilian unions may
petition the Board to initiate so-called "fact finding pro-
ceedings". Once such a petition is filed, either the Board
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appoints — or the parties agree upon — a person to serve
as a fact-finder. The fact-finder has 30 days to investi-
gate the dispute and to submit recommendations for resolu-
tion of the impasse to the Board, though, in practice, the
deadline is always waived by the parties. If the impasse
remains for ten days after the fact-finder submits his
report, the Board must make the report public and the par-
ties must either resolve the impasse or return to the bar-
gaining table. As of January 1, 1984, only one union, the
15-member Graphics Artists International Union, Local 600,
was in the fact-finding process. The major issue in the
Local 600 fact-finding relates to promotions and work
assignments
.
The parties often agree to waive the fact-finding
procedure because of its advisory, non-binding nature and,
instead, petition the Board for arbitration of the impasse.
The arbitration of such impasses is called "interest arbi-
tration" .
Under the arbitration procedure applicable to dis-
putes involving all Boston employees other than policemen
and firemen, the parties may but are not required to agree
to submit their disputes to the Board for arbitration and
the arbitrator is free to order a settlement which he deems
fair, regardless of the parties' final negotiation posi-
tions. Though either party may refuse to submit the dispute
to arbitration, once the parties agree, the arbitrator's
decision, called an "award", is binding on the City and the
employee representative, provided the City Council or the
School Committee authorized the arbitration proceedings.
Since parties in school employee and other non-civilian
negotiations are not required to arbitrate their disputes,
an impasse in such negotiations could continue forever. In
such cases employees continue to receive the pay and bene-
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fits provided under the prior, expired contract until a new
contract is negotiated. Before making changes in employee
wages, benefits or other terms covered by the previous
agreement, the City has a duty to bargain with the union on
a new contract.
As noted above, disputes involving policemen and
firemen are submitted to a Joint Labor Management Committee,
a 14-member panel appointed by the Governor which is com-
posed of six firefighter and police union leaders, six local
government representatives and two members nominated by the
other twelve members. If, after the failure of the Commit-
tee's mediation efforts, the Committee concludes that the
process of collective bargaining has been exhausted, then
either the parties must select -- or the Committee must
nominate — a neutral arbitration panel to resolve the
impasse. The Committee is free to determine the rules and
procedures for arbitration.
Prior to the passage of Proposition 2 1/2, the
state statute provided that the Committee could resolve
impasses in collective bargaining involving municipal police
and firefighters by so-called last best offer, final and
binding arbitration. Under the last best offer procedure,
the arbitrator was required to select either the City's
final proposal on all disputed issues or the union's final
proposal on all disputed issues. This procedure greatly
limited arbitrator discretion, proved costly for many com-
munities, and in 1980 was repealed by Proposition 2-1/2.
Under the terms of their latest contract, the
Boston Police, represented by the BPPA, and the City have
agreed that either party to their negotiations may force all
disputed issues to final and binding interest arbitration.
This is potentially a costly agreement for the City and is
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of questionable validity in light of Proposition 2-1/2
which, as noted above, repealed a similar statutory proce-
dure then applicable to all police and firefighter arbitra-
tions .
Funding Collective Bargaining Costs
Once the City and the union sign an agreement, the
Mayor has 30 days to submit a supplemental appropriation
order to the City Council requesting funding for the incre-
mental cost items included in the agreement, such as wage
and benefit increases. If the City Council appropriates the
requested funds, the contract is binding on the City. In
addition, the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that an
appropriation funding the first year of a multi-year con-
tract constitutes approval by the City of the entire agree-
ment. By law, if the Council rejects the Mayor's request,
then the union and OLR or, in the case of school employee
contract negotiations, the School Committee Bargaining Team,
must meet for further negotiations.
Grievance Arbitration
Formal disputes over the terms and administration
of fully executed collective bargaining contracts are called
grievances. On behalf of the Mayor, OLR represents the City
in all grievances filed by non-school employees. School em-
ployee grievances are handled separately by the School
Department. As Table 3 indicates, most grievances involving
non-school employees are resolved prior to a formal arbitra-
tion hearing and, of those which do go to arbitration, near-
ly 70% are decided in the City's favor. (See Table 3 on the
following page.)
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Decisions against the City cost Boston $62,708 in
FY 1982, the most recent year for which such statistics are
available. Similar statistics for school employee griev-
ances were not available for inclusion in this chapter.
PATTERNS IN PAST COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SETTLEMENTS
Civilian Employees
(Exclusive of School Department Employees)
Historically, the two largest civilian unions,
AFSCME, Council 93 (3415 employees) and SEIU, Local 285
(2975 employees) have settled on similar or identical wage
increases in their collective bargaining contracts with the
City. As Table 4 indicates, collective bargaining agree-
ments were reached with both unions which provided for a
$300 annual lump sum payment and a 2% to 3.3% wage increase
in three successive years, FY 1978 through 1980. (See Table
4 on the following page.)
Similarly, both unions accepted wage increases of
7% or $700 (whichever is greater for each individual em-
ployee) in FY81 and FY82 and a 6% or $700 increase (which-
ever is greater) in FY83. In addition, in FY 1981 the
AFSCME city-wide unit negotiated a longevity program provid-
ing for the annual payment of awards to employees based on
their years of service with the City. Other AFSCME bargain-
ing units and the SEIU added similar programs in FY82 and
FY83. As Table 4 illustrates these wage and longevity award
settlements have set the pattern for all other collective
bargaining agreements with the City, with the exception of
SEIU nursing contracts. (See Table 4).
Of course, wage and longevity program awards repre-
sent only two of the items contained in the City's agree-
ments with employee unions. The City-wide SEIU contract
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health and life insurance benefits, and tuition reimburse-
ment for certain technicians. A "differential" is a salary
premium paid to an employee for certain, specified duties,
or special hours of work and is expressed as a percentage of
the employee's base pay. In addition, the agreement in-
cludes a "partial" sick leave redemption provision under
which employees are paid for up to one-third of their unused
sick days currently limited to 15 days per year. The maxi-
mum redemption of 5 days is an incentive to minimize em-
ployee absences. Other civilian collective bargaining
agreements contain similar provisions. Though no detailed
estimates of the cost of these benefits are available, the
Boston Municipal Research Bureau has estimated that such
employee benefits represent 20% to 30% of total personnel
costs
.
Uniformed Forces
The majority of Boston's police and firefighters
belong to the BPPA (1500 members) and the IAFF (1657 mem-
bers) respectively. Like police and firefighter unions in
other cities, the BPPA and the IAFF seek parity in their
negotiations with the City. Typically, they also seek wage
increases slightly in excess of those negotiated by civilian
unions. The BPPA and the City have yet to agree on a con-
tract for the union which covers FY 1983.
As is the case in civilian agreements, salary dif-
ferentials and non-wage benefits represent a substantial
portion of the cost to the City of police and firefighter
contracts. A Boston police patrolman, for example, is eli-
gible for night shift differentials (9% of base salary),
special assignment pay (varies from $6.00/week to $19.50/
week according to assignment), weekend differentials
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(4.56% of base), holiday pay (one extra day's pay), vacation
work (time and one-half plus one extra compensation day),
unscheduled overtime allowances (double time), and the more
standard vacation, health and life insurance, and uniform
allowances. Upon their retirement, patrolmen may "buy back"
(redeem) up to 30 unused sick leave days. In addition, they
are eligible for certain education incentive programs (for
example, annual payments of $950 for an Associates degree,
$1300 for B.A., and $1900 for a M.A. ) and for leave without
loss of pay for veterans' conventions, veterans' funerals,
Red Cross, medical and promotional exams, inservice training
and family deaths. Collective bargaining agreements for the
City's firefighters include some of the same benefit provi-
sions, as well as a 4.75% differential for hazardous duty
and four personal days redeemable annually. Firefighters
cannot redeem sick time annually, have no weekend differen-
tial, and their night shift differential is only 5.3%. In
addition, present firefighter contracts do not provide for
education incentive payments.
School Department Employees
As noted earlier, negotiations between the City and
School Department employees are conducted by the Boston
School Committee, not by the Mayor's Office of Labor Rela-
tions. This Chapter does not review past wage settlements
betweeen the School Committee and each of the School Depart-
ment employee unions. It does contain projections for the
City-wide cost of collective bargaining in FY84, which where
based on estimates of the FY84 costs of School Department
collective bargaining agreements, including the recently
settled BTU contract. The BTU contract, which in the past
has set a precedent for settlements with other school em-
ployees, included a 5% annual wage increase for all teachers
for the 1983-84, 84-85 and 85-86 school years.
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Additional terms of the BTU contract, as announced
by the School Committee, include the following:
General Provisions
1. Eliminate third step cap for step
advancement for non-tenured teachers.
2. Subsequently laid off teachers may
resign prior to August 31 with sever-
ance pay but with forfeiture of recall
rights and curtailment of any unemploy-
ment compensation.
3. Class size maxima.
4. Annual sick leave buyback.
5. Third personal day, non-cumulative, in
exchange for elimination of laundry
list.
6. "Cooperation" between the Committee and
BTU to eradicate the asbestos problem.
7. "Cooperation" between building admini-
strator and teachers in ordering sup-
plies.
8. Health & Welfare contributions for
paras: $100, $200, $300.
9. Maternity and child care leave for
paras
.
Layoff, Recall and Transfer
1. Program areas — teachers and paras.
2. Teachers and paras must be qualified.
3. More flexibility for building admini-
strators in picking teachers from the
excess list.
4. No bumping in excessing.
5. Exemption from strict seniority when
classes are consolidated after Novem-
ber 1
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6. Stricter time limits on accepting a
recall offer.
7. More flexibility for building admini-
strators in filling vacancies by volun-
tary transfer (pick one out of three
most senior )
.
General Management Improvements
1. Longer and stronger management rights
clause
.
2. Stronger affirmative action clause.
3. Hiring rate flexibility.
4. Elimination of retroactive provisional
contracts
.
5. Right to require doctor's certificate
to control sick leave abuse.
6. Stricter notice requirements for tak-
ing, extending or returning from a
leave of absence.
7. "Unsatisfactory" coaches lose grand-
father protection.
8. "Excellent" grade in performance evalu-
ations .
9. More flexible school calendar.
More Work Time
1. Two extra days in teacher work year.
2. Five two-hour extra afternoon meetings,
plus two evening parent meetings.
3. Three extra days in teacher work year
for Group II.
Fringe Benefits
1. Two hundred fifty-day cap on sick leave.
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2. Reduction in Health & Welfare contribu-
tions for teachers in the first and
second contract years.
3. No increase in contract hourly rate for
life of contract.
4. Fixed stipends may be paid on exter-
nally funded programs.
5. Course credits for lane advancement
must be job-related and no law degrees
creditable after June 30, 1985.
6. Eliminate laundry list of personal days.
7. Elimination of mandatory ETL overtime.
CURRENT BARGAINING ISSUES
The major issues involved in the City's collective
bargaining negotiations with City unions, other than those
representing School Department employees, are as follows.
AFSCME
The present AFSCME contract covering the City-wide
bargaining units runs through FY 1984, with a "reopener"
clause for negotiations to commence March 15, 1983. In July
of 1983, the Union proposed an increase in the salary sched-
ules for all bargaining units. The minimal wage increase
proposed by the Union was 3%. The negotiations became dead-
locked and resulted in an attempt of mediation. As of Jan-
uary 1, 1984, an agreement has not been reached. Another
issue under consideration by the union is the deletion of a
contract clause which gives the appointing authority the
"sole judgment of qualifications and abilities" of employees
and applicants. The union believes this clause permits man-
agers to make arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable deci-
sions relating to hiring, promotions and temporary job
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reassignments . Other matters which are being contemplated
include expanded bereavement leave, a "paternity" leave, new
health and safety rules, and additional sick and personal
days
.
SEIU, Local 285
Present SEIU contracts covering all five City
Department bargaining units run through FY 1984, but they
contain wage "reopener" clauses providing for renegotiation
commencing last July 1, 1983. At the time, the union pro-
posed revised salary schedules for all bargaining units. If
it had been accepted by the City, the proposal would have
resulted in a minimum of a 5% wage increase for clerical,
technical and professional personnel and a 9% raise for
nurses. Negotiations over the proposals stalled and the
union went to the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration,
which assigned a mediator to attempt to resolve the im-
passe. As of January 1, 1984 the contract negotiations were
still in mediation. Other issues of interest to the SEIU
membership, and scheduled for study by union/management com-
mittees set up by the present contracts include a training
and career ladder, uniform allowances similar to those
received by police and fire, day-care, health and safety
rules, a four-day week, and employee productivity. The
union is concerned with the delay in the commencement of
these studies.
IAFF Local 718
Since the expiration of their contract on June 30,
1983, the IAFF has submitted several negotiating proposals
to OLR, but no formal bargaining sessions have been held.
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In addition to resolving issues associated with firefighter
layoffs, the union is interested in obtaining an educational
incentive program for its membership similar to one contain-
ed in the most recent BPPA contract. Under the BPPA pro-
gram, police patrolmen receive an additional $950 per year
for an Associate's Degree, $1300 per year for a B.A. and
$1900 for a Master's Degree.
BPPA
According to BPPA officials, the patrolmen met with
the City in July and again in December to attempt to settle
the FY 1983 contracts, but have not made proposals for the
FY 1984 contract period. For the FY 1983 contracts, the
union appears to want a 6% pay increase, holiday pay calcu-
lated at 1/4 of a week's salary instead of the present 1/5
week payment, and language providing for hazardous duty dif-
ferential for one-man patrol car shifts. Three similiar
items are contained in the firefighters contract for FY 1983.
Boston Police Detectives Benevolent Society
This newer union broke from the BPPA and Superior
Officers Association in 1982 because its membership, includ-
ing detective patrolmen and detective superior officers,
felt unable to assert its interests within the Police
Department bargaining process. The patrolmen detectives'
biggest concern is the detective differential, currently at
$24 per week. The union's long-term goal is a $50 per week
differential above the base salary of police patrolmen. The
Superior officers are dissatisfied with their differential
as well. Like the BPPA, the detectives have yet to settle
their FY82-83 contracts. In July, the City made an offer of
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a 6% wage increase plus a $5.00 per week increase in detec-
tive differential, but withdrew the offer shortly after its
proposal. Counsel to the union has indicated that it is
filing an Unfair Labor Practice petition against the pre-
vious City administration for this action.
Boston Police Superior Officers Federation
This union, representing sergeants, lieutenants and
captains, tends to reach agreements with the City which are
based on the BPPA wage levels. Under their latest contract,
covering FY 1982, salaries for sergeants were set at 23%
above a patrolman's computed average salary (this percentage
covers longevity and educational differentials); lieutenants
received 16.5% above a sergeant's computed average; and cap-
tains received 16.5% above a lieutenant's average. Like
other police unions, the Superior Officers have yet to set-
tle their FY 1983 contract. Their goal for that contract
is to increase the sergeant's differential from 23% to
24.5%. The union met with the City in December, but nego-
tiations have stalled.
Other
Most of the smaller civilian unions are waiting for
AFSCME and Local 285 contract settlements before formally
bargaining over their FY 1984 wage renegotiations and FY
1985 contracts. However, the 21-member Graphic Arts Local
600 did commence negotiations with the City. The negotia-
tions reached an impasse over promotion policy and work
assignments and are now in fact-finding. In addition, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, like the
police unions, received a 6% offer from the City in July
which the City later withdrew.
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School Department Unions
Last month, the BTU settled its contract through FY
1986, agreeing to a salary increase of 5% per year for three
years. According to School Department officials, no other
School employee bargaining unit has settled its FY 1984 con-
tract, although the School Committee Bargaining Team has
drafted proposals for the 316-member Administrative Guild
unit
.
ESTIMATED FISCAL IMPACT OF 5% CITY-WIDE WAGE SETTLEMENT
The total cost in FY 1984 of settling all outstand-
ing collective bargaining negotiations, including wage "re-
opener" negotiations, is estimated to be $30.7 million.
Table 5 presents the calculations which form the basis for
this estimate, including the cost impact of the wage in-
crease for the major City unions and the projected costs of
accompanying increases in non-wage benefits.
INTER-CITY COMPARISONS
In light of the significant impact collective bar-
gaining costs have on Boston's fiscal health, the collective
bargaining and contract funding procedures used in four
other eastern U.S. cities — Baltimore, Hartford, Providence
and New York City — are surveyed here. Like the Boston
municipal work force, most public employees in these cities
are represented by unions who collectively bargain over
employee wages, benefits and conditions of employment.
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TABLE 5
INCREMENTAL FISCAL IMPACT IN FY 1984 OF
FIVE PERCENT CITY-WIDE SETTLEMENT
(dollars in millions)
Retro-i 5% Pay- Other 2
active Raise for Benefit
Payments FY 1984 Increases Total
City/County Departments
AFSCME — 2.5 .5 3.0
SEIU, Local 285 — 2.0 .4 2.4
BPPA 2.0 1.7 .3 4.0
Superior Officers .5 .4 .1 1.0
IAFF, IBFO — 2.0 .4 2.4
Others .4 .4 .
1
.9
Subtotals 2.9 9.0 1.8 13.7
School Department
BTU and
all other units 6.3 7.5 3.2 17.0
TOTAL INCREMENTAL
FISCAL IMPACT 9.2 16.5 5.0 30.7
SOURCE: Based in part on Office of Labor Relations and
School Department estimates.
Assumes 6% wage settlement for unsettled FY 1983 City/
County employee.
City/County Department figures for other benefit in-
creases assume 5% increases in non-wage items and
assumes the non-wage items equal 20% of wages.
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Baltimore
The major difference between the Baltimore City
collective bargaining process and the Boston experience is
the method by which Baltimore integrates their contract
agreements into the City's annual budget process. In Balti-
more, all collective bargaining between unions and the City
is done in conjunction with budget preparation. All con-
tract negotiations must be completed by March so that the
incremental costs resulting from wage and benefit increases
may be included in the Board of Estimate's city-wide budget
submitted to the City Council in May. The Board of Estimate
is a five-member executive authority comprised of the Mayor,
President of the City Council, Comptroller, City Solicitor
and the Director of Public Works. The budget is then en-
acted before the new fiscal year begins each July 1. This
process avoids the need for passage of supplemental appro-
priations for collective bargaining costs mid-way through
each fiscal year, a practice which fosters deficit spending
in Boston.
Hartford
The Hartford collective bargaining process is simi-
lar to that found in Boston, with the City Manager and his
Personnel Department counsel representing the municipality
in negotiations with that City's 2400 union employees. As
in Boston, Hartford teachers negotiate separately with the
City's Board of Education. Teacher contracts are settled by
binding arbitration. Unlike Boston, Hartford expressly pro-
vides for prospective collective bargaining cost increases
in its budget by estimating the percentage wage settlement
for negotiations scheduled for that year. The City Budget
Office calculates the resulting cost increase and places
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funds in a "wage and fringe improvements" account. When the
collective bargaining agreements are reached, the City uses
the reserve to fund the increases and makes up any shortfall
by transferring funds from other accounts or, if necessary,
by supplemental appropriations. Before passing a supple-
mental appropriation, however, the Hartford Finance Director
must certify that the additional funds are available. No
similar requirement existed in Boston until June 1983, when
the Massachusetts Department of Revenue imposed the require-
ment as a condition precedent to state approval of the
City's property tax levy.
Providence
The Providence collective bargaining process is
similar to Boston's. Most civilian unions and the police
and firefighters bargain with the Mayor, while the City
School Board handles teacher negotiations. Police and fire-
men seek parity, and their negotiation impasses with the
City are resolved by binding arbitration. Teachers and
other municipal employees have binding arbitration on all
items not involving the expenditure of money (for example
class size, and seniority rules). As in Boston, collective
bargaining negotiations are not integrated with the budget
process, and typically require supplemental appropriations.
New York City
Since the fiscal crisis of 1975, collective bar-
gaining negotiations in New York have been held City-wide,
on a "coalition" basis. Wage increases have been restricted
by the City's ability to pay. All municipal employee con-
tracts have approximately the same expiration date and the
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unions bargain as a coalition on all economic issues. The
coalition includes teachers' unions, which until recently-
held separate negotiations with a State Public Employee
Relations Board. 70 bargaining units representing 250,000
employees meet with the City to settle all economic items,
including wage increases and health insurance benefit terms.
Police and fire have wage parity, by statute, and tend to
receive a higher percentage increase. Each unit then bar-
gains separately with the Mayor's Office of Municipal Labor
Relations. A seven-member Office of Collective Bargaining
appointed by union and management settles disputes over the
permissible scope of contract terms and serves as an impar-
tial peace keeper for all municipal collective bargaining.
When negotiations break down, the impasse is re-
solved by an Impasse Panel. By law, the City's Financial
Control Board set up in 1975 has the right to appear before
the Panel. The Impasse Panel must give "substantial weight"
to the City's ability to pay.
As in Hartford, New York City sets aside funds for
anticipated costs of collective bargaining in a reserve
account contained in its annual budget. This year, the
reserve acount contains 2% of the City's payroll. In addi-
tion, the City projects collective bargaining cost increases
for two years and includes these projections in its four-
year financial plan.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The new Administration should fill the
position of supervisor of the office of
labor relations and hire two additional
assistant corporation counsel as soon
as possible to ensure that the City has
an effective in-house representative in
negotiations and contract administra-
tion in time to prepare for spring
negotiations
.
2. To comply with the City's agreement
with the Revenue Department, the Mayor
and City Council should halt the prac-
tice of filing supplemental appropria-
tion orders without making correspond-
ing budget cuts or determining the
existence of additional revenue. The
Mayor should work with the unions and
the City Council to integrate the col-
lective bargaining process with the
budget process, as is currently prac-
ticed in Baltimore. The City and
unions should renegotiate the termina-
tion dates of their agreements so that
all contracts end on the same date, in
time for inclusion in the budget.
Contract termination years should be
staggered to avoid the burden of simul-
taneous negotiations with all unions in
a single year. All unions whose con-
tracts expire in a given year would
still bargain with the City on a "coa-
litional" basis.
3. To enforce the new contract negotiation
deadlines discussed above, the City
should enact an ordinance stating that
if collective bargaining contracts are
not settled before a certain date they
would not be funded until the following
fiscal year. In fact, the state law
contains a similar provision, but the
clause lacks an adequate, city-level
enforcement mechanism.
4. Following New York City practice since
the 1975 fiscal crisis, the Mayor and
the School Committee should conduct a
single, coalitional bargaining session
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over wage increases for all City em-
ployees. The practice has avoided
"leap-frogging" in New York's collec-
tive bargaining process and represents
the most equitable approach for City
employees
.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the fiscal performance of the
Boston School Committee and School Department has had a
major impact on the financial health of the City of Boston.
Inadequate managerial controls, dramatically increased per-
sonnel costs, demographic shifts in the student population,
and the financial burdens imposed by desegregation efforts
have all been reflected in a pattern of annual School
Department deficits. While notable managerial progress has
been achieved under the current Superintendent and his
staff, the budgetary requirements of the Boston School
Department will continue to influence critically the fiscal
options of the new Administration and will require contin-
uous analysis and control.
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide
a descriptive assessment of the current financial status of
the Boston School Department — a statistical and analytical
overview and guide to the incoming Administration. The
goals that guided the analysis were:
o To provide a descriptive examination of
the financial status of the Boston Pub-
lic School Department as of December 31,
1983.
o To provide insight into foreseeable
future financial issues facing the
School Department.
o To provide an uncomplicated picture of
the Boston Public School Department Bud-
get for FY 1983-84 and the factors like-
ly to influence expenditure requirements
in the near future.
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OVERVIEW OF THE BUDGET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The process by which the budget of the Boston
School Department is developed strongly influences ultimate
expenditures. The formal process is initiated in late Octo-
ber with the submission of the various central responsi-
bility center managers' budget requests, based on the pro-
gram needs of the various schools and programs. The re-
quests are initially reviewed and coordinated in meetings
between the Departmental budget coordinator and the center
managers. Following these initial discussions, the revised
central office budget is forwarded to the Deputy Superin-
tendent of Finance and Administration. Subsequent changes
are recommended by the Superintendent and the School Commit-
tee before the budget is forwarded to the Mayor. As sub-
mitted to the Mayor, the budget proposal contains two parts:
1) The "hold-harmless," or base budget
over which the School Committee exer-
cises its autonomous power of appro-
priation.
2) Supplementary requests for funds neces-
sary to fund programmed expenditures
above the certified "hold-harmless"
level
.
THE FY 1984 OPERATING BUDGET
Hold-Harmless Appropriation for 1984
For FY 1984, the total appropriations request for
the Boston School Committee was $238.1 million. This repre-
sented an increase of $3.8 million or 1.6 percent over the
FY 1983 expenditure level. The request was approximately
$13.6 million above the hold-harmless appropriation of
$224.5 million. (In FY 1983, the School Committee's author-
ized hold-harmless budget was $210.8 million.)
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As shown in Table 1, the $13.6 million supplemen-
tary request was spread over a variety of programs. Subse-
quent review by the City Council and Mayor led to a supple-
mentary approval of $5.2 million, only 40 percent of the
requested supplementary appropriation. Thus, the total
"available" expenditure budget for FY 1984, as of December
31, 1983, approximated $229.7 million.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the FY 1984 budget
by function. The pattern of spending by function has been
relatively stable except for decreasing funds allocated to
regular education and support services. In FY 1982, regular
education was 37 percent of the total budget compared to 35
percent in 1984; support services had decreased during the
same period from 19 percent to 13 percent. This suggests
fairly stable functional policies within the School Depart-
ment and the slight shifting of limited resources from sup-
port services to instruction.
As has been historically true, most of the School
Department budget is spent in salaries and this percentage
is increasing at the expense of nonsalaried items; salaries
in FY 1982 were 62 percent of the school budget compared to
64 percent in FY 1984.
Incremental Request in 1984 Budget
As noted earlier, the supplemental budget requested
for FY 1984 totaled in excess of $13 million. While the
programs and items in the request were considered important
contributions to planned school programs, it is the view of
School Department officials that many of the programs will
not be implemented due to the lack of funding in the actual
supplemental appropriation received. Spending reductions in
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TABLE 1
INCREMENTAL SCHOOL BUDGET REQUESTS FOR FY 1984
Basic Skills - Middle and High Schools $1,740,000
Academic Programs - Middle and High Schools 2,650,000
Middle Schools Administration 290,000
Class Size Reduction, Grades 1-2:
Kindergartens
:
Retention of Extended Day for K2
Restoration of Kl as Extended Day Program 4,450,000
Bilingual and Special Education 1,070,000
Special Intervention and Prevention Efforts:
School-Based Management
Targeted High Schools
Alternative Education Expansion, Middle
and High Schools 960,000
Athletics 951,996
Boston Compact 975,000
Vocational Education and Security 500, 000
$13,586,996
TABLE 2
BUDGET BY FUNCTION
(dollars in thousands)
# of # of
1982 Pos
.
1984 Pos
.
Instruction
Regular Education 77,438 2,637 79, 133 2,423
Career (Occ. Ed.) 5,125 189 11,837 436
Special Education 44,814 1,290 47,855 1,418
Bilingual Education 8, 107 514 10,126 535
Adult Education 312 2 204 42
Summer Session 100 140 81
Support Services 39, 958 1, 304 30,787 1, 371
Pupil Services 7,209 292 9,890 819
Community Services 567 28 617 26
Unallocated &
Benefits 21,940 33, 111 50
Total General School
Purposes 205,571 6,254 223, 700 7,201
Alterations & Repairs 4,963 48 6,000
Total School Budget 210, 534 6, 302 229, 700 7, 201
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selected programs will allow the School Department to keep
projected deficits below the level which would have resulted
had original program expenditure patterns been maintained.
Budget Update
By December 9, 1983, the School Department had
expended approximately 33.8 percent of its FY 1984 budget,
or $77.7 million. The projected deficit for FY 1984, based
on spending patterns through December 9, 1983, is expected
to total $6.3 million (see Table 3 and Display 1). This
deficit was created by projected salary variances related to
the recently signed Boston Teachers Union (BTU) contract
discussed below. This projected budget deficit, however,
does not reflect all of the additional costs expected to be
incurred as a result of the BTU agreement. As of January 1,
1984, funding for the agreement had yet to be approved by
the City Council.
Projected Impact of Collective Bargaining
In previous years, collective bargaining with the
BTU has had a major influence upon the expenditure patterns
and budgetary requirements of the School Department. In FY
1984, the projected impact of the most recent agreements is
$17 million. Of this amount, $6.3 million is reflected in
the FY 1984 budget update as the projected deficit as of
December 1983. (See Table 3 and Display 1.) The resultant
projected expenditure level will approximate $246.7 million
for FY 1984 compared to the $238.1 originally proposed and
the $229.7 currently funded ($224.5 hold-harmless and $5.2
supplementary appropriations). These projections assume
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED COSTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
FY 1984, FY 1985, FY 1986
(figures in millions rounded to nearest hundred thousand)
I . FY 1984 Costs (Incremental)
(A) Current Salary Deficit
(Restorations: Career Awards:
BA + 15, MA + 15, MA + 45 Lanes:
Group II; Differentials:
Coaches; Hourly Rate
Extracurricular Payments) $6.3M
(B) Step Increases 1.2
(C) Lane Advances Pending 0.4
(D) Sick-Leave Buy Back Costs 0.7
(E) Health & Welfare
(@$200/teacher & $100/para) 0.9
(F) 5% Across-the-Board Pay Raise 7.5
Total FY 1984 Costs: $17. 0M
II . FY 1985 Costs (Incremental)
(A) 5% Across-the-Board Pay Raise
on Total Impacted Salary
(B) Step Increases
(C) Lane Advances Pending
(D) Incremental Increase in
Health & Welfare Payments
( @$300/teacher $200/para)
(E) Reduction in Class Sizes
(45 Positions @/$31K)
(F) Severance Incremental Increase
Total FY 1985 Costs:
7.9M
1.3
0.4
0.5
1.4
0. 1
$11. 5M
III. FY 1986 Costs (Incremental)
(A) 5% Across-the-Board Pay Raise
on Total Impacted Salary $8.5M
(B) Step Increases 1.3
(C) Lane Advances Pending 0.4
(D) Incremental Increase in
Health & Welfare Payments
(@$400/teacher $300/para) 0.5
(E) Severance Incremental Increase . -*-
Total FY 1986 Costs: $10. 7M
RESULTANT BUDGETARY LEVELS $246 . 7M $258. 2M $268. 9M
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986
% Increase in Budget 7.4% 4.6% 4.1%
1 Incremental severance increase is $30,000 annually in FY 1985
and FY 1986.
Source: School Department Memo December 19, 1983
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Display 1
that the School Committee will reach a 5 percent wage in-
crease settlement with all other unions representing School
Department employees.
The imperative funding required for FY 1984 there-
fore will be 7.4 percent greater than the appropriated
$229.7 million and 3.6 percent ($8.6 million) above the ori-
ginal School Committee Budget Proposal for FY 1984 (see
Table 3 )
.
In FY 1985 and FY 1986, the incremental impact of
the new tentative agreement will approximate $11.5 million
and $10.7 million, respectively. As with previous budgetary
patterns, the major portion of the incremental cost will be
in across-the-board pay raises. Such salary increases ac-
count for 43.9 percent of the incremental costs in FY 1984,
for example, and 69.1 percent and 79.3 percent, respec-
tively, in FY 1985 and FY 1986.
Non-City Budget Sources of Funds
In addition to the funds appropriated by the city,
the Boston School Department will receive in FY 1984 about
$32.5 million in direct grant funds from state and federal
sources (see Table 4 on following page). These grant funds
are not reflected in the Department's budget proposal.
Within the School Department itself, there are
limited revenue sources, primarily lunch programs and tui-
tions for nonresidents. These amounts are minimal (less
than one-half of one percent of budget annually) and have
declined in recent years.
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TABLE 4
EXTERNAL GRANT AWARDS: FY 1984
SOURCE OF FY 1984 AWARD
Adult Basic Education $ 270,000
Boston Sister Cities (Polaroid) 1,000
Chapter 2 - ECIA - Block Grant 1,359,804 a
Chapter 74 - Apprenticeship Training (state) 253,160
Chapter 636 (state) 5,335,380
Ed. Handicapped - PL 94-142 2,235,750
Chapter 1 - PL 89-313 527,250
ESEA - (Ch. 1) 12,011,880
ESEA - Title VII (SUCCESS) 368,037
ESEA - Title VII (CHILD) 231,879
Food Services 8,426,000 b
Ford Foundation: SBHS 20,000
Impact Aid 188,828 c
Indian Education Act 63,472
Neighborhood Development & Employment Act 51,596
Refugee Children Assistance e
TOTAL $31.344.036
a Includes non-public schools allocation of $326,362
b Projected revenue: expenditures projected at $9,623,110
c FY 1983 entitlement received in FY 1984
d Adult External Diploma Program
e No projection available at this time
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Impact on City Debt Service
On August 1, 1983, the gross principal debt of the
City of Boston was $455.7 million. Debt for School Depart-
ment expenditures represented the largest portion at $184.1
million, or 40.4 percent of the gross debt. As of August 1,
1983, the School Department had an additional $20.8 million
of authorized and unissued debt. The debt attributable to
the School Department results from the fixed cost require-
ment for buildings and schools, and must be monitored care-
fully because of its magnitude and consequent potential im-
pact on the interest burden borne by the City.
HISTORICAL BUDGETING EXPENSES OF THE BOSTON SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT
Between December 31, 1972, and June 30, 1982, the
budget of the School Department doubled from an appropria-
tion of $105.8 million to $210.5 million. School Department
budgets have shown a striking pattern of year-end deficits,
with the deficit growing from less than one million to the
record $26.7 million achieved in 1981.
MAJOR FACTORS AND TRENDS AFFECTING THE BUDGET
Two of the major influences on the expenditures of
the School Department are, of course, the size of the stu-
dent population and teaching and staffing levels.
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Student Enrollment
Enrollment in the Boston Public School system de-
clined 27 percent during the period 1976-77 to December
1983, from 73,683 to the current 53,745. (See Display 2.)
While enrollment levels are expected to stabilize at an
approximate population of 52,000, significant efforts will
be required to prevent further decline.
One result of declining enrollment is an increased
cost per student as associated fixed building and staffing
expenses do not decline proportionally. In fact, the yearly
budget cost per pupil has risen steadily since 1977 reaching
a high of $4,120 per pupil in 1984 (see Table 5). The com-
pound annual growth rate in the cost per student has been
nearly 8.6 percent since 1978, although the growth slowed to
less than 1 percent from 1983 to 1984.
TABLE 5
BUDGETED DOLLARS/STUDENT
Budgeted
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
$2, 316
2,423
2,746
2,990
3,401
3,575
4,092
4, 120
While enrollment in the lower grades (kinder-
garten, elementary) and special schools has remained fairly
stable during this period, middle and high school enrollment
declined markedly (see Table 6). This is the result of a
combination of factors including a general decline in the
birthrate and children leaving the system after lower school.
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GENERAL REVENUE FUND, DISPLAY 2, GOES HERE
TABLE 6
BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENT/SCHOOL RATIOS
Students
Kindergarten
Elementary
Subtotal (K +
Middle
High
Special
TOTAL
E)
1980
7,392
21, 526
28,918
14,651
19, 164
983
63,716
1984
Projected
4,450
20,090
24, 540
12,115
17, 115
450
54,220
Based on 1980-1983 and projected 1984 enrollments,
the number of students per school over the past five years
has averaged 423. From a low of 380 students per school in
1981, the ratio has risen to a projected 430 students per
school for FY 1984. The improvement in school capacity
utilization is a direct result of the School Committee's
decision to close 27 schools in 1981. Still, reduction of
classroom capacity has not been pursued as rapidly as the
rate of decline in the student population would warrant.
Table 7 provides a projection of student enrollment
from December 1984 to December 1987. The number of high
school students is expected to decline by 2,410 or 14.1 per-
cent for this period. Populations enrolled in other grade
levels should remain relatively stable.
Kindergarten
Elementary
Middle
High
Other
TOTAL
TABLE 7
FIVE YEAR ENROLLMENT PROJECTIONS
12/84 12/85 12/86 12/87
4,450 4,600 4,740 4,860
20,090 20,470 20,950 20,625
12,115 11, 300 10,690 11,665
17, 115 16, 105 15, 515 14, 705
450 450 450 450
54.220 52.925 52.345 52.305
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A graphic example of the need to more carefully
examine school capacity is shown in Table 8 which shows a
selected sampling of the utilization of elementary and
middle schools in the Boston Public School system for the
1982-83 school year. Utilization ranged from a low of 27
percent to a high of 53 percent. The weighted average was
46 percent.
TABLE 8
RATIO OF SCHOOL BUILDING
ENROLLMENTS TO CAPACITIES
(selected sample)
1982-83
School Enrollment Capacity Ratio
Elementary:
Beethoven 150 350 43%
Clapp 150 350 43%
Grew 168 350 48%
Higginson 119 310 38%
P.J. Kennedy 172 350 49%
Longfellow 208 450 46%
Mason 143 300 48%
Perkins 178 400 45%
Perry 93 350 27%
Winthrop 159 380 42%
Middle
:
Gavin 540 1,050 51%
Lewenberg 451 900 50%
Lewis 238 450 53%
Michelangelo 219 450 49%
Rogers 550 1,100 50%
Shaw 326 800 41%
TOTALS AND
WEIGHTED AVERAGE 3,864 8,340 46%
These numbers in Tables 7 and 8 suggest potential savings by
further consolidating schools.
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Teacher and Staff Trend
The staffing patterns of the School system have a
major impact on budget and resource allocation decisions.
From FY 1978 to FY 1981, staff declined by 194, or 2.5 per-
cent of total staff. Between FY 1981 and FY 1984 (pro-
jected), City-funded full-time staff and teachers will have
declined by 23.8 percent, an absolute drop of 1817 indivi-
duals. As shown in Display 3, the most dramatic single year
decrease occurred between FY 1981 and FY 1982 when full-time
staff were reduced by 19.7 percent from 7,646 to 6,140.
Boston Public School Staffing
1977 - 1984
10.000 —
I
9.000 —
Other Staff
Teachers
77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84
School Year . _
Display 3
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Between 1975 and 1983, the number of teachers in
the Boston Public School system declined from 5,443 to
4,085, a drop of 24.9 percent. For the same period, the
student-teacher ratio declined from 15.6 to 14.5. This
trend was a function of both declining enrollments and col-
lective bargaining constraints. These ratios are calculated
on a system-wide basis and do not reflect variation within
grade levels and/or programs. Advanced work, vocational
education, special education, student-teacher ratios may
vary from less than ten students per teacher to as high as
eighteen. Of course, the demand/need for special programs
such as bilingual education increases or decreases as the
demographic composition of the school population shifts,
another factor with cost consequences that should be
analyzed
.
Boston Public School Staffing; A National Comparison
Measured against six other major cities, Boston's
Public School system has the lowest student-teacher ratio of
all systems studied. Boston also has the lowest student-
school ratio of all cities; Boston's ratio is 26.2 percent
less than Atlanta, the city with the next lowest student-
school ratio. Both these ratios are presumably beneficial
to students but they are also expensive and constitute too
much of a luxury. Noteworthy is the fact that Atlanta has
the next to lowest per pupil cost, $2,556, while Boston has
the highest per pupil cost, $4,092. Boston's per pupil cost
is 17.7 percent above the next highest, 28.2 percent above
the average including Boston, and 34.6 percent above the
average excluding Boston. Additional study of Boston and
other major cities is clearly warranted as even in surround-
ing Massachusetts towns, the cost per pupil is considerably
less than in Boston. Arlington, Duxbury, Quincy and Needham
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spent $2,873, $2,297, $2,354 and $3,114 per pupil respec-
tively in FY 1982-83.
Contingent Liabilities—The Bornstein Award
In addition to the trends in student enrollment and
teacher staffing levels discussed above, one major court
action could have a substantial, one-time impact on School
Department finances. During the 1981 fiscal crisis, the
Department laid off 710 tenured teachers. At the time of
the layoffs, the BTU 1980-1983 collective bargaining agree-
ment contained a job security clause, effective through the
1981-82 school year, which prohibited tenured teacher lay-
offs. The teachers challenged the City's action and
obtained an arbitration award, widely referred to as the
Bornstein award, ordering the School Committee to pay
contractual damages of roughly $17 million. The award
represented the full back pay for the laid-off teachers,
offset by outside earnings, but not offset by unemployment
compensation paid to the teachers during the same period.
The School Committee has appealed the overall decision in
the courts and has requested the arbitrator to reconsider
his decision not to offset the City's liability by the
amount of unemployment compensation (approximately $2
million) . No payment has been made pending court determina-
tion of the Committee's appeal. The City's total liability
in the case could range from $15 million to $17 million.
Projected Budgets through FY 1985-86
In 1982, the School Department prepared a three-
year expenditure projection for FY 1984-86 (see Table 10).
Since that time, the FY 1984 budget has been approved. The
XII - 17
U rH vo H vo O o ID CN
CD -H in rH rH o
IT) o IT) CO CO o
-CO CU CN co CN CO CO CO
in 00 00 O
r» rH 00 co CO H O
4J in t-~ CN o O CO
o CD
o Cn <tf H CO I—
1
CO <tf
o T3 0> 00 VO in rH CO
-40 D i—
i
CN o vo CN CN
CQ
iH CO
ON
W
J
CQ
<
E-<
CO
CO
I
CN
CO
w
>
H
Eh
U
w
0-
CO PS
OS
w
On
i
o
H
Eh
<
P CO
C rH
CD O
'O O
-P U
CO CO
in CO VO VO 00 CN -<*
rH VO vD 1—
1
in in
VD 00 00 vo
I— 1— <* VO
CTi CN CO CN
CN CT> CN <—
1
CN CO CO CO CO
o rH CN m
i—
I
CN rH rH CN CN rH
o CO VO in ON O
CD in o CO rH
rC in rH CO rH VO
o
m CO rH CTi CO CT> CN CO
0) CN in
Eh
4J o o CO
c o o
CD CO o o
T3
3 00
P VO CN
CO <* rH
vo 00 o CN
00 CN o in
m VD co CN
rH r»
CN VO in
rH
>1
p cd u
•H •H CO
u rC
a,
ci
rH c
c u CD
Cn
-o n c
c CO -p (0 Cn
(0 U CO rH p
p rH •H •H (0
-H P rC (1) rC cd
u < u 53 Ou CO CQ
XII -
actual FY 1984 appropriation has been included alongside the
Table 10 projections to provide a comparison between actual
and projected results. The projections for 1984, 1985, and
1986 do not reflect the significant incremental costs asso-
ciated with the tentative Boston Teachers Union contract
recently negotiated. When these incremental costs (dis-
cussed earlier) are added in, the projected budgets for FY
1985 and FY 1986 become $256.8 million and $273.3 million,
respectively. In the School Department's budget update,
however, as shown earlier in this chapter in Table 3, FY
1985 and FY 1986 budgets, including incremental contract
costs, are expected to approximate $258.2 million and
$268.9 million for the two years in question. Using the
lower of the figures for FY 1985 and FY 1986, the projected
budgets for those years will require $24.5 million and
$39.2 million, respectively, above the FY 1984 appropria-
tion. The required budget in FY 1985 will apparently be
11.5 percent greater than FY 1984, and the budget require-
ment for FY 1986 will be 17.1 percent greater than FY 1984.
None of the figures in this paragraph reflect external grant
funds discussed earlier.
Recommendations
As of January 1, 1984, the approved appropriations
for the Boston Public Schools are still far below what will
be needed to insure uninterrupted sessions for the remainder
of the fiscal year. The most pressing issue is the need to
fund or absorb the incremental costs resulting from the re-
cently concluded BTU collective bargaining agreement. If
approved by the City, the accord will necessitate funding
the School Department by $17 million above the current
appropriation.
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Although the principal objectives of this chapter
were descriptive in nature, analysis of the operating budget
leads to certain tentative recommendations, predicated on
the need to achieve responsible and adequate spending poli-
cies by the Boston School Committee.
o The Mayor and/or his administration
should become involved in the early
budget preparation process of the Boston
School Committee given the political and
financial impact of the Committee's
decision.
o School closings and district consoli-
dations should be carefully matched with
trends in the student population.
o Aggressive efforts must be made to make
the Boston Public School System more
attractive to potential students.
Specifically, new, innovative and
specialized programs geared to higher
achievers and "talented" students must
be developed. The resources and support
of the many colleges and universities in
and around Boston provide fertile ground
for such efforts.
o The City Administration must carefully
study and monitor the potentially costly
(approximately $15-$20 million) impact
of the Bornstein Award.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For this report, six human service agencies were
reviewed. Current human service policy was found to be one
of benign neglect. A policy vacuum resulting in a signifi-
cant variation in management controls and service delivery
was found among the agencies surveyed.
The agencies reviewed in this chapter are: Commis-
sion on Affairs of the Elderly, Handicapped Affairs Commis-
sion, Emergency Shelter Commission, Fair Housing Commission,
Rent Equity Board, and Veterans Services Department. Fol-
lowing these reviews is a survey of Boston's growing Hispan-
ic community's access to such services.
It was impossible to determine which Bostonians
receive what City services. Agencies could not say exactly
whom they were helping.
o Four agencies reported not collecting
client information by either race, sex,
age, or neighborhood residence.
o One agency collects client demographics
but has never compiled the information.
o One agency that collects client demo-
graphics does so in different formats
for 11 different programs. The informa-
tion is inconsistent between programs
and subsequently has not been integrated.
Without accurate information identifying who the
City directly serves, an analysis of service distribution
and determination of the extent to which needs are being met
is impossible. It is imperative that a client data collec-
tion system be developed that is both comprehensive and
uniform enough to allow for comparison between departments.
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Policy direction from the Mayor's Office is mini-
mal. One agency head reported never having met with either
the Mayor, Deputy Mayors or Budget Director. Individual
agency interpretation and development of policy was the
general practice. Four agencies employ legislative liaisons
and conduct state and federal lobbying activity independent
of the City's Inter-Governmental Relations Office.
Interdepartmental coordination of program services
is also absent. Communication between departments is spora-
dic and highly informal. Despite often overlapping consti-
tuencies, joint planning and delivery of program services is
nonexi stent
.
II. COMMISSION ON AFFAIRS OF THE ELDERLY
The Commission on Affairs of the Elderly was estab-
lished by ordinance in 1970. Its scope and financial
resources were increased considerably in 1974 upon being
designated as an Area Agency on Aging, and thus the conduit
for Federal funds allocated to Boston under Title III of the
Older Americans Act. The Commission was to act as grant
maker and grant monitor of Older Americans Act funds.
Elderly in Boston
95,262 persons over the age of sixty live in Bos-
ton, 16.9% of the total population. Compared to the state
as a whole, Boston's elderly population includes more minor-
ities and is disproportionately poorer. Since 1970, the
City's elder population has decreased by 10%. However, the
numbers of oldest Bostonians (85+ years), the most dependent
on government services, have increased from 5.8% of Boston's
elder population in 1970 to 8.0% in 1980.
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Commission Funding
The Commission's FY 84 budget is $5.3 million; City
and federal funds account for 99%. These funds support
agency administration, eleven programs operated directly by
the Commission, and subcontracts for community programs in
eight additional service categories.
Older Americans Act funds (Title III-B and III-C)
constitute 52% of the Commission's budget. These funds are
appropriated annually by Congress and distributed to states
according to the number of persons 60 years and older. They
pass directly to the Massachusetts Department of Elder
Affairs (DEA), which in turn distributes them by formula to
Area Agencies on Aging throughout the State.
In 1980, the formula was changed to redistribute
more funds to rural and suburban areas and less to inner
cities. This lowered Boston's proportion from 20% of the
State's allocation in 1980 to 16% in 1984.
The DEA also awards $95,000 in Council on Aging
funds to the Commission. An additional $16,497,151 in State
funds is awarded to three Home Care Corporations in the
City. These agencies are charged with serving the most
frail older Bostonians.
In FY 84 the Commission received $2,754,691 in
Title III-B and III-C funds. These grants are allocated to
three service categories: administration, social services
and nutrition services. Eight percent ($214,866) was
retained by the Commission for administration.
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The Commission also participates in two other
federal programs, both related to elder employment. The
Senior Aide program (which receives $379,899) pays low in-
come elders working part-time in private and public sector
settings. The Retired Corps of Senior Volunteers (RCSV)
receives a grant of $65,000, supplemented by $57,145 of City
funds. It provides stipends for meals and transportation to
800 senior volunteers.
City appropriations this year of $2,058,631 repre-
sent 38% of the Commission's total budget. Of this, 74.5%
($1.5 million) pays for staff salaries.
The Older Americans Act requires that the Com-
mission fund a city-wide nutrition program for the elderly
and award social service grants in categories of documented
local need. The nutrition program funds are divided among
three vendors serving different parts of the city. These
contracts are put out for public bid on an annual basis.
This past year only the three existing vendors responded to
the bid, and each was awarded a grant.
Each contractor provides two types of nutrition
service. The first is a daily group meal for elders held at
one of 60 hot lunch sites throughout the city. Last year a
total of 4,690 elders participated in the program and a
total of 432,378 meals were served.
"Meals on Wheels," the home-delivered meals pro-
gram, is targeted to the most frail homebound elders. A
typical client is female, over the age of 70, living alone
on a fixed income. Her Meals on Wheels delivery person
comes at noon and may be her only daily social contact.
This year 2,130 such clients will have 261,036 hot meals
delivered to them. To offset costs a donation is requested
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(75^-$1.00) from the elders. The average per meal donation
is about 55^; these funds are calculated as part of each
nutrition program budget.
The distribution of resources for community social
services is more complex. There are over 400 organizations
in the city who serve, or have the capacity to serve,
elders. The competition for Title III-B service funds is
intense. This year the Commission retained $163,000 of
social service funds to deliver programs directly to elder
Bostonians. The balance ($699,834) was awarded to community
organizations
.
Allocation of social service grants is reportedly
determined through community input gathered through task
forces, staff-initiated needs assessments, and an advisory
council appointed by the Mayor. This information is sum-
marized and forms the basis of grant specifications
(requests for proposals) that are put out to public bid. At
this point public involvement in the process ends. Propo-
sals are evaluated within the Commission, and recommenda-
tions are developed. The Mayor makes actual funding awards
to selected contractors. In accordance with Department of
Elder Affairs regulations, a local administrative review
process exists and further appeal can be made to the Depart-
ment of Elder Affairs.
This year 21 grant awards, totalling $699,834, were
made to 18 agencies. They ranged from a low of $7,523 to a
high of $186,734. Thirty-eight percent were in the range of
$25,000-35,000. Four of the grants were awarded for city-
wide services; these totalled $253,387. Three of the grants
were awarded for minority (Black, Hispanic and Asian)
elderly services; these totalled $83,068.
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The 11 direct services provided by the Commission
fall into 3 categories: community services, outreach ser-
vices, and information and referral services. Major pro-
grams include the Senior Shuttle, health screening, employ-
ment/volunteer programs, and informat ion/referral and advo-
cacy.
Transportation has been identified as a major need
of Boston's elderly. Forty-eight percent of elders surveyed
in a 1983 needs assessment stated that they would use spe-
cial transportation services either frequently or some-
times. Ninety- three percent of those surveyed were aware of
the Senior Shuttle and 23% reported that they used it.
The Senior Shuttle is completely funded by the City
at a cost of $751,104. There are 25 vehicles in the fleet,
which are dispatched directly from either che Commission or
from neighborhood sites. Each neighborhood is covered by at
least one shuttle van, with Allston/Br ighton (2), Roslindale
(2), Dorchester (3), and West Roxbury (2) having more.
The primary goal of this program is to provide
medical and food shopping transportation within the city.
It is a door-to-door service which must be scheduled in
advance. Elders are informed of the service through the
Mayor's Hotline and publicity efforts.
Staff regularly gather statistics on monthly ser-
vice utilization, including numbers of clients, and new
clients by neighborhood. The form in which data is compiled
differs among programs. The current data collection system
produces data that is not readily comparable beween neigh-
borhoods and racial populations.
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A Neighborhood View of
Boston's Elderly Population
and the Senior Shuttle Service
Percent of
Boston's
Elderly
Population
Percent of
Monthly Elders in
Average Neighborhood
Senior Shuttle Riding the
Ridership* Shuttle
Allston/Brighton
Back Bay/Beacon Hill
Downtown/Central/West End/
Chinatown/South Cove/
Bay Village
Charlestown
Dorchester
East Boston
Fenway/Kenmore/Mission Hill
Hyde Park
Jamaica Plain
Mattapan
North End
Roslindale
Roxbury
South Boston
South End
West Roxbury
Totals
*Based upon operating statistics for the months of July through October, 1983
10,682
3,556
11.2
3.7
374
149
z,zzo Z.J
2,281 2.4 89
16,831
7,284
17.7
7.7
445
140
3,894 4.1 117
5,918 126
7,638 8.0 174
1,993 2.1 71
2,259 2.4 167
6,434 6.8 339
4,305 4.5 150
6,867 7.2 126
3,705 3.9 116
8,946 9.4 280
94,819 100.0 2,958
3.5
Display 1
A review of four months (July 1983-Oct. 1983) of
client utilization showed an average of 2,956 elders using
the service per month. Total clients per neighborhood were
highest in Allston/Br ighton (an average of 748 per month)
and lowest in Mattapan (71 per month).
The Senior Shuttle has been plagued by van break-
downs. Vehicles are periodically leased on a per diem basis
to maintain service. Twelve new vans have been purchased.
Within the next two years, the remaining fleet will need to
be replaced.
Management controls also need to be checked.
Shuttles are not parked in a central location each night.
At the discretion of the Commissioner, some shuttles are
parked at drivers' homes. This prevents the Commission from
accounting for vehicles during unscheduled hours. This
"trust" system needs to be re-examined.
Information and referral, government benefits
screening and the Elder Hotline cost $254,119 in FY 84. The
hotline cost $44,672, the Information/Referral Unit $54,021,
and the government benefits screening $155,425.
Last year, the number of hotline calls totalled
13,520; 29% of these were inquiries about the Elder Discount
program. Last year the government benefits screening unit,
which targets frail homebound elders, served 8,682 clients,
36% of whom were non-English speaking. The two most common-
ly presented problems were Medicaid and SSI.
The City also spends $48,170 on the "Senior Stars"
program, which sponsors volunteer elderly performers who
entertain at sites throughout the City and have generated
considerable favorable publicity.
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Personnel
The Commission employs 120 people, excluding "sen-
ior aides". All but one of the Commission employees are
mayoral appointments; one holds civil service status in the
City Budget Department and is on loan to the Commission.
Total personnel funding is $1,984,478, 37% of the total
operating budget.
Salary ranges were determined through the Mayor's
Office. The Commissioner reported that she awarded pay
increases based on merit. She measures this through annual
performance reviews.
Commission staff is divided among four functional
units. The senior management level of the Commission
includes one Commissioner, one Assistant Commissioner, one
Legislative Liaison, and five Deputy Commissioners. These
salaries range from $26,000 to $40,000 per year.
The senior level of the Commission should be
reviewed to clearly define job roles. The role of Legisla-
tive Liaison should be reviewed to determine if that person
would be better placed within inter-governmental relations.
III. COMMISSION ON HANDICAPPED AFFAIRS
The Commission on Handicapped Affairs was origi-
nally established in 1971 as the Commission on the Physi-
cally Handicapped. From 1971 through 1979 the Commission
operated without staff. During this period the eight Com-
mission members, who serve one-year terms, met with Vice
Mayor Sullivan monthly to discuss issues affecting the
physically handicapped. In 1979, responding to complaints
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of limited handicapped access to Boston's downtown develop-
ments, the Office of Handicapped Affairs was first funded.
At this time the Commission's name was changed to include
both physically and mentally handicapped individuals. By
law, one Member must be a physician specializing in the
physically handicapped and one must be a certified special
education teacher. All Commissioners' terms expired January
2, 1984; seven former Commissioners have submitted formal
requests for r ~aanointment
.
The Handicapped Popul ar ion
The federal definition of a handicapped person is
anyone who has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities. How many
Americans this definition covers is unknown. A recent study
by the Arkansas Rehabilitation and Research Institutes esti-
mated that 11% of the population between the ages of 16 and
64 years are handicapped. Estimates rise to 25% if all age
groups are included. Applying these percentages to the 1980
Census population figure for Boston, 562,994, would give
61,929 working age and 140,740 Bostonians of all ages with
some type of a handicap. For Commission activity a func-
tional definition must be considerably narrower.
Agency Services
The Commission completes intake forms on all cli-
ents requesting service. This form distinguishes clients by
type of disability, race, sex, and neighborhood residence.
Although this data has never been analyzed, the Commission
Director estimates that approximately 60% of all handicapped
clients are elderly. Despite this percentage, Handicapped
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Affairs and the Elder Commission have never discussed or
planned services jointly.
Commission services include:
o information and referral services
o individual client advocacy
o training seminars on handicapped access
o interdepartmental coordination for han-
dicapped issues
The Commission reports 136 active "clients" who
have called for service and completed an intake form.
Another 80 to 100 individuals receive snow shoveling from
volunteers coordinated by Commission staff.
The Commission lists the following as highlights of
1983 program activities:
o Faneuil Hall Access: The Commission
successfully advocated for installation
of handicapped accessible bathrooms;
o Police Department: Supported installa-
tion of Telecommunications Devices for
the Deaf (TDD) within 911 units and con-
ducted training session for community
liaison officers;
o Purchased 10 additional TDDs for distri-
bution within City government;
o BRA: testified on behalf of paralyzed
veterans regarding access to new down-
town developments;
o HP/V Ordinance: advocated for passage
of M.G.L. Chapter 644 and is negotiating
with City Administration to set aside
revenue from HP parking violations for
physical access renovations;
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o Deaf Interpreters: provided interpreter
services to any deaf client request for
access to municipal proceedings;
o Snow Removal: coordinated volunteers
for up to 100 handicapped individuals in
need of service;
o Represented the City at the National MS
Society, Boston Marathon, Deaf Media
Coalition, BPL, Gay/Lesbian Outreach,
Summerfest Committee, Boy Scouts, etc.
Although Commission staff attempt to address a
broad range of handicapped needs, the Commission's effec-
tiveness has suffered from attention scattered among far too
many activities, lack of policy direction, and the failure
to design realistic work plans. The Commission is both
programmat ically and administratively isolated within the
City's bureaucracy. The Commissioner reports that no formal
communication procedures exist with either Administrative
Services or the Policy Management Offices. An immediate
reexamination of the Commission's role within City govern-
ment is required. Present staff capacity for the existing
work plan is grossly inadequate. It is unfair to both
employees and clients to raise expectations for service that
cannot be delivered.
Commission Funding
The following is a summary of total appropriation
for the Commission from FY 80 through FY 84.
FY 80 FY 81 FY 82 FY 83 FY 84
$50,000 $50,000 $32,000 $65,000 $82,416
(-36%) (+103%) (+27%)
The FY 84 appropriation includes staff funding for a Commis-
sioner (in effect, the Executive Director), Assistant Com-
missioner, Social Worker, and Student Intern, whose salaries
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account for 82% of the total appropriation. During FY 83
the Commission utilized contracted service funds to provide
interpreters for deaf individuals requesting access to City
services. The recently enacted Deaf Rights Law requires all
levels of government to provide interpreters to deaf indi-
viduals using public services or proceedings. The publicity
this legislation received is expected to increase demands
for interpreters.
FY 84 Issues
Section 504—Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Amendment (1974) expanded the scope of previous federal law
to include all disabled citizens. This section had pre-
viously applied only to "potentially employable" disabled.
Section 504 reads:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual in the United States, as defined in
Section 7 (6), shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any
program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.
Section 504 applies to every public and private
body which receives federal support. This section primarily
applies to hiring practices and physical access to municipal
programs and facilities. The penalties for noncompliance
with Section 504 are suspension or termination of, or
refusal to grant or to continue, federal assistance.
In 1982 the Commissioner of Handicapped Affairs was
designated the City's 504 Compliance Officer. The Commis-
sioner reports that the City has never implemented 504 regu-
lations. Only one City department, Health and Hospitals,
has a 504 compliance office. The current practice is for
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individual departments to negotiate 504 complaints. In the
past 12 months, five citizens filed complaints; one com-
plaint remains unresolved.
Compliance with 504 regulation involves both simple
actions such as announcements and signs and more long-term
projects including employee training, development of com-
plaint investigation procedures, and physical rehabilita-
tion. What it would cost the City to meet 504 provisions is
unknown. The fiscal and programmatic requirements of 504
compliance have never been evaluated.
IV. BOSTON'S EMERGENCY SHELTER COMMISSION
On January 9, 1983, a woman was found frozen to
death under a bench in Boston Common. Media attention to
this case and the plight of other homeless prompted the Bos-
ton City Council to pass an ordinance on January 19, 1983,
establishing Boston's Emergency Shelter Commission. The
City Council also ordered the Department of Health and Hosp-
itals to begin providing emergency shelter. That evening
accommodations for 100 were established in the Boston City
Hospital auditorium. Two weeks later this program was
transferred to the Tobin Building at Long Island Hospital.
There are five members of the Emergency Shelter
Commission. The following display shows present Board com-
position and terms of office.
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EMERGENCY SHELTER COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP
AND TERMS OF OFFICE
Director of Public Facilities ex officio
Donald Manson
Commissioner of Health & Hospitals ex officio
Lewis Pollack
Appointment term expires
Richard Ring 1/31/84
Executive Director,
Pine Street Inn
Appointment term expires
Barbara Whelan 1/31/85
Executive Director, Bridge
Over Troubled Waters
Appointment term expires
Honorable J. John Fox 1/31/86
The Commission has the authority to hire a Director
and other staff as necessary. The duties of the Commission
are
:
o Compile and publish statistics on the
number of homeless in Boston,
o Coordinate public and private organiza-
tional efforts to provide facilities for
homeless
,
o Work with City departments, agencies and
commissions for the use of vacant or tax
foreclosed buildings as temporary shel-
ters for the homeless,
o Report quarterly to Mayor and City Coun-
cil regarding the homeless and the need
for emergency shelters due to weather or
other emergencies.
During FY 83 the Emergency Shelter Commission
received a special appropriation of $75,000. In May 1983
the Commission hired a Director, and in June added a
research assistant, a secretary and a student intern.
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The Commission views itself as a coordinator of
city, state, federal and private efforts to address the
needs of the homeless in Boston, as an advocate within the
bureaucracy for homeless individuals, and as a monitor of
the effectiveness of homeless shelters. These functions are
carried out through bi-monthly meetings of the Commission-
ers, weekly meetings of shelter directors, and monthly meet-
ings of the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Homeless.
In the seven months since the Director was hired,
the Commission cites the following accomplishments:
o Hired staff and set-up Commission office,
o Functioned as a liaison between the
Department of Health and Hospitals and
state officials for the continued opera-
tion of the Long Island Shelter,
o Recommended that the state, NDEA and PFD
secure funding for the Arch Street
Church Day Center and the Transitional
Housing Horizon Program,
o Conducted one-night homeless count and
published pilot study (Nov. 1983),
o Provided information and referral
services to 56 walk-ins and 56 phone
appeals, which reflect 42 males, 30
females and 49 families (with 99
children)
.
In addition, the Commission currently is coordinating pro-
posal development for permanent single room housing with a
group of nonprofit organizations.
Boston's Homeless
The homeless population no longer reflects the
stereotypical elderly alcoholic male. It is diverse and
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growing, with an increasing number of the mentally ill (pre-
dominantly between the ages of 20 and 50), as well as women
(estimated to be 20% of the total population) and children.
Boston attracts homeless from across the state and
throughout New England. Although the exact number of home-
less in Boston is unknown, unofficial estimates range from
3,000 to 8,000. A Commission survey, known as the "October
Project" and based on a one-night (October 27, 1983) count
in shelters and on the street, found 2,767 homeless Boston-
ians. Additionally, the report identified 981 families who
were doubled or tripled up. The table below summarizes the
findings
.
One-Night Count — October 27, 1983
Homeless Males Homeless Females
Street 903
Shelter 597
Detox 500
Mental Health 86
Children 7
TOTAL 2.093
Street 287
Shelter 194
Detox 18
Mental Health 48
Children
_7
TOTAL 554
The Commission readily admits that these findings
are not comprehensive. Two neighborhoods, West Roxbury and
Charlestown, were not included in the street count. Some
battered women's programs did not submit data. Finally,
four major social service agencies with knowledge of doubled
or tripled up families refused to participate for fear of
reprisals from City and State programs affecting their
clients
.
Despite the limitations of the report, it is signi-
ficant that on October 27, 1983, a windy night with tempera-
ture lows of 39° F., 1,190 men, women and children were
found in Boston's streets without any form of shelter.
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The Massachusetts Association for Mental Health and
the United Community Planning Corporation (MAMH-UCPC) also
conducted a one-night (February 25, 1983) count which found
970 individuals in emergency shelters, of whom 81% were male
and 19% female. Ninety percent of the guests were under 65
years old; 54% were between the ages of 20 and 40.
The MAMH-UCPC also conducted an "Identification of
Needs" assessment of persons residing at the State-operated
Lemuel Shattuck Shelter during the week of April 25, 1983.
Major findings include:
o N=78 (Male 83%, Female 17%);
o 77% of all clients were white;
o 41% of clients had a major mental dis-
order ;
o 37% reported no income and only 23%
reported receiving any type of public
assistance;
o 72% had no form of medical insurance; and
o 73% had no contact with social service
agencies
.
The MAMH-UCPC profile of Shattuck Shelter clients
depicted a grim picture of a population greatly in need of
psychological and medical services in addition to their
primary need of shelter. There is also general consensus
that the homeless are a growing population. Pine Street Inn
alone experienced an increase of 677 new clients in 1982.
During the winter of 1983 up to 250 individuals slept in the
lobby of the shelter after its 300 beds were full.
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Commission Funding
The Emergency Shelter Commission is entirely funded
by City revenues. In FY 1983 the Commission received a
special appropriation of $75,000. Due to the late start-up,
only $36,000 was expended during FY 1983. In FY 1984 the
Commission received another special appropriation of $75,000.
Emergency Shelter Commission Budget
FY 84 Expend 12/13/83
Permanent Emp. $64,461 (83%) $24,568
Student Intern — 2,408
Supplies-Materials
Office — 500
Miscellaneous 8,039 30
Telephone 3,000 1,191
Postage 1,000 440
Printing — 928
Travel 500 368
Subscriptions -- 25
TOTAL $75,000 $30.458 (40%)
For both FY 1983 and FY 1984 the Commission's bud-
get was appropriated in one line item. Determination of
expenditures was done by the Commission staff internally
with little guidance from the Budget Department. Budget
reports are not submitted to the Department. The absence of
formal management linkages with the Administrative Services
Department is evident in all areas of Commission operation.
The Commission Director reported never receiving instruc-
tions regarding City management procedures.
The Commission's staff was hired by the Board of
Commissioners as specified by the enabling ordinance. How-
ever, termination of staff is not outlined by the ordinance
and thus staff status is similar to provisional employees.
The management of staff is described as a "team approach."
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The small number of employees combined with good intra-
office morale has allowed this approach to function effec-
tively for the past seven months.
Officially, the Commission reports to the Mayor's
Coordinator of Housing policy. The degree of direction from
this office appears to be minimal. An informal network
calling upon the voluntary assistance of the Director of
Public Facilities and the Commissioner of Health and Hospi-
tals, both Emergency Shelter Commissioners, has enabled the
Commission's staff to learn the ropes of City Hall. This
assistance has helped the Commission avoid the dilemmas of
being isolated from and uninformed about City Hall. This
network has also introduced Commission staff to other
department heads resulting in a level of inter-departmental
coordination not found in the other agencies surveyed.
FY 1984 Issues
A number of programmatic and funding topics will
require Mayoral decisions and/or policy direction in the
near future.
Commission Membership—The term of one Commis-
sioner, Richard Ring, Executive Director of Pine Street Inn,
will expire January 31, 1984. Commissioner Ring currently
satisfies the requirement that at least one Commissioner
work directly for a homeless shelter.
Long Island Shelter—On February 2, 1983, the BCH
opened the Tobin Building at Long Island Hospital to accom-
modate those persons still in the BCH auditorium and reduce
the health hazards of cross-infection within a hospital
setting. Until 1979 the Tobin Building was used as an
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alcoholic treatment facility. The program was completely
phased out by 1980. The Tobin Building has a present capa-
city of 100 beds.
Each Long Island Shelter guest receives a medical/
social interview. Follow-up medical treatment is coordi-
nated with staff at Boston City Hospital. Shelter guests
are accepted on a first-come, first-served basis. Each day
at 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. MBTA buses leave BCH, transport-
ing 50 homeless persons per trip. The shelter director
reports that guests are lining up 2 to 3 hours before the
first bus leaves. The Tobin shelter provides nursing staff,
showers and an evening meal. After breakfast guests are
transported back to BCH. A small advocacy program allows
30-40 clients to stay at the Tobin facility to receive
social and housing support counseling.
During FY 1984 funding for the Long Island Shelter
has come from three sources:
FY 1984 Funding - Long Island Shelter
City.
Supplemental appropriation (August 83) $330,000
Federal
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
appropriated via the State (must be
encumbered by 12/31/83) 300,000
CDBG
Via NDEA 89,500
State
MBTA (2 buses daily) in-kind state donation
TOTAL* $719.500
*FY 1984 costs - $719,500
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City appropriations are made to the Health and
Hospitals budget, which in turn contracts with the Trustees
of Health and Hospitals for the operation of the Long Island
Shelter. The Trustees act as a direct financial agent for
all other shelter revenue.
FEMA funds became available during the spring of
1983. The State received $1.6 million of a national appro-
priation of $50 million. Boston was subsequently granted
$300,000 for the Long Island Shelter. Federal guidelines
require FEMA funds to be encumbered by December 31, 1983.
In order to meet this requirement and still be able to con-
tinue program operation, program costs for FEMA reimburse-
ment are categorized as a $50,000 per month lease of the
Tobin Building between Health and Hospitals and BCH. By
March 1984, the federal funding agency requires a financial
audit. The federal intent of these funds was strictly tar-
geted to food and shelter costs. It is unclear whether cur-
rent encumbrance practices will withstand federal review.
This contract should immediately be reviewed with State
officials who have agreed to this arrangement.
NDEA has granted $89,500 of CDBG funds to provide
funding for professional staff at the shelter. Health and
Hospitals was required to write a formal proposal for these
funds. This proposal process differs from the experience of
other City agencies that maintain "Memoranda of Agreement"
with NDEA for grants.
Present funds will be sufficient to continue the
Long Island facility through FY 1984. However, the Emergen-
cy Shelter Commission has actively proposed the establish-
ment of an additional 100 beds for the winter of 1984. The
Commission anticipates that the City Council will shortly be
submitting a supplemental appropriation request of $460,000
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for such expansion. The Public Facilities Department has
also set aside $35,000 of CDBG funds to provide structural
rehabilitation required for this expansion. Aside from
availability of funds, Health and Hospitals has expressed
strong reservations concerning the program implications of
sheltering 200 homeless. BCH claims existing guests present
needs that the shelter is only beginning to address. Prior
to any decision regarding the expansion proposal, a serious
analysis of program quality and long-term funding require-
ments must be conducted.
FY 1985 funding is uncertain. To continue opera-
tion of the present shelter capacity in FY 1985 will cost
$778,000. State officials indicate that FEMA funds were
one-time grants, not to be anticipated in 1984. NDEA has
also told the Shelter to anticipate a 40% reduction of CDBG
funding. It is not known if the State will continue to pay
for the MBTA buses which are provided without the benefit of
a written agreement. Without additional revenue sources,
the City would need to supplement the Shelter's operation
with an additional $335,800 for a total appropriation of
$665,800. This projection does not include the expansion of
100 beds, which would increase the city appropriation in FY
1985 to $1,324,000, a 201% increase over FY 1984.
The Emergency Shelter Commission has taken an
active role in advocating and making recommendations for the
Long Island Shelter. While relations between the Commission
and BCH have been productive, BCH has strong feelings
regarding health, security and fire safety issues that will
accompany any shelter expansion.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, in cooperation
with the U.S. Conference of Mayors, notified the White
Administration on October 20, 1983, of their sponsorship of
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the "Health Care for the Homeless Program." This project
offers to make available as many as 14 four-year grants of
up to $1.4 million each for development and implementation
of projects to deliver health care services to the homeless
through a competitive grant application process open to the
50 largest U.S. cities. Conditions of application require
grantees to represent city-wide coalitions of the health
care community and providers of homeless services. Coali-
tions can be combinations of city, state and private pro-
viders. Of each $1.4 million award, only $200,000 can be
used for planning and oversight; the remainder must be used
for direct health care services. The City of Boston is not
required, but is encouraged, to take the lead in the devel-
opment of grant applications. Each application does require
a letter of endorsement from the Mayor.
In October 1983, the Mayor's Office assigned
responsibility for this grant to the Emergency Shelter Com-
mission. There is an immediate planning and application
process that needs to be addressed. The formal grant time-
table is as follows:
o March 1, 1984: Deadline for receipt of
letters of interest,
o July 1, 1984: Deadline for receipt of
applications
,
o October 15, 1984: Completion of review
of applications and site visits to
selected applicants,
o December 31, 1984: Grant recipients
announced.
At a policy level, a decision is required as to
whether the Emergency Shelter Commission should continue to
be designated the lead agency. Further, the role Health and
Hospitals should play (considering that the grant is for
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health services) must be clarified,
sion on this matter will allow for
and higher quality proposals.
An early policy deci-
more effective planning
V. BOSTON FAIR HOUSING COMMISSION
The Boston Fair Housing Commission (BFHC) was
created by ordinance in March 1982. The Commission became
operational in March, subsuming the responsibilities of the
Mayor's Office of Fair Housing (MOFH) . The goal of the
Commission is to ensure equal access to housing for all,
regardless of race, color, creed, marital status, military
status, handicap, children, national origin, sex, age,
ancestry, sexual preference or source of income. Three of
these categories are not covered by other fair housing
legislation: handicap, sexual preference and source of
income
.
The Commission's operating budget totals $712,000,
77% of which is federal funds (CDBG). These funds are
awarded to the Commission by the Neighborhood Development
and Employment Agency (NDEA) , which is also charged with
monitoring them. The Commission's budget is primarily used
for the salaries of staff members and the five Fair Housing
Commissioners
.
The budget negotiation and monitoring role of NDEA
is minimal; it does not require a formal funding proposal
from the Commission. Instead, the Commission is informed of
its maximum budget level and directed to submit line items
not exceeding that amount. NDEA requires formal proposals
from other agencies within City government.
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For the past two years, NDEA has approved generous
levels of funding within certain line items. Although the
Commission is located in City Hall, and inherited furniture
from the MOFH, last year NDEA approved $25,000 for new fur-
niture. Approved furniture costs were as follows: Execu-
tive Director's Office - $6,000; Hearing Conference Room -
9,000; Reception Area - $2,000; three staff members'
offices - $8,000. In the area of training, NDEA allowed
$8,400 for a 16-week Staff and Board training seminar.
Preparation of the series cost $2,000.
Staff salary levels were determined by the Execu-
tive Director. Fifteen salaries are paid through CDBG; the
average is $21,600. City revenues are used to pay three
salaries which average $32,400. The Executive Director
receives $52,000 per year.
The City pays a per diem rate of $300 to the Fair
Housing Commission Chairman, and $200 to four Fair Housing
Commissioners. Commissioners' salaries cannot exceed an
annual level of $15,000 (Chairman) or $10,000 (Commis-
sioners ) .
The Fair Housing Commission provides three direct
services and one indirect service. The former are investi-
gation, conciliation/mediat ion and information/referral.
The latter is public education. From January 1983 to Octo-
ber 1983 the Commission received 1,574 calls, conciliated/
mediated 8 cases and analyzed 132 discrimination complaints.
Most attention was devoted to racial issues related to Fair
Housing
.
Recently, a significant level of staff time was
devoted to lobbying activity — specifically, legislative
lobbying related to passage of the Fair Housing Home Rule
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Petition. This activity was not coordinated with the City's
Office of Inter-Governmental Relations.
VI. RENT EQUITY BOARD
In 1969, the City Council established a Rent Con-
trol Board in Boston and charged it with regulating rents
and evictions in approximately 70,000 rental units covered
under the ordinance. Since then, a number of changes rela-
ted to its scope and mandate have occurred, the most drama-
tic being passage of an ordinance in 1983 re-naming the
Board and changing its mandate and service population.
Renamed the Rent Equity Board, it is charged with
regulating rents and evictions in approximately 30,000 rent
controlled units (40,000 units were de-controlled under the
new ordinance). It is also required to establish a rent
grievance process for protected classes of tenants (low/
moderate income, handicapped and elderly), and maintain data
on rental housing stock in the city. The changes decreased
the total service population but increased the complexity of
administration.
Agency Finances
The Rent Equity Board operates with a budget of
$527,485, all from City revenues. The budget rose 20% from
the previous year, although the administration had requested
a 42% increase to meet its new mandate.
The Rent Equity Board budget, which is included in
the FY 84 Activity Budget, and the budget information
received from the Rent Equity Board Administration did not
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reconcile on three counts: structure, board members' sala-
ries and number of staff positions.
The FY 84 Activity Budget lists two divisions; the
Board's organizational structure reflects five sections.
There are six board members listed in the Activity Budget at
a total salary level of $62,640. The salary schedule sub-
mitted by the Board's Administrator during the transition
lists four paid Board members with salaries totalling
$9,396. Finally, 20 staff positions are listed in the
Activity Budget (accounting for over 80% of total funding)
while 25 are listed on the organizational chart. The Rent
Board Administration stated that the Activity Budget format
had little relevance to their organization.
In the first two quarters of this fiscal year, the
Rent Equity Board expended 44% of its total personnel allo-
cation. In three other categories, the Rent Equity Board is
underspending to a significant degree. These are: contrac-
tual services (20% expended), supplies and materials (.03%
/expended), and current charges and obligations (.02% expend-
ed) .
The Board is divided into four program units: rent
section, legal section, eviction/condo compliance, and cli-
ent services. Each provides a different service to Boston's
tenants and landlords. The Rent Section is authorized for
eight positions — seven are currently filled. The rent
section's personnel costs total $107,759. In a one-year
period (Jan. 1, 1983 - Dec. 31, 1983), this section pro-
cessed 486 cases (rent increases, rent grievances, condo
compliance, and vacancy decontrol compliance) with 71 still
pending. The personnel cost per completed case is $221.72.
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The legal section has four staff positions at a
total personnel cost of $86,592. A summary of activities
completed from Jan. 1, 1983 - Dec. 31, 1983 shows a total of
117 new cases, with 102 resolved. Three hundred twenty
cases are being carried over from 1983 and prior years.
The eviction/condo compliance section is princi-
pally responsible for granting eviction certificates in
rent-controlled units and monitoring the tenant notification
process in eviction cases related to condominium conver-
sion. It includes three current staff members whose sala-
ries total $48,529; a fourth staff position is vacant. From
Jan. 1, 1983 - Dec. 31, 1983, staff held a total of 406
hearings; on the average it takes five weeks to receive a
decision through this section.
Client services is staffed by five, at a cost of
$50,139. This section is primarily responsible for informa-
tion/referral and processing applications. They refer an
average of 400 clients per week, and directly assist 150.
Although landlords are required to register their property
through this section, there is no practical mechanism to
ensure that units have been registered.
The level of staffing appears low. In the rent
section, only four hearing officers are available to hear
rent grievances and investigate compliance violations from a
potential population of 30,000 controlled units and 28,000
units occupied by elderly, handicapped, and low/moderate
income tenants. There are 25 City-funded positions in the
Rent Equity Board beyond the five salaried board members.
Fifty-two percent of the positions are covered under a union
contract (Local 285); there are no civil service employees.
Union salaries are established through negotiations with the
City. The average salary for a unionized worker is $13,727.
Management salaries are based on the salary plan developed
by the prior administration. The average management salary
is $26,113, 47% higher than the average union salary.
The roles of workers in the four functional sec-
tions of the Rent Equity Board are clearly defined. Senior
management roles are not. Two staff positions, Project
Manager (salary $29,000) and MIS Systems Manager (salary
$22,700), should be closely examined. The responsibilities
of the first position are unclear; the second position is
responsible for the implementation and development of an MIS
system. To date, the Rent Equity Board has no computerized
data. An analysis of computerization need was completed
through subcontract at a cost of $2,500.
The success of the Rent Equity Board in fulfilling
its educational, service, and data base development is an
open question. Approximately 28,000 tenants (elderly, han-
dicapped and low/moderate income) have the legal right to
grieve rent increases. The grievance process has been in
place for six months; to date a total of 174 have been pro-
cessed. Public information efforts have been minimal.
All rent control data is processed manually and
held in a central file. The statistical format counts ser-
vice units, but does not record distribution of those units
by neighborhood, race or language minority. The Rent Equity
Board has no facility for needs assessment, management plan-
ning or program evaluation. In addition, the Rent Equity
Board office lease expired December 31, 1983. Funds must be
reallocated for moving expenses (approx. $30,000) and rental
costs
.
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VII. VETERANS SERVICES DEPARTMENT
Cities and towns in the Commonwealth are required
by Chapter 115 of the Massachusetts General Laws to provide
benefits and assistance to veterans and their dependents.
Chapter 115 also mandates that each city and town appoint a
veterans services agent, a veterans burial agent, and a
veterans advisory board. The Commonwealth reimburses the
City 50% of the costs of veterans' benefits.
There are an estimated 745,000 veterans in Massa-
chusetts; 8.8% (65,552) of this population lives in Boston.
Boston's Veterans Services Department is located on the
second floor of 26 West Street, in downtown Boston. Ser-
vices offered by the department include job referral and
claims processing assistance for benefits including V.A.
pensions, Social Security, and vocational rehabilitation.
Benefits include financial assistance for food, clothing,
shelter and medical care. The Program is, however, selec- /
tive. Veterans are required to meet three conditions: war
time service with an honorable discharge, legal residency in
Boston, and financial need. Eligibility criteria and assis-
tance payments are determined by the State's Veteran Ser-
vices Administration.
The Veterans Services Department has 28 employees,
divided among six functional units:
o The billing unit monitors and makes pay-
ments to hospitals, pharmacies, and
physicians for expenses of eligible
veterans
.
o The finance unit monitors departmental
expenditures, payroll and personnel
matters
.
o The application unit interviews veterans
applying for benefits
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o The investigation unit checks the eligi-
bility status of each application.
o The community relations unit conducts
outreach and communications with local
veterans organizations.
o The job referral unit provides job coun-
seling and referral to all employable
benefit recipients.
Thirteen employees are provisional appointees who have
requested Section 26 Permanent Status. Included within
those seeking permanent designation is the Executive Assis-
tant .
Not reflected in the organizational chart is the
Veterans Graves Registration Division. Although the Divi-
sion technically is part of the Veterans Services Depart-
ment, in the City's activity budget this division is repre-
sented as a separate appropriation account, and the Commis-
sioner of Veterans Services reports little oversight of the
Graves Registration Division by his Department. The Divi-
sion employs three individuals, a supervisor and two cleri-
cal staff.
Veterans Services Funding
The account histories of the Veterans Services
Department and the Graves Registration Division are depicted
below.
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Both of these accounts show substantial appropria-
tion reductions in FY 1982 related to the impact of Proposi-
tion 2-1/2. In the Veterans Services Department these cut-
backs required the layoff of 27 staff. In FY 1983, 94% of
the Department's cuts were restored.
In FY 1984 expenditures for the Department and the
Graves Division are allocated as follows:
FY 84 Veterans Services Veterans Graves Reg
Personnel $ 671,590 21% $ 55,650 46%
Communications 14,000 .4% 1,000 .8%
Service of Equip. 1,500 .05%
Travel 12,500 .3% 1,000 .8%
Misc. Contracted Svcs 62,000 52%
Office Supplies 7,000 .2% 600 .4%
Aid to Veterans 2,509,201 78%
Other Charges 5, 000 15%
TOTALS &3. 220. 791 100% &120.250 100%
XIII - 33
The State reimburses the City for 50% of all benefits paid.
Reimbursements for FY 1984 benefits would reduce the net
City expenses for the Veterans Services Department to
$1,966,191.
Two amendments to Chapter 115 were proposed in the
Massachusetts legislature in 1983 to raise the reimbursement
rate for veterans benefits from 50% to 75%. These amend-
ments narrowly failed. Passage would have saved the City
$627,300 in FY 1984.
As of November 1983, the Department reports 759
active cases, representing 1,076 beneficiaries. During the
past 15 months a 22% decrease in cases and a 24% decrease in
beneficiaries was reported.
The Department records monthly statistics differen-
tiating between new cases, ongoing cases and reapplications
.
The number of individuals receiving job counseling are
recorded by "placed in job," "active case," or terminated.
Clients are coded by the war in which they served. However,
the Department does not compile these codes, thus prohibi-
ting analysis of older versus younger veterans. Also, the
Department does not collect data on sex, race, residential
location or disabling condition. The absence of this data
prevents the Department from presenting client profiles.
The application unit reports an average of 600
walk-ins per month. This unit has a supervisor, two social
service technicians and a clerical assistant. On an average
day 29 intakes are conducted, 14.5 intakes per technician.
Comparing intakes with monthly investigations of new cases
indicates that only 6% of all applicants are determined eli-
gible for further assessment.
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The job referral unit averages 42 new clients per
month. This unit has three employees — a job referral
specialist and two administrative assistants. It conducts
both individual and group sessions related to job place-
ments. Of all clients serviced each month, 12% are placed
in jobs, 31% remain active cases, and 57% are terminated.
Present client demand does not require the existing
personnel levels within the Department. For both admini-
stration and direct services, personnel reductions combined
with Department reorganization could occur while maintaining
current service levels. Proposed personnel reductions
include
:
o 3 clerks (billing unit);
o 1 administrative assistant (job referral
uni t )
;
o 1 community relations specialist;
o 1 Assistant Commissioner (application unit);
and
TOTAL 8 personnel = $162,668 annual savings.
Proposed reorganization would consolidate the
application unit with the investigation unit, and the
finance unit with billing; streamline the community rela-
tions and job referral units; and bring the Veterans Graves
Registration Division directly within the Veterans Services
Department. It is recommended that the procedures currently
in operation for conducting intake, investigations and data
collection be consolidated. Personnel and support cost sav-
ings realized by this proposal are projected to be $150,000
annually.
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The consolidation of the finance and billing units
would save three salaries and align these responsibilities
under one supervision. The elimination of the Community
Relations Specialist is not expected to affect Departmental
outreach efforts. Presently the Community Relations Offi-
cer, the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner all report
community relations functions. Outreach efforts need to be
analyzed for effectiveness. Three individuals are engaged
in this area, but no funds are allocated for public informa-
tion materials. The only brochure available lists an
incorrect address for the Department.
In the job referral unit client demand does not
require existing staff levels. Further, only 12% of all
clients are placed in jobs. The effectiveness of this unit
and the duplication of effort with other City and State
employment programs require review.
VIII. HISPANIC ACCESS TO HUMAN SERVICES
Introduction
To accomplish the goal of ensuring the delivery of
public services to all neighborhoods more efficiently and
effectively services must be designed for, and offered to,
all segments of the Boston population. That population is
changing rapidly, as clearly indicated in Table 1, drawn
from Census Bureau figures.
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TABLE 1
BOSTON'S POPULATION BY RACE AND
SPANISH ORIGIN 1970-1980
1970 1980 % CHANGE
White 524,709 393,937 -24.9
Black 104,707 126,227 20.5
Other3 ll,555b 42,828c 270.6
Hispanic 17, 984 36,060 100.5
TOTALd 640,971 562,994 -12.1
a Other includes Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean,
Vietnamese, American Indian, Hawaiian, Guamanian,
Samoan, Eskimo, Aleut or other.
b Spanish language
c Spanish origin
^ Columns do not add to total because Hispanic may
include White, Black and Other.
Hispanics have become the second largest minority population
in the State of Massachusetts.
There are three major areas where Hispanics are
concentrated in the City of Boston. They are: Jamaica
Plain-Fenway, Dorchester-Mattapan, and South End-Lower
Roxbury. For the future planning of services delivery, note
should also be taken of the growing Hispanic neighborhoods
in Allston-Brighton and East Boston.
Because of low socio-economic conditions and major
cultural and linguistic differences from mainstream society,
Spanish-speaking people have a critical need for the devel-
opment and implementation of a wide range of specialized
human services. This section reviews how well those needs
are being met by the City departments covered in this chap-
ter. Hispanic community reaction is also included.
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Commission on the Affairs of the Elderly—The
Commission has contracted with 23 agencies in the City of
Boston to provide services to the elderly. Of those 23
agencies, Alianza Hispana and Jamaica Plain Senior Team
principally provide services for Hispanic elderly. The Com-
mission has started, through its meal program, to provide
Spanish meals in the Columbus Avenue program. The Commis-
sion also has a newspaper, the "Boston Seniority," that was
printed in Spanish until two years ago. The rationale for
terminating the Spanish version was lack of interest from
the Hispanic elderly community. The Commission also makes
presentations, whenever requested, on its programs in Span-
ish, and printed information regarding the Commission's ser-
vices is available in Spanish. Presently, the Commission
has one Hispanic outreach worker and two bilingual staff in
administrative and middle management positions.
A study conducted by the Commission in 1983 on the
needs of the elderly in the City of Boston contacted 83 His-
panic elderly. The results showed little usage of or famil-
iarity with services for the Hispanic elderly. A high num-
ber stated that they needed transportation services. Most
of the elderly related to Alianza Hispana.
The Hispanic community appears to feel that even
though the Commission has been providing services to the
Hispanic elderly, those services could be improved, and pro-
grams should be revised and made relevant to the specific
needs of Hispanics. Lack of Hispanics in the Commission's
policy-making process may have had a negative effect on the
quality and provision of services to the Hispanic elderly.
Because of language, socio-economic and educational bar-
riers, delivery of services to non-English-speaking elderly
is more difficult. The Hispanic elderly not only use ser-
vices for the elderly less, but are also less familiar with
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them. More outreach is especially important in the medical
area.
Handicapped Affairs Commission—The Commission
does not do a statistical breakdown in terms of race, ethni-
city, or neighborhood of requested services. Of a staff of
seven, there is one social worker who has a minimal knowl-
edge of Spanish. Through this social worker an informal
arrangement has been made with the Commission on the Affairs
of the Elderly to have a Spanish-speaking interpreter avail-
able whenever there are communication difficulties. Still,
the Commission does not receive many calls from Hispanic
handicapped people. No information regarding the Commis-
sion's services is available in Spanish. The Commission
would like to hire a Spanish-speaking person in order to
provide better services to the Hispanic community and is
planning to contract out for the translation into Spanish of
a brochure to be disseminated to the Hispanic community.
There is a need for more services to be given to
the Hispanic handicapped, such as more bilingual educational
and vocational programs. Through the Hispanic unit of the
Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, services have been
provided to approximately 1,200 Hispanic handicapped since
the program started five years ago. Attempts to open up the
job market should be made by City Hall as well as at state
level
.
Emergency Shelter Commission—The Commission does
not keep statistical records based upon race or ethnicity.
There are no Spanish-speaking or Hispanic staff, but the
Commission would like to "have someone that speaks Span-
ish.". There is no printed information on the Commission
available in Spanish. The Commission receives many calls
from Hispanics with housing problems. On the other hand,
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the battered
vices, due to
women shelters are not using
an "issue of confidentiality."
Commission ser-
Services from the Commission are needed in the
Hispanic community, particularly with single mothers and
children. An average of 800 single women with children per
year were given shelter at Casa Myrna Vasquez. Respondents
also noticed a growing population of homeless single His-
panic males. The Commission may be unaware of the specific
needs of the Hispanic community.
Fair Housing Commission—Up to December 1, 1983,
the Commission recorded a total of 2,000 complaints, of
which 18% (360) were discrimination complaints from Hispan-
ics
.
The Commission has five Spanish-speaking staff out
of a total of 18 personnel. The Commission has utilized TV
spots in Spanish and has translated forms and brochures into
Spanish, which have been disseminated to certain programs or
agencies that serve the Hispanic community. The Commission
has not been widely utilized by Hispanics. Clear linkages
with the Hispanic community need to be promoted.
Large numbers of Hispanics in Boston live in sub-
standard housing conditions and often experience discrimina-
tion while searching for adequate housing. This is the case
particularly with single mothers with children, welfare
recipients and those with language barriers.
Rent Equity Board--The Board has no client
statistical information broken down by race, ethnicity or
neighborhood. There is only one staff member in an admini-
strative position who has a working knowledge of Spanish.
Most forms are written in Spanish, but there is no general
information regarding services available in Spanish.
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Orientation regarding the Board's services will be
provided upon request. The Board needs an assessment of
Hispanic community needs. Presently, there are no organized
plans to disseminate information regarding the Board's ser-
vices to the Hispanic community. Steps have been taken
towards translating a general information format to be dis-
seminated through the two main Hispanic newspapers in the
community.
Efforts to spread information regarding the ser-
vices provided by the Rent Equity Board have not been felt
widely in the community. Clearly there are language bar-
riers in dealing with the office.
Department of Veterans Services—The Department
does not keep any statistical information by race or ethnic
background. Few Hispanic veterans request services from
City Hall. There is one Hispanic in a clerical position.
When Hispanic veterans request services, for the most part
the Department collaborates with the Director of the federal
Veterans Center Outreach Program, located in the South End.
The Department has been able to establish a good relation-
ship with this office, but training should be given to those
who provide services to the Hispanic veterans.
In general, the delivery of services should be cul-
turally responsive, accessible, visible and available to the
Hispanic veterans.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENTS
General
o The Mayor's human service policy needs
to be clearly defined and communicated
to line departments and commissions.
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o A uniform collection system of client
demographic data must be developed and
applied to all agencies.
o Interdepartmental communication proce-
dures with emphasis on joint planning
and problem solving should be estab-
lished.
o Inter-governmental lobbying activities
of individual human service issues
should be guided by the Office of
Inter-Governmental Relations.
Commission on Affairs of the Elderly
o A data collection system that is consis-
tent across service categories should be
developed to ascertain distribution of
City resources by race and neighborhood.
o The physical condition of the Senior
Shuttle fleet should be reviewed and
decisions to replace or repair aging
vehicles should be made.
o The costs and benefits of a donation
system for the Senior Shuttle should be
reviewed
.
o Senior Shuttle vans should be parked in
a central location during evening hours.
o The Commission should develop strategies
to increase coordination with Boston's
three Home Care Corporations.
o The role of the legislative liaison
should be reviewed for possible transfer
to the Inter-Governmental Relations
Office.
Handicapped Affairs Commission
o The Commission's mission and existing
work plans require policy and management
review.
o A consolidation of this Commission with
the Elder Commission should be consi-
dered .
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o The designation of the Commission's
Director as the City's 504 compliance
officer must be reevaluated. Further,
the 504 compliance officer should chair
a committee representative of all
departments to evaluate the requirements
of 504 regulations.
o The present office space, which is func-
tionally inaccessible to the physically
handicapped, should be changed.
Emergency Shelter Commission
o The present role of the Commission as
coordinator of state, federal and pri-
vate funding of homeless programs in
Boston should be clarified and analyzed
with respect to the reorganization of
housing programs.
o The Robert Wood Johnson proposal process
requires immediate attention in order to
meet proposal deadlines.
o Dialogue with state and federal offi-
cials related to mentally ill homeless,
and Medicaid reimbursements for treat-
ment of homeless individuals should be
initiated
.
o Comprehensive program and fiscal analy-
sis surrounding the proposed expansion
of the Long Island Shelter should be
completed prior to approval of a supple-
mental appropriation for expansion.
Fair Housing Commission
o Formal communication with the Mayor's
Office of Housing Policy should be
established
.
o The Commission should prepare proposals
for CDBG funds.
o CDBG funds should be monitored by NDEA.
o Compensation for Commissioners should be
reviewed
.
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o The legislative role of the Commission
needs to be analyzed and closely coordi-
nated with the Inter-Governmental Rela-
tions Office.
Rent Equity Board
o The terms of the current Board members
expired January 2, 1984. New appoint-
ments need to be made promptly.
o The Rent Equity Board's lease expired
December 31, 1983. The need for new
space is immediate as the Board is a
tenant at will. Additional funds must
be allocated for moving expenses.
o The manual system of data collection is
inefficient. The system must be compu-
terized to produce timely and accurate
data
.
o The Rent Equity Board has a minimal
level of line staff, which should be
increased to provide faster service to
landlords and tenants. Senior manage-
ment level positions should be carefully
reviewed to clearly define job responsi-
bilities.
o A program of public education that
focuses on tenant and landlord rights
under the Rent Equity Law does not
exist. This should be planned and
implemented, and should include strate-
gies to ensure outreach to language
minorities
.
Veterans Services Department
o Reorganization and consolidation of pro-
gram units is recommended. The proposed
reorganization would eliminate eight
positions and produce annual savings of
$200,000.
o The Veterans Graves Registration Divi-
sion requires management review and
should be brought directly into the
Veterans Services Department.
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Dialogue with state officials should
begin to increase the reimbursement of
veterans benefits from 50% to 75%,
producing annual savings of $627,300.
spanic Access
A further detailed review of the social
service needs of the Hispanic community,
as well as resources available, should
be undertaken.
An outreach program should be developed
with the Hispanic community in order to
promote inter-agency collaboration in
sharing resources and expertise, avoid-
ing duplication and, consequently,
improving the human service delivery
network for the Hispanic population.
Efforts should be made, in all City Hall
departments, to ensure bilingual and
Hispanic staffing at all levels of ser-
vice delivery and planning.
City Hall administration should ensure
that translations of forms, brochures,
and other related consumer documents be
made available in Spanish.
At some point, cross-cultural training
on the Hispanic culture should be pro-
vided to all departments that provide
social services to the community.
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Health and Hospitals

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Any analysis of the Department of Health and Hos-
pitals must begin by recognizing the following four points:
1. The Department is the primary source of
health care for many people who would
otherwise get none.
2. The Department is a major economic
force in the City. The annual subsidy
from the City of $20 to $30 million
attracts approximately $100 million in
state, federal and insurance funds.
3. The Department is a major political
force in the City because many resi-
dents and families are dependent upon
it for their livelihoods.
4. Most City departments are completely
funded by the City. Therefore, savings
can be accomplished by reducing costs.
The DH&H, on the other hand, earns most
of its money from payments for ser-
vices. Therefore, its cost to the City
can be reduced, with least hardship
both to its patients and employees, by
increasing income.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are divided into two
groups. The first group is of overriding importance to the
future of the Department. The second group is of major sig-
nificance to the future of the Department.
Recommendations of overriding importance:
1. The services of the Department must be
continued. It is unrealistic to con-
sider a major shutdown of the Depart-
ment's facilities so long as the con-
ditions summarized above prevail.
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The Department must increase its earned
income. The most sensible way to ac-
complish this is to provide increased
services to the elderly, as they are
usually covered by Medicare and/or Med-
icaid.
The staff, patients and services of all
three hospitals should be consolidated
at BCH in facilities that are compet-
itive with those of any other hospital
in the City. The Department cannot
attract additional paying patients into
its present physical plant, nor can it
sustain the extra costs created by
under-utilized, inefficient buildings.
The continued deterioration of the
physical plant could result either in
sudden, major renovation expenses or in
delicensing and consequent loss of re-
venues. Moreover, even after the sale
of the old outpatient building, 265,000
square feet of space at the three hos-
pitals remains unused. The Department
must create and implement a master plan
for preserving and maintaining real
estate
.
Funding plans for a new facility should
consider financing the new facility
through the sale or development of the
old one.
The Department needs organizational and
administrative improvement. Chains of
command must be strengthened. Auth-
ority and responsibility need to be
assigned more consistently, particu-
larly in the case of middle and lower
management. All staff, including phys-
icians, nurses, providers of general
services, and administrators, need to
be brought into a more organized,
directed, and effective structure.
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Recommendations of major significance:
The system by which the City budgets
and funds the Department is not proper
for a group of services that earn over
70% of its funding. The City should
budget its subsidy to the Department,
but let the Department manage the money
so it can maximize earned income.
Several fiscal problems relating to
reimbursement for services provided to
patients covered by Medicaid, Medicare
and private insurance remain. The De-
partment is working on these matters
and expects to resolve them satis-
factorily; nevertheless, they need to
be monitored. They include:
Several issues relating to the $300
outpatient visit rate, including the
possibility of a payback to Medicaid
of $15 million; a suit brought by
private insurers for $5 million; and
the potential loss of future
revenues if the $300 per visit fee
is ended.
- Several issues relating to the new
hospital reimbursement scheme known
as "Chapter 372," and in particular
the amounts of free care and bad
debt that will be allowed for inclu-
sion in reimbursement formulas.
3. The patient census in the chronic dis-
ease hospitals is falling off because
Medicaid and Medicare regulations for
chronic care services have become much
more restrictive. The Department's
plans to create an integrated system of
services to the elderly require the
Administration's support to prevent a
continued deterioration of census and
payer mix.
4. The Department's health management or-
ganization, known as the Boston Plan,
will lose its subsidies for free care
patients and has not been able to at-
tract sufficient numbers to make up for
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the loss of paying patients. A real-
istic decision about the Plan needs to
be made within the next six months.
BACKGROUND
Department of Health and Hospitals
The present system of public health care facilities
and programs for residents of Boston was organized in 1966
under one administrative body, the Department of Health and
Hospitals (DH&H). Overseeing the administrative body of
DH&H is a nine-member, Mayorally-appointed board. The board
is primarily charged with the responsibilities of any city
board of health: the mandatory duty to report disease; the
duty to ensure hospitalization of diseased persons; and the
duty (shared with the Department of Inspection and Services)
to enforce the sanitary code. Significant to the board is
its additional role as a corporate body known as the Trus-
tees of Health and Hospitals of the City of Boston. The
Trustees' powers include taking and holding property given,
granted, bequeathed or devised to the Trustees and accepted
by the Board for health or hospital purposes, and entering
into arrangements for contracts, grants and gifts from gov-
ernments, foundations, businesses, and individuals.
The DH&H Administrative Unit is composed of three
separate operating divisions: the Boston City Hospital, the
Chronic Disease Division, which includes Mattapan and Long
Island Hospitals; and the Division of Community Health Ser-
vices .
Boston City Hospital—The BCH, Boston's third
oldest and only public hospital, opened its doors in 1864.
It was founded as an
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asylum for the industrious and honest mech-
anic and laborer who by sudden injury or
disease is temporarily prevented from la-
boring for the support of himself and family
and as a
home to which a respectable domestic might
be sent . . . whose attic chambers cannot be
made comfortable and who cannot receive the
requisite attendance.
( City Hospitals , Dowling, Harry F. f Harvard University
Press, Camb. MA., 1981, p. 31). Although the hospital was
required to accept all comers, many of whom were among the
poorest in the City, it was established as a hospital for
the deserving poor, not an almshouse, as were many of the
early public hospitals. Lofty objectives of City and hos-
pital officials alike tended to elevate both staff morale
and the public perception of the institution.
Historically, BCH has served as a major teaching
hospital, at various times for the medical schools of Har-
vard, Tufts and Boston Universities. Many of the research
facilities and additional patient buildings were built with
donations from prosperous City patrons, who were cared for
by the same world-renowned MDs serving on the BCH medical
school services. Since 1973 BCH ' s exclusive affiliation has
been with Boston University's School of Medicine.
BCH established one of the nation's first schools
of nursing. Despite its reputation as one of the top hos-
pital nursing programs in the country, competition from aca-
demic programs forced its RN certificate program to close in
1975. Presently it runs two LPN training programs: a
full-time day and a part-time evening program. The school
is funded by federal dollars, small endowments and City
monies. It recruits a majority of its students from
low-income and minority neighborhoods in Boston. Most of
XIV - 5
its graduates are employed by the Department. Arrangements
have been made through Roxbury and Bunker Hill
Community Colleges and University of Massachusetts (Boston)
to give interested nursing students the opportunity to gain
an Associate or Baccalaureate Degree and RN certification.
The LPN program has doubled its enrollment in the past few
years, an increase attributable in part to flexibility of
the part-time evening LPN program.
In the last 15 years BCH has consolidated its acute
care services and closed a number of its units due to lack
of use. Once a sprawling 1180-bed hospital, it now has only
436 beds. These changes, along with the 1973 departures of
the Harvard and Tufts teaching programs, have created empty
wards and unutilized research floors that DH&H must maintain.
Even with the reduced number of hospital beds, how-
ever, occupancy has generally declined over the past several
years. This trend is expected to continue by reason of the
enactment of G.L. ch. 372, the hospital cost containment
statute. The table below reflects overall hospital bed use.
TABLE 1
DH&H PATIENT VOLUMES
1980 to 1984 (5 mo. ending 10/31/83)
1980 1983 1984
BCH
HI
Patient Days 137,003 135,881 39,802
Available Days 171,185 171,185 57,687
% Occupancy 80% 79% 69%
0/P
Clinic Visits 160,646 137,771 46,204
Emergency Floor 91,041 38,779 12,605
Pediatric Visits N/A 23,278 7,935
Ambulance Trips N/A 27,004 9,043
TOTAL O/P 251,687 226,832 75,787
These figures were obtained from the RCS 401 report.
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Data covering the period from July 1980 to June
1982 suggests that patient volumes at individual hospital
units have generally remained constant, with the exception
of the medical unit where the volume has varied by 10% with-
in a given year.
Chronic Disease Division—The Chronic Disease
Division consists of the Long Island and Mattapan Hos-
pitals. Long Island Hospital was established in 1890 as the
Boston Almshouse, and became the Long Island Hospital in
1927. Mattapan Hospital was established in 1907 to provide
care for patients with pulmonary tuberculosis. Today, both
hospitals provide long-term care for chronically ill in-
dividuals and some rehabilitative care, primarily for
head-injured patients.
The bed capacities of both institutions have been
reduced over the past 15 years. At Mattapan, the capacity
was reduced from 376 to 165 beds. At Long Island the capa-
city of the chronic unit was reduced from 631 to 260, and
the alcohol rehabilitation unit from 439 to 114. Occupancy
has fluctuated over the years. Recent changes in the Medi-
caid regulations concerning criteria for chronic care admis-
sions and continued utilization review have resulted in
lowered occupancy. Currently both hospitals seek patients
with third-party coverage and refuse to admit patients with-
out it. Despite their effort to increase revenue, the cen-
sus is so low that the facilities admit Level 2 and Level
3 — Skilled and Intermediate Nursing Care -- patients with
third-party coverage on "AND" status (administratively
necessary days). The rate for these patients is matched to
the services provided and represents a loss compared to the
rates charged for chronic care services. However, the pre-
vailing opinion is that some income is better than none.
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Below is a display comparing bed use at the two
hospitals to bed use at Lakeville Hospital (a state-run
chronic/rehabilitation hospital) and at Spaulding Rehabili-
tation Hospital (formerly the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Hospital, a private hospital) during FY 1980 to the pre-
sent. The display suggests that trends in use at Boston's
chronic care hospitals are similar to those at other hos-
pitals serving large numbers of Medicaid or Medicare pat-
ients and dissimilar to those at hospitals serving large
numbers of privately insured patients. The term "available
days" refers to the total number of licensed bed-days used,
while "available beds" refers to the number of beds avail-
able for patient use. It should be noted that the fiscal
year for Mattapan, Long Island and Lakeville Hospitals be-
gins on July 1, whereas the fiscal year begins on October 1
at Spaulding.
Community Health Services—The Community Health
Services Division finances 22 community health centers and
operates community health programs in the areas of disease
prevention, environmental health, maternal and child health,
and elderly health. The division also administers the
City-wide ambulance service, the 24-hour Emergency Room, a
Pediatric Walk-In Clinic, and the Ambulatory Care Center at
BCH.
The health centers began in the late 1960s and
early 1970s in response to the lack of available primary
health care services. Few private practice family phys-
icians remained in Boston's neighborhoods, and by default,
hospitals had become the major providers of medical care.
Community health centers were designed to bring qualified
physicians back to the neighborhoods as well as to
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integrate clinical and preventive medicine in community-
based and community-controlled settings. The neighborhood
health center system in the City has the most potential to
meet the primary and preventive health needs of Boston's
residents and is the most loosely tied to the Department in
terms of administration and funding. Each community health
center is managed by an administrator hired by its own board
of trustees. Each center runs independently, in an attempt
to meet the health needs of its own neighborhood. Each
health center acquires its own funds, including both state
and federal funds, to supplement City monies.
Beyond the extensive provision of quality primary
medical care, health centers take a broad view of their com-
munities' needs. For example, responding to the void in
housing, health and social services for the elderly, some
centers have developed a continuum of services from
home-health aide coverage to nursing home programs.
The development of health centers has meant that
many public health programs and services formerly centrally
administered could be decentralized and incorporated into
the programs of the centers. It has also meant that some
programs were no longer necessary. For example, the public
health well-child clinics and home visiting programs
initiated in the '20s were no longer necessary in 1980 be-
cause pediatric services were made available through the
health centers.
While some programs were shifted to the health cen-
ters and some, such as the TB program, were reduced because
of changing needs and/or treatment techniques, others were
developed in response to newly recognized needs. For ex-
ample, new environmental health programs were established to
address problems of rodent control and lead paint poisoning.
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Trustees of Health and Hospitals—There is a pri-
vate, non-profit corporation known as the Trustees' Corp-
oration, which serves as the fiscal conduit and operator of
a number of research and administrative activities. The
Trustees' Corp. provides the Trustees and the Commissioner
with a small degree of flexibility in dealing with agencies
which make research grants, providing support to neighbor-
hood health centers, and other worthwhile smaller activi-
ties. The Trustees Corp. is analogous to similar organiza-
tions which exist at state institutions. The Department
carries a receivable of $2.3 million from the Trustees,
which is principally generated by overhead on research
grants
.
Various Perceptions of the Department
The facilities of the Department of Health and Hos-
pitals mean many things to many people. To the patients the
hospitals provide care. To the Boston University Medical
School the hospital is the vehicle for over 40% of its
teaching and training activities. To nurses, physicians, and
other professional and skilled employees the Department pro-
vides desirable employment opportunities. To less-skilled
employees the Department provides employment to those who
might otherwise have none. To suppliers, consultants, local
businesses, advertising agencies, and others the Department
provides economic opportunity. To health care regulators,
third-party payers, and other hospitals in the city, there
is considerable ambivalence towards the three DH&H hos-
pitals: they provide much-needed service (including the
major share of free care in the City), but are always on the
brink of financial and regulatory disaster. To community
health centers the Department is viewed as the most ac-
cessible and supportive governmental agency. Finally,
friendly critics believe the Department provides greatly
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needed services to the poor, but lacks the facilities and
organizational strength to do so competitively with other
City hospitals.
CASE STUDIES
Four case studies of patient care, from which all
identifying data have been removed, are summarized below.
They illustrate some of the difficulties which are inherent
in providing health care to an inner-city community and
which contribute significantly to the cost of providing care.
Charles J.
Charles J. is a two-month-old child admitted to BCH
last December. His admitting diagnosis was hydrocephalus
(excess fluid in the brain causing the head to grow to ab-
normal proportions to accommodate the excess fluid) , with
possible developmental delay and severe visual impairment.
Charles had an uncomplicated birth at South Miami
Hospital, in Miami, Florida. He was born to Marie, a
28-year-old Haitian woman who entered this country illegally
last year. While in Miami she met another Haitian refugee
and conceived Charles. When Charles was three weeks old,
Marie brought him to South Miami Hospital with a concern
about his growth and development. Following a routine
check-up, he was sent home. Two weeks later, she brought
him back for further evaluation. At the time it was noted
that his head circumference had increased from 33 cm to 42
cm. A week later, when his head measured 46-1/2 cm the
staff recommended elective surgery to insert a shunt to
drain the excess fluid from his head. He was scheduled to
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be admitted to South Miami Hospital in November. By then,
however, Marie had moved to Boston, where she has relatives,
a decision precipitated by the death of the baby's father in
a car accident.
Surgery was successful. The draining off of the
excess fluid through the shunt has allowed the baby to gain
some vision. He is beginning to track objects with his eyes
and has begun to grow. There remains a concern about pos-
sible developmental delay, so his discharge plans should
include active follow-up.
However, Marie's situation presents a number of
obstacles to discharge. She lives with a cousin, whose
apartment has no heat. On cold days she stays with a dis-
tant relative, whose household already consists of seven
people. Neither her two stepbrothers nor her uncle, all of
whom live in Boston, will let her move in with them, pro-
bably because of the stigma of Charles's disability and il-
legitimate birth. Without a relative to sponsor her, how-
ever, it is unlikely that Marie's situation will change.
She has no money to move into her own apartment. She has no
skills, and her illegal status prevents her from applying
for work or for welfare for herself. The social service
staff, doctors, and nurses have all spent hours encouraging
family members to take responsibility for the situation.
The state Department of Social Services was contacted two
weeks ago to investigate the possibility of foster care. As
yet there has been no response. Charles is presently in the
hospital on AND status (administratively necessary days)
with a charge to Medicaid of approximately $300 per day.
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Edward C.
Edward C, a 57-year-old white male, was admitted
to Boston City Hospital in October 1983. His primary diag-
nosis upon admission was severe head trauma resulting from a
fall down a stairwell. A secondary diagnosis was substance
abuse, which is presumed to be the cause of the accident.
He was evaluated using the Glascow Coma Scale: unresponsive
to verbal commands, no observable motor response, and no
observable eye opening response.
In early November he was transferred from the In-
tensive Care Unit to the Medical Unit. A referral for Medi-
caid was made on November 8, in anticipation of chronic hos-
pital care. On November 18, he was screened by Long Island
Hospital and medically accepted for admission.
Because of the nature of the injury, it was dif-
ficult to obtain information about his financial resources.
Mr. C. is estranged from his wife and daughter. Hospital
staff contacted his sister for medical history and informa-
tion regarding his financial resources. She is reportedly a
substance abuser as well, and has been unable to follow
through consistently on their requests. According to the
billing worker, four pieces of documentation are needed in
order to process an application for Medicaid: a birth cer-
tificate: a medical statement that the patient is expected
to be disabled for a period of one year, evidence of res-
idency (the patient's sister said she would sign an af-
fidavit that Mr. C. has been a life-long resident of South
Boston); and income verification (the patient's sister
stated that he is a retired City of Boston employee who re-
ceives a pension check of $735.98 each month and has no sav-
ings). The information was given to the admitting office at
Long Island Hospital. Unfortunately it took the hospital
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billing office 23 days to make the decision for financial
clearance, and by that time Mr C. had recovered to the
extent that he no longer met the medical criteria for
admission to Long Island as a chronic care patient.
By the end of December, Long Island and Mattapan
Hospitals changed their medical admission criteria to in-
clude Level 2 (skilled nursing) patients, and Mr. C. was
certified to be eligible for Level II-Skilled Nursing. How-
ever, his discharge from BCH has again been delayed. In
order for Medicaid to fund a nursing home patient, the Wel-
fare Department must approve the Medicaid application. Yet
Mr. C's. application cannot even be processed because the
BCH billing worker has not received a copy of Mr. C's. re-
tirement check, required to verify his income. As a result,
he has remained on AND status for seven weeks, at a cost to
the City of approximately $500 per day.
Robert M.
Robert M. is a 46-year-old Haitian who has been
admitted to BCH repeatedly for treatment of frostbite of his
legs and feet, most recently in mid-December.
For the past two years, he has been living in the
Symphony MBTA station. His history is unavailable, as he is
either unable or unwilling to reveal information about him-
self. On two previous occasions, he has been committed to a
mental health facility. On the first occasion, because of
the serious nature of his medical condition, he was im-
mediately transferred to Lemuel Shattuck Hospital. He re-
mained there for three weeks, and was then discharged. In
January 1982 he was committed to an area Mental Health
Center, where he remained for 35 days. His hospital records
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are unavailable as he refuses to sign the necessary release
forms. Mr. M. is considered to be incompetent by several
psychiatrists because of his denial of the nature of his
medical problems, his poor judgment, and his inability to
make decisions about his care. In February 1983, after two
months of hospitalization at BCH, an effort was made through
the hospital's psychiatry service to commit him to the DMH
inpatient unit of a mental health center. However,
admission was refused.
There is a concern that if discharged from BCH he
will return to his former life-style where he will be "at
risk" to become septic and ultimately die. General staff
consensus is that he can be maintained in a nursing home.
However, efforts to discharge Mr. M. to a long-term care
nursing home program are thwarted so long as he refuses to
sign welfare application forms. He is presently entering
his twenty-fifth month of care at BCH awaiting a discharge
plan. The estimated cost per day for his care is $400.
This burden has been assumed by the City of Boston.
Amos J.
Amos J. is an 83-year-old black male who was born
in Boston. In December 1983 he was admitted to BCH from the
Long Island Shelter, where he was staying while the rooming
house he lived in was fumigated and repaired. He was admit-
ted on an inpatient basis for an "evaluation of his medical
status." Within a week of his admission, he contracted
pneumonia
.
Although he has improved, his discharge has been
delayed. First, the landlord refused to let him return un-
til he made other arrangements for his cats (which once num-
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bered 23). The hospital staff was finally able to convince
him to do so. Then the landlord delayed making the neces-
sary repairs.
In the meantime, the City is absorbing the cost of
Mr. J's. stay. His only income is Social Security in the
amount of $426.00 per month. Medicaid applications have
been taken at various times in the past, but he has never
followed through. A social worker has tried to apply for a
conservator, since Mr. J. has no relatives, but he was not
interested
.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Introduction
The Department of Health and Hospitals and the City
do not share the same system for describing the Department's
financial activities. The City has a combination accrual
and cash system under which it recognizes accrued liabil-
ities but deals with income on a cash basis, making up the
difference between the Department's cash receipts and dis-
bursements through a transfer of funds. Moreover, although
the City recognizes certain non-cash expenses, most notably
depreciation and accrued pension liability, it does not as-
sign cash to these accounts. Instead, they are carried for-
ward in accrued deficit. (The City's Statement of Revenues,
Expenses, Operating Expenses and Accumulated Deficit for the
period 1980-1983 is set forth in Table 2.)
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TABLE 2
CITY OF BOSTON
HEALTH AND HOSPITALS' ENTERPRISE FUND
STATEMENTS OF REVENUES, EXPENSES, OPERATING TRANSFERS
AND ACCUMULATED DEFICIT (Notes 1 and 10)
for the years ended June 30, 1980 through 1983)
( in thousands
)
1980 1981 1982 1983
Gross Revenues from Services to Patients:
Room and care
Clinics
Special services
63,451
18,263
35,071
68, 153
21 , 591
39,862
76,792
3 7,246
105,822
75,510
51,030
261,810
ul Ua b L c VcilUca J.LU1II ocl V ILco
to patients 116,785 129, 606 219, 860 388, 350
n^Hii<^i"ii^riG -f y oTn Hrncc Pat i pnt R o upn 1 1 p qUCUULLiUIJa L L KJIU ulUDD r u L 1 Cli L AC VC11UC9
Estimated contractual allowances
Provision for uncollectible amounts,
free care services provided to
City employees
16, 073
7 O OCT
£. J i J D 1
12,910
jo a netjo / *»U ?
56, 744
7 7 7 c. 1
142,683
1 ->*t r 1 DO
Total deductions from gross
patient revenues 39,430 51, 319 134, 495 297,029
Net revenues from services to
patients 77, 355 78, 287 85, 365 91,321
Other Operating Revenues 1, 636 2, 511 2,839 4,967
Total net revenues 78, 991 80, 798 88, 204 96, 288
Patient Services Expenses
Salaries, wages and fringe
benefits - regular employees
Salaries and wages — CETA employees
Professional fees
P^v-Aq —Yn i i—f^n y* 1" i T" om on t- rncfct a y r\ o i uu *o w l c l i e eu l >_ z> i_ o
Provision for accrued retirement
Materials and supplies
Provision for accrued judgments
and claims)
Administrative and general
Tnf 01"DCf1 11 Let Co l_
Depreciation
53,619
769
8,464
8 , 669
5 489
8, 584
1, 240
13, 348
2 7 20
4,056
55, 719
615
9,494
9 , 280
5 100
1, 116
(440
14, 396
2 830
4, 188
55, 168
53
9,411
9,453
5 585
9,874
200
18,262
2 416
4,099
60, 534
10, 711
8 882
6 325
9^617
699
14,505
2 7 58
4,823
Total patient services expenses 106,958 112,298 114, 521 118,554
Xjw o o L L kj 111 aci v XLca LU pet L 1 c ll L b 27 967 3 1 500 26 317 22 566
riuvibiuii lul i leu i La iu c_uiici.riuj.riy
loss from patient services 15,532
38,098
Other Operations Requiring
R C; C 1 t~ H r~1 P f~> tJiiHc 1 1 PCnbblbLallLc OUUblUlco
Community services, special programs
and real estate operations i £. , ziy 1 1 1 QQlj, Xo<5 X 4* , JO 1 in 7 7 7
Loss before operating transfers 50, 317 39,505 45,837 38,689
Operating Transfers from
General Fund
Special Revenue Funds
21 , 500 19 r 061
53
1 "3 Q C 1JJ, O D 1
750
f 1UZ
738
Total operating transfers 21, 500 19, 114 34, 601 31,840
Loss 28,817 20,391 11,236 6,849
Accumulated deficit, beginning
of year 81,459 61,068 49,832 42,984
Accumulated deficit, end of year $110, 276 $ 81,459 $ 61,068 $ 49,833
Capital contributions 1,000 2,000 1,000 4,000
City services 2,500 2, 500 2,500
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The Department of Health and Hospitals, on the other hand,
employs a conventional hospital and business accounting and
reporting system that reports both income and expense on an
accrual system. This means that income earned in a parti-
cular year will be reported in that year, even though the
money may not have been collected in that year. It also
means that expenses incurred in a particular year will be
reported in that year, even though the bills may not have
been paid in that year.
This will probably explain any differences between
the City's figures and the Department's figures.
Income
Table 3, which is based on information obtained
from DH&H, shows the Department's income (including City
subsidies) over the past four years.
The major sources of income are:
1 . Payment for services provided to
patients
. These funds are collected
from patients, insurance companies,
Medicaid, Medicare, and from the Boston
Plan. They have been reduced by free
care, allowances, and bad debt.
2 . Contracts and grants to provide
specific, special services . These funds
are received from state and federal
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TABLE 3
INCOME
(in millions of dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 a 1984b
GROSS REVENUE $116.8 $129. 6 $219. 9 $388. 4 $405. 3
Less Contrct '
1
Allowances 16.
1
12. 9 56. 8 142. 7 138. 4
Less Provision
for Uncollect-
ibles, Free
Care, etc. 23.4 38. 4 77. 8 154. 2 182. 5
NET INCOME
From Pat. Serv. 77.4 78. 3 85. 4 91. 3 84. 5
ALL OTHER 1.6 2. 5 3. 8 5. 7. 6
NET REVENUE 79.0 80. 8 87. 9 96. 3 C 9. 2
CITY SUBSIDY 31.8 34. 6 19. 1 21. 5 11. 9
ADDITIONAL
CAPITAL FUNDS 4.0 1. 2. 2. 0^ 2.
TOTAL INCOME $114.8 $116. 4 $109. $119. 8 $106.
Excludes $13.0 in potential reimbursement under ch. 372.
Excludes $16.0 in potential reimbursement under ch. 372, as
well as a $10.0 payback to Medicare.
Excludes possible $15.0 payback to Medicare.
Estimate
.
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agencies for such purposes as alcohol
services, pest control, de-leading pro-
grams, etc. These monies are channelled
through the Trustees' nonprofit corpora-
tion.
3 . Miscellaneous other operating revenue .
This includes such items as rent, cafe-
teria receipts, laboratory income for
services provided to patients of other
institutions, and bank interest.
4. Operating subsidies from the City.
These cover the annual cash operating
deficit and provide funding to neighbor-
hood health centers and various public
health services not adequately funded by
other sources.
5 . Capital funds from the City.
The income from patient services represents by far
the largest component of revenue. In FY 1983, the Depart-
ment's gross revenue for patient services came to $388.4
million, enough to fund the Department for three years.
However, no hospital collects the full amount of its gross
revenue. Gross revenue must be reduced by contractual al-
lowances, free care, and bad debt.
Contractual allowances result from the fact that
certain third-party payers reimburse for services on the
basis of cost or other formulas rather than on the basis of
what the hospital charges. For example, the hospital
charges private patients at the rate of $200 per day, but
Medicaid pays no more than cost. If cost is only $185 per
day then there will be a $15 contractual allowance for each
patient day billed to Medicaid. Free care consists of ser-
vices the Department and the City have agreed to subsidize.
Bad debt consists of those bills for which the Department
expected to be paid but was not.
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Net revenue from services to patients increased
significantly in the past two years. This increase is at-
tributable to free care reductions through subsidies to the
Boston Plan and to increased billings to third parties from
the Department's outpatient facilities.
During the period between 1980 and 1983, Net Ser-
vice Revenue increased by 2.2% ($78,991,000 to
$80,756,000). During that same period, Total Patient Ser-
vices expenses increased by 10.8% ($106,958,000 to
$118,554,000.) If the Department receives a major part of
the free care money available through the ch. 372 pool, the
additional $10 million would result in a Net Service Revenue
increase of 14.9%. This would mean that income has in-
creased faster than expense.
Expenses
The main category of expense is Patient Service
Expense
.
As discussed in Table 4 below, in FY 1983 the total
amounts of salaries, professional fees, retirement costs
paid, retirement costs accrued, and administrative and gen-
eral salaries came to at least $101 million (over 85% of
total patient care expenses of $118.6 million). This has
profound implications:
o The subsidy provided by the City to the
Department results in income approx-
imately five times the subsidy. Without
the subsidy the system would probably
not be able to survive, an economic dis-
aster for the employees and the City as
well as for the patients.
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o Although there are assuredly opportun-
ities to cut costs in non-personnel
areas, personnel is the major item of
expense. Any attempt to balance the
budget through cost-cutting in personnel
would take place mainly by eliminating
jobs. This would result in drastically
reduced services.
TABLE 4
PATIENT SERVICE EXPENSES FOR PAST FOUR YEARS
Based on rough estimates from
Department of Health & Hospitals
(dollars in thousands)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 est.
Salaries 53,619 55,719 55,168 60,534 62,200
CETA 769 615 53
Professional Fees 8,464 9,494 9,411 10,711 10,800
Pay as you go
Retirement Costs 8,669 9,280 9,453 8,882 9,000
Retirement Costs 5,489 5,100 5,585 6,325 7,900
Materials
and Supplies 8,584 11,116 9,874 9,617 9,400
Provi sions
for Judgments 1,240 (440) 200 699 700
Administration
and General 13,348 14,396 18,262 14,505 13,500
Interest 2,720 2,830 2,416 2,755 2,800
Depreciation 4,056 4,188 4,099 4,823 5,400
TOTAL PATIENT
SERVICES
EXPENSES 106,958 112,298 114,521 118,554 121,700*
* Based on rough estimates.
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pay
and
Salaries, Wages and Fringe Benefits—These monies
staff who are mainly involved in providing patient care
services
.
Professional Fees—These monies pay for the phys-
icial staff, including contracts with B.U. Medical School
for about $4.5 million to provide physicians and contracts
with the Trustees to provide temporary nurses for about
$2.6 million.
Pay-As-You-Go Retirement Costs--These monies pay
for the current cost of former employees receiving retire-
ment benefits.
Provisions for Accrued Retirement Costs—These
monies are budgeted to be set aside for future payment of
retirement benefits for present employees. This account is
not funded to the Department; instead, the City assumes the
responsibility of funding the account at the City level.
Material and Supplies—The amount of money spent
on materials and supplies has remained relatively constant
over the past few years. Inflation has increased the unit
cost of materials and supplies; however, the decreasing pa-
tient load has resulted in a need for fewer materials and
supplies. In 1983, pharmacy supplies of $6.0 million and
general medical supplies of $1.4 million comprised most of
the $9.6 million spent. It is not within the scope of this
chapter to address purchasing policies, procedures, price
effectiveness, inventory levels, etc. However, the purch-
asing systems are not nearly as sophisticated as the person-
nel systems and probably require upgrading.
Provision for Accrued Judgment and Claims—This
is a relatively minor item.
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Administrative and General—These monies pay for
the staff who are administrative and general rather than
directly involved in patient care and services. Certain of
the administrative staff have significant patient involve-
ment, however, such as clinic receptionists.
SUBSIDIES FROM THE CITY
Each year the City provides funds to make up the
Department's operating deficit. The subsidy can be des-
cribed as a subsidy to the Department by which the City
makes up the difference between income and expense or as a
subsidy to people who cannot afford its services. However
it is characterized, neither the institution nor the
patients could survive without it.
The deficit which is funded by the City is calcu-
lated on the basis of cash expenditures rather than on ac-
crued obligations. Accordingly, Depreciation and Provision
for Accrued Retirement Costs are not funded but, instead,
accumulated in the Deficit.
Table 4 (based on Table 1) shows the Department's
unsubsidized loss, the City's operating subsidy to the De-
partment, and the resulting deficit for the past four years.
TABLE 4
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 (est.)
Loss $38,689 $45,837 $39,505 $50,317
Operating
Transfers 31,840 34,601 19,114 21,500 6,549
Deficit 6,849 11,236 20,391 28,817
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The loss and the deficit in 1983 and 1984 reflect
monies set aside as a reserve in case it becomes necessary
to repay Medicaid and private insurers, in settlement of
claims brought by them, for reasons discussed below. This
reserve amounted to $15.5 million in 1983. If the Depart-
ment receives favorable decisions, both the loss and the
deficit would be reduced by the amount of the reserve. If
the Department receives an adverse decision on the Medicaid
claim, the loss and the deficit would remain the same, but
the Department and the City would be required to repay $15.5
million. In addition, it might be necessary to repay
another $5 million to private insurers who brought suit over
the same issue.
In addition, over the past four years, the City has
provided approximately $8 million in capital funds for pro-
jects that could not be financed out of income. Because of
the age and condition of the physical plant as well as the
ever-changing regulations governing health care facilities,
that capital requirements are expected to continue to in-
crease .
Finally, the City pays health insurance premiums
for employees of the Department. The City has considered
requiring the Department to assume these payments. The De-
partment is concerned that it might be required to do so
without being provided the necessary funds, an action that
would have the effect of a significant budget cut. This is
obviously a matter for negotiation. While it makes sense to
identify all items of expense in the City budget that per-
tain to the Department and to assign those expenses to the
Department, the means to fund those expenses should be
transferred as well.
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SPECIAL ITEMS OF CONCERN
Free Care
When social welfare programs were established in
the '60s, the burden of caring for the poor was to have been
transferred from the City to the state and federal govern-
ments. Many of the patients who had been free care patients
became covered by Medicaid, Medicare, and the General Relief
medical program. Recently, however, there has been a major
effort by both state and federal governments to reduce the
number of people receiving the benefits of such coverage.
The Department was especially hurt when the state eliminated
hospital services from the General Relief program at a time
when the federal government was making it more difficult for
disabled people to qualify for the federal disability pro-
gram (SSI-DA) To give an idea of the magnitude of the De-
partment's loss, the final payment received for services
provided General Relief recipients was $7.0 million.
The Department of Health and Hospitals has tra-
ditionally been the health care system of last resort, ser-
ving people without private resources, insurance coverage,
Medicaid, or Medicare. It is therefore expected that DH&H
will have a deficit, primarily because of the amount of free
care it provides.
Reducing the level of free care provided will not
automatically save money. Reducing free care reduces the
number of employees required to provide that care, without a
corresponding reduction in overhead.
Accordingly, any proposed solution to the problems
of the Department through the reduction of free care
services must be looked at carefully. Any proposal that
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offers a reasonable opportunity to cut costs without reduc-
ing services or employees, that offers the opportunity to
increase the numbers of paying patients, or that creates
coverage for uncovered patients, should be considered
enthusiastically.
The cost of free care varies with a number of fac-
tors other than service, including:
o payer mix (the number of free care pa-
tients as compared to the number of pay-
ing patients )
;
o scope of services provided;
o cost of services provided;
o quality of the effort to discover
whether patients have coverage and to
obtain coverage for those who do not;
o quality of the billing effort;
o the new reimbursement formula; and
o the free care policies of other institu-
tions .
These will be explored in depth below.
Payer Mix—The Department must improve its payer
mix. Payer mix means the proportion of patients who are
covered by insurance, Medicaid, other third parties, and
self-pay to those who receive free care. Table 5 (based on
DH&H figures) shows the payer mix for the Department in 1983.
As indicated below, 40.4% of the BCH patients are
self-payers, most of whom receive free care. This is a bad
payer mix. There are too many free care patients and not
enough paying patients. If the number of free care patients
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were to remain the same while the number of paying patients
increased significantly, the free care burden would become
more manageable, mainly because the cost of providing ser-
vices to the additional patients would be less.
The Department's major problem has been its inabil-
ity to attract patients who are covered by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield or other kinds of insurance. There are several rea-
sons for this, including an antiquated and unattractive
physical plant; poor nonmedical services (TV sets and tele-
phones, linen supplies and hot water, unattractive rooms, no
air conditioning); security problems; effective competition
from other hospitals; inadequate parking; its reputation as
a "poor people's health facility;" and frequent bad pub-
licity.
The primary effort to increase the number of paying
patients has been through the Boston Plan. Under this Plan
the Department offers prepaid comprehensive services to City
employees and other groups. Unfortunately, the funding
source that subsidizes free care within the Plan is expected
to dry up in 1984. The Department believes that there are
sufficient funds to continue the free care component of the
Boston Plan through 1985, but perhaps not beyond.
As the elderly are more likely to be covered by
Medicare and Medicaid, an increase in elderly services and
elderly patients would improve the patient mix.
Scope of Free Care—The scope of the services
provided affects the cost of free care in two ways. First,
the greater the range of services provided to free care pa-
tients, the greater the free care deficit. In other words,
if the Department did not do oral surgery, it would not have
to subsidize free care for patients requiring oral surgery.
The patients would be forced to go elsewhere or do without.
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Second, the cost of free care will be increased by
providing services that will not be subsidized, including
extraordinary social services; translation; assistance in
obtaining public support; housing assistance; unusual legal
and protective services; and cultural differences.
Third, patients with third-party coverage who no
longer require hospitalization for medical purpose but who
cannot be released for other reasons require "administra-
tively necessary days," for which the hospital does not get
fully paid.
Excessive Facility Costs—A major problem for the
Department is that the cost of free care is significantly
increased by its real estate costs. It operates in older
facilities that are no longer used or are inefficient, and
in newer facilities which are significantly under-utilized.
Obtaining Third-Party Payment--In the past there
has been some concern that the Department lacks both the
systems and the staff to effectively ascertain whether its
patients have insurance coverage. The inpatient staff has a
reasonable opportunity to obtain relevant billing informa-
tion. As a result, the inpatient self-pay percentages are
low. However, ambulance and inpatient services have a
higher percentage of self-pay patients. This is because
they have less opportunity to obtain this information. And
the ambulance system is particularly at a disadvantage be-
cause it takes patients to hospitals that are less efficient
than BCH in obtaining billing information.
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The Department is currently installing an on-line
computerized registration and encounter system that will
improve the process of obtaining and using billing informa-
tion.
At one time, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare had an office at BCH to make it easier for the Hos-
pital to determine whether or not a patient had coverage and
to make it easier to obtain coverage for people who were
potentially eligible but had not applied. This office no
longer exists. Many patients are street people who are, for
practical purposes, unbillable.
It takes skill, energy, and tenacity as well to get
Medicaid to pay 99% of submitted bills rather than 85%. The
Department has employed a collection agency to recover from
its self-pay patients. However, it was unable to recover a
significant amount of money in that way.
Free Care Policies at Other Hospitals — Notwith-
standing the passage of the Hill-Burton Act, a federal bill
requiring hospitals that receive federal construction funds
dispense a certain amount of free care, several Boston hos-
pitals appear to be quietly referring their free care pa-
tients to BCH. Whether the numbers of inappropriate hos-
pital referrals to BCH are significant is questionable.
Certainly, the poor living in the neighborhoods that sur-
round BCH should have access to its services. Boston has a
number of renowned medical institutions to which most neigh-
borhoods have access. However, it is the perception of BCH
staff that the poor of other city neighborhoods find their
way to BCH with predictable regularity. The Department of
Health and Hospitals should investigate the matter.
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Chapter 372 (the Hospital Cost Containment Statute)
Various aspects of the previous reimbursement sys-
tem for acute care hospitals contributed to the high cost of
care, including: automatic cost increases; additional pa-
tient days; ancillary testing; administrative charges to
absorb the cost of filing multiple cost reports, duplicate
audits, and annual regulatory changes; the frequent shifting
between government, private, and commercial payers; and
forced increases in health insurance premiums in excess of
the rate of inflation.
G.L. ch. 372 was enacted in August 1982 for the
purpose of containing hospital costs. It sets forth the
method by which hospital charges are set and third-party
payments are made, and significantly changes the existing
reimbursement system for acute care hospitals in Mass-
achusetts. Hospitals will now be reimbursed for certain
services at a fixed rate. If they can provide those same
services at less cost, they are allowed to keep the "sur-
plus" they generate by doing so.
The passage of ch. 372 will impact on BCH revenues
in several ways.
Inflation Allowances and Productivity—The max-
imum allowable cost (MAC) formula adjusts reimbursement
levels each year by an inflation allowance, based on the
level of actual inflation in the hospital industry. The
actual inflation rate is currently low (estimated at 5.1% in
1984), and will result in lower reimbursement than
otherwise. The effect will be offset to some extent by ad-
justments for hospital productivity. However, BCH has lit-
tle flexibility in achieving these gains in productivity; it
has a decentralized and antiquated physical plant; a staff
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that consists mainly of civil service employees and union
members; and wage levels set by a collective bargaining pro-
cess over which it has no control.
Volume Corridors and Incentives—BCH must choose
a volume strategy that matches BCH realities with ch. 372
incentives. For example, many inpatients require social
services, which are considered to be ancillary services.
However, under ch. 372, acute care facilities that increase
their level of ancillary services will be penalized, since
the hospital's reimbursement level is relatively fixed at 4%
adjustment to gross. Conversely, facilities will have an
incentive to reduce ancillary services below the level of
the adjustment, since they retain the surplus they generate
by doing so.
Free Care—Before ch. 372 became law, all free
care and bad debt was reflected as a single loss in the De-
partment's budget. Hospitals were not directly reimbursed
for that loss, except to the extent it was reflected in
their rates. Ch. 372 allows acute care hospitals that pro-
vide a significant amount of free care, such as BCH, to be
directly reimbursed for a percentage of that care by Medi-
care and Medicaid. This change required a waiver from
existing Medicare and Medicaid regulation: however, the
waiver expires shortly and must be extended so that BCH
obtains the benefit of this change in the future.
Medicaid Payment Ratio--BCH is currently the only
hospital with a Medicaid payment ratio that is greater
than 1. (Medicaid payment ratio is the ratio of the
reimbursement payment to hospital charges.) In fact, BCH ' s
ratio is 1.5%, compared to a state-wide ratio of only 0.7%.
Under current regulations this ratio is locked in (only
minor year-to-year changes will affect it during the life of
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ch. 372. However, there is always a possibility that cor-
rective legislation will be filed which would effectively
reduce BCH ' s premium: this possibility should be carefully
monitored
.
Section 51—Section 51 of ch. 372 sets forth the
mechanism by which a state-wide uniform MAC will be set,
effective October 1, 1984. Under MAC each payer reimburses
a hospital based on the percentage its billings represent of
the hospital's total billings. This will significantly re-
duce BCH
'
s revenues, because it reduces the revenue from
commercial insurers, a significant source of revenue for
BCH. These insurers previously reimbursed the hospital for
100% of its charges. They will now reimburse the hospital
based on the percentage their billings represent of BCH '
s
total billings, significantly less than 100%.
Medicaid and Insurance Payback Issue
When Proposition 2-1/2 was enacted, the Department
was faced with the prospect of a decrease in its subsidy
from the City. At the time, Medicaid's formula for reim-
bursement allowed payment of 100% of outpatient charges,
whereas inpatient service payments were limited to cost.
Commercial insurers and self-pay patients were expected to
pay 100% of outpatient charges as well.
To benefit from this policy, the Department re-
quested permission to raise its outpatient charges from $90
to $300, an increase of 233%! The dramatically-inflated
charge was seen as a controversial, but a necessary step to
increase earned income. The charge was accepted by Medicaid
and approved by the Rate Setting Commission.
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In August 1982, the State enacted ch. 372, which
requires Medicaid and Medicare to contribute to the support
of free care. As a result, a substantial amount of the free
care deficit can now be underwritten by Medicaid.
In view of this change, State Medicaid officials
now question whether the $300 outpatient rate was proper.
An investigation is presently underway that may result in an
order that the Department pay back the inflated outpatient
charges. The Department would have to return $8.2 million
earned in FY 1982 and $9.8 million earned in FY 1983, a to-
tal of $18.0 million. The Department might also have to
reimburse private insurers, who have sued it for
$5.0 million under the same theory. As a precautionary
measure, the Department and its accountants have set up a
reserve of $15.0 million on its 1983 statement. However,
the reserve has not been funded.
The Effect of the City's Budgeting Process on the DH&H
Deficit
The way in which the City budgets the expenses of
the Department may increase the deficit, and therefore its
effective cost to the City. The system it uses is a basic
governmental line item budgeting system which works reason-
ably well for governmental agencies of which they are a
part. DH&H, however, is not a typical governmental agency
in that it earns most of its money independently. There-
fore, its budgeting system should be one which provides
incentives to earn more money from its services. It is of-
ten suggested that the City create a private non-profit
corporation, or quasi-governmental independent authority.
In fact, the same result could be achieved administratively.
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First, the City should have an agreed-upon amount
of free care subsidy at approximately the present level,
rather than a commitment to the Department's entire budget.
Second, the City's line item budget control over the Depart-
ment should be eliminated so that the Department can spend
its money in areas which produce the best financial as well
as health care return. Third, the Department should be
given credit for the money it earns, so that it will have an
incentive to earn more. Fourth, the Department's leader-
ship should be held accountable for meeting or exceeding its
own goals. Fifth, the subsidy should be renegotiated to
reflect any increase in the moneys earned by the
Department. These arrangements would result in reduced
costs to the City.
Unfunded Items
The Department's financial statements are based on
the accrual system under which income and expenses are
recognized when they are earned or incurred. This is usual
and customary. The City, however, recognizes only cash com-
ing in and cash going out. Accordingly, the City's subsidy
enables the Department to break even on a cash basis even
though the Department shows an annual and cumulative loss
because of a number of unfunded accrued expenses. These
expenses create an accumulated deficit of $81.5 million by
the end of FY83.
Provision for Accrued Retirement Costs—Each year
the Department shows as an expense the amount of pension
liability that has been earned by employees during that
year. Unlike "pay-as-you-go" pension payments, accrued re-
tirement costs will not be paid out until some time in the
future, so that the money set aside each year is allowed to
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accumulate as a reserve fund. The City has not allowed the
Department to do this, however. This means that at some
time in the future when pensions come due they will have to
be funded out of current funds, rather than the intended
reserves. In FY 83, the amount of unfunded pension liabil-
ity was $9.5 million.
Depreciation—Each year the Department shows ap-
proximately $4 million in depreciation expenses on its
statements. The purpose of depreciation is to enable
funds to be set aside for replacing used up buildings and
equipment. In fact, many of the building crises at the De-
partment result from the failure to set aside depreciation
funds on an annual basis so the department can have a sen-
sible program for maintaining and upgrading its real es-
tate. However, the City does not recognize depreciation as
an expense to be funded.
Expected Retroactive Collective Bargaining
Increases—This item will be covered in another chapter of
this Report. However, it should at least be noted that
there is no reserve set aside to cover retroactive col-
lective bargaining increases to Department employees.
The Boston Health Plan (BHP)
The Boston Health Plan (BHP) is a managed care sys-
tem organized similarly to an Independent Practice
Association. BHP was created in 1981 through a three-year
demonstration grant from the Health Care Financing Agency of
the Department of Health and Human Services. The BHP is in
its final months of the grant, which expires on January 15,
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1984. An extension application which seeks funding for ad-
ministrative support for an additional three to five years
is being prepared.
Three categories of subscribers are served by BHP:
Medicaid recipients, City of Boston employees and near-poor
residents of Boston. Presently the Plan has 11,204 sub-
scribers, with City employees comprising 1,212, Medicaid
733, and near-poor residents 8,652.
The grant was designed to achieve two primary ob-
jectives: 1) gaining federal support for health care to the
near poor, and 2) developing a capitated managed care system
with the Department providers managing cases and assuming
financial risk.
The Plan receives a f
enrolled person. If the Plan
that total costs are less than
generate a surplus. If total
the Plan suffers a loss.
ixed annual payment for each
can control service costs so
total premiums, the Plan can
costs exceed total premiums.
The Boston Plan has been heavily subsidized by the
City. If the 11,204 subscribers were paying premiums at the
same rate as the Harvard Community Health Plan (about
$15,000 per year), total premium income would be
$16.8 million. Actual premiums came to less than half that
amount. Moreover, because of the nature of health needs of
the subscribers to the Boston Plan as opposed to the Harvard
Plan, the Boston Plan rate should, realistically, be
higher. Finally, the number of City employees enrolled in
the Boston Plan is 1,212, which represents less than 6% of
the City's 21,000 employees. This is true even though the
City pays 100% of employee premiums for the Plan as opposed
to 75% of BC/BS premiums. Obviously, there is a large
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amount of free care going on through the Boston Plan. How-
ever, much of this care would have been free care under any
circumstances
.
The Boston Plan is clearly not a solution to the
Department's problems. Unless Hospital facilities are up-
graded and the payer mix improved, the Boston Plan has no
future
.
Real Estate and Capital Needs
DH&H owns over a million and a half square feet of
space. Much of this space is presently unused, as can be
seen from the following table:
TABLE 6
Total
Footage
VACANT PLANT
6/30/83
Vacant
Footage Vacant Remarks
BCH
83 Adj.
Richards
Thorndike
Surgical
BCD
Sears
Peabody
913,460
(6,678)
45, 509
(3,570)
4,485
39,582
7, 776
32, 755
(7,167)
BCH now on
9/30/83
basis
Demol i shed
Basement
vacant
Building
vacant
Currently in
use
BCH Total 906, 782 119, 370 13 .2%
Mattapan 251, 381 87, 144 34 .7%
Long Island 381, 506 59, 290 15 .5%
Grand Total 1, 539, 669 265,804 17 r> o.• S> "o
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These figures, furnished by sources at DH&H, do not include
the South Block, which is managed by the Trustees of Health
and Hospitals. Note that 26,800 sq. ft. of Dowling is in
renovat ion
.
There are major problems with the Department's
physical plant with significant impact on its financial pos-
ition.
1. The costs of the overall operation in-
clude substantial costs attributable to
unused space;
2. Much of the space, especially the new
Ambulatory Care Center and the new South
Block building, are under-utilized;
3. The older buildings are inefficient, and
therefore add considerably to the cost
of operations; and
4. The older buildings are unattractive,
which makes it extremely difficult to
attract middle-class, paying patients.
On December 9, 1983, the Department prepared a list
of capital improvement needs totalling approximately
$12.0 million. Major items include: a new boiler plant
($3.5 million), life safety improvements ($2.0 million);
Dowling Building ($2.0 million); and porch removal ( MD and
Ob-Gyn Buildings, $1.0 million). While there is an obvious
need for these projects, renovations of this scope will not
have a significant effect on the overall condition of the
physical plant.
A plan must be developed for the real estate that
will provide the Department with facilities that are com-
petitive with those of other hospitals. Otherwise, the De-
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partment will continue to lose paying patients to other hos-
pitals until the burden on the City becomes so great that
the Department's facilities will be forced to close.
This plan could be combined with a plan to develop
a vertically integrated system of care for the elderly. It
could and should include plans to sell some of the real es-
tate to provide funds for a new hospital (which should com-
bine all three hospitals at one location) . Any sale of pro-
perty should require tax payments or payments in lieu of
taxes. The Department should consider making payments in
lieu of taxes.
Table 7 charts details of the property, plant, and
equipment carried on the balance sheet.
These values are so-called "book values." They do
not indicate either the market value or the replacement val-
ue of the Department's physical assets. If there is any
intention to revitalize the Department's physical plant and
to finance some portion of the revi talizat ion by the devel-
opment or sale of some of the physical assets, it would be
important to know the market and/or developmental value of
the Department's physical plant.
The Relationship With Boston University Medical School
BCH, as a teaching hospital, has a close involve-
ment with Boston University Medical School and its Medical
Center. Most of the leadership at the Department is pro-
vided by physicians whose services are obtained under con-
tract with the School. On-going care is provided by res-
idents and interns who have close professional ties to both
the School and the Department.
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TABLE 7
CITY OF BOSTON
NOTES TO COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Health and Hospital's Property, Plant
and Equipment and Accumulated Depreciation
Hospital
South
Block
Facilities Complex
( thousands
)
Total
1983:
Land and improvements
Buildings and improvements
Equipment
3, 784
101,001
19, 727
132
18,238
495
3,916
119, 239
20, 222
124, 512 18,865 143,377
Less accumulated depreciation 51 , 506 5,820 57,326
73.006 13,045 86.051
1982:
Land and improvements
Buildings and improvements
Equipment
3,777
99,551
12,651
132
18,569
495
3,909
118, 120
13, 146
115,979 19,196 135, 175
Less accumulated depreciation 47,843 5,404 53,247
$ 68,136 $ 13,792 $ 81.928
The South Block Complex consists of residential apartments,
parking for resident and hospital use and facilities that
house the Boston City Hospital School of Practical Nursing.
Health and Hospitals' Leases :
Included in plant and equipment is leased property as fol-
lows :
Buildings and improvements
Equipment
Less accumulated depreciation
Total
in thousands)
$ 358
7,667
8,025
831
$ 7.194
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The relationship between School and Department is a
complex one. Many aspects of the relationship are finan-
cial. However, there are also deep programmatic and organ-
izational issues which are beyond the scope of this chap-
ter. There is no question that the School and the Depart-
ment need each other. The question is how to improve the
relationship for the benefit of both parties.
The hospital's financial relationship with
School is shaped by several contracts through which the
partment purchases the services of physicians. The
senior physicians have the following roles:
1. Chairman of the Department. In this
role, the physician is an employee of
the Medical School and is responsible
for teaching and other academic activi-
ties of the Department.
2. Chief of the Service. In this role, the
physician is an employee of the Hospital
and is responsible for the provision of
services
.
3. Provider of Service. In this role, the
physician provides services and may,
under certain conditions, bill for those
services privately or as the member of a
group, even through he is being paid a
salary for being Chairman and Chief.
4. Researcher. Many of the physicians have
research grants and activities in ad-
dition to their other roles.
The Department feels that the School is vital to
the quality of care it provides. However, in the opinion of
the Department, the School does not provide enough leader-
ship and support, both within and without the Department.
Consequently, its efforts to improve payer mix suffer.
Also, some Department representatives believe that the con-
tracts may be somewhat "rich" in favor of the School. The
the
De-
most
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School has the strongest commitment to the Department be-
cause City Hospital is the major teaching facility of the
School. The School/Department relationship needs some
friendly investigation and resultant collaboration in order
to meet the concerns and needs of both parties.
Organizational and Staff Issues
Hospitals are difficult enough to operate under the
best of circumstances. When they are also part of govern-
mental structures, the difficulties increase significantly.
A major challenge for the new Administration will be to
create conditions under which people will be able to work at
the upper levels of their skills and energies. In the past,
the staff has not been as productive as it could have been
for a number of reasons:
1. The hospitals and their sub-units are
physically isolated from each other,
making communication difficult.
2. The physical conditions under which
people work are not pleasant.
3. Some staff members are civil service
employees, while others belong to unions.
4. The staff is organized by discipline
rather than by program. The organiza-
tional structure must be strengthened to
facilitate a unified effort between
physicians, nurses, general service
staff, and administration.
5. There are significant weaknesses in the
managerial chain of command. Middle
management in particular needs to be
strengthened so it can provide the pro-
per communication link between top man-
ager and line employees and the leader-
ship that will enable line employees to
be more productive.
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6. There are no traditions of organiza-
tional excellence.
7. Unnecessary and unqualified employees
should be let go. Commissioner Pollock
has removed 100 employees since he took
office, through a committee which re-
views individual performances and va-
cancies .
However, unless the strength and philosophies of
this Administration and of the Department's leadership are
reflected throughout the organization, the quality of opera-
tions and the cost will continue to reflect the frustration
of good people who are unable to work as effectively as they
would otherwise.
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INTRODUCTION
Municipal managers must rely on different sources
of information to make daily decisions. Much of this infor-
mation is financial in nature and it must be timely and
accurate. Managers can be confident of decisions if they
are confident of the accuracy of the information on which
they are based. Auditing is the process by which its
accuracy is determined.
Audits may be classified as internal or independent
depending upon whether they are performed by internal or
external auditors. Internal auditors are those employed by
the City and reporting to the Mayor. External auditors are
those employed by other governmental agencies, such as state
or federal agencies, or independent public accountants who
are hired by the City.
Internal auditors are a necessary part of any
management team and should be used to review management
operations. They function as a managerial tool with which
to measure the effectiveness of management controls.
External audits do not obviate the need for inter-
nal audits. The two functions, while separate, complement
each other. Currently, the City has an external audit
function but not an internal audit function. The need for
the latter will be discussed later in this chapter.
Audits may take many forms, but all are basically
methodical examinations of how resources are utilized. They
also test management's accounting systems to make sure there
are internal controls over resources and that those controls
are functioning properly.
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Internal controls are all methods, procedures and
controls adopted to ensure the safeguarding of resources,
the accuracy of accounting records, the adherence to manage-
ment's programs and policies and the efficiency of oper-
ations in compliance with the law. However, the inherent
limitations of any system of internal controls must be
recognized. Errors, mistakes in judgement, misunder-
standings, and carelessness can all affect the controls.
In addition, controls rely heavily on the segregation of
duties. They can therefore be circumvented by collusion.
However, these weaknesses can be minimized by strengthening
the controls themselves and by periodically reviewing their
operation. It should be noted that the objective of inter-
nal contols is to provide reasonable, not absolute, assur-
ance. The cost of a system of internal controls should not
exceed its benefit.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an over-
view of the audit function in the City and to discuss the
related issues that will face the new Administration. The
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
is an overview of the annual audits conducted by independent
public accountants. The second section focuses on the
audits conducted by various federal agencies which distri-
bute money to the City. Finally, an internal audit function
within Boston is discussed.
ANNUAL INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT AUDITS
During the 1970' s, municipal financial markets,
already weakened by long-standing inflationary pressures and
a recession, were hard-hit by the financial difficulties of
the City of New York. New York's crisis reduced the ability
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of cities such as Boston to borrow at reasonable rates. In
addition, the rating agencies began to demand more reliable
information on the financial well-being of the municipal-
ities seeking ratings. For the first time in its history,
Boston was forced to engage an independent public accounting
firm to perform an audit of its financial statement.
The FY 1978 audit was undertaken by the firm of
Coopers & Lybrand. An immediate audit problem was encoun-
tered since the City kept its accounting records on a statu-
tory basis (STAT) while audited financial statements are
required to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (GAAP). The two methods of accounting produce sig-
nificantly different results, as illustrated below in Table
1.
TABLE 1
REVENUES OVER EXPENDITURES
(in thousands)
Fiscal Budgetary Basis
Year (Statutory)
1979 $ 34,503
1980 (29,532)
1981 (31,397)
1982 (42,199)
1983 (37,023)
Financial
Statements
(GAAP)
$ 11,399
(50,499)
(19,644)
37, 308
5,242
Differences
23,104
20,867
( 9,114)
(79,427)
(42,265)
Most of the differences reflect timing differences
in that GAAP and STAT financial statements differ as to when
a particular transaction is recorded on the books. This
difference is not usually permanent and will eventually
cancel out.
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Statutory accounting, a relatively clear-cut
method, is described in detail in state and city ordi-
nances. It is used to calculate both the budget and the tax
rate. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are
formulated and published by the National Council on Govern-
mental Accounting (NCGA) . NCGA has gained widespread accep-
tance as the primary authority on the application of GAAP to
state and local governments. GAAP, however, is less clear-
cut than STAT, as it changes from time-to-time and is sub-
ject to interpretation.
The following reconciliation, from the Coopers &
Lybrand audit of fiscal years 1983 and 1982, summarizes the
impact of GAAP versus STAT accounting differences on General
Fund operations.
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1983 1982
Deficiency of revenues & available
funds over expenditures & encum-
brances on budgetary basis (STAT)
Tax title collections not report-
ed as revenue on a budgetary basis
Change in provisions for estimated
abatements & losses on collection
of real and personal property taxes,
tax titles and tax possessions
Change in state aid for school
construction from Debt Service Funds
Change in state reimbursement of
teachers' retirement costs from recog-
nition on modified accrual basis
Funding Loan Act Proceeds
Amounts reserved for debt service
Amounts reserved for appropriation
for Capital Projects
Other available funds
Additional provision for accrued
judgments and claims
Elimination of encumbrances, net
Prior year appropriation deficit
raised
Other
Excess of revenues over expenditures &
other financing sources (uses) on the
basis of generally accepted accounting
principles
(in thousands
)
$(37,023) $(42,119)
17,925 15,000
10,015
1,777
631
87,124
(36,966)
(6,000)
(19,900)
(72,963)
5,373
6, 515
6,848
(12,557)
2,540
1,006
(5,260)
(24,815)
6,993
2,218
9,852
$ 5,242 ft 37.308
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that apply
to municipalities are different from those that apply to
business entities. Governments and businesses have dif-
ferent organizational objectives, and operate in different
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economic, legal, political and social environments. These
differences are reflected in the accounting principles which
apply to each.
The different accounting systems reflect basic dif-
ferences between governmental and business entities, most
notably
:
1. The political process and its influence
on financial transactions and reporting;
2. The absence of a profit motive which
can bring uniformity to management;
3. The role of the budget and related
inefficiencies; and
4. The difficulty of operating in a
financial "fish bowl".
Yet, government and business accounting practices
are similar in many ways. They are both concerned with con-
trolling and reporting on financial position, results of
operations, and changes in financial position. They are
concerned with safeguarding assets and with providing infor-
mation for internal and external decisions.
Both the similarities and differences must be taken
into account in determining Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles in a government context. Credit markets require
information of governments, similar to that required of
businesses, in order to make credit decisions. Yet the law
imposes additional requirements on government spending, such
as the appropriations and budget processes. Therefore, gov-
ernmental GAAP financial reporting must provide information
required both by the investment community and by those who
oversee the governmental spending process. This will in-
volve broader reporting requirements than for business GAAP
financial reporting.
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This goal is accomplished in part by the govern-
mental practice of fund accounting. Individual government
resources are accounted for in separate funds which are
self-balancing. In addition, there is an emphasis on
"financial flow" data, which is information on the source
and use of "available spendable resources" for a certain
period of time. NCGA has established Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles based on such governmental needs.
The basic funds and sub-accounts which are used by
the City are defined by Coopers & Lybrand as follows:
Governmental Fund Types
General Fund—transact ions related to revenues
and expenditures for delivery of those services tradi-
tionally provided by a government, which are not provided
for in any other fund are accounted for in this fund.
Special Revenue Fund— transactions related to
revenues and expenditures under certain federal and state
grants and from other sources upon which restrictions are
imposed are accounted for in this fund.
Debt Service Fund—transactions related to
resources obtained and used for the payment of debt service
on long-term general obligation debts are accounted for in
this fund.
Capital Projects Fund—transactions related to
resources obtained and used for the acquisition, construc-
tion and improvement of capital facilities are accounted for
in this fund.
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Boston Redevelopment Authority Fund
Transactions related to revenues and expenditures,
resources obtained and used for the development of projects
overseen by the BRA or for transactions not specifically
restricted to development projects are accounted for in this
fund
.
Proprietary Fund Types
Health and Hospitals' Enterprise Fund trans-
actions related to the operation of Boston City, Mattapan
and Long Island Hospitals and the Community Health Services
Division are accounted for in this fund.
Fiduciary Fund Types
Retirement Systems—transactions related to
assets, liabilities and fund equity of the city-administered
retirement systems (State-Boston and Boston Retirement
Systems) are reflected in this fund.
Trust Funds—transactions related to resources
obtained and held by the City in a fiduciary capacity are
recorded in these funds.
Agency Funds— these funds are used to account for
assets held by the City as custodial trustee and do not
involve measurement of results of operation.
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Account Groups
General Long-Term Obligations—all liabilities
arising from governmental final operations, with the
exception of the BRA, not payable from current expendable
resources are accounted for in this fund. These liabilities
consist of accrued sick and vacation, judgements and claims,
retirement costs and unmatured general long-term obligations
and installment notes payable.
The modified accrual basis of accounting is used
for the governmental fund types and expendable trust funds,
while the full accrual method of accounting is used for
proprietary fund types, retirement systems, non-expendable
trust funds and agency funds.
The annual Coopers & Lybrand audit is undertaken
for the purpose of obtaining an opinion from the auditors
that the financial statements of these funds present fairly
the financial position of the City and the results of oper-
ations in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles applied on a consistent basis.
Certain issues, some of which are beyond the City's
control, have prompted the auditors to qualify their opinion
over the past six years. The qualification has a material
effect on the financial position of the City and hence must
be disclosed for any financial statement to which the
auditors' opinion applies.
The audit for FY 1983 has qualifications in the
following areas:
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Entity Qualification—During 1983, the City
adopted NCGA Statement #3 entitled, "Defining the Govern-
mental Entity". This statement defines the oversight entity
as one which has responsibility for overseeing other com-
ponent units and it is for this "entity" that financial
information is required. The City's 1983 Financial State-
ments, however, did not include a number of entities with
respect to which it has such responsibility, such as the
Boston Water and Sewer Commission, the Boston Housing
Authority, the Ecomonic Development and Industrial Com-
mission, the Boston Industrial Development Financing Autho-
rity, the Boston Foundation, Inc., and the Trustees of
Health and Hospitals of the City of Boston, Inc., because
this information was not available. In this respect, the
Financial Statements do not conform to GAAP.
Presentation Qualifications—The City does not
maintain records of fixed assets and, therefore, does not
have a Statement of General Fixed Assets as required by GAAP.
In addition, the City does not report certain trust
funds as they end on different years.
Statement Presentation—Some of the grant
programs accounted for in Special Revenue Funds and the BRA
have different fiscal periods. Budgetary basis statements
of Revenues, Expenditures and Encumbrances are therefore not
presented as required by GAAP.
Overrecorded Liability—The City recorded a lia-
bility for overpayments of $15.5 million received by Health
and Hospitals from Medicaid. The letter from corporate
counsel indicated there was a question as to the certainty
of this liability. The auditors' have taken the position
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that GAAP does not require uncertain liabilities to be
accounted for in the financial statements; the City's posi-
tion is consistent with conservative accounting practice.
Unrecorded Income—Boston City Hospital is due
reimbursement for a portion of free care provided to
patients. This amount is difficult to measure and has,
therefore, not been recorded. The auditors' qualification
relative to this item is unnecessary since it was disclosed
in the footnotes and is consistent with conservative accoun-
ting practice.
Unknown Liability—There are many pending real
estate tax abatement cases as a result of Tregor v . Board of
Assessors . The Auditors were not able to satisfy themselves
that the $123.0 million liability recorded in the Financial
Statements was reasonable.
The auditors' opinion states that the otherwise
fair presentation of the City's financial position may be
subject to adjustments based on these qualifications. This
may lead a reader to put less faith in the Statements than
if they had not been qualified. The City should adopt a
plan to eliminate those qualifications over which it has
control and to at least reduce the impact of those it does
not control.
A review of the Financial Statements demonstrates
the improved condition of Boston's finances under GAAP,
despite years of deficits under STAT accounting. The mea-
sure of the City's fiscal health can be best illustrated by
tracking the improvement of the Fund Equity over the past
six years as follows:
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Fiscal General Fund
Year Equity (Deficit)
1978 $(27,418)
1979 (13,732)
1980 (59,902)
1981 (38,039)
1982 (731)
1983 4,511
Governmental Fund transactions are accounted for on
a spending, or financial flow measurement focus. This means
that only assets that will be available, or liabilities that
will be payable in the next period, are included in the bal-
ance sheet. Therefore, this positive fund balance in the
General Fund is considered a measurement of available spend-
able resources.
With the exception of the Capital Projects Fund,
which has a deficit due to its having borrowed from other
funds, all of the City's funds show a positive balance as of
June 30, 1983.
However, in evaluating the fiscal health of the
City, one must take into account the future problems that
face Boston, such as its growing pension liability, its out-
standing property tax abatement liability, and the revenue
constraints of Proposition 2-1/2. while the City has made
progress in improving its fiscal position, fundamental
changes are required if improvement is to continue.
In addition to the Financial Statements and the
auditor's opinion, the annual audit produces a document
called a management letter. The management letter is a
detailed commentary on City management and its internal
controls as observed by the auditors during the audit
process. Typically, the letter illustrates areas of
strength or weakness, outlines their implications, and
recommends solutions.
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The first Report on Internal Accounting Controls
and Other Matters
,
issued by Coopers & Lybrand on August
3, 1979 and relating to FY 1978, detailed over 375 specific
observations and recommendations for improvements in ten
areas. While the City attempted to implement many of the
recommendations, others remain to be addressed. Each year,
additional recommendations are made as each successive
year's audit is completed. The City has hired a CPA firm as
a consultant to code and classify the recommendations. How-
ever, this project has been ongoing for almost eighteen
months and has yet to be completed. The City must implement
these recommendations immediately or the current method will
be outdated by the time it is in place.
In August, 1983, the City Auditor issued a Request
for Proposals for a firm to provide audit services for the
City in FY 1984. Most major public accounting firms in the
City submitted proposals. After an extensive review of the
proposals, the Auditor's office selected the firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell and Co. as the new internal auditors for
the City.
RECOMMENDATIONS — ANNUAL INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNT AUDIT
1. Auditor's Qualifications. The Admin-
istration should undertake an effort to
reduce, to the extent possible, the
qualifications in the auditor's opinion.
2. STAT vs. GAAP. The Administration
should make every effort to reduce the
differences in STAT vs. GAAP accounting,
with the ultimate goal of being able to
budget and account on a GAAP basis.
Some of these changes will require
amendments to both state statutes and
City ordinances.
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FEDERAL GRANT AUDITS
Federal agencies typically attach strings to the
monies they provide to City departments. Different programs
usually involve different accounting, reporting, auditing
and other requirements which must be met as a condition of
accepting the funds. Audits initiated to test the extent of
a government's compliance with these requirements are called
program compliance audits. In addition, some federal pro-
grams require performance audits which cover economy and
efficiency audits as well.
Economy and efficiency audits are used by the fed-
eral government to determine if the agency is utilizing its
resources economically end to identify the causes of any
inefficiencies in certain of its practices, including
administrative practices and organizational structure. The
audits pave the way for improvements in the use of grant
dollars distributed by the agencies.
Program effectiveness audits or program result
audits are different in that their objective is to determine
whether the desired benefits of a program are being
attained. A review is made to determine whether the program
achieves its goals in a cost-effective manner.
Along with the proliferation of federal agencies
distributing money to the City are program compliance
requirements which are increasingly contradictory. In an
effort to reduce the resulting confusion, the federal Office
of Management and Budget has instituted the single audit
concept through Circular A102, Attachment P. This concept
will combine financial and compliance audits with program
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compliance audits so that an agency is only audited once for
each particular grant. The single audit is performed by an
independent public accountant in compliance with Federal
guidelines
.
The City is presently implementing Attachment P,
but there are audit issues outstanding from prior audits by
federal agencies. Outstanding audit issues relating to the
Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) and the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Assistance program
(CETA), which are both administered by the Neighborhood
Development and Employment Agency (NDEA), are summarized
below
.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT FUNDS (CDBG)
The CDBG program is administered by the Neighbor-
hood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA) while the
money to fund it comes through the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) . Grants for the past four years
were
:
Program Grant
Year Period Grant Number Amount
5 7/1/79-6/30/80 B-79-MG-25-0002 $24,936,000
6 7/1/80-6/30/81 B-80-MC-25-0002 $25,115,000
7 7/1/81-6/30/82 B-81-MC-25-0002 $25,768,000
8 7/1/82-6/30/83 B-83-MC-25-0002 $23,285,000*
* This amount was reduced by $1.2 million for net dis-
allowed costs and reduced conditionally by $3.9 million
for questioned costs, netting the city $18.1 million for
Program Year 8.
On December 3, 1982 the Regional Inspector General
for Audit (RIGA) of HUD issued a report covering program
years 5, 6, and 7. The scope of the audit was limited to an
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evaluation of the Grantee's (NDEA) administrative and pay-
roll costs and contracting procedures. The purpose was to
determine whether the NDEA complied with pertinent laws and
regulations, carried out the program as it was described in
the application, whether the charged costs were reasonable
and eligible, and whether the program was administered in an
economical, efficient and effective manner.
The Inspector General found that NDEA has not
administered the CDBG program effectively and cited various
examples. As a result, costs of $1,754,276 were disallowed
and costs of $3,979,224 were questioned. Disallowed costs
are those which are clearly not allowable by statute, regu-
lation or contract, while questioned costs are those which
are not clearly eligible or ineligible but which warrant
contest by the Inspector General for any one of a number of
reasons, such as lack of sufficient documentation.
Disallowed costs must be repaid to the grantor agency
(immediately or over time) either in cash or by identifying
other funds expended on qualified items by the grantee which
could be substituted for those disallowed. This is subject
to negotiation with the appropriate federal agency. Ques-
tioned costs, on the other hand, are subject to further dis-
cussion and negotiation before a determination can be made
as to whether they will be treated as allowed or disallowed
costs
.
Disallowed and questioned costs in the December 3,
1982 audit, including relevant findings, are:
o that the program's administration and
control mechanisms were inadequate,
o that CDBG Funds were expended on nonCDBG
activities, resulting in disallowed
costs of $1,750,201 and questioned costs
of $206,933,
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o that inadequate grantee performance on
housing programs resulted in questioned
costs of $3,225,047,
o that contracting procedures for pro-
fessional services were inadequate,
resulting in questioned costs of
$240,720,
o that monitoring of subgrantees was
ineffective,
o that a failure to implement monitoring
consultants' recommendations resulted in
questioned costs of $43,494,
o that improper accounting for reim-
bursement for boarding and demolition
costs resulted in questioned costs of
$180,000,
o that questionable payroll and budgeting
practices may have cost $52,389.
These findings and the resulting questioned and
disallowed costs have resulted in the following paybacks and
adjustments to the CDBG program:
FY 1982 Entitlement Grant
(City FY 1983) $23,285,000
Less - Disallowed Costs as per RIGA
Audit $1,754,276
Paid by the City (5/23/83) 529,466
Balance due HUD 1,224,810
Less - Questioned Costs 3, 979, 224
Amount Available to the
City upon Grant Award $18. 080, 966
The reduction for questioned ~osts is a restriction
on the funds pending resolution of audit issues. As the
audit findings are resolved monies will be restored in
appropriate amounts.
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Although the audit was issued over one year ago,
and the City formally responded in February 1983, HUD has
taken no formal action, beyond monitoring the City's pro-
gress. The new Administration should take this opportunity
to establish an active dialogue with the HUD Regional
Administrator's Office to determine what the outcome of this
audit will be.
In addition, an ongoing investigation of the
Mayor's Office of Housing is being conducted by HUD's
criminal division and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The
investigation centers on a housing program administered by
the Mayor's Office of Housing in which the City reimburses
homeowners for qualified improvement to their home. At that
time, the regulations did not prevent the same agency worker
from estimating the value of work to be done and determining
whether the work is completed from being one and the same.
However, the investigation alleges there has been collusion
between certain of these workers in order to misappropriate
funds. It was difficult to get information on this inves-
tigation and, as a result, its present status is unknown.
The Administration should request a briefing on the status
of this investigation to determine the extent of its pos-
sible liability, if any.
COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT (CETA)
The CETA program was
vide specific employment and
prepare and place eligible
employment. The program was
before that by the EEPA. The
federal Department of Labor.
established in 1973, to pro-
training services required to
individuals into unsubsidized
administered by the NDEA and
funds are supplied through the
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The CETA program has many outstanding audit issues
dating from 1974, with a potential exposure to the City in
questioned costs of $6 million. According to the NDEA the
audits are:
1. 1974-1976: the Public Service Employ-
ment audit resulted in a final deter-
mination of $1,595,458 in disallowed
costs. Subsequent negotiations reduced
this to $1,504,176. These costs repre-
sent the wages paid 8 participants who
were ineligible because they were not
Boston residents, 15 participants who
were ineligible because of nepotism,
and 56 participants who were ineligible
because of their length of prior
employment. The City requested a hear-
ing before an Administrative Law Judge,
which was held on March 10, 1983. Both
parties have submitted post-hearing
briefs and are awaiting a decision.
Settlement negotiations, now ongoing,
should continue.
2. 1977-1978: An audit of the City as
Prime Sponsor and its subgrantees is in
the final stages and will be issued
shortly by the DOL-0IG. The draft re-
port questioned costs of $5.2 million,
$800,000 of which relates to a prior
audit. Of the remaining $4.4 million,
slightly more than $2 million is
attributable to the subgrantees.
3. 1979-1980 and 1981: An audit of sub-
grantees for this period was completed
by an independent public accountant on
December 28, 1983. Questioned costs
were $62,000.
4. 1980-1983: An audit of the Prime
Sponsor and its subgrantees commenced
in December 1983. The audit should be
monitored so that questioned costs can
be adequately documented before the
final report is issued.
The CETA program has been phased out; however the
City's liability for past practices will require close moni-
toring to avoid the possibility of a large payback.
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RECOMMENDATIONS — FEDERAL GRANT AUDITS
The City has made progress over the past few years
in consolidating the grant audit process. However, much
remains to be accomplished.
1. Formal Procedures for Audit Coordin-
ation - formal procedures must be
developed between the federal agencies
and the grantee agencies to notify the
City Auditor's office when it begins to
audit grants. They should require that
the Auditor be present at all entrance
and exit conferences and that his
approval be required before grantee
agencies sign off on audit issues.
2. Audit Tracking and Monitoring
Procedure - The Auditor's Office must
establish formal tracking and moni-
toring procedures covering all City
grant audits. Such procedures would
allow the City to determine the status
of any federal audit at any given time.
3. Selection of Independent Public
Accountants - Currently independent
public accountants (IPA's) are selected
by either the Auditor's or the grantee
agency depending on the grant. All
IPA's should be selected by the Audi-
tor's Office as it has expertise in the
procedure. This would allow better
control and monitoring of audits.
4. Implementaton of Audit Recommendations
- There is no system for monitoring the
implementation of federal grant audit
recommendations. Most of the audits
reviewed touched on many of the same
issues. This area reflects overall
weakness in controls over inter-
governmental resources.
5. Monitor and Control of Federal Grants
- Currently there is no central
coordination of grant information. The
Auditor's Office does not even know
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which agencies apply for grants and
when. In order to avoid the disal-
lowance of costs, the Auditor's Office
should be notified whenever a grant is
awarded and should establish controls
over grant expenditures to ensure that
they comply, with federal require-
ments. The Auditors Office should also
periodically review each grant to
ensure compliance with these controls.
INTERNAL AUDIT
Given the millions of dollars spent each year in
the City of Boston and the importance of controls and the
control function over those dollars, Boston should create an
agency which would perform a professional internal audit
function. The internal audit function should report
directly to the Mayor in order to maintain objectivity and
independence.
Internal Audit Department responsibilities would
include reviewing, on an ongoing basis, the internal control
systems of the City to determine their adequacy and compli-
ance. The Department would provide additional management
control by monitoring other management controls.
Broad objectives for an Internal Audit Department
would include responsibility to:
o Determine adequacy and compliance with
management's policies, plans and proce-
dures and recommendations as to
improvements
.
o Review the integrity of Management
Information Systems.
o Oversee the use of resources in an
economic and efficient manner.
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o Determine the adequacy of operating
objectives and goals as well as the
effectiveness of results.
c Post-audit and oversight regarding large
transactions and projects
o Determine compliance with applicable
federal, state and city statutes, rules
and regulations.
In establishing the internal audit staff, it would
be wise for the City to adopt some of the standards of the
federal government's General Accounting Office. The GAO
recommends that persons with a variety of skills, rather
than just accountants be hired and that the qualifications
of the staff assigned to an audit should reflect the scope
and complexities of the audit assignment.
Due to variations in program objectives as well as
laws, regulations and rules applicable to different pro-
grams, the qualifications need to apply to the Internal
Audit Department as a whole and not necessarily to the indi-
vidual auditors. Therefore, the skills should range from
accounting and auditing to engineering to computer sciences
to program administration to legal. The skill level will be
determined by the amount of resources that the adminis-
tration wishes to expend on this department.
RECOMMENDATIONS — INTERNAL AUDIT DEPARTMENT
1. Establishment of an Internal Audit
Department. The administration should
establish an Internal Audit Department
which reports to the Mayor. This
department should be staffed initially
with between 5 and 10 professionals
with a variety of skills and experience.
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Establishment of Objectives. The
administration must establish a policy
and outline the objectives of the
Internal Audit Department as well as
its duties, powers and responsibilities.
Establishment of Monitoring Proce-
dures. Additionally, administrative
procedures should be established to
monitor the implementation of Internal
Audit Department recommendations. Such
procedures must have "teeth" to ensure
prompt and full compliance.
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